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Abstract 
The French Revolution created the first era of mass warfare, and all the major 
European powers were forced to address the needs of this unprecedented level of 
mobilisation. Such demands have been recognised by historians and reflected in the 
work that exists on war and society between 1793 and 1815. Yet Britain has remained 
aloof from these trends, as it is generally assumed that Britain did not adopt mass 
warfare, and instead relied on a small, highly trained, professional army, in keeping 
with the warfare of the eighteenth century. Britain is seen as distinct and insulated from 
the experiences on the continent. 
It is undeniable that Britain had peculiar strategic, structural, and political 
restraints that impacted on its military policy. Within the context of these, Britain was 
committed to fighting Napoleon, and so came under the same pressures to expand the 
army and address the means of supplying such a force, although compared to the 
continent to a more limited extent. However, Britain's army peaked at 250,000 men in 
1813, compared to just over 100,000 in the American War of Independence, and a 
paltry 30,000 during peacetime in the 1780s. Such a significant increase in numbers is 
likely to have challenged the government, and forced changes in military policy. 
This thesis explores the demands on Britain during its most intense years of 
warfare (1807 to 1815), and explores the choices made by the government. It then 
follows the implementation of its policy, and finally assesses the impact on the army. In 
doing so, it brings historical understanding of the British army during this period into 
alignment with studies of continental European states, and examines the response of an 
eighteenth century political system to the biggest military threat it had faced to its 
existence. 
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Notes 
Certain conventions have been used throughout this work with regard to 
contemporary military and geo-political terminology. The term 'regulars' means all the 
full-time forces under the control of the Commander in Chief, whilst the 'line' refers 
just to the numbered foot infantry regiments (or line regiments). Where a line regiment 
has more than one battalion, to signify the different battalions within the regiment the 
battalion number is given first followed by the regiment; thus 1/6h refers to the first 
battalion, the 6h regiment of foot. 
There were many different terms of service introduced during the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars and the following terms have been standardised: limited-service 
refers to men limited geographically in their service (for instance to the UK); short- 
service signifies enlistment for a period of time; unlimited service is service without 
restriction geographically or in time; general service means soldiers enlisted to serve in 
the army, and not attached to any particular regiment. 
Finally, there is a rather complex use of the term British. Although strictly 
speaking after the Union with Ireland in 1801 Britain refers to the UK, (hence British 
army refers to the entire regular military force of the UK), but many aspects of the 
Union were left incomplete, so there was a British Militia (the militias of England, 
Wales and Scotland) and an Irish Militia. So wherever possible when speaking of 
Britain the term the UK has been used, except in where this has been impossible (for 
instance the British army); otherwise Britain refers just to England, Wales and Scotland. 
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Introduction: British Mili! Aa Histoly and the 'Scum 
of the Earth'. 
British military history of the eighteenth century has been dominated by one, 
often misquoted remark by the Duke of Wellington who described the common soldier 
as 'the scum of the earth". Although he qualified his statements by emphasising that 
they made good soldiers, his judgement has been repeated in the writings about British 
history in the eighteenth century, particularly in the case of the army between 1793 and 
1815. ' This is unsurprising, as the history of the British army has largely been divorced 
from the context of British social history. In eighteenth century Britain 'War resembled 
a remote theatre in which spectators and actors were forever separated", and although 
the military provided Britain with its police force, and it is recognised that the re- 
invigoration of the militia from 1757 brought a more obtrusive military presence into 
British society, the emphasis of British history has been biased towards politics, society, 
and the economy. Work on this has produced some epic pieces of history and continues 
to generate debate. ' but has tended to dominate other subject areas. Typical of this is 
incorporating the wars into the period 1783-1832, thus encasing the wars in a political 
period. The impact of the French Revolution and the industrial revolution in Britain 
have received more attention than the almost continuous wars that Britain experienced 
during the same twenty-two years. ' 
In some respects the concentration on social and political history is justified. 
Economic history has received more attention as the financial power of Britain was used 
1 Supplementary Dispatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda ofArthur Duke of Wellington, Ed. By the 
Second Duke of Wellington, (London, 185 8-72), X, 53 1, Earl Stanhope, Notes of Conversations with the 
Duke of Wellington, (London, 1888), pp. 14,18. 2 Gunther Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age ofNapoleon, (London, 1977), pp. 177-78; D. Gates, 
'T'he Transformation of the British Army, 1793-1815. ', in D. Chandler & 1. Beckett (ed. ), The Oxford 
Illustrated History o the British Army, (Oxford, 1994), pp. 142-143. 
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file 
and Commercial People. England 1727-1783, (Oxford, 1989), p. 628. 
Such as E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, (London, 1991 edition), J. C. D. 
Clark, English Society, 1688-1832, (London, 1985), John Rule, Albion s People, English Society, 1714- 
1815, (London, 1992), J. Stevenson, Popular Disturbances in Englangt 1700-1870, (New York, 1979); a 
recent synthesis of high and low politics from 1783 until the Reform Act is provided in Michael J. Turner, 
The Age of Unease: Government and Reform in Britair4 1782-1832, (Stroud, 2000). ' For instance, If. T. Dickinson (ed. ), Britain and the French Revolution, (London 1989). 
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to fight wars, particularly subsidising other nations to fight, and this has further demoted 
the role of Britain's army. ' Moreover, Britain's first concern, as an island nation had to 
be the navy, which prevented any invasion of the country, and protected its overseas 
trade. The army always had a subsidiary role to the navy, and was also subjected 
throughout the period to a pervading anti-army ideology, which labelled it an offensive 
and absolutist weapon! Consequently, compared with the massive military presence in 
continental states such as France and Prussia, ' the presence of the military in Britain 
was largely remote, and 'offshore'. Its major point of contact with civilians was in a 
public order role, as an aid to the civil power, not as a military force. British history has 
propagated the attitudes of contemporary British society towards the military. 
The military history of the period has traditionally focused on narrative accounts 
of campaigns, of which the epic J. W. Fortescue's History of the British Army (13 vols.; 
London, 1899-1930), and Sir C. W. C. Oman's History of the Peninsular War (7 vols.; 
Oxford, 1902-1930) remain classics. Although these works are important, they do not 
make reference to British society in general, nor to the problems and themes underlying 
Britain's prosecution of wars during a period of dramatic change in the organisation of 
military forces across Europe. Nowhere is this more apparent than with the continuing 
concentration on the campaign and battle of Waterloo, and the seemingly endless re- 
evaluations of the battle. ' British military history has also produced works on the large 
figures of the period, particularly Wellington, ` which, again, although useful in their 
'6 J. M. Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowden British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-181.5, 
ýýambridge, MA, 1969). 
Jeremy Black, European Warfare, 1660-1815, (London, 1994), p. 106; Lois 0. Schwoerer, No Standing 
Armies: The Origins ofAntiarmy Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England, (London, 1974). 'John Gooch, Armies in Europe, (London, 1980), p. 6; Black, European Warfare, pp. 9-10. 9 Controversy over the battle emerged soon after 1815, with the publication of W. Sibourne's History of 
the Waterloo Campaign, (London, 1848, recently republished in 1990), recent contributions include D. 
Ilamilton-Williams, Waterloo: New Perspectives, The Great Battle Reappraised, (London, 1993); John 
Ifussey, 'At What Time on 15 June 1815 did Wellington Learn of Napoleon's Attack on the Prussians? ', 
War in History, 6 (1996), pp. 88-116. 10 The number of studies on Wellington continues to proliferate, included among them are M. Glover, 
Wellington as a Military Commander (London, 1969), P. Griffith, Wellington Commander. The Iron 
Duke's Generalship, (Chichester, 1985), L. James, The Iron Duke: A Military biography of Wellington, 
(London, 1992), E. Longford, Welfingtom the Years of the Sword, (London, 1969), and J Weller, 
Wellington in the Peninsula; 1808-14, (London, 1962). 
It 
own right, do little to contribute to the further understanding of Britain and its military 
organisations. This is particularly true for the years 1793 to 1815, as it produced some 
epic national heroes who died in their hours of greatest triumph, such as Nelson and Sir 
John Moore, and even to an extent Pitt, who died when it was apparent that Britain was 
safe from invasion. " To this was added a developing regimental tradition, which finther 
deflected military history away from war and society. " 
All of these trends - the concentration of historical focus on British society, and 
British military history being relegated to campaigns, battles and commanders - are 
emphasised for the wars between 1793 to 1815, despite its title as the Great War until 
1914. 'Ibis is because the underlying factors affecting the choice of historical subject are 
exaggerated during this period: the insular attitude of Britain was reinforced in these 
years. Britain relied on the navy for its defence, whilst the upheavals of the industrial 
revolution, and radical politics forced underground by a 'white ten-or' and transformed 
into a revolutionary threat, pointed to a bigger threat from inside Britain rather than 
outside it. 13 The major emphasis of historical work for these wars has been radical 
politics, peace movements and the tax burden, " so the military has lacked the requisite 
degree of investigation. The worst example of this is the often-recited fact that the same 
numbers of troops were needed to suppress the Luddites as Wellington had in the 
Peninsula. " This is true superficially, but totally fails to examine Britain's military 
structure. The troops used in the Luddite disturbances were mainly militia regiments, 
11 This is also true for other countries, as G. Best points out the events of 1793-1815 provided an 
'unusually rich harvest of national myths and figures. ' (G. Best, War and Society in Revolutionary 
Euro e, 1770-1870, (Leicester, 1982)). 
Is 12 It 
T 
not surprising that soon after the Napoleonic Wars regimental histories began to be written, and the 
first official histories were R. Cannon, Historical Records of the British Army, comprising history of 
every regiment in HM's service, 70 vols., (1835-53). 13 Besides 11ompson, The Making, a more thorough investigation is made in Roger Wells, Insurrection: 
the British Experience 1795-1801, (Gloucester, 1983). 
14 j. Cookson, The Friends ofPeace: Anti-War Liberalism in Englanij 1793-1815, (Cambridge, 1982); J. 
Bobstedt, Riots and Community Politics in England and Wales, 1790-1810, (Cambridge, MA, 1983); C. 
Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, 1793-1815, (London, 1979). 15 Asa Briggs, The Age of Improvement, 1783-1867, (London, 1976 edition), p. 182; ThoTpson, The 
Making, p. 617. Both state that there were 12,000 men used to put down the Luddite riots, which was 'a 
greater force than Wellington had under his command in the Peninsula', this is only true when comparing 
it to the force sent to Portugal in 1808. In 1812 there were approximately 50,000 British Amy troops in 
the Peninsula (which admittedly would include foreign regiments in British service, such as the King's 
German Legion). 
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aided by cavalry, so any comparison with the force under Wellington is inaccurate. 
These sorts of inaccuracies are not made in studies of continental powers 
because those societies were witnessing a war that was unparalleled in its demands upon 
them, and so detailed studies of the main continental armies and their societies exist. " 
Conscription was taking large numbers of young men off to war, whilst large tracts of 
central Europe were constantly fought over, bringing the ravages of campaigning 
armies, and virtually removing normal government from parts of Europe. In some areas 
rebellions broke out against central authority, with its seemingly endless demands, and 
invasive penetration of traditional society, leading to the creation of guerrilla warfare, 
and a complex phenomenon of local resistance - which in some cases have been labelled 
national liberation movements -a subject which receives much historical attention. " 
Modem historical attention has broadened the analysis of British military 
history, with more general studies of the British army's campaigns and detailed 
examinations of its training and operations. C. D. Hall's British Strategy in the 
Napoleonic Wars, (Manchester, 1992), and R. Muir's Britain and the Defeat of 
Napoleon, (London, 1996) are good examples of the former. Both of them, though 
narrative based, have a larger focus on the underlying themes and problems of Britain's 
military effort: Hall concentrating on the limiting influences on British strategy, and 
Muir concentrating on the government's diplomatic problems and policies, and the 
cabinet discussions over the deployment of the 'disposable force' of the British army. " 
The studies of tactics and operation of the army have necessarily broken the traditional 
limitations of campaign narratives and regimental parochialism, expanding the horizons 
16 Owen Connelly, Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms, (London, 1965); A. Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters: the French Army and Society during the Revolution and Empire, (Oxford, 1989); S. Schama, Patriots andLiberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780-1813, (New York, 1977). 17 All general surveys of the wars touch on this point, for instance M. Broers, Europe Under Napoleon, 1799-1815, (London, 1996); C. Esdaile, The Wars of Napoleon, (London, 1995); D. Gates, The Napoleonic War, 1803-1815, (London, 1997). 18 See also, G. Desmond, Sicily: The Insecure Base, A Study of the British Occupation ofSicily, 1806-15, (London, 1988); G. Bond, The Grand Expedition: 7he British Invasion of Holland in 1809, (Athens, Georgia, 1979); P. Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-10, (London, 1957); D. Gates, The 
Spanish Ulcer. - A History of1he Peninsular War, (London, 1986). 
13 
of British military history and placing it in a European context. D. Gates' The British 
Light Infantry Arm, c. 1790-1815: its Creation, Training and Operational Role, 
(London, 1987), provides an examination of the regiments created in the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars specifically to counter the change in tactics engendered by the 
French armies, and Richard Glover's Peninsular Preparation: the Reform of the British 
Army, 1795-1809, (Cambridge, 1963), details the Duke of York's transformation of the 
British army from a ramshackle collection of regiments into a efficient modem fighting 
machine. " These works join a growing list of detailed studies of tactics in the 
Napoleonic Wars, which have exposed many myths and greatly added to historical 
understanding of the many battles of the period. " 
These works still preserve the distinction between army and society. However, 
recent works have sought to redress this balance. The earlier work of J. R. Western on 
the militiaý' showed that military concerns did occupy the minds of the British during 
the eighteenth century. 1. Beckett's The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558-1945, 
(Manchester, 1993) seeks to place government and local responses to wars into a wide 
time frame, concluding, as the title suggests, that Britain has a tradition of raising part- 
time emergency forces to counter overseas threats. To this has been added some studies 
on the part-time forces that were raised during the titanic struggle with Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic France, ' and more recently Cookson's The British Armed Nation 1793- 
1815, (Oxford, 1997), which, if in its title only, reveals much about the changes in 
19 This work has been preceded by a study of the British army in the eighteenth century, in J. A. 
I folding's Fitfor Service: The Training ofthe British Army, 1715-1795, (Oxford, 1981). 20 J. Keegan, The Face of Battle, (New York, 1976) included a ground breaking chapter on Waterloo 
(predictably), and more general, and therefore definitive, studies have been made in John A. Lynn, The 
Bayonets ofthe Republic., Motivation and Tactics in the Army ofRevolutionary France, (Chicago, 1984), 
Brent Nosworthy, Battle Tactics ofNapoleon and his Enemies, (London, 1995), and Rory Muir, Tactics 
and the Experience ofBattle in the Age ofNapoleon, (London, 1998). 21 J. R. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century, (London, 1965). 22 Nigel J. Arch, 'A Mark of Esteem for their Beloved Commanden', Journal of the Societyfor Army 
Historical Research, 59 (1981), pp. 201-06; J. E. Cookson, 'The English Volunteers Movement of the 
French Wars, 1793-1815: Some Contexts. ', Historical Journal, 32 (1989), pp. 867-91; P J. 
Ilaythorrithwaite, 'The Volunteer Force, 1803-04. ', JSAHR, 64 (1986), pp. 193-204; K. B. Linch, 'A 
Geography of Loyalism?: The Local Military Forces of the West Riding of Yorkshire, 1794-1814', War 
and Society, 19 (May 2001), pp. 1-21; J. R. Western, 'The Volunteer movement as an anti-revolutionary force, 1793-180 U, English Historical Review, 71 (October 1956), pp. 603-14. 
14 
British society in the period 1793-1815. From these modern works, only two mention 
the recruitment of the army. Hall only devotes nine pages to the manpower demands 
and responses of the government, and so only provides a sketchy outline of recruitment 
policy. The only remaining work to consider army recruitment is The British Armed 
Nation, and although this allows a detailed introduction to the subject, it is firmly in the 
context of Britain's manpower mobilisation at every level, and the attempts to create a 
'nation in arms'. It demonstrates that the British government, just like those of the 
continent, had to emulate France, although with their own adaptations, to meet the 
massive manpower demands of the wars. The experience of the Napoleonic Wars has 
been seen as instrumental in the development of national consciousness in Britain. In 
Colley's excellent and controversial Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707 to 1837, 
(London, 1992), the volunteer movement, which mobilised 450,000 men in 1803-05, 
was an important means of creating a sense of British national identity, and 
participation in the regular military forces of Britain, although not examined by Colley, 
would undoubtedly assist in the development of nationalism. 
For the continental powers it is undeniable that there was a military revolution 
created by the French revolution, to which they had to respond. " Yet the British army 
(and navy) are considered exceptions, and generally regarded as unchanging. " Any 
adaptations that were made in Britain are considered as the result of different factors 
than those that influenced continental states. But it is difficult to comprehend that an 
army that stood at 40,000 men in 1792 and expanded to a quarter of million men by 
1813 - mirroring the increase of military forces in Europe - did not experience any 
changes, and that its social composition could still be categorised, without ftirther 
examination, as 'the lowest classes of British society. " The denial of any change in 
23 Ilere is a debate as to the extent of the revolution, mainly concerning tactical details (see Brent Nosworthy, Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies; it is undoubted that a change in the scale of 
warfare took place, Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800, (Cambridge, 1988), p. 153; Black, European War 24 Best, War andSociety in Revolutiona? y Europe, p. 122 
fiare, p. 76. 
23 Rothenburg, The Art of Warfare in the Age ofNapoleon, pp. 177-78. 
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Britain's military structure has also precluded any study of arguably the more important 
subject of the politics of army recruitment - the essential question that all European 
states had to address - and one that took up much parliamentary time. Contemporaries 
recognised that a radical change had happened in warfare, particularly in the state's 
ability to mobilise its manpower. Mr. Law, speaking in Parliament in 1813 urged the 
government to follow the example of the continent: 
It was his firm opinion that without a radical change in our military system, millions might 
be thrown away without producing any benefit. A general change of military system has 
taken place in Europe during the last twenty years. Almost all the other powers had 
introduced conscription instead of enlistment. Was it possible that our system could proceed 
successfully against this change? We might as well say that the militia could contend against 
a regular army. 26 
Wellington's description of the army has often been taken to assume that the 
soldier was primarily a criminal, and thus the study of their recruitment is of little use. 
However studies of the recruitment of the army in the eighteenth century suggest that 
the soldiers were more representative of the social structure of the UK at that timcý' 
Both Colley and Cookson point out that very little is known of the character of the army 
between 1793 and 1815 and this thesis attempts to close this gap. In spite of 
Wellington's attitude, contemporaries also showed that they did not agree with the 
perception of the soldier as a social misfit, motivated only by the lash. Within the army 
a new spirit was emerging that viewed the soldier as capable of independent thought, 
and that officers should be closer to their men; an attitude embodied particularly in the 
light infantry regiments. Soldiers were encouraged to perform their duty, with tangible 
rewards for good conduct, " and officers were expected to be positive examples to the 
men under their charge, in keeping with the evangelical revival that stressed moral 
leadership. " It must be emphasiscd that such attitudes were not universal, although the 
26 Hansard, 1812-1813, Y-XVI, 890. 27 S. R. Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutiona_7 Period, (Texas, 198 1), p. 2 1. Steve BrumwelL 'Rank and File: A Profile of one of Wolfe's Regiments, JSAHR, 79 (Spring 2001), pp. 3-24. 2" Gates, The Light InfantryArm, p. 97. 29 C. A. Stevens, 'The Rifle Brigade 1800 to c. 1870: A Study of Social, Cultural and Religious Attitudes'O PhD (University of Sheffield, 1996). 
16 
95'h was a modem, progressive regiment, an inspection of the 1/96th, whilst stationed in 
the West Indies, testifies the continuing existence of attitudes at a regimental level 
which viewed the soldier as worth very little: 
No less than 30,000 lashes appear to have been sentenced on 106 persons, of which 
10,163 have been actually inflicted; the men appear to have grown callous even to corporal 
punishment from its extreme freqMency; (they] go from punishment to drunkenness and from 
drunkenness back to punishment. " 
The recruitment of the army is also important in the wider context of war and 
society studies. In Forrest's Conscripts and Deserters, conscription was the arena were 
state and local interests clashed, " and there is little reason to doubt that army 
recruitment in Britain was of similar significance, particularly as objections to, and 
debates on, the government's military policy could be aired in Parliament. The large 
size of the army, and the existence of locally raised ancillary forces, also emphasise the 
need for a study of the changing roles and perceptions of the army. 
Why 1807 to 1815? 
A thorough study of the entire period would be far beyond the capacity of a PhD 
thesis, and the Revolutionary War has already been covered, " so the later stages of the 
war have been chosen. After 1807, it was clear that the war would be a long one. Britain 
had no major allies and there was no chance of peace with Napoleon; " in effect Britain 
had to commit to fighting a large-scale war on the continent. Instead of a British army 
being an auxiliary force to one of the continent's major powers (Austria, Prussia and 
Russia), its army was now a principal fighting force, which could be supported by 
contingents from the smaller powers. Also in 1807 the return to power of a Pittite 
government signalled a renewed commitment to a continental strategy. That year a force 
was belatedly sent to Stralsund to support Russia and Prussia. A year later Britain began 
30 Public Record Office, War Office Papers, W027/103, Inspection return of 1/96h, 12 May IS II 31 Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters, p. viii. 32 j. I; L Western, 'The Recruitment of the Land Forces in Great Britain, 1793-1799', PhD (University of 
Edinburgh, 1953); Glover, Peninsular Preparation. 33 Hall, British StrateSy in the Napoleonic Wars, p. 78. 
17 
its six year struggle with France in the Peninsula, although it was not immediately 
obvious that the small force landed under Wellington in 1808 would develop into the 
epic, and much written about, army that it became, it does represent a turning point. 
Before then Britain had largely concentrated on what were in essence large raids, and 
although another (the largest ever) was mounted on Walcheren in 1809, the government 
was mindful of the benefits derived by having an army in the Peninsula, " and continued 
to reinforce it. Only in 1810-11, when a massive French invasion of Portugal by 
Marshal Massena. threatened the British army's foothold in the Peninsula, were thoughts 
of an evacuation entertained. " 
The return of a Pittite government in 1807 ushered in a series of governments 
that had a continuation of personnel, despite the splintering of political groups 
witnessed in this period, and the uncertainty of the longevity of these ministries. Robert 
Banks Jenkinson, Baron Hawkesbury, who became Second Earl of Liverpool in 1808, 
was Home Secretary under the Portland government of 1807 to 1809, and Secretary of 
War in Spencer Pcrceval's government of 1809 to 1812. He then went on to become 
Prime Minister himself. Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh and Earl of Londonderry, 
was Secretary of War in the Portland administration, and although a political outcast 
after the break-up of the Portland government and the disaster of 'his' Walcheren 
expedition, he returned as Foreign Secretary in the Liverpool government of 1812. For 
the army, 1807 also represents an administrative watershed. The office of Inspector 
General of Recruiting was abolished that year, and the responsibility given over to the 
Adjutant General, placing control of recruiting more firmly under the supervision of the 
Commander in Chief. 
This period represents Britain's closest parallel to the continual campaigning 
3" Benefits included breaking the strategic deadlock, gaining new allies, and access to valuable ports (and 
potential hostile fleets), while absorbing many of Napoleon's troops thus reducing the chance of an 
invasion of Britain. It also provided a convenient excuse to avoid continental entanglements elsewhere. 35 Muir, Britain and the Defeat ofNapoleon, pp. 135-13 8. 
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that France endured, and justifies examination to determine if, and how, the recruitment 
of the army, and the character of the recruits obtained, adapted to meet the demands 
created by the massive increase in casualties (regarded by the army as any loss from the 
strength of units, not just deaths). As such the work will concentrate on the 'disposable 
force' of the army (those troops that could be spared for active service in Europe) and 
the army at home which provided drafts to these troops. The regiments used during this 
period remained fairly constant, although a major shift in the composition of this force 
occured in 1815, when most of the Peninsular regiments were sent to fight in North 
America, and those used at Waterloo were either from the much reduced home garrison, 
or troops returning from colonial duty. In such a study no attempt is made to examine 
the combat capabilities, or campaigning conditions of the army. Detailed narrative 
studies of the fighting have already been made, " and although some syntheses of the 
general fighting abilities of the British army are required, this justifies the fidl attention 
of a separate study. This work will analyse the recruitment of the regular army (other 
than the artillery, which was a separate establishment under the Board of Ordnance and 
had separate records) from two different approaches: examining the measures for, and 
the outcomes of, recruitment between 1807 to 1815. 
Aims and Themes 
Firstly, an outline of Britain's military strength, its limits and constraints, and 
the size of the Napoleonic problem will be made. This will seek to demonstrate the full 
extent of the pressures that the government, and the army, were under in these eight 
years. In Chapter I the extent of the problem, and the political, strategic, and structural 
limitations on a solution are examined, with Chapter 2 making particular reference to 
the problems caused by the deployment of the army. A central theme of the Napoleonic 
Wars was that in order to fight the French on equal terms, all the major continental 
36 Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, & The British Light Infant? y Arm; % Glover, Britain at Bay. Defence 
against Bonaparte, 1803-14, (London, 1973). 
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powers had to imitate conscription, the administration needed to operate it, and the 
tactics used by the French and its allies. With this is mind the Chapter 3 will examine 
the measures proposed, and those adopted, and why drafts from the militia, rather than 
any conscriptive measure, was used to maintain the strength of the army. This work will 
then concentrate on the implementation of the government's recruiting policy, by first 
examining ordinary recruiting (Chapter 4), and then the implementation of the militia 
drafts (Chapter 5). 
Secondly, a social examination of the regiments and the army's soldiers will be 
made in Chapter 6, but no attempt will be made to study the officers of the army. The 
complexities of patronage networks, and the probability that large number of personal 
histories could be reconstructed, mean that the officers require a separate study, 
perhaps, as in this thesis, to see if the officer corps was opening up under the pressure to 
fill commissions in a vastly expanded army. Finally, another glimpse of the character of 
the British soldier will be gained by studying desertion in Chapter 7, a problem that was 
also closely linked to recruiting. Desertion was one area where the government could 
decrease wastage, thus reducing the demands on recruiting. 
This work will draw from the papers of the Home Office, and all the various 
departments that have collectively been catalogued as the War Office - the Secretary of 
War's office, the Commander in Chief's office, and to a lesser extent, the Secretary at 
War. Use will be made of the statistical evidence in the War Office records on the 
composition of the regiments, and to give these figures a human aspect through the 
many personal recollections of soldiers to illustrate the bare facts. However, it is 
recognised that an understanding of the soldiers themselves can relate to their fighting 
capabilities and it is hoped that further study of the latter will profit from this thesis. 
It is intended that this thesis will reveal the massive impact of the Napoleonic 
Wars upon the British army, and British society. At present the Peninsular War and 
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Wars upon the British army, and British society. At present the Peninsular War and 
Waterloo provide a large stock of the continuing regimental tradition of the British army 
clearly evident in many regimental histories, yet the wider impact, and the pressure to 
change the anny, has been largely neglected. In this respect the thesis will perhaps find 
the origins of later reforms in the army, and show how the army changed from a 
minuscule almost part-time necessity, to a proud part of Britain's imperial system. 
Moreover, it will investigate the workings of the British state during a war that stretched 
its resources to the limit. 
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Chapter 1: The Political and Structural Limitations 
on the Strenath of the British Arm 
Introduction 
Britain remained an exception in Europe during the Napoleonic Wars because it 
did not introduce conscription. ' The continental powers all had to adopt similar military 
methods and organisation, and as Britain did not, it has been assumed that Britain was 
not subject to the same demands as faced on the continent. But, although they may not 
have been as great, the British army was under increasing pressure to find more men. ' 
The British army on the continent totalled around 90,000 rank and file (known as the 
disposable force), to which must be added static troops in the UK and the colonies, and 
a navy of 145,000 men, ' all of which needed to be supplied from Britain's manpower 
resources. Judged by its own standards, the British army grew enormously from its 
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pre-war establishment: by 1812 it was over six times as large as it had been in 1792, " 
including the militia. 
The Problem: Casualty Levels 
The remarkable growth of the army had to offset prodigious levels of casualties 
- an annual average of 22,695 men between 1807 and 1813 (1814 and 1815 are clearly 
exceptional because of the peace in those years), which mostly fell on the infantry. This 
equated to an average annual loss during the war years of 10.8% per year. ' The army's 
deployment into an active campaign in Europe, and the demands of the colonial 
garrisons inevitably increased the casualties the army suffered each year, and although 
discharges and desertions remained fairly stable at least until 1814, casualties remained 
a massive predicament in the period 1807 to 1815. ' 
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The casualty problem was that on average annual losses were 8,000 men above 
the number of men obtained through recruiting; " only in 1807 did recruiting by 
regimental parties alone cover casualties. There were periods of acute manpower 
shortages: in 1810 the Commander in Chief. Sir David Dundas, reported that there 
would be a shortage of 9,360 men that year; ' by 1813, the Duke of York (who returned 
to his previous position as Commander in Chiefin 1811) estimated that there would be 
41,000 casualties that year because ofthe unnecessary war with the United States, and 
the continued fighting in the Peninsula. " Throughout tile period in question, the 
government was urged to enact alternative methods to maintain tile strength of' the 
army, and the pressure to do so varied according to the fiorturies ofthe war. I lowever, 
the government and the army had to work with in entrenched military structure, contend 
with general hostility to the military, and take into account the view ofinterest groups in 
the formulation ofits recruitment policy. 
' W01/946, F. 13. Littlehales to William Wellesley Pole, 3 February 1811, incl. Memorandum by F. arl 
Liverpool. 
R) W025/3224, Sir David Dunclas to Liverpool, 8 June 18 10. 
W025/3225, Duke of York to Earl Bathurst, 31 January 1813. 
24 
The Structural Limitations of the AMy 
The organisation of the army was dominated by the regimental system, which 
restricted the options available to government in its recruiting policies. As all officers in 
the army belonged to a regiment, the regimental system permeated the military 
hierarchy. Even small encroachments on the traditional rights of the regimental colonels 
could arouse fierce opposition and suspicion. In 1808 the Duke of York received a curt 
letter from the Duke of Kent, Colonel of the I" Foot, after orders were sent direct to 
brigade generals, and then to battalions, rather than passing through colonels (the order 
in question was the abolition of queues). Although Major General Harry Calvert, the 
Adjutant General, replied that the Duke of York looked to general officers to implement 
general orders, he reaffirmed the army's commitment to the regimental system. It was 
not the Duke of York's system 'to render regiments independent of their Colonels, on 
the contrary it is His Royal Highness's wish, as far as circumstances will permit, to 
draw that connexion as close as possible'. " 
Far more serious was the dispute between the Secretary at War, Viscount 
Palmerston, and the Commander in Chief in 1810. Palmerston proposed that instead of 
receiving an allowance for clothing the regiment, the colonels could receive uniforms 
from government. Dundas immediately began arguing with the Secretary at War, 
perceiving this as an encroachment on a colonel's rights. In the course of the argument, 
the debate escalated into a broader disagreement on the position of the Secretary at War: 
the Horse Guards considered him under the control of the Commander in Chief-, whilst 
Palmerston, and Parliament believed the post to be independent of army control. When 
the Duke of York, returned he had the same opinion as Dundas, and the matter was only 
resolved by the Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool. The Secretary at War received a new 
warrant, establishing him as the financial officer responsible to Parliament, and paid the 
expenses of the Commander in Chief s office by parliamentary budget, rather than from 
10 W03146, Calvert to Kent, 29 July 1808 &I August 1808. 
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the army's extraordinaries account, thus subjecting the Commander in Chief to closer 
parliamentary control. 717he supply of clothing by government was left as voluntary. " 
This demonstrated that governments could not impose terms on the army, especially 
when they related to regiments, and the command of the army was committed to 
maintaining this system. 
The regimental system also affected recruitment, inasmuch as a recruit joined a 
particular regiment, and not the army. Previously, this had been overcome to some 
extent by raising units specifically to draft the men into other regiments, but in 1795 this 
led to disturbances in some units. 12 The Duke of York had strong feelings on the 
regimental system, and wanted to create and maintain regimental identities by avoiding 
drafts. Only three line regiments were added to the establishment between 1807 and 
1815, the 102nd, 10P, and 100, but these were unnumbered units that were transferred 
to the line because it was considered inexpedient to draft them into other regiments. " 
Consequently, some alternative was needed to improve recruiting within the regimental 
structure, and this was the second battalion system. In 1803 and 1804, the Addington 
and then the Pitt government tried different approaches to increase the army (the Army 
of Reserve Act and Permanent Additional Force Act), " and this increase in numbers 
allowed the Duke of York to create second battalions for many regiments. " Ilroughout 
the period, new battalions were added to regiments to sustain their numbers, in an cffort 
to maintain the strength of regiments overseas. The logic was quite simple, the second 
battalions would be based in the UK, providing a defensive force there, and supplying 
11 Ifew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, (Oxford, 1997) pp. 54-55; K. J. Bartlett, 'The Development of the British Army during the wars with France, 1793-1815', PhD (University of Durham, 
1997), pp. 29-30. 2 All regiments above the 100'h were dralled, which caused riots by soldiers at Cork, Dublin and Sheffield; ý. McAnally, 7he Irish Militia. 1793-1815, (Dublin, 1949), p. 85. 13 The IS2 was formed from th. 9 New South Wales Corps when it was ordered back to the UK in 1808' 
the 103 was created from the 9'" Garrison Battalion after it also extended its services in 1808; the 104iA 
was established when the New Brunswick Fencibles offered to serve anywhere in 1810. See entries in W0380/3. 
14 The Army of Reserve Act of 1803 intended to raise 50,000 men by ballot for service in the UK: the Permanent Additional Force Act of 1804 asked for 20,000 men to be raised by parish officials. Hall, British Strategy pp. 3-5. 15 See Appendi; C for details of the raising of second battalions. 
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drafts to the first battalions overseas as and when needed. This principle was extended 
further with the establishment of recruiting companies, when a unit did not have enough 
men to justify a second battalion, but was ordered overseas and needed some means to 
keep up its strength. The cavalry also needed some means of support whilst 
campaigning, and therefore established depot squadrons when their units were ordered 
overseas. 
The divergent demands on the second battalions did not always result in 
effective units for Britain's defence. In 1807, the 2/78h wanted to retain part of the 
detachment about to go to the first battalion, but this request was denied, as the first 
battalion was seven hundred men under establishment. "' The commanding officer of the 
2/8'h was in a similar situation; he wanted to improve the second battalion, to which 
Calvert replied 
The expediency of keeping the I' battalion constantly in a state fit for immediate service 
is so obvious, that it is to be trusted, that the commanding officer of the 2"d battalion will 
never suffice his exertions, nor those the officers under his command, to relax in affording 
necessary aid to the I' battalion, in which the general Reputation and Character of the 
regiment is so intimately concerned. 17 
The continual supply of drafts made many of the second battalions small and inefficient, 
a situation worsened when first battalions were campaigning for any length of time. In 
1810, with a large force deployed in Portugal, there were thirty-nine line battalions in 
England (excluding the Guards, Kings German Legion, veteran and fencibic battalions), 
totalling 24,764, an average of 635 men per battalion, many of whom were recovering 
from Walchercn fcvcr (7,677 were sick, equalling 31.0%), leaving only 17,087 men fit 
for duty. " The situation was worse by 1811: out of 55,938 men in the UK there were 
only five battalions which could be sent to reinforce Wellington, the rest were weak 
second battalions, having transferred 6,353 men to their first battalions. The eight 
16 W03/44, Calvert to Maj. Gen. MacKenzie, I December 1807. 
17 
W03/44, Calvert to Gen. Dundas (col. 8'h), 16 October 1807. a W025/3224, Return of British Army, 25 April 1810. Overall there were 69,280 soldiers in the UK (excluding artillery), of which 11,832 were sick (17.1%). 
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second battalions in Jersey only averaged 401 men per battalion. " This was after the 
Irish and British Militias had been permitted to serve throughout the UK, allowing a 
reduction of the regulars in Ireland. " Despite the recognised need to reinforce 
Wellington in 1813, the Duke of York reported that 'Little or nothing remains that could 
be available for its augmentation. "' Although there might be numbers, there were not 
units. 
In 1807 it was suggested that second battalions should be disbanded, as they did 
not fulfil home defence requirements (i. e. being large and efficient enough to fight) and 
so were really an expensive recruiting service as they had a full complement of 
officers. ' During the 1810 retrenchment in army spending, it was again suggested that 
second battalions should be disbanded if they were not effective within six monthO 
But the utility of second battalions was recognised by the government, and although 
two-battalion regiments totalling less than 1,000 men had their second battalion reduced 
to six companies of thirty-three men under the command of a major, "' new battalions 
were still formed throughout the period. ' Forming second battalions tumed oversize 
recruiting companies into useful corps: in the 2/41"'s case, as a recruiting company, it 
was 'In a state of disorganisation from the great number of supernumeraries beyond the 
establishment. " Lessons had been learnt from the 1790s, and the Commander in Chief 
always raised new battalions gradually, augmenting them two companies at a time, 
avoiding the expense and confusion of placing an entirely new battalion on the 
establishment and appointing all the officers, Whilst there were no men for them to 
command. 27 
19 WO25/3224, York to Liverpool, 7 December 1811. 20 WO25/3224, York to Liverpool, 27 September 1811. It released 3,790 cavalry (from 9,566) and 5,140 infantry (from 17,450). 
21 WO25/3225, York to Bathurst, 30 August & 20 October 1813. 22 W01/903, Memorandum to the Cabinet, 26 May 1807. 23 WOI/645, Dundas to Liverpool, 30 December 1810; WOI/646, Lt. Col. Henry Torrens to LL Col. 
Henry Edward Bunbury, 10 January 1811. 
24 W06/134, Bunbury to Torrens, 9 January 1811; WO 1/646, Torrens to Bunbury, 10 January 1811. 25 See Appendix C. 
26 WO 1/652, York to Bathurst, 17 July 1812. 27 This had been the problem in the early 1790s, see J. R. Western, 'The Recruitment of the Land Forces in Great Britain', PhD., pp. 46-47. 
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The regimental system did impose a theoretical limit to the size of the army. As 
mentioned above, the Duke of York was reluctant to raise additional line regiments, and 
also the Duke of York's policy on additional battalions was limited. The I" and 27 th 
both applied for extra battalions, because of their success in recruiting, but the Duke of 
York rejected them, considering them too unwieldy already (the I" had four battalions, 
and the 27th three). "' As the army had a limit of 1,200 rank and file per battalion, and the 
number of battalions per regiment was extremely unlikely to go beyond two, the line 
infantry had an upper limit of 249,600 rank and file. Although the total British line 
strength reached a maximum ofjust under 160,000 in 1813, " far short of the theoretical 
limit, the line regiments could not have expanded much more than they did, as some 
units failed to attract sufficient recruits to form a second battalion while Parliament was 
always concerned about the expense of army recruiting. Potential cavalry numbers were 
even more limited, and the proportion of cavalry in the army fell during from 14.7% in 
1807 to 12.6% in 1813. Cavalry was vastly more expensive to maintain than the 
infantry, was difficult to transport overseas. 10 and the army was generally deployed in 
areas unsuited for large cavalry actions. 
A large part of the army was formed of unnumbered corps, often raised for the 
duration of the war, and for specific duties. Many of these were foreign corps, either 
exile units, such as the King's German Legion (KGL), or units raised specifically to 
recruit foreigners, of which the 600' was the most famous. There were also units for 
deserters and criminals, typically deployed in the inhospitable climates of Affica, (the 
Royal African Corps) and the West Indies (the Royal West Indian Rangers and the 
Royal York Rangers). 
29 W01/640, York to Castlereagh, 16 January 1809; W06/133, Hon. C. W. Stewart to Lt. Col. James 
Willoughby Gordon, 28 March 1809. 29 CJ, 1813-14, XI, 1, Return of the Effective Strength of the Army, 13 November 1813; W025/3225, Effective strength of Foreign and Provincial Corps, 31 December 1812. On the I' January 1813 the infantry totalled 201,538, of which 41,601 were foreign (excluding the 60t'). '0 The 20,000 infantry of the 1805 expedition to the Weser required 30,000 tons of shipping, the 2,000 
cavalry 16,000 tons. Hall, British Strategy, p. 46. 
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The British army also had auxiliary reserve units. In 1802 the royal veteran 
battalions were created. As implied by the name, they were composed of old soldiers fit 
enough to be in the army, but not suitable for active campaigning. The veteran 
battalions were preserved for old and deserving soldiers (i. e. recommended by their 
officers), and five had specific roles. The Oh and 9h were for soldiers'from Scotland, the 
I O'h was for service in North America, and the 7h and I Ph were only for guardsmen or 
cavalrymen. " Garrison battalions were established in 1805 from men raised under the 
Army of Reserve and Additional Force Act who did not volunteer for the line, and so 
these units were formed just for duty in the LTK. The roles of the nine battalions changed 
quickly, " as no more men were raised under geographically limited terms. The Horse 
Guards began using them to relocate men who were temporarily unfit (from illness, 
etc. ), and those who had not served a suitable length of time to be able to claim a place 
in a veteran battalion. However, this was not an official policy, and the boundary 
between garrison and veteran battalions lacked definition. Some men in the 5 th and 11 th 
Royal Veteran Battalions were reported to be fit for duty, and the Duke of York wanted 
an inspection of the battalions to determine if this was true, and if so, to return the men 
to their original regiments. " As late as 1811, Major General Henry Clinton, the Irish 
Adjutant General, suggested that the veteran battalions should be preserved for 
deserving soldiers, as one battalion in Ireland had increased rapidly by virtue of the 
malingerers offloaded onto it by line regiments. " When the Duc de Castries suggested 
that a veteran battalion for foreigners should be raised, Lord Liverpool was sympathetic, 
31 W0380/1, Regimental Record Book. The royal veteran battalions were established on the 24 December 
1802. Initially there were seven battalions, the Oh became the Royal North British on II February 1803, 
and the 7h was formed from men discharged from the cavalrx and Foot Guards. Eventually the total 
reached ddneen: the 8'h was raised 25 December 1804; the 9 was raised on 25 April 1805; the 10d' 
formed on 25h December 1806 for service in North America; the I Ph formed on the 25 April 1807, for 
cavalry and Foot Guards; the 12'h was formed from men from the 4'h who were unfit for service at 
Gibraltar, 25 June 1808; the 13'h was formed 25 March 1813, from unfit men at the Lisbon depot. A. S. 
White, 'Garrison, Reserve and Veteran Battalions and coTTanies. ', JSAHP, 38 (1960), pp. 156-166. 32 'ne number of battalions was gradually reduced. the 7 was disbanded on 14 March 18 10, the e 24 
March 1810, and the 9* became the 103'd in December 1808; White, 'Garrison, Reserve and Veteran 
Battalions', JSAHR, 38 (1960), pp. 156-166. 33 W03/45, Lt. Col. William Wynyard to Lt. Gen. Doyle, 9 March 1808. 
34 W035/24, Clinton to Calvert, 6 November 1811. 
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but the battalion was never raised, although the KGL did have an invalid company. " 
Despite the confusion over the composition of the veteran and garrison 
battalions they ftdfilled two important roles. They retained men in the army who would 
otherwise have received discharges, and kept the maximum proportion of the line and 
cavalry regiments ready for active service, both by taking over garrison duties and 
removing unfit soldiers from their ranks. The process for transferring men was quite 
simple. In the biannual inspections made by general officers, a return of unfit men was 
included in their reports, describing if they were suitable for a discharge, or for dispatch 
to a garrison or a veteran battalion. As the local general officer and the inspecting 
medical officer made this decision, it is little wonder that the boundary between a man 
suitable for a veteran battalion and one for the garrison battalion was unclear. No doubt 
the confusion in Ireland in 1811 was simply due to the fact there was a veteran battalion 
nearby, and the overriding concern was to remove unfit men from the regiment. 
The final formations that supported the strength of the army were the units 
raised from local populations specifically to defend their communities. There were 
many of these units in the colonies, but the most important of this type was the English, 
Irish and Scottish Militias. The militia was different from the rest of the army, as it was 
not totally under the command of the army. Although once raised they were placed 
under the command of army generals, in all other matters (recruiting, establishment, 
general correspondence) the Home Secretary was the responsible government minister, 
and the Lord Lieutenant controlled each county's militia. The militia held a particular 
place amongst the constitutionally minded aristocracy, and Parliament. The militia 
brought benefits and problems to the army, as it provided more men for home defence, 
but the existence of a separate military force removed ultimate control over Britain's 
land forces from the army. Similarly, the various part-time local volunteers retained a 
great deal of autonomy, but with the establishment of the local militia in 1808, and the 
35 W06/122, Liverpool to Duc de Castries, 22 February 1811. 
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willingness of most of these men and officers to comply with government wishes, they, 
and the militia, were gradually brought into some kind of integrated military system. " 
The Political Restrictions on the Size of the A 
The British army was always regarded with some degree of suspicion, born of 
Britain's experiences of military rule under Cromwell and later James Il. Permanent, or 
standing, armies were the tool of despots whých threatened British liberty, and the 
constitution. " Besides ideologically inspired scrutiny, the army also came under 
inspection because the armed forces were the major expense of any government in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century. After every conflict, the army had to contend with a 
Parliament that wanted the size of the army reduced to its pre-war establishment. This 
explains why the army was so small in 1792, and why calls were made in 1814 to 
reduce the army to its 1780s establishment, "' showing a total incomprehension of 
Britain's new position as the world's imperial power. Thomas Grenville, Lord 
Grenville's brother, declared that 'No one can have proposed a peace establishment of 
19 millions but with the intention of changing the constitution of the country in such 
sort [sic], that it shall no longer continue a free country to make this nation rank 
among the great military nations of Europe. "' 
The intellectual objections to a large army naturally abated during wars, but 
many members of Parliament still felt duty-bound to examine public expenditure 
minutely to insure that no more was spent than was necessary. This ethos had a 
powerftd influence over what government ministers, and the army, regarded as possible. 
Every year the Secretary at War presented the army estimates to the House, in which he 
had to demonstrate that the funds to be voted were essential. This was no formality; in 
36 Much has been made of the localism of many part-time corps, (Cookson, British Armed Nation, pp. 85- 
90) but in some cases, local units were successfully militarised. See the author's article 'A Geography of 
Loyalism? Ilie Local Military Forces of the West Riding of Yorkshire, 1794-1814', War and Society, 19 
P001), pp. 1-21. 
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1807, George Johnston questioned the large sums that the government had brought 
forward in the army estimates, without giving, in his opinion, enough details on them. ' 
In 1810, with the war showing no signs of ending, the government embarked on a 
retrenchment programme to curtail the crippling drain on specie, and reduce costs, by 
however little. The establishment of some regiments was reduced, and twenty men per 
cavalry troop were dismounted, the latter saving a miserly 000,000 per annum. ", 
Parliament was also not afraid to investigate the army, and its workings. During the 
Napoleonic Wars, there were a series of often forgotten Committees of Military 
Enquiry, which looked into all aspects military bureaucracy. ' 
Parliament's control over the army was particularly demonstrated in 1809 by the 
removal of the Duke of York from his position as Commander in Chief after a 
parliamentary inquiry into perceived abuses in purchasing commissions revolving 
around the Duke's mistress. ' Although never judged guilty, he was forced into 
resigning, and was replaced with the aged Sir David Dundas. The allegations turned out 
to be a complete fabrication, and the Duke returned to his position, although with some 
objections. Yet, in the period 1809 to 1811 Britain's military policy drifted, without any 
major innovations, and during 1810, the army decreased in numbers for the first time 
after the resumption of the war in 1803. 
Parliamentary uneasiness of the military was reflected in the diverse and 
disparate control of the armed forces that had developed since the Glorious Revolution. 
The army was headed by the Commander in Chief, who, with the rest of the higher 
offices of the army (Adjutant General, Quarter Master General), were responsible for 
the daily running of the army, officer appointments and promotions, and maintaining 
40 Hansard, 1806-1807, VIII, 453. In some respects this was a party tactic, as he agreed with the Pittites 
that the Talents had abandoned Windham's short service scheme and he believed full details of army 
expenditure would prove this. See entry in R. G. Thome, The House of Commons, 1790-1820, (London, 
1986), vol. 4. 41 Hansard, 18 10, XV, 608,657-672. L28.9 million was spent on the army and ordnance in 18 10, B. I- 
Mitchell & P. Deane, Abstract ofBritish Historical Statistics, (Cambridge, 1962), p. 396. 42 W. H. Greenleaf, 'The Commission of Military Enquiry', JSAHR, 41 (1963), pp. 171-18 1. 43 For a detailed examination of the trial, see Alfired H. Burne, The Noble Duke of York The Military Life 
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discipline and training in the army. 'Me Horse Guards, as this organisation was 
collectively known, only had an advisory role to government on military policy, as any 
ftirther powers had been stripped from the Crown and placed under parliamentary 
control in 1688. " The cabinet discussed strategy, with the Secretary for War and 
Colonies (created in 1794 and more usually know as the Secretary of War) particularly 
concerned with the army. The government gained financial control of recruiting from 
the colonels by the 1783 Pay Office Act, which accordingly expanded the concerns of 
the Secretary of War into recruitment policy. " The Secretary of War also oversaw the 
deployment of the army on active campaigns, and naturally co-opcrated with the 
Foreign Secretary, generals on campaign and colonial governors. The Secretary of State 
for the Home Department also had an involvement in military matters, as he was 
concerned with 'internal defence', whether that be anti-invasion plans, or policing the 
country. After reforms in 1782-83, the main concern of the Secretary at War was 
finance, but he was also the traditional point of contact between civilians and the army 
establishment in general, and had to sanction all troop movements within the UK. ' 
There were also a host of other government departments involved in military 
matters, such as the Transport Board, and other autonomous military establishments, 
like the Board of Ordnance (the Master General of which was also a cabinet member). 
The ill-defined post-Union military establishment in Ireland compounded this lack of 
central military authority. The Commander of the Forces in Ireland, created after the 
separate Irish establishment and Commander in Chief were suppressed, reported both to 
the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (who in turn answered to the Home Secretary), and to the 
military hierarchy based on the Horse Guards, which inevitably resulted in conflicts 
" Strachan, The Politics ofthe British Army, pp. 4447; Bartlettý 'The Development of the British Army'. 
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pp. 121-208. 
34 
between military and civil interests! ' Such diversity meant that wide consultation was 
needed in government, even before considering Parliament, and ensured that no one 
department, or person, could have total control of the armed forces. This 'dual control' 
of the army was considered an essential part of the constitution, but it prohibited the 
army from implementing purely military solutions to its problems, and made the 
implementation of strategy, and the running of the army, personal and informal. "' 
Parliamentary nervousness was easily aroused by the use of foreign troops, and 
led to particularly acrimonious debates on foreigners in the army during 1812 and 1813. 
Although this was a partisan attack on the government, it emphasised the constitutional 
objections to a standing army. The army was only permitted to have foreigners, and 
station them on British soil, with permission from Parliament. This dated back to the 
Act of Settlement in 1701, which forbade William of Orange to keep his Dutch troops, 
and like so much from the revolutionary settlement, became a cornerstone of the British 
constitution. In previous wars, the government had been allowed to recruit foreigners, 
and during the 1780s only one regiment was considered specifically foreign, the 60th 
(Royal Americans), but during the Napoleonic wars, the numbers of foreigners 
increased massively, as one of the remedies to Britain's manpower demands. By 1813 
this was considered a threat to the constitutioný' and only tolerated as a temporary 
measure. Palmerston declared: 
He knew that many had an objection to employing foreign soldiers on constitutional 
principles. He thought however, of the times, as well as the constitution of the country, 
would not object to their being employed at present. If any man would look at the map of 
Europe, and see what a proportion of its population the enemy had forced into hostility 
against this country, if he were also to consider the limited population of these two islands, 
and the extensive colonies we had to defend, and the navy we had to support, it appeared to 
him hardly possible that such a man could now adhere to the idea of not employing 
foreigners in our service. 50 
47 Allan Blackstock, 'The Union and the Military, 1801-c. 1830. ', Transactions of the Royal Historical 
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Nevertheless, Palmerston had to ftirther placate Parliament, and each year afterwards 
gave details of the number of foreigners in British regular regiments. 
The traditional mistrust of the army perpetuated certain trends with the military. 
Firstly, it ensured that Britain had several different types of units raised for specific 
circumstances. Secondly, and more importantly, direction of the war and military policy 
was not concentrated in a single office, albeit that this dual control was essentially 
becoming civilian control. This meant that any political solution to Britain's manpower 
problems was heavily influenced by political considerations. 
The Political Situation 
The governments that had to deal with the problem of army recruitment were 
generally weak, and had uncertain tenures. Only the governments at either end of the 
period under question (the Ministry of All the Talents, 1806 to 1807, and the Liverpool 
government 1812 onwards) had significant parliamentary support, and none of them 
were broad coalition governments. No government between 1807 and 1815 had the 
backing that Pitt did in the 1790s. The Talents government only had a total majority of 
forty members, but most of the non-ministerial MPs were 'neutrals', and the Portland 
government faired better after the election of 1807 and increased its majority to 106 
from a 'sure majority' of twenty-three votes. " Around seventy of these members 
deserted the Percey. al government over the Walcheren expedition, but fortunately, 
Perceval was able to rally some of these members during the committal of Burdett to the 
Tower, which frightened most wavering MPs back into the government's lists. The 
election of 1812 saw the government's overall majority rise to 142: ` Even still, such a 
majority was only half the number Pitt commanded during the Revolutionary Wars. " 
51 A. Aspinall (ed. ), The Later Correspondence ofGeorge III, (Cwnbridge, 1968), IV, 571, Portland to the 
King, 24 April 1807. 
52 Thorne, The Commons, L 185,192,199-202,235. The 1806 list is as follows: Ministers 349 (including 
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224, Independent 29, Doubtfuls 17, and Neutrals 12. For 1812, Ministers 400, Opposition 196, 
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This political instability derived from the collapse of the coalition built up under 
Pitt. This formidable phalanx began to break down in 1801 after the Act of Union with 
Ireland. Pitt, and some members of the government, wanted Catholic Emancipation to 
form part of the Union, but after strong representations to the already receptive ears of 
the King, he refused to sanction this, and Pitt resigned. ' The government then passed to 
Addington, but the split over Pitt's resignation had caused a dangerous political 
situation. Some pro-Catholic members of Pitt's governments, such as Castlereagh, " 
continued to work under Addington, whilst others, such as Grenville, who had been 
uncertain over the issue, resigned with Pitt. The political situation became more volatile 
when Grenville and his followers joined Fox and the Whig party in active opposition. 
Such diverse elements in the conservative minded MPs, and a resurgent 
Opposition, meant there was a consistent lack of parliamentary stability. Between 1807 
and 1815 there were four different ministries within five years, and also moments of 
high political drama. " The situation continued to be unstable; the duel between Canning 
and Castlereagh after Portland's death, " further fragmented the nascent Tory party, and 
their departure from the government, each with a small following of MPs, made the 
Perceval ministry appear impotent. Perceval even doubted that his ministry could carry 
on any business, and so opened negotiations with Viscount Sidmouth, and then the 
VAiigs and Grenvillites to form a broader government, all of which failed. " It was clear 
that Perceval would have a difficult time in the Commons, as soon after the opening of 
the 1810 session, a motion for an investigation into the Walcheren expedition was 
passed. " The government then faced a new crisis caused by the continuing illness of 
"4 B. W. Hill, British Parliamentary Parties 1742-1832: From the Fall of Walpole to the First Reform 
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George III. The prospect of establishing a Regency went to the very heart of the status 
of Parliament in the constitution, and generated further uncertainty in the House. 
Governments could influence the Commons either by political management, or, 
as in 1807, by having an election. However, the House of Lords was also an area of 
concern for British governments, especially after Grenville, one of the ablest debaters in 
the Lords, joined the Opposition. During Perceval's considerations on his government's 
majorities, he estimated that there were 110 Lords in opposition to government, whilst a 
list of 1807 only gave the government 176 supporters. ' Ilie character of the Lords had 
changed dramatically since 1784, with many creations and promotions (known as Pitt's 
peers), which despite the parliamentary splits from 1801, made the Lords an inherently 
conservative body. Provided the government was competent, and crucially had the 
King's backing, governments were not likely to be challenged there. 
Although Tory governments after 1807 survived, this was largely as the result of 
the Opposition being even weaker and more disparate than the government, despite its 
numerical strength. Opposition to the government during wartime was always awkward, 
and often seen as unpatriotic. " The death of Fox in 1806 ushered in an era of weak 
leadership in the Whig party, which also had its own schisms. The failure to inaugurate 
any major reforms during the Talents government resulted in some Whigs losing seats 
to radicals. Their call for reforms, which were rising in 1809, did not settle well with the 
aristocratic Grenville wing of the Opposition, who gradually drifted from their alliance 
with the Whigs. " This was dramatically shown in 1815 when Earl Grey, the leader of 
the Whigs in the Lords, openly disagreed with Grenville over the resumption of the war 
in 1815.6' 
Although the assassination of Perceval in 1812 led to another political crisis, 
60 Aspinall (ed. ), Later Correspondence of George III, V, 356-362, Perccval to the King, 18 September 
1809. 
6' Hill, British Parliamentary Parties, p 196. 62 Hill, British Parliamentwy Parties, pp. 190-191 & 199. 63 A. S. Turberville, The House ofLords in theAge ofReform, 1784-1837, (London, 1958), p. 160. 
38 
after a motion calling for a strong government, the Tories were better situated than 
before. During the Talents government Portland had begun organising a potential 
government of Pittites, and despite his death, the Tory party continued to develop. 
Although many MPs were not committed to a party, most were party orientated and 
very few were independents that voted outside party voting patterns. " In 1811 the 
Prince of Wales retained the Perceval ministry, and despite Lord Wellesley's 
resignation in 1812, the various groups of conservatives in Parliament began to reunite. 
Just before his death, Perceval negotiated Castlereagh and Sidmouth back into 
government, and although Britain was without a government for two weeks in 1812, the 
old ministers returned to their offices, and small gains were made in the election that 
year. 65 
Despite such political machinations, there was some continuity in personnel 
within the governments from 1807. After the Talents, all the governments were Tory, 
with a core of ministers who continued to work in various capacities, some of whom 
had worked under Addington, or Pitt's governments. Hawkesbury, the future Lord 
Liverpool, had a particularly vast experience of government by the time he became 
Prime Minister in 1812. Under Addington, he had been Foreign Secretary, and was 
moved to the Home Office under Pitt's 1804 ministry. In the Portland government he 
returned as Home Secretary, and under Perceval he was Secretary of War. By 1812, 
when he became Prime Minister, he was particularly able to direct the war. " Similar can 
be said of Castlereagh, albeit that he was out of government between 1809 and 1812; he 
was also once the Secretary of War (from 1805 to 1806, and in the Portland ministry), 
and ably directed British foreign policy during the final coalition against Napoleon 
between 1812 and 1815. " 
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Within Parliament there were interest groups that could also subject 
governments to scrutiny, and whose needs required to be addressed if legislation that 
affected them was to be successful. This was particularly so with the militia, seen as the 
constitutional counter-balance to the royal army. " Although the ideological basis for the 
force had diminishedý" some officers felt that it should be upheld as a separate force, as 
the county had to meet the cost of raising and maintaining its strength, and, moreover, 
because the militia regiments were a nexus of local patronage to the Lord Lieutenants 
and the militia colonels. The militia interest was always significant, " and besides the 
300 plus MPs who were militia officers between 1790 and 1820, "" the militia's main 
strength resided in Lords. Obviously the Lord Lieutenants would have a voice there, but 
there were also many other peers who were connected with the militia. As the guardians 
of the constitution, they viewed any alterations to the balance of power extremely 
suspiciously, and they were particularly concerned about the militia. As many peers had 
direct access to members of the government and the King, they could raise their 
objections without saying anything in the Lords. ' If their views were still not taken into 
consideration, individual Lords could use their patronage in the Commons, potentially 
upsetting government majorities. 
The strength of the militia interest was demonstrated in 1798, when the 
government ordered all the flank companies of each militia regiment to be detached and 
formed into composite battalions. After a meeting by the friends of the militia, headed 
by Earl Fitzwilliam, representations were made to the government, and the policy was 
abandoned, without ever being raised in the House. A more damaging incident occurred 
when the government proposed to fill up vacant militia officers in the same year. 
69 Schwoerer, No Standing Armies, p. 195. 69 Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 438-440. 70 Bartlett, 'Development of the British Army, PhD, p. 113, considers them an insignificant political force, but has failed to understand where their strength lied. 71 Thorne, The Commons. 1,300. Two thirds of them were either lieutenant colonels or colonels. 72 M. W. McCahil, Order and Equipoise., The Peerage and the House of Lords, 1783-1806, (London, 1978), pp. 168-174. 
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Besides rousing the usual friends of the militia qedicularly Lords Carnarvon and 
Radnor), Grenville's brother-in-law Earl Fortescue, and the ministerial stalwarts, Lords 
Sydney and Powis, also objected. 71 Iffie first militia transfer in . 1799 horrified some 
militia colonels who had no wish to be 'drill sergeants' for the regular army. " The 
government could not ignore these men, and outside their political remit, no 
government legislation on the militia could be enacted without the active approval of 
the militia officers. 
The militia interest was not a wholly obstructive group. Within their ranks were 
men of considerable expertise on the militia, and actively encouraged reforms in the 
force to make it effective. " From the 1780s militia legislation had passed from the 
preserve privately sponsored bills to executive proposals, and so government relied on 
militia officers as vital sources of information about the force and its composition. 76Nor 
was the militia interest a politically homogenous body. In the 1807 list of political 
affiliations in the Lords, the Lord Lieutenants are fairly representative of the entire 
house. 
Two particular examples serve to emphasise the diversity in militia officers. Earl 
Fitzwilliam was practically the defender of the militia interest. He was heir, both 
literally and politically, of the Marquis of Rockingham, " and so upheld the virtues of 
the militia as a counterpoise to the executive and the army. As a committed Whig, he 
opposed the Tory governments anyway, but his rhetoric was particularly vociferous 
when it was clear that they intended to use the militia to remedy Britain's manpower 
shortage. In contrast to Fitzwilliam was Baron Seaforth. One of Pitt's peers of the 
1790s, he was created Baron Seaforth in 1797, and was Colonel of the Ross Militia. His 
ancestors had forfeited their estates in 1715 for complicity in the Jacobite rebellion, and 
73 McCahil, Order and Equipoise, p. 54. 74 Cookson, British Armed Nation, p. I 18. 73 For instance, H043/16, Hawkesbury to Marquis Buckingham, 27 July 1807, thanking Buckingham for 
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as part of the Seaforth's reconciliation to the government; he had raised a regiment in 
1777, and also one in the Revolutionary wars, "' and was a firm government supporter. 
The varying opinions within the militia interest were shown in the responses to 
Castlereagh's suggestion of an annual draft from the militia to the line in 1807. 
Significantly some opposition Lords and MPs supported the measure. Baron Grantley, 
Colonel of the I" Surrey Militia was listed as an Opposition peer, but he agreed with 
Castlereagh's annual drafL Ile Earl of Mansfield, Colonel of the Perth Militia, who 
was usually a government supporter, disagreed with Castlereagh. The militia interest 
was a diverse body, and lacked unity, particularly during the war, when many militia 
officers considered opposition unpatriotic. Yet the militia interest could not be ignored. 
Theoretically, there should have been an army interest within the house, as there 
were always large numbers of MPs who were, or had been, army officers. Between 
1790 and 1820 a fifth of all MPs had military experience in the regulars, and 135 
military members were added between 1793 and 1815. But political affiliations usually 
came before any considerations as military men, and, given the length of the war, many 
of these MPs were on active duty. 100 members went to the Peninsula at some stage, 
besides those who served on the staff at home and elsewhere overseas. Only a third of 
the military members ever spoke in Parliament, and a third of these only spoke once or 
twice, often to acknowledge the thanks of the House. " As such, their influence on the 
political situation was minimal. 
The final consideration for any government in deciding policy was the attitude 
of the King. Having caused two governments to collapse over Catholic relief, it is clear 
he was still a force in British politics. The army had always been a particular interest of 
the Hanoverian dynasty, and George III was no different in this respect. " In the early 
73 In 1793 he raised the Vý. Stephen Wood, The Scottish Soldier, (Edinburgh, 1987), p. 41. 79 Thorne, The Commons, 1,306-311. 
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years of the War of American Independence, army mobilisation had been slowed by 
George III's reluctance to raise any new regiments. " Although the King's feeling had 
been ignored when the Talents introduced limited service in 1806, governments after 
that, particularly as they were ideologically committed to the authority of the King, 
were bound to listen to his opinions. 
The combination of political weakness in both houses of Parliament, the militia 
interest, and the King meant that government legislation on military policy often had a 
long gestation. Even though Castlereagh in 1807 advocated immediate measures to be 
taken during debates in the Portland cabinet, it was not until four months (and an 
election) later that a Militia Transfer Bill was introduced. It is not surprising that during 
18 10 the Perceval ministry hardly considered military policy, as it was preoccupied with 
its own survival. 
Conclusion 
The Napoleonic Wars continued the pattern of the growth of the British army 
during the eighteenth century. Successive wars in the 1700s had seen the British army 
increase from a peak of 62,3 73 in the War of Austrian Succession, breaking the 100,000 
men mark in the American War of Independence. "' But the 300,000 men under arms in 
1813 represented a massive leap from the 1770s, and with it came a sustained 
manpower problem to solve: casualties outstripped recruiting. In addressing this 
problem government was restricted by the army's structure, and the political situation. 
The Horse Guards had many diverse units, and men engaged under terms of service, 
under its command. The veteran and garrison battalions showed some flexibility within 
the regimental system, and occasionally men were transferred to other units, but beyond 
this the regimental system still dominated the army. 
a' Stephen Conway, 'The Politics of British Military and Naval Mobilisation, 1775-83', EHR 112 (1997), 
ri 1182. 
John Brewer, The Sinews ofPower. ý War, Money and the English Stale, 1688-1783. (London, 1989), p. 
30. 
43 
Parliament's scrutiny of the army insured that government would never expand 
the army massively in the way that France did during the early 1790s. It also meant that 
the government tended to raise forces for specific duties, and situations. This reflected 
the permanent demands on the army to protect the UK, its colonies, and to provide a 
force for the continent. Within each of these strategic roles there were ftuther divisions 
into the duties that troops were expected to perform, all of which further restricted the 
army. The governments from 1803 inherited a three-tier system, consisting of the 
regulars, a militia for each part of the UK, and local part-time forces. One answer to the 
manpower problem would have been to integrate Britain's existing forces, but UK 
governments had to work with the existing army structure, and also a fluctuating 
parliamentary situation. Accordingly military policy tended towards compromise; it 
sometimes ignored the advice of the Horse Guards, but it normally earned a broad 
measure of political support. However, these were not the only restrictions on the army, 
it was also limited in the way it was deployed. 
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Chqpter 2: The DeployLnent of the Arm 
Introduction 
The British Army was permanently subject to diverse demands on its slender 
numbers. Its roles varied from colonial garrison duty, protecting naval establishments, 
policing, besides trying to allocate men to wage war. This resulted in only small forces 
being sent to the continent, making Britain's military effort appear small in comparison 
to the other great powers. But, the duties that the army performed outside the Iberian 
peninsula were vital to maintaining Britain's war effort; they were not the result of 
British governments adhering to an outdated 'blue water' strategy which placed colonial 
conquests above defeating the enemy. Examining the deployment of the army reveals 
that the government sometimes took considerable risks in its commitment to fighting in 
Spain, and that the forces left elsewhere were, at best, at minimum levels, and usually 
below what the army considered sufficient. 
The Home Army 
Superficially an overlarge proportion of the British army always remained in the 
UK, ' but this was necessary to meet a range of disparate and conflicting duties. The 
army still had to perform its peacetime remit as a police force, and it also had separate 
wartime functions to fulfil. The army would be the mainstay of defence if an invasion 
occurred, and provided recruiting depots for the battalions overseas, either in colonial 
garrisons or part of the disposable force. These demands impaired the efficiency of units 
and ensured that the troops at home were not always available for active service. 
The first priority of the army at home during the war was anti-invasion duty. It 
has often been assumed that after Trafalgar there was no invasion threat, but although 
Nelson's victory, the building of the Martello towers, and other improvements in 
1 See Graph IV. 
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fortification removed the immediate threat of invasion by French invasion barges, ' it did 
not remove the possibility of a later invasion. Although the Copenhagen expedition of 
1807 thwarted Napoleon's attempt to unify the fleets of Europe against the UK, and the 
Peninsular War effectively removed the Spanish and Portuguese fleets from his control, 
France was still able to concentrate the resources of the continent into a massive 
building programme, both of ships of the line and naval bases. ' 
Fears of a future invasion were particularly acute in 1811. In that year 
Napoleon's domination of Europe was absolute: he had annexed Holland and the North 
German coast, placing it under the direct control of France, and boldly announced that 
very soon France would be able to command 150 ships of the line, fifty above Britain's 
fleet. " Moreover, Britain's foothold in the Peninsula, the only scene of combat for the 
French, seemed a lost cause, as Wellington retired behind the fortified lines outside 
Lisbon in the face of a large French army. In January 1811 the Horse Guards prepared a 
' See N. Longmate, Island Fortress: the Defence of Great Britain, 1603-1945, (London, 199 1), pp. 274- 
283. 
' R. Glover, 'The French Fleet, 1807-1814: Britain's Problem; and Madison's Opportunity', Journal of 
Modern History, 39 (1967), pp. 233-52. 4 Glover, 'The French Fleet', Journal ofModern History, 39 (1967), p. 235. 
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report on the need to reform the army, with the aim of countering an estimated French 
invasion force of 160,000 men. As the author put it, 'until an invasion is attempted he 
[Napoleon] will never rest'. -' France's deteriorating relations with Russia, and the 
subsequent disastrous campaign for the French in 1812 removed the chance of invasion 
altogether, allowing Britain to reinforce Wellington in 1813, and send troops to North 
Germany and Holland. " 
The militia, local military forces, and of course the navy, augmented the force 
needed to counter an invasion, but regular troops were still necessary. In 1804, when the 
possibility of an invasion was at its greatest, the Duke of York estimated that the British 
Isles needed 143,000 troops, with the added proviso that the 30,000 regulars in Ireland 
should not be Irish because they might not be busted in case of an invasion. With the 
militia the UK would be defended by 205,000 men, of which a proportion would 
provide drafts for colonial garrisons (it was the army's policy to rotate regiments on 
7 colonial duty and so it was necessary to allocate regiments in the UK to relieve them). 
Although this amount was not strictly adhered to, especially as the invasion threat 
diminished after Trafalgar in 1805, it was still felt necessary to keep a large force in 
Britain: in October 1813 there were 50,000 men stationed in the UK. " 
Besides garrisoning the points of a possible large-scale invasion, the army also 
had to protect towns not under direct threat, such as Bristol, where in 1808 two militia 
regiments were despatched to increase the weak garrison. ' The landing of a small 
French force at Fishguard in 1797, and the subsequent panic that led to the suspension 
of cash payments by the Bank of England, demonstrated that small raids could have 
damaging effects. 10 Consequently, the army had to deploy some of its troops in small 
3 W030180, Defence Report, I" January 18 11. 6 Hall, British Strategy, pp. 199-203. 7 W025/3224, York to Iord Hobart (Secretary of War in the Addington government 1801 to 1804), 13 January 1804 (copy). 
8 See Graph IV. 
9 W03/45 Calvert to Lt. Gen. Tarleton, 27 April 1808. 10 Ernsley, 'British Society during the French Wars, p. 132. 
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detachments along Britain's coast to prevent such raids, particularly in ports that were 
vital to Britain's trading interest, such as Liverpool, Glasgow, Hull, and most important 
of all London. 
The exposed Channel Islands provided an example of the demands anti-invasion 
duty placed on the Horse Guards, and how, after 1805, it was not automatic that the 
home garrison could be reduced. In 1807 when two battalions were withdrawn, 
Lieutenant General Don (the commander at Jersey) only received one battalion as a 
replacement, and it was found that the garrison was too weak to mount guard on the 
coast and help construct the fortress. " 'Me islands were particularly vulnerable and 
important. A survey of late 1807 recommended reinforcing the garrison, as, in the 
opinion of the naval officers consulted, the squadron there could not protect Jersey 
between the end of October and the end of April. Don also believed that Jersey was the 
key to the islands, and if it were taken, the other islands would soon be captured. 
Retaking the islands would be very difficult, and with them in French hands, any 
merchant ships in the Channel would only be able to sail in large convoys. 12 
The situation in the islands deteriorated as reports arrived between 1809 and 
1811 of preparations by the French to invade the islands, those of 1810 and 1811 were 
particularly threatening as central Europe was quiet and Napoleon could direct his 
attentions to an invasion of the islands. " Lieutenant General Doyle, the commander on 
Guernsey and Alderney, received reports from the long serving royalist spy, the Duke of 
Bouillon, that armaments were fitting out in Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk for an attack 
on the Channel Islands, yet he did not have half of the troops that he required in the 
garrison. Doyle, like his superior in Jersey, advocated that the garrison needed 
11 wow74, Gen. Don to Earl Spencer, 23 March 1807; H050/17 1, Gordon to J. Beckett, 3 April 1807. 
2 Charles William Vane (ed. ), Corrgondence, Despatches, and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, 
&cond Marquess of Londondeny, 2 Series, 7, (London, 1851), 8 1, Lt. Gen. Don to Hawkesbury, 13 
August 1807. 
13 H050/41 1, Gordon to Beckett, 13 February 1809; H050/417, Torrens to Henry Goulburn, August 
1810; H051/171, Goulburn to Torrens, I September 1810; H051/172, Goulburn to Torrens, 14 October 
1811. 
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increasing. Alderney was particularly vulnerable; it was only twelve miles from 
Cherbourg, which could not be closely blockaded, and so all that was needed was one 
easterly gale to bring an invasion force across. Communications with Alderney were 
regularly cut off by the weather (in 1809, at the beginning of the invasion fears over the 
Channel Islands, it was worringly cut off for eighteen days)"', and the capture of the 
island could have serious political repercussions, depressing not only the Channel 
Islands assembly, but also the entire UK. " Yet twice requests for more troops, to help 
complete the all-important fortresses and provide an adequate garrison for the islands, 
were turned down because of other manpower demands. Eventually the 2/32nd , was sent 
there, but this reinforcement still was not considered sufficient by local commanders. ' 
The war also brought more mundane and debilitating tasks for the army, such as 
guarding the increasing number of prisoners of war, both on ships, and at the two large 
camps at Norman Cross and Dartmoor. Fortunately, after some debate, it was ruled that 
militia regiments could serve on prison ships, thereby overcoming objections that this 
duty was not covered by their terms of service. " The UK also became a depot for the 
army overseas, and retained many of the soldiers that were in no fit state for active duty, 
especially the long-term sick. At acute periods, such as after the Walcheren expedition, 
there could be huge numbers of troops in Britain who were too ill to do anything. In the 
winter of 1810,4,766 men out of 25,237 were ill. "' From 1808 there were also outbreaks 
of ophthalmia, and the fears of spreading it through the population forced the army to 
try and remove afflicted regiments to barracks (such as the 1/88 th moved to Maldon 
barracks in May 1808). "' Soon after, a specialist hospital at Selsea was established, and 
all cases were sent thereý" Despite the hospital, there were recurrences of ophthalmia, 
14 WO 11605, Doyle to Castlereagh, 6 February 1809. 
15 WO 1/1120, Doyle to Liverpool, 15 August 18 10. "6 H050/415, Torrens to Beckett, 7 April 1810; H050/417, Torrens to Goulburn, August 1810 and 7 
September 1810. 
17 W03/45, Wynyard to Maj. Gen. Whetham and Lt. Gen. Sir George Ludlow, 5 April 1808. 's BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38361, ff. 22-23, Return of British Army, 28 November 1810. 19 W03/45, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Fitzroy, 31 May 1808. 
20 W03/195, Wynyard to Bgd. Gen. Taylor (OC Army Depot), 30 July 1808; W03/46, Wynyard to Lt. 
Gen. Somerset, 10 September 1808. 
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which prevented the Horse Guards fi-orn moving units where it wanted. In 1813 when 
five militia regiments reported men suffering from ophthalmia, a general order was 
given that such men were to be lcft behind if the regiment volunteered for service in the 
UK. This frustrated the plans of the Horse Guards to move these regiments to other 
garrisons under the terms of the Militia Interchange Act. " 
The army continued to suffer the same health problems that it did in peacetime. 
In 1811 the 1/91" was reported to have a particularly large number of hospital patients, 
some had Walcheren fever, but the bane of eighteenth century health was also prevalent: 
venereal infections. This regiment was not unique: out of 5,816 sick men from the army 
and militia in December 1810,1,190 had venereal diseases. ' Wartime improved the 
supervision of the health of the army, with the establishment of Inspectors of Hospitals, 
21 and frequent reports on the health of corps. Of the 13,334 men that passed through 
military hospitals in Great Britain during December 1810, only 108 died, and 7,410 
were discharged (the return does not indicate if they were discharged back to their 
regiments, or from the army). 24 Individual surgeons often came under close scrutiny, if 
there was any belief that they were incompetent. The Deputy Inspector of Hospitals was 
critical of the surgeon of the 1/91", Mr. Douglas, as his was the most expensive medical 
account, yet the least successful. Many of the cases of syphilis and gonorrhoea, must 
have been contracted whilst he was in charge of their health. It appeared that, 
understandably, men were reluctant to come forward with such complaints and were 
treating themselves with mercury. Only when the infection became severe did they seek 
help. The inspectors suggested 'frequent health inspections' which would both act as a 
21 W07/108, Circular, 7 May 1813. The five regiments were Northumberland, North Devon, Galway, 
Kilkenny and Kerry. See Chapter 3 for further details on the Militia Interchange Act. 22 W017/837, Monthly report of the Sick of the Army on the Establishment of Great Britain, I January 
1811. 
23 For instance, W040/29, Medical Report for 1808, Pepys & Heale to York, I November 1808, reported 
that after its move the 88h's health had improved, but the I' Surrey, Wiltshire and Ross militia had a 
Igge number of deaths that year. 24 W017/837, Monthly report of the Sick of the Army on the Establishment of Great Britain, I January 
1811. 
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means of detection and encourage men to come forward at an early stage. ' 
The army also had to fulfil its peacetime duties, especially its police role, 
although, as with the anti-invasion duties, the Horse Guards could use the militia. This 
duty was particularly detrimental to the army, and the war sometimes exaggerated this 
'friction of peace'. ' This was particularly so in Ireland, where the civil power was 
largely impotent, and every warrant required a military presence to execute it. " Ever 
since the rebellion in 1798 and Union in 1801, Dublin Castle had been deliberately 
using a sectarian policy to uphold its rule. By 1807, this was inflamed in the 'no popery' 
election after the collapse of the Talents, and the continued reliance of the Castle to 
uphold order with the Protestant yeomanry. 29 The situation was made more difficult by 
the fact that alongside sectarian outbursts, there were still republican organisations in 
existence. In 1807, the Adjutant General of Ireland warned a garrison that he had had 
information that there would be an attempt to storm the fort on the upcoming fair day. 29 
Early in 1809 the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland warned that the withdrawal of another 
brigade would leave an inadequate force to aid the magistrates in any disturbances, and 
by 1810, he was calling for reinforcements because of disturbances in Tipperary. He 
could not strengthen particular areas 'Without endangering the post from whence such 
reinforcement must be drawn': a striking parallel to the French in the Peninsula. " The 
situation in Ireland resulted in troops there being considered on active duty. Lord 
Charles Fitzroy was informed that the 2/48hcould not be withdrawn from Ireland to 
recruit in England because it was an effective battalion. " 
Maintaining the force in Ireland was not always easy, and the Horse Guards 
were hampered in allocating a force for Ireland by the meteorological elements and 
25 W07/107, ? to Grant (Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, Canterbury), 8& 25 April 18 11. 26 Houlding, Fitfor Service. 
27 McAnally, The Irish Militia, p. 279. U Cookson, British Armed Nation, pp. 163-164 & 168-170. 29 W035/24, Col. Robert Anstruther (Irish Adjutant General) to Calvert, II December 1807. 
30 WOI/640, Beckett to Gordon, 14 February 1809; H051/171, Ryder to Dundas, 11 January 1810; 
Cookson, British ArmedNation, pp. 54-55 also notes this, and the possible influence it had on Wellington 
before he went to the Peninsula. 31 W03142, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Lord Charles Fitzroy, 5 January 1807. 
51 
other government departments. In 18 10, the Horse Guards were well aware of the need 
to get troops to Ireland, and five battalions were allotted to join the troops there. Yet 
two battalions had been waiting for transports across the Irish Sea for over two 
months. " The situation was summed up in 1815, in the north, where there was evidence 
of republicanism, and the laws were everywhere resisted, even by armed force; in the 
south, disturbances had become habitual, although not prompted by any principles, but 
caused by exorbitant rents, and absenteeism amongst landlords. " Consequently the 
army was needed everywhere. The dispersal of troops to aid the civil powers in 1815, 
and the resumption of the war, meant that Ireland was 'almost defenceless. "" 
Civilian disturbances were not limited to Ireland, they were endemic in 
eighteenth century Britain, " and as always, the main burden of policing Britain fell to 
the army; a modem police force barely existed in London, and only Dublin had an 
efficient police presence. "' During the Napoleonic Wars there were two particularly 
large-scale disturbances. The Burdett riots in London aroused great concerns over the 
lack of policing in the capital. Hon. Richard Ryder, the Home Secretary, was in constant 
communication with the Horse Guards as to the disposition of troops around London, 
and the army set up a series of command posts, with generals permanently available to 
command any troops that might be moved into the capital. " The Luddite disturbances of 
1811 and 1812 were a magnitude greater than any previous disturbances, and they have 
been considered quasi-insurrectionary. " In late 1811 magistrates in Nottingham, the 
centre of the initial outburst of machine breaking, requested more troops for the area, 
and similar calls came from not only the north of England, but all over the country in 
32 W03/595, Torrens to Ryder, 26 July 18 10. 33 W030179, ? to P. Carry, 22 June 18 15. 34 W03On9, Carry to Torrens, 23 June 1815. 35 Bohstedt, Riots and Community. 36 Clive Emsley, 'The Military and Popular Disorder in England, 1790-1801', JS, 4HR 61 (1983), pp. 10- 
21,96-112; Stanley H. Palmer, Police and Protest in England and lrel=4 1780-1850, (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 56-69,117-119, & 152-159. 37 W03/595, Torrens to Ryder, 2 April 18 10 38 Thompson, The Making ofthe English Working Class, pp. 604-624 
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1811 and 1812, showing the general level of distress that Britain experienced. " Initially, 
the army felt that the number of troops in the affected areas was sufficient. "' However, a 
year after this confident assertion, eight troops of cavalry, and three militia regiments 
were sent to the inland district alone. "' Under such circumstances the Duke of York 
reported that 'The chief reliance for this defence (against an invasion) rests with the 
artillery, which has already suffered nearly as great a diminution as I can consider 
consistent with our security'. Out of six cavalry regiments, five were in the interior 
'Where there are still disturbances to an alarming extent', and there were only 15,835 
regulars in Britain with another 12,000 in Ireland which left the militia as 'the chief 
effective force in this country'. 42 Nor were difficulties like this unusual, although the 
scale of it was: magistrates in the Severn district wanted more troops in 1813, which 
were dispatched, but there was no more cavalry available, the preferred arm to quell 
civil disturbanceS. 4' Luddism reappeared around Nottingham in 1814, but the demands 
placed on the army by its policing duties were alleviated by the militia, and local 
military forces. When troubles arose around Cardigan in 1815 the local militia was 
called out, as the nearest cavalry regiment was in Manchester. " 
In such turbulent atmospheres the line regiments and the militia were not always 
well disciplined. In 1807 some Irish militiamen thought that their service had expired, 
and that they were due a discharge, so they refused to obey orders. This was caused by 
confusion in the oaths that the men took, "' and this only served to confirm many of the 
suspicions held about the discipline of the Irish Militia. Similar problems arose with the 
39 H051/172, Beckett to William Merry, 15 November 1811 (Nottingham); Beckett to Torrens, 3 April 
1812 (Truro), 11 April 1812 (Birmingham), 14 April 1812 (Bristol), 20 April (Coventry), 23 April 
(Ashton under Lyme); Ryder to York, 29 April 1812, requesting 5,000 more troops for the north-west 
district. 
40 H050/460, Dundas to Ryder, 26 February 1811. 
41 H050/460, Memorandum, Horse Guards, 7 February 1812. 
42 W01/653, York to Bathurst, 22 December 1812. 
43 For detailed surveys of the army's police role, see L Boyd, 'The Role of the Military in Civil Disorders 
in England and Wales, 1780-181 V, PhD, (University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1977), and K. 0. Fox, 
Making Life Possible. A Study of military aid to the civilpower in Regency England, (Kineton, 1982). 44 H050/427, Torrens to Beckett, 19 April 1813; H050/430, Torrens to Beckett, 8 August 1814; Torrens 
to Addington, 21 October 1814; H050/432, Torrens to Beckett, II November 1815. 
45 McAnally, The Irish Militia, pp. 211-214. 
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Scottish Militia in 1813,, ' and rivalries between regiments could easily lead to violence. 
There were lingering doubts over the loyalty of troops when faced by rioters with whom 
they might have some sympathy. " Reports reached the Home Office that attempts were 
made to 'seduce soldiers' during 1810, "' and some militiamen refused to fire on 
Luddites in 1811, " but, generally, the militia and the army proved obedient. 
In addition, the army, like the navy, aided the Revenue Service, but this duty 
could impair the discipline of the units involved. Calvert warned Perceval that constant 
vigilance would be required 'to prevent this desultory sort of service interfering with the 
discipline of the Men. ` The Irish Militia, especially from 1806, was principally 
involved in the prevention of illegal distilling, " and cavalry was also needed to prevent 
smuggling along the south coast of England, " even sometimes at the expense of other 
duties. When a troop of the 14th Light Dragoons was required to protect an Ordnance 
depot at Dorchester, the local general officer was told 'the continuance of the Military 
in aid of the officers of the Revenue at Poole is necessary for the Public Service. ' 
Calvert suggested that the Board of Ordnance build a proper depot, so that cavalry 
protection was unnecessary for it. " In fulfilling the functions of a police force, and 
aiding customs men, the troops were dispersed in small detachments to cover wide 
areas, which impaired their drill and battle efficiency. ' 
The army still had its ceremonial duties. The Royal family perpetually had a 
military escort, and one militia regiment (the Staffordshire) was permanently stationed 
at Windsor, effectively removing it from any deployment schemes the Horse Guards 
46 H051/28, Addington to Lt. Col. Gordon (OC Inverness Militia), 20 January 1813; Sidmouth to 
Adjutant General, 15 February 18 13; Sidmouth to Lt Col. Gordon, 25 March 1813. 47 Emsley, 'The Military and Popular Disorder', JSAHR 6 (1983), pp 96-110. " H043/16, Beckett to Sir David William, Post Office, Whitechapel, 8 May 18 10; H05 In 1, Beckett to 
Torrens, 8 May 1810. 
49 H043/20, Goulburn. to OC South Hampshire Militia, 15 May 1812. 50 Claydon House Archive, 9/101/2, Calvert to Perceval, 12 October 1807. 51 McAnally, The Irish Militia, p. 197. 52 W03/195, Wynyard to Taylor, 30 July 1808. 53 W03/42, Calvert to Cumberland, 4 April 1807. 54 McAnally, Irish Militia, p. 197. 
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devised. " As an example of the ceremonial functions, the Duke of York required that 
200 guardsmen and a captain's guard of Life Guards should be present when the 
foundation stone of a new theatre in Covent Garden was laid. 56 State funerals, and 
jubilee celebrations all required a military presence as part of the pageantry of the event. 
The army's billeting showýd the differing effects of the war on troops in the UK. 
Before the wars, Britain only had seventeen permanent barracks, but early in the 
Revolutionary Wars, a massive barrack building campaign was begun. Initially cavalry 
barracks were built near large industrial towns, as a police measure, but, after 1795, 
large infantry barracks were built which allowed troops to be concentrated and gave 
them the ability to practise large scale (i. e. above normal company drill) manoeuvres. 17 
In 1794, barracks existed, or were being built, for 8,408 cavalry and 54,736 infantry; ` 
by 1807, the total barrack capacity for Great Britain was 16,162 cavalry and 137,427 
infantry (NCOs and privates). " But this did not mean that troops were always 
concentrated, fully trained, and that conflicts of interest with civilians did not occur. At 
Guildford, an important stop between London and Portsmouth, with barracks that could 
accommodate 537 horses, the army still needed to billet troops in the town. Each year 
during the annual fair troops stationed in local public houses were removed, so that 
there was sufficient accommodation for people coming to the fair. " Billeting in public 
houses could disperse troops very widely. Captain Gordon's troop of seventy-four men 
and eighty horses were stationed at twelve different locations in Guildford, with some 
men's arms, and even horses, kept at different locations from their billets . 6' Guildford's 
example could be repeated across the county at similar towns stationed on the main 
55 Michael R. Haley, 'Civilian Soldiers in Staffordshire, 1793-1823', PhD (Sheffield Hallam University, 
1995), pp. 37. Only in 1812 did the Staffordshire Militia move from Windsor. 56 W03/47, Calvert to General Lord Heathfield, 28 December 1808. 57 Emsley, 'The Military and Popular Disorder', JSAHR, 61 (1983), pp. 17-18. 58 BL, Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37891, f 16, Statement of Barracks in Great Britain, 30 December 
1794. 
59 WO40/26, General Return of Barracks in Great Britain, I April 1807. 60 Surrey History Centre, BR/QS/5/32, Draft letter to Secretary at War, 22 April 1807,29 April 1808; 
Merry to Mayor of Guildford, 12 July 1811; draft letter to Secretary at War, 17 November 18 10; Merry to 
Mayor of Guildford, 2 October 18 10; Merry to Mayor of Guildford, 3 May 1811. 61 SHC, BR/QS/5/33, List of quarters of Capt. Gordon's troop, 19 October 1809. 
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military arteries of the UK. 
As noted above, health concerns prompted the removal of soldiers from contact 
with civilians, but there were also other calls for soldiers to be relocated. This 
particularly applied to captured deserters and criminals who were awaiting 
transportation or were destined for service in one of the penal units. In 1808, it was 
suggested that a permanent arrangement be made for the removal of these men of 
'desperate character' as their numbers were growing to alarming levels, and tying down 
troops to police them. ' In 1809, the 2/60P was sent as a reinforcement to the Channel 
Islands, to replace the 39P which had left for Portugal, but this regiment, as Doyle 
argued, is 'instead of being a reinforcement, it is in truth an embarrassment to me, as it 
requires other troops to watch them': in six days six had deserted. The regiment had 
enlisted some French sailors, who absconded to France, prompting Doyle to beg that the 
remainder be given to the navy. ' 
Service at home also encouraged officers, and in some cases men, to take leave, 
and it was difficult to refuse when they had been fighting overseas. However, this 
further reduced the fighting capacity of the unit, and limited the options available to the 
Duke of York and the government. The system of inspection reports insured that the 
Horse Guards had reasonably accurate information on the state of the army, and so 
could take remedial action if needed. For instance, the 2/67th stationed at Alderney was 
particularly bad in 1808, because of the lack of officers, and so it was removed to 
Guernsey, where the local general was told to improve the unijL64 Fortunately it did 
improve, and so Calvert did not have to carry out his threat to bring it to the Duke of 
York's attention. In 1808, the commander of the 2& received a warning that his 
regiment had too many unfit men in it, the implication being that it was not receiving 
sufficient attention. The regiment was threatened with a special inspection to determine 
62 W03/195, Calvert to Gordon, 21 May 1808. 63 WO 1/605, Doyle to Castlereagh, 6 July 1809. 64 W03/46, Calvert to Doyle, 16 & 17 July 1808. 
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if they should be removed. ' 
Finally, the army had to recruit on a larger scale than in peacetime, requiring the 
dispersal of troops in recruiting parties spread across the UK in an effort to attract more 
men. The seven recruiting parties from the 2/6h in 1812 provide a typical example of 
their dispersion across the UK: it had parties at Blackburn, Manchester, Cambridge, 
Stamford, Newcastle-under-Lyme, Royston and Tunbridge. The 4/0"'s quest for men 
ensured it had thirty-one parties out, from Inverness to Truro, from Hackney to 
Roscommon. This made the transfer of units from the home army to overseas or even 
Ireland slower, as they had to assemble the units fust. When the 2/34th and 2/39h were 
chosen to go to the Peninsula, they had to go first to a port in England where they could 
pick up the recruits they had gained. 66The units also needed to acquire accoutrements 
and equipment for their new establishment, caused by their success in attracting men, 
which meant involving the Ordnance and civilian contractor, and often resulting in 
delays. Heavy recruiting could mean that some units would be mostly composed of 
recruits in training, and so unfit for active campaigns. In 1808 the 2/36th was reported as 
having many young men in its rear and centre ranks who 'have not sufficient strength to 
undergo much fatigue. " Bringing recruits up to standard was a time consuming 
process. In the report on the 2/8th for 1810,400 men were 'daily improving in strength 
and size; in two or three years they will be capable of any service. '" The 4/1' was 
particularly bad with respect to its training, as it supported three battalions overseas. In 
1812, only 562 of its 1,279 privates could exercise with the battalion (i. e. had learnt to 
use a musket and march in company formations). 6' 
The interaction of the different deployments, contradictory priorities, and the use 
of the UK as a depot for unhealthy troops severely impaired the efficiency of the army 
65 03/45 Wynyard to Maj. Gen. Forbes (Canterbury), II February 1808. 66 
67 
03/197, Calvert to Gordon, 2 June 1809. 
69 
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in the UK, and produced difficult choices for the Horse Guards. In 1810, although a 
large part of the disposable force was at that time in Britain, adding to the potential 
number of troops available, the effects of its use in that role meant most of them were ill 
with Walcheren fever. Consequently, the calls for troops in Ireland were only answered 
with two battalions (the 2/59h and 75h), although it was hoped that 3,500 would soon 
be sufficiently recovered to join them. Although these hopes proved premature as the 
number of sick actually increased, the government decided to send troops over anyway, 
trusting that a change of air would aid their recovery. " It is not surprising that the 
Militia Interchange Act was so important to the government and the army, as it allowed 
the army to use British Militia regiments to supply the manpower demands of Ireland in 
the absence of regulars. At home, the army also interacted with, and had plans affected 
by, the demands of the troops overseas, giving the army difficult decisions to make. In 
1810 the 2/35th was due to fulfil its role as a second battalion and give its fit men to the 
first battalion, but the draft was reduced to 300 men, as the battalion was required in 
Ireland, and it needed to be 'tolerably efficient. "' 
The Static Garrisons Overseas 
The force overseas can be divided into two categories: those on colonial duties 
or in static garrisons, and those who were part of the 'disposable force. On account of 
the numbers of troops committed to overseas garrisons, Britain struggled to deploy a 
large force on the continent. ' The colonial garrisons grew enormously, settling at 
around 80,000 during the Peninsular War, which seems an excessive amount compared 
with pre-war numbers, " but these troops were not committed because of imperial 
ideology. Commerce was crucial to Britain's war effort, but it required massive 
70 H051/171, Ryder to Dundas, 6 March 1810,27 March 1810; H050/415, Torrens to Beckett, 13 April 
1810,4 May 1810; 11051/171, Beckett to Torrens, 7 August 1810. 71 W03/595, Torrens to Bunbury, 14 April IS 10. 72 Hall, British Strategy, also shows the difficulties that existed in concentrating a British army in 
continental Europe. 73 For a detailed breakdown see Graph V. 
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resources to protect it, and resulted in a large portion of the army being subordinate to 
the requirements of the navy. ' The navy was the principal defence of British trade, and 
the maintenance of British naval supremacy was the overriding aim of Britain's wartime 
strategy. However the navy needed bases, not only to service its ships, but also to 
supply them. One of the reasons for the large military force in the Mediterranean was to 
supply the naval blockade of southern France and Italy. The occupation of Sicily meant 
that the blockading fleets were more easily supplied, and the vital base at Malta 
received regular provisions. " 
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threat of other colonies being attacked. ' As always there was the usefulness of captured 
colonies as bargaining counters in any peace negotiations. This powerful combination 
of arguments prompted the attacks on Martinique in 1809, Mauritius in 1810, and Java 
in 1811, leaving Britain as the sole European colonial power. However, these 
acquisitions did little to alter the number of troops required overseas, as each conquered 
colony required a new garrison, and the war with the United States from 1812 meant no 
troops could be taken from the Caribbean. ' Significantly operations outside Europe 
were made with troops already in the vicinity, and only after the war ended in 1814 did 
Britain transfer large numbers of its troops outside Europe, to prosecute the war with the 
USA. 
The Horse Guards was also pressured by interest groups into deploying soldiers 
to the colonies: in the case of Mauritius, the East India Company repeatedly represented 
the mischief that French raiders operating out of the islands did to trade. " The Jamaican 
charter specified that it had to have a garrison of 3,000 white troops, and the Jamaican 
assembly was not afraid to deny ftmds to uphold this point. ' In a further concession to 
the West Indian interest, two thirds of every garrison in the Caribbean had to be white, 
ensuring that the black regiments did not predominate in any single place. "' Moreover, 
the colonies had occasional disturbances and mutinies that led to troops being 
dispatched. The Vellore mutiny in 1806 was particularly disturbing, as it was not over 
the usual traditional 'industrial' claims of pay arrears, but religious issues. " The spread 
of 'the spirit of insubordination' prompted Castlereagh to recommend sending a 
76 French possessions in the Indian Ocean proved especially troublesome, Patrick Crowhurst, The Defence 
of British Trade, 1689-1815, (Folkestone, 1977), pp. 243-245; for the policy of denying Napoleon access 
to colonies, C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the Worlg 1780-1830, (London, 
1989), pp. 103-105. 77 American privateers swarmed throughout the Caribbean in 1812, Donald I- II ickey, The War of 1812: 
A Forgotten Conflict, (Urbana, 1989), p. 97. 78 W03/597, Torrens to Bunbury, 2 June 18 10. 
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1600-1947, (Manchester, 1995), p. 62. 
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reinforcement of 3,000 men to India. " There were ftu-ther disturbances, even involving 
some officers, at Seringapatam. " Finally, there were open conflicts in the colonies: 
between 1805 and 1814 India was relatively quiet after Wellesley's conquests, but war 
broke out with Nepal in 1814, lasting two years. " The most disruptive 'colonial' war 
involved hostilities with the USA between 1812 and 18 IS. " 
When Britain became the only colonial power in 1811, the demands on the army 
were still large. In the Defence Report of that year, it was estimated that 55,000 infantry 
and six regiments of cavalry were required for colonial garrisons, " and after further 
consideration the Duke of York felt that all the colonial garrisons were at a minimum, 
and the deteriorating situation with the United States meant that a reinforcement would 
probably be needed in the West Indies and North America, further stretching the army's 
manpower. "" By 1813 the war with the United States had worsened the situation, and the 
colonies needed reinforcing urgently. The Duke of York reported that 'It is impossible 
to say that the Leeward Islands are left in a state of safety': out of 13,521 men, 3,922 
were black, 3,927 foreigners, and 2,124 ex-deserters. "' The new strategic burden of an 
expanded empire was confirmed after the war, and the establishment of the colonial 
garrisons was set at 66,300, a number not substantially different from the wartime total 
especially considering some colonies were returned. "' 
Britain's colonial duty imposed many of the same restrictions on troops as the 
home army. Canada, at one stage, resembled the situation in Ireland. The local general 
wanted an Irish regiment (the 98h) removed because of democratic agitation, believed 
to be French inspired in the province, and because the catholic bishop was thought to 
82 Vane (edL), Castlereagh Correspondence, 2d Series, 7,52-53, Minute for Cabinet, May 1807. 
83 Heathcote, The Mflita? y in British India, p. 64. " Heathcote, The Military in British India, p. 66. as For an account of the war from the USA's perspective, see Hickey, The War of 1812. 86 W030/80, Defence RepoM I January 18 11, p. 17. :7 W025/3224, York to Liverpool, 7 December 1811. 
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have 'too great a sway amongst them. '" More damaging was the effect of climate and 
deployment in the colonies. This could debilitate corps very quickly, and although the 
army tried to maintain its rotation system, inevitably demands elsewhere took priority, 
and units usually remained in inhospitable garrisons until they were wrecks. This was 
particularly true of corps in America and the West Indies. The 1/91" was deliberately 
ordered to Canada from the West Indies because the climate was healthier there, after 
the Wh had 'effected a wonderful recovery' from a similar move. 9' When more units 
were shipped to North America from the Caribbean during the war with the USA, it 
revealed the effects of the Caribbean climate on European troops. The general at 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, feared that the North American winter would prove fatal to many 
men of the 64th, recently moved there, despite the comforts of its garrison. 92 The 13' 
was in a similar state in 1815.9' 
In the Caribbean, the British army faced the dual problem of an unhealthy 
climate, and unit dispersion. The effects of the climate are well documented, and it is 
estimated that there were 352,000 casualties in the West Indies between 1793 and 1815, 
including all sick, wounded, missing or dead: less than ten per cent of these horrific 
figures were battle related. " Unit dispersion also incapacitated units. The local colonial 
assemblies wanted troops to guard every possible point of attack and watch over their 
plantations. This ensured that a battalion could have companies spread over a wide 
distance, and in some cases spend several years apart from their headquarters. It was not 
uncommon for separate companies of the same battalion to be stationed on different 
islands, and although the army wanted to rotate such detached units, so that each 
company would spend some time with the headquarters, the general shortage of 
90 BL verpool papers, Add. Mss. 38244, ff. 234-35, Craig to Liverpool, 24 March 18 10. 91 W07/107, ? to Grant, I May IS 11. 92 W027/117, Inspection report of 64th, 22 September 1813. 93 W027/133, Inspection report of 13'h, 25 May 18 15. 94 Roger Buckley, "Ilie Destruction of the British Army in the West Indies, 1793-1815: A Medical 
History. ', JS, 4HR, 56 (1978), p. 80; these figures have been questioned, see the response of D. Geggins in 
the same volume, pp. 238-240. 
62 
transports ensured that this rarely happened. Consequently, the whole unit effectively 
ceased any training, and discipline became lax. " 
Iffiere were also structural problems that affected the colonial army. Many of the 
units in those garrisons did not have second battalions, and so received very few new 
troops, if any. The 65h, stationed at Bombay, had no means of support at home, and by 
1810, although it was well acclimatised, it was so reduced in numbers as to be almost 
useless. " Otherwise, units in the East Indies were generally better, as they had troops 
transported to them each year, allowing them to keep up their strength. However, 
because of the huge distances, and the length it took to sail there, the army had to be 
careful when, and whom, it sent to India. Units in India were allowed to recruit lads and 
boys, and they were chosen specifically to reinforce local forces. Hopefully their youth 
meant that they could better withstand the climate, and serve the army for many years. 97 
The West Indies were slightly different, and the official policy was to select men fit 
enough to serve there, which probably meant having some experience of being a soldier, 
but also not being too old. "' 
The army therefore sought alternatives to provide for colonial defence. One 
option was to send penal units to areas such as the Caribbean and African coast where 
desertion was difficult, if not impossible. This was actively taken up, and, in 1807, a 
separate corps was created for garrison duty on the African coast, and a large proportion 
of the troops in the West Indies were deserters and criminals. A second alternative was 
to raise colonial corps, in a repetition of the local forces in the UK. in the West Indies, 
there were the West India regiments raised in Africa, " and the 60th was composed of 
foreigners which besides the fifth battalion, was used exclusively in the West Indies and 
93 Buckley, Slaves in Redcoats, pp. 108-109. 96 W027/99, Inspection report of 65th, 14 March 18 10. 97 W03/45, Calvert to Whetham, 9 April 1808, informing Whetham to select all the lads and boys from 
the 2/89h to reinforce the first battalion in India. 98 W03/49 Wynyard to Lt. Gen. Leighton, 29 November 1809, informing Leighton to select men for the 
1/96'h and 
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America. " Because of the large number of battalions it had (eight eventually) the 
individual battalions were used in rotation, ensuring that the battalions in the colonies 
were always kept up to strength, and each unit had a backbone of experienced 
soldiers. 101 In Canada, fencible units were raised, and there were similar local units at 
the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon. It was even suggested that a corps of cavalry could 
be raised from French deserters for service at the Cape of Good Hope, along with a 
colonising corps of 600 to 700 highlanders to help protect the frontier there, thus 
releasing some regular troops. 102 The prime example of the use of local populations to 
provide for colonial defence was India. In this period, the East India Company's army 
expanded massively, reflecting the company's growing militarism. In 1805, the East 
India Company controlled 150,000 men; by 1813 there were approximately 300,000 
troops there, with the British army only accounting for 40,000. " Such a mobilisation 
was exceptional, and unlikely elsewhere because of local hostility to the raising of 
native troops. '" 
The distances involved created immense transportation problems for the Horse 
Guards. In 1810, the French conquest of Andalusia and the consequent need to reinforce 
the Mediterranean coincided with calls from the commanding officer in Malta that two 
units there needed to be relieved. It also coincided with a re-organisation of troops in the 
East Indies and the Cape. So, the 2/3e and 2/47fl' were moved from Gibraltar to the 
East Indies (their first battalions were already there), to replace the corps coming home. 
To get them to India, they were to move to Madeira and be picked up by the annual 
100 The third and forth battalions of the 60'h were raised in 1787 specifically for service overseas, Pimlott, 
'The Administration of the British Army, 1783-1793, PhD, p. 228. 101 W03/595, Torrens to Edward Cooke, 5 October 1809. The 2/60, h as sent out, after completing its 
numbers from Germans captured at Walcheren, and the 1/60 th returned, as it had been longest in the 
Caribbean. 
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India convoy. " It was felt that the climate at Gibraltar might be better for some of the 
remaining Walcheren regiments, so the 2/4h and 1/28 th would move from the UK to 
Gibraltar. Torrens had hoped the reinforcement at Gibraltar would be sufficient to meet 
the crisis in Spain, and although he knew the benefit of moving old corps from 
garrisons, Malta would have to wait: 'it cannot counterbalance the injury we do the 
service, and the Individual regiments in particular, by moving from the country, the 
corps which are little better than in Hospital. "' All he could suggest was to wait and 
see if Corfu was occupied, and if troops could be made available from Sicily to replace 
those at Malta. The choice was to relieve the Mediterranean garrisons, or have a few 
disposable men in Britain. Even then, troops for the Mediterranean would have to come 
from the Channel Islands, which, as seen above, were fearful of an invasion. "' 
Eventually, as a last resort, the Horse Guards suggested placing a garrison corps there, 
which was not approved by government. "' Such troop movements also tied up 
manpower: in December 1807,12,73 6 soldiers were on passage, and in November 1811 
the figure was only down to 7,892 men. " 
The 'Disl2osable Force' 
It is evident that the restrictions placed by the home and colonial garrisons had 
serious repercussions upon the size of the army that could be deployed in Europe. 
Ministers were keen to have such a force for a number of reasons: in aid of its allies (for 
example the expedition to Stralsund in 1807), or to maintain its naval predominance 
(the Copenhagen expedition), or a combination of both (such as Walcheren). "I 
However, providing an active force seriously compromised the strength of the home and 
colonial garrisons. In 1807, a memorandum presented to the Cabinet highlighted that 
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sending a relatively small force of 16,000 to the continent would leave only eight 
battalions of over 500 men in Britain (totalling 7,787 men, including the always large 
Foot Guards battalions), and sixteen battalions in Ireland (10,966 men). At the same 
time the colonial garrisons were 10,000 men short of their establishments, "' which also 
needed to be supplied from the home army. At the end of 1807 the disposable force had 
been reduced to 10,077 men, of whom 3,909 were GUardS. 112 
The size of any British army deployed on the continent was therefore a political 
decision, judged on the advantages gained versus the risks involved in reducing 
garrisons. The figures given by the Horse Guards were always hedged with provisos 
and warnings. "' In 1812, the Horse Guards transmitted a return of the number of men 
available in an emergency, but Torrens warned 'In returning these numbers, His Royal 
Highness has not been guided in any degree by the necessity of reinforcing troops for 
the defence of this country and Ireland. It will therefore remain for the government to 
consider how far any contingency would warrant the embarkation of the whole effective 
force now disposable for service. ""' At one point the Duke of York questioned the 
wisdom of the commitment to Portugal: although it tied down a French army, it had 
reduced the home garrison by 63,000 men, which might not compensate for Napoleon's 
expansion into northern Europe, and the threat that posed to Britain. "' 
From 1809, a system of consultation emerged between the army and government 
to establish what troops could be sent to reinforce Wellington's growing army. In that 
year conversations were held between Torrens and Bunbury, with Torrens providing the 
necessary details on the state of troops (i. e. strength, efficiency, etc., all from the 
inspection returns), which Bunbury would then use to decide which troops were to be 
sent to the Peninsula. In 1809, they had no difficulty finding the 5,000 infantry and a 
"1 WO 1/903, Memorandum to the Cabinet on the Military Force, 26 May 1807. 112 WO 1/636, York to Castlereagh, I September 1807. 113 W025/3224, York to Liverpool, 7 Decmber 1811. 
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cavalry regiment that had been requested by Wellington. "" However, it was not always 
that simple. In February 1810, two units were selected as potential reinforcements to 
Wellington, but the 2/67th was about to make a draft to its second battalion in India, and 
the other corps, the 2/38h, only had five hundred men, which Torrens thought would be 
totally inefficient after six weeks service. Consequently Torrens recommended that the 
2/38th be kept at home. "" 
Massena's advance against Wellington in 1810, and the retreat of Wellington's 
army back to the lines of Torres Vedras forced the government and the army to consider 
the total force available in an emergency. In August 1810, five units were considered fit 
for field service in an emergency (4h, 5th, 50th, 68d', totalling 2,750 men plus the 
Brunswick corps). "' By November 1810 the units available had been revised, and 
preparations were made to concentrate them around Portsmouth and Cork. "' A week 
later, orders were given for the concentration of a force at Portsmouth, consisting of the 
2 nd , 1/36th, 51't9 2/52 nd , 68th, 85h and I't and 2 
nd KGL Light Dragoons. Torrens added 
that the Guards could possibly give another 1,000 men. They were ready by early 
December, a quite creditable achievement. 120 The calculations made in 1811 for an 
emergency force demonstrated the benefit of the militia interchange. Toffens calculated 
that from England and the Channel Islands 9,562 men were available, in Scotland 2,977 
and Ireland 2,702 (all exclusive of Foot Guards). In this memorandum, he also drew the 
distinction between units that could go without any inconvenience (5,600 men), and 
those that could be used in an emergency (an additional 9,450). However, once again, 
he warned that using this force would only leave two weak battalions, 'none of which 
could be rendered available to service abroad at present. "" The development of such 
116 BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38244, f. 63, Bunbury to Liverpool, 2 December 1809. 117 W03/595, Torrens to Bunbury, 21 February 18 10. 11g W03/597, Torrens, to Bunbury, 2 August 18 10. 
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consultation between the army and government, enabled Britain to respond more 
effectively to crises and opportunities, but it placed control over the size and 
deployment of Britain's disposable force fmnly in the hands of the government. 
Giving control over the organisation of the disposable force to government 
meant that the army's ideal deployment of a first battalion serving overseas being 
supplied by the second battalion at home was not always maintained. As many of the 
first battalions were incapacitated during 1809 and 1810 after Corunna and Walcheren, 
second battalions were sent to reinforce Wellington in the Peninsula during those 
years. " This created problems later, as the Horse Guards wanted to adhere to the ideal 
deployment of a regiment, whilst Wellington wanted to retain second battalions as they 
were seasoned and experienced. A compromise was agreed that if the regiment was 
sufficiently strong (for a two-battalion regiment over 1,600 men), the Commander in 
Chief allowed both battalions to be on active service. So, in 1808, the 2/5 th and 2/40 th 
remained in the Peninsula, whilst the 2/38h and 2nis, came back to the UK. "' Often 
when the first battalions were sufficiently recovered they were sent to the Peninsula, the 
men of the second battalion were drafted into the first, and the skeleton of the second 
battalion sent back to recruit in the UK. 
In 1811 the Duke of York requested that all second battalions should be returned 
to recruit in Britain and the number of squadrons in cavalry regiments in the Peninsula 
should be reduced so that they could have a good depot in the UK. "' Although 
Wellington complied with the latter request, he formed small second battalions into 
provisional battalions, and kept them for the duration of the Peninsular War, despite the 
Duke of York's requests to have them returned to recruit. Some second battalions also 
belonged to regiments with battalions on colonial duty, and they were needed at home 
122 For instance the 2/34"' and 2/39h went to Portugal in 1809, W01/641, Gordon to Robinson, 2 June 
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to preserve the efficiency of their first battalions (namely the 2/24h, 2/30'h and 2/5P). 
The plight of single battalion regiments, which were also formed into provisional 
battalions, was similar to that of second battalions. The Duke of York wanted them 
home to recruit when they were reduced in numbers, and advised against dividing single 
battalion regiments, after the experience of the 85 th had resulted in 'A degree of 
irregularity, contention and every species of indiscipline. "" 
Conclusion 
The deployment of the British Army clearly showed that it was subservient to a 
number of interests, but these interests were not necessarily detrimental to Britain's war 
effort, they were crucial to Britain's position as a military power. As government relied 
exclusively on public credit, it was necessarily at the mercy of public perceptions of its 
protection of British interests. In a climate were a small invasion in Wales could cause a 
panic, it was hardly surprising that the British army had to be deployed everywhere, and 
to defend everything. Britain's financial strength was crucial to its continued 
commitment to the war, and although the tax burden within the UK had increased after 
the introduction of the income tax in 1798, customs from overseas trade were a major 
component of government finance. The navy was the mainstay of commercial defence, 
but it required bases across the world, which the army had to protect, and of course the 
army had to protect overseas possessions from whence the valuable cargoes emanated. 
In such circumstances, control over the deployment of the army was bound to 
pass to politicians, as the decision made on the strength of troops in a particular location 
could not be made purely on military grounds. The transfer of control of the army to the 
politicians has been seen as one of the crucial developments during the Napoleonic 
Wars, but it was almost inevitable given the scale of British commitments and the size 
of its military resources. Judged from a continental military perspective (as it often has 
125 W01/654, York to Wellington, 13 January 1813. 
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been), the deployment of the army during the Peninsular War was flawed, but this fAs 
to understand the reality of Britain's war effort. 
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ChUter 3: The Politics of Anny Recruitment 
Introduction 
In 1812 Marquis Wellesley testified to the importance of the politics of army 
recruitment by leaving the Perceval ministry because he claimed that the government's 
efforts in the Peninsula were conducted 'on an inadequate and imperfect scale'. ' 
Between 1803 and 1811 the UK's various ministries tried five different methods to 
increase the army, and replace the increasing casualties. In fi-aming these measures, they 
were influenced by the strategic and parliamentary circumstances. The Addington 
government raised an Army of Reserve in 1803, a force raised by ballot for service in 
the UK and organised into new battalions, which were later incorporated into the regular 
army as second battalions. Pitt's government of 1804 to 1806 passed the Permanent 
Additional Force Act which placed the onus on raising men on parish officials, each 
parish having a quota to fulfil, again for service in the UK and incorporated into the 
second battalions. The Talents repealed both of these measures in 1806, and chose to try 
to increase recruiting through making soldiering attractive. After the collapse of the 
Talents in 1807, Parliament had three choices: to continue with Windham's short 
service system; to use the militia to supply the deficiencies in the army, and integrating 
Britain's existing military forces into a general system; or to consider more radical 
reforms of the army, raising a force similar to the Army of Reserve. 
ne Minisqy of all the Talents: Windham's Short Service Plan 
The Talents Ministry that came to power in 1806 held very specific opinions on 
supplying the army. Both the new Secretary of War, William Windham, and the 
Secretary at War, Hon. Richard Fitzpatrick, had previously advocated the introduction 
of short-service into the army. They believed balloting for the armed forces, either for 
1 BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38247, ff. 267-276, Minutes by Wellesley on a conversation with Liverpool, 17 May 1812. 
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the regulars or the militia, merely raised bounties and encouraged desertion. Short- 
service would stimulate ordinary recruiting, and if accompanied by a compulsory 
pension, would make soldiering more competitive in the labour market. 
The main points of the short service scheme, which were incorpomted into the 
1806 Mutiny Act, were enlistment for seven years, after which a soldier could obtain his 
discharge or re-enlist for another seven years at a higher rate of pay. He could re-enlist 
for a maximum of two more periods making the maximum length of service twenty-one 
years. A pension was provided as an automatic right, guaranteeing a soldier some 
remuneration for his time in the service. The plan meant that a soldier was not signing 
away his life, and he would not be destitute if he was unfit to work again after his term 
of service. Windham wanted the army to cease being composed of 'those who were 
easy to be acted upon by the arts of crimps, or the immediate temptation of a high 
bounty. ' and to be filled with a 'thoughtful, considerate and undebauched class of 
men'. ' By this measure, Windham hoped to present a choice to the 'bargain making part 
of society ... that is, on thoughtful and considerate men, who looked somewhat to 
futurity. ' This was an admirable act of enlightened social policy, recognising that the 
state had some responsibility for those who served it. As Windham emphasised in 
defence of his scheme during 1807, it was not just about recruiting men; 'it was a bare 
act of justice due to the brave men who had spent their lives in the service of the 
country'. 3 
Despite the intentions of Windham's system, it failed to produce sufficient 
numbers quickly, and became a party issue - one by which the recently ousted Pittites 
could embarrass the Talents. Castlereagh, as Secretary of War in Pitt's last 
administration, was the obvious choice to lead such an attack. In early 1807, as the 
annual renewal of the Mutiny Act approached, he called for returns of the effective 
2 HanSard, 1806-07, VHI, 472. 
3 Hansard, 1806-07, VIII, 472. 
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strength of the regulars and the militia, hoping to humiliate the Talents Ministry, and 
strengthen his campaign to discontinue limited service. Although the returns were not 
produced, because such information would immediately be transmitted to Napoleon, " it 
signalled the opening of deliberations on Britain's military recruitment policy. 
A complex and lengthy series of debates on Windham's system ensued before 
the passing of the 1807 Mutiny Act. Castlereagh had two objections to the system: first, 
that it was not producing a sufficient number of men; second, that it provided an 
automatic right to a pension regardless of the length, or the record, of a soldier's service. 
On the issue of numbers, Castlereagh pointed out that Parliament was being asked to 
vote for 293,000 men, yet there was a deficiency of 37,000 men, which the Talents 
showed no vigour in trying to remedy. In fact, he asserted that the strength of the army 
was only preserved in 1806 by measures introduced in the previous government (the 
Permanent Additional Force Act, which was in operation in early 1806, and the annual 
Irish Militia transfers), and that 'It did not appear that one man more had enlisted from 
the temptation of the right honourable gentleman's system. ' This was a particularly 
effective criticism, as Windham had previously condemned the Addington and Pitt 
governments on the performance of their military policies. Castlereagh closed his 
speech by highlighting the fact that Windham had not discharged the soldiers with over 
twenty-one year's service, as he had promised to do, demonstrating that even Windham 
was losing faith in his plan. ' 
Windham's main defence was that he 'never expected, from the adoption of the 
it, any sudden effect, but rather a gradual amelioration in the recruiting of the army, 
leading finally to the most beneficial effects'. The system was only fully established in 
October, and he expected better results the longer it was in operation. Appealing to the 
ever-present desire in Parliament to see improvements in public spending, Windham 
4 Hansard, 1806-07, VIII, 438. 
5 Hansard, 1806-07, VIII, 472-507. 
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hinted that he would eventually be able to withdraw the bounty altogether. He criticised 
Castlereagh's preference for militia transfers, as 'like a dram given to the country, 
which for the moment might increase its power, but which would be followed by greater 
languor and debility'. ' 
The subsequent debate showed the party divisions on this issue. Perceval duly 
agreed with Castlereagh; Whig support for Windham came from Lord Howick (soon to 
be Earl Grey), and Lord Henry Petty. Significantly, Windham had support from outside 
the obvious government supporters. Sir John Doyle, closely connected to Earl Moira 
and the Whig faction of the Prince of Wales, presented facts on the success of 
Windham's system in some of the garrison battalions under his command in Guernsey,, 7 
and H. 'Momton (Wilberforce's cousin, and one of the 'Saints') also supported short- 
service. The scheme was even defended by some future supporters of the Portland 
government" Consequently, Castlereagh's proposal to allow men to enlist for life was 
easily defeated by 179 votes to 60. " 
During these debates in early 1807, some of Windham's support in the House, 
was qualified: they believed that Windham's system was a long-term solution, but 
another measure was also required to cover the army's immediate needs. Windham 
received similar views from outside Parliament. Lieutenant General Lord William 
Bentinck praised the short service scheme, but added 'The only point in which I felt 
disappointed was that the completion of the military establishment was still left to 
chance and uncertainty. We must have sooner or later have recourse either to 
conscription or ballot. "' Windham's system might have been admired, but its support 
was qualified by the practicalities of maintaining the strength of the army. 
6 Hansard, 1806-07, VIII, 472-507. 
7 In the six months previous to Windham's system being introduced, in one battalion, 147 men 
volunteered for general-service, in the six months following, 334 men volunteered. In another battalion, 
the figures were I and 264 (out of 400 men). 8 Sir James Pulteney (the next Secretary at War), and Colonel John Maxwell Barry, who owed his seat to 
the Wellesley interest in Ireland, and was Colonel of Cavan Militia. See entries in Thome, The Commons. 9 Hansard, 1806-07, VIII, 536-549; 1807, IX, 63,102-105. 
10 BL, Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37886, ff. 174-177, Bentick to Windham, 12 March 1807. 
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After the collapse of the Talents, Castlereagh was keen to discontinue short- 
service, and although he had the Duke of York's and the King's approval, " given the 
support for Windham, Castlereagh proceeded cautiously. Firstly, he waited until a new 
Parliament had convened, which increased the number of MPs supporting the ministry 
by encouraging and utilising 'Church and King' feeling in the country during the 
election. " Despite this victory for the government, Castlereagh still advocated caution, 
to avoid 'unnecessary difficulty on the first meeting of Parliament'. He recommended 
that the proceedings on the military that session 'should be confined as much as possible 
to the simple provision of increasing our disposable force, reserving all more disputable 
regulations of military detail for future decision'. " Secondly, he was mindftil that the 
1807 Mutiny Act had received the King's assent, and so it was better to wait until its 
renewal in 1808.1" Any ftirther changes in recruitment policy were left until the next 
session, as Castlereagh warned 'it will be more prudent to manifest no impatience 
abruptly to subvert it (Windham's system), but reserve such alterations as, from ftdl 
deliberation may appear to be expedient to be proposed in the subsequent session. ' 15 
Castlereagh wanted to change the, Talents' military system, and also test the 
strength of Windham's supporters. To this end, in the Militia Transfer Bill of 1807, 
Castlereagh introduced a clause during the committee stage of its passage allowing 
militiamen the choice to serve for life or enlist under Windham's system. Adding an 
important clause in such a manner was initially disconcerting to many MPs, but, after a 
long discussion, the clause was passed by 73 votes to 10. When this amendment was 
presented to the house, it was again passed, but with a narrower margin of 96 to 46. The 
11 Cookson, British ArmedNation, pp. 122-123. 12 Before the 1807 election the Portland ministry had a 'sure majority' of 23; after the election it could 
count on 388 ministerial MPs, against 224 opposition, 29 independent, 17 doubtful and 12 neutral, giving 
the government a clear majority of 106. Tliome, The Commons, 1, pp. 188-192. 13 Vane (ed. ), Castlereagh Correspondence, 2 nd Series, 7,55-56, 'Measures proposed for Improving the State of the Military Force', 12 May 1807. 14 Aspinall (ed. ), Later Correspondence ofGeorge Iff, IV, 552, Castlereagh to the King, 3 April 1807. 15 Vane (ed. ), Castlereagh Correspondence, 2d Series, 7,56, 'Measures proposed for Improving the State 
of the Military Force, 12 May 1807. 
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passage of the Militia Transfer Bill, '6meant that Windham's system was closer to being 
undone. Windham even suggested that the clause re-introducing unlimited service was 
the reason behind the Militia Transfer Bill. 17 
Before the Mutiny Act of 1808, the Duke of York presented a long 
memorandum in which he concurred with Castlereagh's view of short-service. Although 
recruiting in the last quarter of 1806 had been generally better, and desertions were 
reduced, the system of pensions and pay had proved almost impossible to administer, 
and the automatic right to a pension removed any encouragement for a soldier to be 
obedient. Overall the Duke thought eighteen months was a long enough trial, and he 
called upon the government to repeal the measure 'which has not only been found 
incompetent to the purpose for which it was enacted, but replete with inconvenience and 
detriment to His Majesty's service'. "' The King also approved of re-introducing 
unlimited service. " 
Despite this endorsement of its policy, the Portland ministry still had to present 
it to a potentially hostile Parliament, where the opposition were likely to mount a 
serious attack on the issue. The government again proceeded cautiously, and it was not 
until March that Windham had 'the first intimation ... of an intention to attack the 
military system of last year' and this information was only extracted 'out of 
observation'20 The clause allowing men to choose a term of service was, like the similar 
clause in the 1807 Militia Transfer Act, introduced in the committee stage, and so the 
Mutiny Bill of 1808 was contested. Although the re-introduction of unlimited service 
was passed in quite a full house (169 to 100, and 189 to 116 in the second reading), " the 
strength of support for Windham's system was demonstrated, especially considering 
16 47 Geo. III, session 2, c. 55 & c. 57. 17 HanSard, 1807, IX, 860-906, & 931-967. 
'g WO 1/637, York to Stewart, I February 1808. 19 Aspinall (ed. ), Later Correspondence George Iff, V, 26, Castlereagh to the King, 29 February 1808, & 
27, King's reply. 20 H. Baring (ed. ), The Diary of the Right Honourable William Windham, 1784-1810, (London, 1866), p. 
475. 
21 Hansar4 1808, )(, 923; 980-991 & 1080-1084. 
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that the supporters of the Talents administration had lost seats in the recent election. 
Those who voted against Castlereagh in the Commons were sufficiently incensed to 
print a list of the minorityýn and this evidence showed that Windham retained support 
from outside the Grenville-Whig opposition. For instance, Lord Sidmouth and some of 
his followers continued to vote with the Talents, as they had done when they were in 
power. ' There was also support from independent members, such as Ralph 
Mydddelton-Biddulph, who sat for his wife's family seat of Denbigh, and considered 
himself independent of party. He was a member of the select committee on public 
spending, which probably explains his support for Windham's measure. William Eliot, 
despite having had no interest in the Grenville ministry, and a Lord of the Treasury in 
the Portland government, voted for the motion to preserve Windham's system. 24 1 be 
passing of the clause in the Commons effectively ended the debate, and so all that could 
be done in the Lords was an official protest, written by Windham, " from the Whig 
Lords Holland, Grey, Jersey, Essex, and Cawdor. ' 
Shrewdly, Castlereagh did not abolish Windham's system entirely, pitching his 
objection on the 'prescriptive nature of Windham's system, which enforced limited 
service even when the men were perfectly satisfied, and desirous to enter without 
limitation'. This allowed those moderate supporters of Windham's system, to consider 
the passing of the Mutiny Bill of 1808 not as a choice between Castlereagh and 
Windham, but to allow the soldier the decision. In the Lords, Baron Borringdon, 
otherwise a government supporter, summarised this attitude: he considered himself a 
friend of short-service, but thought unlimited service was needed to fulfil the different 
22 Hansard, 1808, X, 1084. 
23 They were Sir George Bowyer and Benjamin Hobhouse. Sidmouth supported Windham's system in the 
Lords, Hansard, 1808, X, 118 1. 
' Although defining political allegiance is difficult in this period, other independents who supported 
Windham, and the Opposition generally, were William Adam, George Anson, Henry Bankes, James 
BuRer, N. Calvert; Nicholas William Ridley Colbourne, James Craig, William Frederick Elliot Eden, 
Maurice Fitzgerald, Lord Henry Fitzgerald, Philip Gell, Benjamin Cooke Griffenhoofe, Henry Arthur 
Herbert, William Hoare Hume, Charles Lemon, Sir William Lemon, Steven Lushington, Richard Power, 
Sir Matthew White Ridley, H. Shelley, William Taylor, John Henry Upton Viscount Templeton. See 
entries in Thorne, The Commons. 25 Baring (ed. ), Windham Diaries, entry for 16 March 1808, p. 476. 26 Hansard, 1808, X, 1179-1193. 
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requirements of colonial defence. The Marquis of Buckingham endorsed this view; 
despite his brother's alliance with the Whigs in opposition. "' Castlereagh's re- 
introduction of unlimited service also postponed discussion of the short service scheme, 
and the limited service men, until 1813, and the King was particularly pleased that the 
government was 'relieved of ftirther discussion on that subject. "' For Windham, his 
short service scheme ceased to be a solution to army recruiting. During the negotiations 
to form a coalition government in 1809, Windham informed Grey that although they 
could repair some of the damage done to their system, 'Part, as I have often told them 
[Castlereagh and the Duke of York] can never be repaired - being the destruction of 
confidence which is no more to be restored than lost virginity. "" 
This was not, however, entirely the end of efforts to improve the soldier's terms 
of service. When the Duke of York informed the Talents in February 1807 that the 
short-scrvicc system was not working, he also included proposals of his own, which 
were shown to the Portland cabinet in March 1808. Short-service would be replaced by 
other benefits: a family allowance to a soldier's wife and family if they remained at 
home whilst he was sent abroad; an extra two pence a day after fourteen years good 
service, and a pension at full rate after eighteen (but with a liability to serve in the 
veteran battalions). " Such proposals were not an attempt to improve recruiting; they 
were part of the efforts by the Horse Guards to make soldiering a profession. " They 
would also make a soldier's service closer to that of the privileged militiaman, and thus 
facilitate volunteering from that force, as it was clear that the Portland government, and 
those that succeeded it, saw transfers from the militia as the means to fulfil the army's 
manpower demands. 
27 ansard, 1808, X, 1179-1180. 28 Aspinall (ed. ), Later Correspondence of George III, V, 26, Castlereagh to the King, 29 February 1808, 
& 42, King to Perceval, 15 March 1808. 29 The Earl of Rosebury (cd. ), The Windham Papers, (London, 1913), pp. 356-358. 30 W01/637, Memorandum by York, 25 February 1807, & 26 March 1808. 31 Cookson, BrifishArmed Nation, pp. 123-124. 
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The Portland Govemment: The Militia Transfers of 1807 and 1809. 
The Portland government, with Castlereagh as the new Secretary of War, had to 
increase the size of the army. As it was committed to intervention on the continent, in 
support of the coalition with Prussia and Russia, the government needed to augment the 
army. Yet the regulars were 35,000 men below the funds voted for them, and the second 
battalions in particular were very weak: fifty-four battalions only totalled 14,098 men, 
an average of 260 men apiece. The state of the second battalions was not simply a 
concern of having unfilled ranks, but was fundamental to the organisation of the army. 
They had a full complement of officers, which cost the government E911,869 annually, 
but only had an average of 16,000 recruits added to them each year, equating to an extra 
E55 per recruit above the bounty paid per man. The number of second battalions 
ensured that these 16,000 men were useless as military units because they were so 
dispersW' but to complete each of these second battalions to a useful 700 men apiece 
would require 23,000 men. The combination of improving the UK's offensive 
capabilities and improving the second battalions meant Castlereagh had to introduce 
'some decisive measure for the augmentation of our Army'. " The withdrawal of 16,000 
troops from the UK for the expedition against Copenhagen made the situation even 
worse. 34 
In the context of the pressing need for men, government military policy 
developed slowly. During May Castlereagh presented the options to the cabinet: they 
could either 'ballot for men direct for the regular army, or to submit to a ballot for men 
for the militia, with the view of our drawing from the militia that aid which the 
incomplete regiments of the line required'. " Castlereagh had previously shown his 
32 Vane (ed. ), Castlereagh Correspondence, 2'd Series, 7,64-65, Memorandum respecting the State of the 
Military Force, 26 May 1807. 
33 Vane (ed. ý Castlereagh Correspondence, 2d Series, 7,53-54, Measures proposed for Improving the 
State of the Military Force, 12 May 1807. 34 Vane (ed. ), Castlereagh Correspondence, 2" Series, 7,62, Memorandum respecting the State of the 
Military Force, 26 May 1807. 
35 HanSard, 1807, K 862-863. 
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preference for using the militia during his last tenure as Secretary of War, overseeing a 
large militia transfer in 1805, and in 1806 introducing an annual draft to the line from 
those Irish Militia regiments who accepted an augmentation of fifteen men per 
company. " There were also particular advantages to drawing men from the militia 
rather than balloting directly for the line. Firstly, it increased the disposable force within 
a few weeks, as the militiamen were all well trained. Secondly, balloting for the militia, 
as opposed to balloting for the line 'had become congenial to the habits of the country'. 
Finally, there were some militiamen whose service was about to expire whom 
Castlereagh wanted to tempt into the army. "' 
It was not sufficient to simply transfer men from the militia, as this would leave 
the militia massively reduced. So, Castlereagh proposed to raise 30,000 men for the 
British Militia and 5,000 for the Irish, which would be sufficient to cover the draft, and 
leave some supernumerary men to cover casualties for a few years. Such a large ballot 
was also intended to placate the militia and county interest in two ways. It was hoped 
that ballots would not be necessary for several years, "' and it would increase the size of 
the militia regiments, meaning more patronage for the militia colonels. 19 The resultant 
bills were complicated, with two linked parts: the militia transfer itself (two fifths of the 
British Militia, and half of the Irish), whilst at the same time balloting for 36,000 men in 
Britain and 8,000 in Ireland. The Copenhagen expedition filled Castlereagh's attention 
during June, and so it was not until July that the measure was finalised, over three 
months after the Portland government came to power. ' 
Besides the protests to Militia Transfer Bill over the inclusion of a clause 
allowing militiamen to choose their terms of service, it also received other objections, 
36 45 Geo. 111, c. 31 & c. 38 (1805 militia transfers); 46 Geo. 111, c. 124 (21 July 1806). Ile augmentation 
act was 44 Geo. III c. 33. 37 Hansard, 1807, M 860-867 & 1106 (HawkesburY repeating the arguments in the Lords). 39 Hd IS 
39 ansar . 
07, DC, 865-867. 
40 
Cookson, British ArmedNation, p. 117. 
Tbe Kin assented the ewýýe on I ly, d the bills Nee resented n 22 807, a month 
t 
10 JyIag ply 11 80 . g, Iy 
a: the gf the ew arllrent. astlerea had Id to sen them on thelyl 71 but was [i 
0 Ju 
tcs to d? sp all ( ), L er Co espondence 0 Geor e III, 
to in wrp 
hall in d, at rr 
neo; 
12 Castlereagh to King, 
r op 0PCpp Jul 
IJ 
!? IN i S( ul 807, Kin 
UI 
July 7; 605-606, Perceval to the 7 07 
80 
again voiced by the Opposition, and some independent MPs. These centred on three 
points: the traditional objections to the disruption of the constitutional force, especially 
when there was no apparent need to do so; the need for such a large ballot; and the 
rejection of balloting directly for the line. There were always the friends of the militia 
who objected to the tampering with the constitutional force (such as William Frankland, 
a Grenvillite, Earl Fitzwilliam's son Lord Milton, and the tenaciously independent John 
Pollexfen Bastard, Colonel of the East Devon Militia), principally militia officers who 
sat in the House, but they were joined by more pragmatic opinion. In late 1807, it 
appeared that Britain's last continental allies were on the verge on making peace with 
Napoleon, and so fears of an invasion were again aroused. A draft from the militia to the 
line implied that the militia was not sufficient for home defence, moreover such a draft 
would damage a major proportion of Britain's defensive force. "' This view was 
confirmed by the fact that the previous militia transfers had been used to increase the 
disposable force for specific objects (in 1799 for the invasion of Holland, in 1805 to 
land a force in North Germany), but in 1807 the government had no allies to help, nor 
any expeditions to launch or mount. " 
The Sidmouthites also voiced restrained disapproval of the government, by 
calling for a ballot directly for the line. Their position recognised the need for 
compulsion in providing men for the army, but they objected to the means, "' and 
Spencer Perceval felt this was the real question for the House to debate. " They feared 
leaving the completion of the army to chance, whilst at the same time disrupting a large 
part of the defensive force of the country. 25,000 men would leave for the line, and the 
remaining 50,000 militiamen would have 44,000 recruits grafted upon them. The 
junction between the ex-Talents and the militia interest produced some unexpected 
41 Hansar4 1807, M 881, speech of Charles Bragge Bathurst (a Sidmouthite). Sir Robert Williams, a 
Grenvillite, said similar (1062). 42 Hansard, 1807, IX, 873, speech of Sir George Warrender. 43 Hansard, 1807, IX, 1111-1117, speech of Sidmouth in the Lords. 44 Aspinall (ed. ), Later Correspondence ofGeorge III, IV, 609, Perceval to the King, 23 July 1807. 
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results. For example, Colonel Edward Lord Stanley, a vociferous detractor of militia 
transfers, stated that 'he would rather the noble lord had brought forward a proposition 
for annihilating the militia altogether, than degrading it by making it subservient to the 
recruiting of the army'. "-' Samuel Whitbread went finther, 'let us not practice it 
(conscription) indirectly but more partially and oppressively, by beating up the militia, 
and then allowing it to feed til it filled itself, in order to devour it. " They were joined 
by similar speeches from Lord Henry Petty, John Bastard, and John Calcraft. This 
alliance of views was centred on the fact that a militia transfer would perhaps destroy 
the constitutional force altogether, for an increase of 28,000 men. "' 
Finally there were objections to the possible effects of the ballot. Charles Philip 
Yorke agreed to the militia transfer and recogriised the need to supply the army by some 
form of compulsion, but objected to the large ballot; Sir Thomas Turton, saw the ballot 
as an unequal tax, and wanted the disparity of it to be remedied first. It would also entail 
a considerable amount of work by the county Lieutenancies, undoubtedly encouraging 
some MPs, such as George Henry Fitzroy, Earl Euston, (whose father was Lord 
Lieutenant of Suffolk), to support the opposition. " The supporters of short service felt 
ballots would destroy Windham's system, as they raised the price for substitutes in the 
militia, and so the lower bounties offered by short-service would not be able to 
compete. "' Windham had the last word in the debates in the Commons, accusing 
Castlereagh of fattening up the militia for his own use; 'Ballot and bounty were indeed 
the only resources that seemed ever to have been thought of "' 
In the new Parliament, however, the government always had it supporters, such 
as Thomas Wood, Colonel of the East Middlesex Militia and brother-in-law of 
45 Hansard, 1807, IX, 932, speech of Col. Stanley. He was colonel of the 2"' Lancashire Militia, son of 12'h Earl Derby, and supported the Talents. 46 Hansard, 1807, M 945, speech of Whitbread. 47 Hansard, 1807, DC, 935-940 (Calcraft and Bastard), 962 (Lord Petty) & 1181 (Sidmouth). 48 Hansard, 1807, IX, 933. He was also Colonel of the West Suffolk Militia, until 1808. His father, the 4h 
Duke of Grafton, originally supported Pitt, but came to terms with Grenville during the Talents ministry. 
Thome, The Commons. 
49 Hansard, 1807, K 1065, speech of Lord Folkestone. " Hansard, 1807, K 883. 
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Castlereagh, or Thomas Hamilton, Lord Binning, who spoke in favour of the 
government. General William Loftus' speech was probably typical of the large military 
presence in the House, supporting the measure as it had given the army some of its best 
NCOs and adjutants. " But as the debate became centred on means, the army's urgent 
need for men discouraged opposition, and encouraged undecided MPs to approve of the 
Bill. The independents Henry Willoughby, John Ingrain Lockhart, and Baron John 
Henniker all spoke in support of the measure. " Thomas Babington spoke for the 
'Saints' (who had decided to judge the Portland ministry on each measure), indicating 
that Wilberforce's followers approved of the militia transfer. " The government could 
also rely on the MPs' desire to perform their patriotic duty and acquiesce in the 
government's plans. Lord Mulgrave thought that there was 'no room to hesitate between 
the two plans (militia transfers and direct balloting)', ' and moderate views ranged from 
Davis Giddy, who supported the bill as the majority of the House did, and Henry 
Bankes, who proclaimed that he was not blind to the inconveniences of the bill, 'but did 
not feel it wan-anted opposing'. " Even Colonel Stanley went as far as to say that 'If, 
however, the bill should pass into a law, he would not throw any impediment in the way 
of its operation. "" The Wbig-Grenville alliance was not united in opposing militia 
transfers, Earl Temple and Thomas Grenville were conspicuously absent from the first 
division on the Bill. 57 
Castlereagh also smoothed the passage of the Bill by declaring that this militia 
draft would be unique: 'the ordinary recruiting, with the aid of the improvements now in 
progress, may, during the war, preserve them [the second battalions] in a state of 
51 Hansard. 1807, IX, 1063. 
52H nS 
' 
53 a ard, 
1807,1)(, 932 (Willoughby), 934 (Lockhart), 964 (Henniker). 
, 
Hansard, 1807, IX, 982. 
.4 
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5 Hansard, 1807, M 980 (Giddy) & 1062 (Bankes). Both were independent, and Bankes was Chairman 
of the Committee of Public Expenditure, and had reformist views. 56 Hansard, 1807, M 932. Mr Bastard said similar (940). 57 Aspinall (ed. ), Later Correspondence ofGeorge III, IV, 610, Perceval to the King, 28 July 1807. 
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efficiency, and, through them, the Army at large. "' As a result the bill was enacted, but 
with divisions; it passed through the Commons 187 to 90, and 76 to 19, and in the Lords 
42 to IV' Windham recognised the significance of the passing of the Bill, as 'If it was 
once admitted that we had a right to plundering the Militia, it was a mere mockery to 
say that a recurrence of the assured necessity of plunder would not happen. " Within 
eighteen months he was proved right, as the government would have cause to use the 
militia again. 
By late 1808, it was clear to the government that there was a new need for 
extraordinary measures. The large disposable force created by the 1807 transfer was 
sent to Spain, and although Sir John Moore's campaign may have saved Spain from 
total conquest, it cost the army dearly. In addition, Austria appeared to be taking 
advantage of Napoleon's involvement in Spain, and the Portland government was 
determined to assist this potential ally in any way possible. As Castlereagh put it, 
'whilst so large a British Force as 45,000 men is exposed to the hazards of war on the 
Continent, it seems indispensable to provide in due time adequate means as well for 
repairing the waste inseparable from military operations, as of providing for home 
defence, should the army in Spain and Portugal unfortunately sustain any more serious 
disaster'. Having decided to use militia drafts as a means to supply deficiencies in the 
army in 1807, Castlereagh again advocated using a militia transfer, but also proposed to 
allow the British Militia to recruit before resorting to a ballot, in this way hoping to 
avoid the detrimental effects of balloting on recruiting. ' This idea had long been in 
58 Vane (ed. ), Castlereagh Correspondence, 2d Series, 7, p. 65, Memorandum on the military force, 26 
May 1807. 
59 Hansard, 1807, K 967,1044,1127. It became 47 Geo. 111, session 2, c. 54 (for Britain) and c. 57 
(Ireland), 13 August 1807. The Militia Completion Acts were 47 Geo. III c. 56 (for Ireland) and c. 71 
(Britain). 
Hansard, 1807, IX, 1065. 
nd Vane (ed. ), Castlereagh Correspondence, 2 Series, 7,127, Memorandum on increasing the Military 
Force. This memo is placed amongst the correspondence of 1807, but it should be dated late 1808. Firstly 
it mentions the 1806 militia transfer, when there was not one, and so this could refer to either 1805 or 
1807. But as it also mentions a ballot as part of the transfer, this means Castlereagh must be referring to 
the 1807 transfer. He also mentions the local militia, which was not created until 1808, and, in the quote 
used above, mentions troops being in Spain, where British troops were not committed until 1808. The 
mention of serious disaster befalling the army in Spain gives a likely date of late 1808, after Moore had 
begun his winter retreat to Comnna. 
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Castlereagh's mind as it had always been an accepted fact in the Irish militia (he was 
Colonel of the County Down Militia). He had initially advocated the extension of this 
scheme to the British Militia in 1807. ' 
As militia drafts were accepted in 1807, the 1809 Militia Enlistment Bill had an 
-easier passage. A division on the first reading was forced by the over zealous Lord 
Milton, which was duly defeated 77 to 26, and then passed through parliamentary stages 
unopposedý' but some MPs did object to the measure. The changes made in the 
recruitment of the militia inflamed the opposition of the militia purists, as much as the 
misuse of the constitutional force to provide men for the regulars. What incensed the 
militia supporters so much was that Castlereagh had broken his pledge that militia 
transfers would not become a regular system to supply the army, yet within six months 
of the end of the 1807 militia draft, he was asking again for more men from the militia. 
George Tierney, one of the opposition's principal spokesmen, simply wanted to know 
what had happened to the force given to Castlereagh in 1807. " Earl Temple concurred 
with Windham's appraisal of two years earlier, and decried the use of militia drafts in 
anticipation of an emergency, 'So that this was now to become a regular system from 
year to year. " Lord Milton and Sir Thomas Turton raised their objections, Milton 
commenting that it appeared that militia drafts were being adopted 'as a regular system 
for supplying the army; "' and Turton stating that it was 'changing constitutional 
principals [sic] of the militia of the country'. " Earl Fitzwilliam went further in the 
Lords, expressing 'considerable regret, that the principle of the militia had in modem 
times been so much departed from, and that the militia regiments should have been 
62 Vane (ed. ), Castlereagh Correspondence, 2nd Series, 7,59, Measures for Improving the state of the 
Military Force, 12 May 1807. 
6' Aspinall (ed. ), Later Correspondence of George 111, V, 176, Perceval to the King, 25 January 1809. 
Some of the votes against the measure were only given out of duty to the Whig party. Hamard, 1809, 
XII, 159-167. 
64 Hansard, 1809, XII, 162. John Calcraft demanded details of the deficiency in the army, supporting 
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made a recruiting, or perhaps, if he might use the expression, a crimping fund for the 
supply of the anny'. " 
Besides these usual howls from the militia die-hards, the principle of drafting 
from the militia had been largely accepted, and the debate in the House shifted to the 
effectiveness of the militia drafting system. Castlereagh, again supported by Colonel 
Wood who was becoming the pro-government militia representative, declared that 
militia transfers were 'the most effectual, and by far the most expeditious means of 
supplying a deficiency in the regular military forces of the country', and that it would 
give the country in the least possible time the largest possible force'. " Militia drafts did 
create a temporary weakness in the defensive force, but this was acceptable. Castlereagh 
pre-empted the Army of Reserve supporters by stating that such a force would do the 
opposite, it would massively increase the defensive force, and reduce the efficiency of 
the offensive troops. 
This did not prevent some MPs from questioning the means adopted by 
govemment. William Eliot, one of Bar-on Eliot's sons and usually a government 
supporter, thought that it would injure 'morality throughout the country; for such would 
be the effect of high bounties given to the recruits from the militia to the line, and the 
substitutes who were to fill their places in the militia ranks'. He had previously 
considered that militia dmfts were a 'fraudulent system of taxation'. "O Sidmouth's 
supporters also voiced their views; Charles Shaw Lefevre declared himself against the 
bill, because of the severity of the ballots, and Sir George Warrender preferred all the 
militia going to the line, and balloting directly for the line. " Sidmouth admitted the 
necessity of militia dmfts and did not oppose the bill, but "He could not approve of the 
practice of enlisting men for one species of service, and afterwards seducing them into 
" Hansard, 1809, XH, 805. The Marquis of Douglas supported him 69 Hansard, 1809, XII, 159-19 1; for Wood's speech supporting Castlereagh, 315-316. 70 Hansard, 1809, XII, 167, & 313. 
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another. " During the debate on the Militia Completion Bill, Daniel Giles went further, 
observing that there were three modes of raising men: increasing the bounty, balloting, 
or reducing service either in time or in space. The government had chosen none of 
these: 'He [Castlereagh] proposed to raise men first by ballot and then by bounty; ' he 
estimated that the last draft had cost E726,000; a third each paid from general taxes, 
from the landed interest, and from individuals subjected to the ballot. " But, as 
Castlereagh observed when he brought in the bill, balloting in some form was 
necessary, and it was better to ballot for the militia, and then draft men into the line, 
than balloting directly to the line. 
The Perceval and LiveMgol Administrations: The 1811 Militia Transfer Act and the 
Intemtion of Britain's Milijaa Forces. 
Fortimately for the Perceval ministry the 1809 transfer act lasted for a year, 74 
which allowed the government to deal with its immediate survival, and the Militia 
Completion Act7' gave the counties a year to try and recruit men to replace those who 
had volunteered for the line. But by summer 1810 it was clear that the army again 
needed reinforcing. General Dundas informed Liverpool that the means of supplying the 
army were inadequate, and that there would be a shortfall of 9,360 men during the year. 
Many of the battalions in Britain were 'wracked with Walcheren fever' and so he 
pressed Liverpool for 'Some strong legislative measure ... with a view of establishing 
such a connection between the different branches of the Armed Forces of the Country as 
may secure the permanent means of recruiting the Regular Regiments. " He did not 
receive any reply to this, from a government preoccupied with the Regency crisis, and 
in December 1810 he again reiterated the need for action, also raising the prospect of 
72 Hansard, 1809, XII, 841. 
73 HanSard, 1809, XII, 803. 
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having to reduce the second battalions, as had been suggested in 1807. " 
During this period, Liverpool turned his attention to the possible measures the 
government could adopt, and considered that 'No other means present themselves but 
drafts from the Militia. "" In a long memorandum, he outlined the problem and proposed 
establishing a permanent annual transfer from the militia. From figures given by 
Dundas, the army had an annual shortfall of around 8,000 men, which he proposed to 
remedy by an annual intake from the militia. At that time the militia had an 
establishment of 96,715, and was 12,395 men deficient, which Liverpool proposed to 
call on the counties to rectify. Then the militia would be reduced to 76,000, but 
gradually through the militia drafts. This would mean that the militia would not have to 
ballot for at least three years, during which time they would be allowed to recruit, as 
they had done in 1809, thus avoiding ballots and not impairing ordinary recruiting or the 
regulars. " Castlereagh had considered the idea of permanent militia transfers in 1807,11 
and his plan was remarkably similar to Liverpool's, inasmuch as he proposed to reduce 
the militia to 60,000, and allow a sixth to volunteer each year. Castlereagh's plan was 
probably modelled upon the successful Irish annual militia transfer, in which fifteen 
men from each company of 100 men could volunteer for the line. The Irish system had 
also demonstrated the success of allowing militia regiments to recruit perpetually to 
replace the volunteers. As Liverpool developed his ideas, they came even closer to 
Castlereagh's plan, reducing the militia to 70,000, and allowing 10,000 men to transfer 
each year! I 
As Liverpool sat in the Lords, it fell to Palmerston to bring the measure to the 
77 W01/644, Dundas to Liverpool, 30 December 1810. Another copy is in BL, Liverpool papers, Add. 
Mss. 38378, ff. 106-107. 
78 BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38361, fE 70-80, Memorandum on the demands of the Army, and 
Militia Transfers, 1810. it is likely this is from the summer of 1810, as it mentions calling on the counties 
to fulfil their militia quotas, i. e. it would be before the expiration of the 1809 Militia Completion Act. 79 BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38361, ff. 65-69, Draft Measure for keeping up the Regular Army. '0 W01/1 116, Militia Transfer Plan, 5 June 1807. Twenty-one colonels supported the plan, twelve were 
pa ainst. 
ne Irish militia transfer took 15% per year; the proposals by Liverpool 14.3%. BL, Liverpool papers, 
Add. Mss. 38361, ff. 65-69, Draft Measure for keeping up the Regular Army. 
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Commons. He outlined the problem, and the reason for an annual transfer: 'it would be 
advisable to recur to the means which experience had shewn [sic] to be so successfiil, 
namely to allow a certain proportion of the militia to volunteer into the line'. " 
Castlereagh added that 'It was extending to the British militia a principle which had 
long been acted upon in Ireland with the greatest advantage. ' He had two suggestions 
for the government: that the militiamen would need some compensation for the loss of 
their family allowance, and that balloting should be avoided for the militia, and 
militiamen should be raised by recruiting parties instead. ' The Horse Guards had 
always advocated the former, and the government adopted the latter. 
Two points especially concerned the House, namely the permanency of the bill, 
and the fear that perpetual ballots would be used to fill the ranks of the militia. Daniel 
Giles declared in the subsequent debate that he would accept a single draft from the 
militia to reduce it to its new establishment, but objected to giving the government 
10,000 men annually, especially when it was not clear how these vacancies were to be 
filled. " He spoke again, in the first debate on the Militia Enlistment Bill (I April 1811), 
against the permanency of the bill, " which increased the antagonism of the supporters 
of Windham's system. William Eliot declared that 'If Mr. Windham's system had been 
preserved in, they would not now have occasion to resort to such a measure as this. It 
could not but disgust the militia officers, who were converted into instruments for 
recruiting the regular army. ' He conceded that if it was temporary, he probably would 
allow it to pass, but as it was a permanent measure, he encouraged the House to pause 
before they 'placed in the hands of ministers a power of perpetual balloting'. " Lord 
Holland believed it would destroy Windham's system by creating competition in 
recruiting. "' 
82 Hansard, 1810-1811, XM 194. 
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The fears about future ballots were secondary to the permanency of the drafts, 
but nonetheless required some management. Ellison declared that he would allow the 
bill to pass if there were to be no ballots, and Henry Banks proposed that no ballots 
should take place until 1813. Castlereagh answered these concerns by highlighting the 
large numbers of supernumerary men who would be kept, so obviating the need for 
ballots. To placate such views, the act specified that militia ballots should be suspended 
until I July 1813. " Colonel Wood again supported his brother-in-law and the 
government, declaring that it would be easy for the militia to recruit the seventh of their 
strength that each year would be drafted into the line. Castlereagh also answered the 
silent supporters of balloting directly for the line, as 'the militia gave habits which 
prepared men for entering the line, and that it was the natural colour of the mind of man 
to prefer home service'. " 
There were some final technical objections to the bill. Daniel Giles and Samuel 
Whitbread questioned the 'double jump' system it would set up, whereby a man could 
enlist into the militia for one bounty, then soon after transfer to the line and receive 
another. ' John Bastard raised the old cry that it would damage the discipline of the 
militia, and in the Lords, Earl Rosslyn believed that the government's calculations were 
not correct, and it would still be insufficient. However, the Home Secretary, Ryder, 
challenged those who objected to present a bill of their own to solve the recruitment 
problems of the army. No alternative was presented, and so the bill passed without a 
voteýl 
The paucity of ideas on army recruitment was echoed in the Lords. Sidmouth 
gave his support to the bill because of 'indispensable necessity' and the lack of an 
altemative. "2 There was a debate on the measure during the 1813 Army Estimates (8 
a eo. III c. 20, clause 22. 89 Hansard, 1810-1811, XM 667,670. 
90 Hansard, 1810-1811, XM 666,668. 
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March 1813), but the criticism over the two bounties was easily answered by John Hiley 
Addington, and Castlereagh (recently returned to office as Foreign Secretary) who 
declared that Britain's military pre-eminence 'was owing in a great measure to the 
system of recruiting from the militia regiments, which he had felt it his duty (at that 
time disagreeable), to bring forward. No other plan would have proved so effectual'. 91 
The lack of an alternative, and the acceptance of militia drafts tacitly given in 1807 and 
1809, ensured that annual militia transfers were permitted without too much trouble. 
Increasing the size of the army, or maintaining it, was only one way of 
improving Britain's military force. The Liverpool government also integrated the 
existing forces into an better-organised system, able to cope with the scale of 
Napoleonic conflict. Besides transferring men to the line, the government sought other 
ways to utilise the militia, particularly focusing on gaining more flexibility in its 
deployment. During the Irish rebellion of 1798 some militia regiments volunteered to 
serve in Ireland, and after the Act of Union in 1801 there were calls to make this a 
permanent arrangement by having an UK militia. As with much of the Act of Union, 
particularly relating to the military, the matter was left unresolved, and the UK 
continued to have two militias. " Henry Arthur Herbert consistently championed this 
idea in the Commons during the fust decade of the nineteenth century, " and his cause 
received powerfid support in 1811 from Castlereagh when, in discussions on the 
permanent militia transfer, he also suggested a common militia as this was the only 
point where the military system was failing. 
The army supported such a measure, both from the Irish Militia's detractors and 
supporters. One of the former, an anonymous staff officer at Athlone, informed 
Windham in 1807 that he did not 'consider them a force fit to be entrusted with the 
93 HanSard , 1812-1813, XXIV, 1163-1187. Bennet and Hon. Edward Law (a Sidmouthite, and son of Baron Ellenborough) raised objections to it 94 Allan Blackstock, 'The Union and the Military, 1801-c. 1830', Transactions of the Royal Historical 
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defence of this M of the United Kingdom, either for the purpose of repelling a foreign 
foe, or for the purpose of crushing internal rebellions'. By interchanging them with 
British regiments, the Irish Militia 'when in England, separated from their priests, 
would make, what they will never prove here, good soldiers'. ' During the review of 
military policy in 1810, the Horse Guards drew up a large exposition of a militia 
interchange. Besides returning to the argument that the Irish militia would be better out 
of Ireland, it also suggested that such an arrangement would have important political 
results, as it 'would unquestionably lead to an acknowledgement of each other as part o 
the same EMpi: re; which not be generally admitted either in England or in Ireland at 
presenffl! '". The memorandum presented an arrangement for this, which was largely 
adopted by government. In future all militia recruits, however they were obtained, 
served in the Militia of the United Kingdom, Whilst those already in the militia could 
volunteer for the new force, and receive a small bounty. 
The Militia Interchange Bill was brought before Parliament on 14 May 1811, 
and, like the militia transfers previously, was strongly opposed by supporters of the 
militia, for similar reasons. Earl Temple and Lord Stanley declared that it would negate 
the militia's constitutional role. There were also practical concerns. John Bastard 
believed that it gave the men the power to decide where they wanted to serve, reversing 
the chain of command, and forcing the officers to accept the men's decision or quit the 
regiment. Wynn? " observed that the government may as well send the militia to Europe, 
and the use of the militia in this manner was so objectionable to Lord Hamilton, that he 
preferred the militia be disbanded than used in such a way. " 
An interchange between the Irish and British Militias also raised the thorny 
96 BI, Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37886, f. 68, A Staff Officer (Athlone) to Windham, 20 February 
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problem of Catholics in an avowedly Protestant army. Many of the Irish Militia 
regiments were overwhelmingly Catholic, and supporters of Catholic relief saw the 
militia interchange as a means to give permanent legality to Catholic worship in Britain. 
Tighe first raised this in the Commons; Sir John Cox Hipperley, Sir John Newport and 
Grattan joined him, and even Ryder conceded that a clause should be inserted allowing 
Catholic worship into the Militia Interchange Bill. Lords Stanhope, Moira and 
Buckingham pressed Catholic claims in the Lords, but the clause was rejected. " 
The militia interchange allowed the deployment of a larger force in the 
Peninsula, as the English and Scottish Militias replaced the role of the regulars in 
Ireland. This was facilitated by the terms of the act which allowed up to a quarter of the 
British Militia could go to Ireland (approximately 18,000 men), whilst a third of the 
Irish Militia could cross the Irish Sea (7,500 men), releasing over 10,000 regulars. 
When the Liverpool government re-examined its military policy in 1813, the 
Duke of York warned that the novelty of militia volunteering had ended, but the 
demands of the army had increased: a deficiency of 10,500 was predicted. 10, Once 
again, the government turned to the militia to make a final sacrifice to achieve victory; 
Bunbury, under secretary for war, outlined the problem, and a possible solution: 
The means of the Regular Army are exhausted (at least in the Infantry). The volunteering 
of the militia into the Regular regiments has become extremely slack, and any measure for 
augmenting the militia, with a view to subsequent volunteering into the line require so much 
time that the season of action would be lost. At the same time it is believed that a great 
Enthusiasm exists in the country: - and that the old militia would freely extend their service if 
they were employed with their own officers and to retain their peculiar advantages. 102 
As seen in the debates on the militia transfers and interchange, such views had 
been expressed before, usually by disgruntled militia officers. The improved 
parliamentary situation and Wellington's successes meant the government was able to 
bring such a radical measure before the House. Castlereagh introduced it, and although 
100 Hansard, 1810-1811, XY, 132-133,329-332,643-645. The issue had been debated earlier that year 
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not part of his remit as Foreign Secretary, he was more popular than ever and a 
recognised expert on military matters. In this bill, he declared that the militiamen and 
officers wanted to serve actively, not passively, and that the government wanted to give 
them that choice. So the quota of volunteers for the line would be doubled for that year, 
and, with the arrears due, 26,000 men would be added to the regulars. He appealed to 
house to overcome its traditional prejudices against the use of the militia in such a way: 
'All the difficulties which frightened our ancestors, and which were important at one 
time in point of privilege, ought now to be lost and swallowed up in the necessity for 
exertion imposed on us by the present times. "' 
To make this large transfer possible, a variety of options were given to the 
militia, with generous benefits to get the 30,000 men. Firstly, men could volunteer as 
before for service in the line, and a proportion of officers would be appointed. Secondly, 
militiamen could volunteer in whole companies, and be formed into provisional 
battalions under the command of militia officers, for service in Europe. Finally, up to 
three-quarters of a militia regiment could volunteer for service in Europe as a complete 
and separate regiment. In the last two options, the men would still be militiamen and so 
retain the family allowance. This was particularly aimed at the Irish and Scottish 
Militias. As part of this 'New Military System, the government also received powers to 
call out the local militia for twenty-eight days beyond its own county, to provide for 
home defence. "' 
The government generally had support for this bill, but some MPs deplored the 
use of the militia in this way. Charles Wynn pointed out that the officers would want 
men to volunteer for the line, so that they could get regular rank, whilst the men would 
want to volunteer as militiamen for Europe. " But, there was general support for this 
measure as the need for such actions was indisputable, and the government's popularity 
1 
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ensured its speedy passage, with minimal debate. The Duke of Norfolk epitomised this 
support, as he was 'anxious that not the slightest obstacle should be thrown in the way 
of the progress of this Bill, which he thought it was essential to pass without delay'. " It 
became law in late November 1813, and although it was implemented in 1814, very 
soon the war was over, and most of the military system established by Castlereagh, the 
Duke of York, and Liverpool, was allowed to lapse. 
Plans for Major Reforms of the Aimy 
It was clear from the Pittite's return to power in 1807 that short-service would 
not be continued as a policy to supply the army, but throughout the period the 
government did have another option available besides transfer from the militia. The 
major flaw of the militia transfers was its voluntary nature, which made predictions 
about the strength of the regiments difficult. The government had to wait for regiments 
to have adequate numbers, and be sufficiently well trained before they could be sent 
overseas. The debates in the House also highlighted the fact that they were altering the 
constitutional arrangement of the military forces of the country, and doing so in a way 
that left many questions about the new arrangements unresolved. As John Cartwig 
observed in a letter to the Secretary of War, 'It is not possible for me to conceive you 
can rest satisfied with our present system of Defence: - if system that can be called 
which equally violates constitutional and military principals [sic] and for its inefficiency 
is a disgrace to the councils of our country. "O' Examining these alternatives reveals the 
reasons why the government chose to use the militia rather am implement any radical 
reform of the army. 
The Horse Guards consistently presented alternative plans to maintain the army, 
and there was support for such measures in Parliament. The principal measure 
advocated was to supply the army by a mechanism similar to the Army of Reserve of 
106 Hansard, 1813-1814, XXVII, 177. 
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1803. The Horse Guards gave detailed proposals for re-introducing ballots for the line. 
In February 1807 the Duke of York proposed to the Talents that the second battalions be 
maintained by a ballot but limited to home service, 'O" and, in 1809, Calvert presented a 
more detailed version of this, in a memorandum for 'New Modelling the Army'. He 
proposed to create a true territorial army of 100 regiments, each of two battalions: the 
first battalions for unlimited service geographically, thus providing a disposable force of 
100,000 men, and the second battalions maintained by ballot, for service in the UK. The 
rest of the military force would be in the local militia, volunteers and yeomanry, all of 
whom should be trained to be fit to act with the line. These part-time troops would 
assume the identity (i. e. name and regimental distinctions) of the county regiment. In 
essence the plan would encourage enlistment into first battalions by establishing a real 
connection between regiments and counties, and the militia would be 'What it ought 
constitutionally to be, the Basis of our National Force. ' He finther warned that 'Every 
measure adopted for the Encrease [sic] of our Military Force, which does not place it on 
an assured and permanent Footing, is illusory and inadequate to the object. "" The plan 
appealed sufficiently to Castlereagh for him to present it to the King. ' 10 
In 18 10 the same idea was presented to the Perceval government. The end of the 
militia volunteering, and the need to 'take account of the military force and the means of 
supporting it' prompted another initiative. The plan was a more refined version of 
Calvert's proposed in 1809, in which every regiment would have a second battalion 
created by reducing the existing ones to eight companies and one field officer, thereby 
providing the means for the army to receive 30,000 men. It was also clear to the 
Adjutant General that the compulsion was necessary, and that the ballot could be made 
less obnoxious by restricting it to limited service, but with the option of extending 
1" Cookson, British ArmedNation, pp. 83-84. 109 W025/3224, Scheme for New Modelling the Army by CalveM November 1809. 110 Vane (ed. ), Castlereagh Correspondence, 2nd Series, 7,193-197. 
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service at any time. "' Significantly, the status of the militia was not mentioned. 
In the following year, the Adjutant General's department again advocated 
balloting for the army with a wide-ranging and comprehensive defence report, written at 
a time when it again appeared that Napoleon would turn his attention to invading 
Britain. It was recognised that Napoleon would only attempt an invasion with an 
overwhelming force, estimated at six armies of 40-50,000 (three against Kent and 
Sussex, two against the North and East, and one against Ireland), with a smaller force of 
20-25,000 against Cornwall and Devon. The prospect of such a massive force 
necessitated a major reform of the army. The militia would be disbanded, the men and 
officers going to the regular army, as 'In the old militia the original institution is 
completely wom out. By the introduction of a general substitution, and by the term of 
enrolment having become indefinite namely the war, the great object of gradually 
training the population of the country to anus is entirely fimstrated. ' Consequently, the 
local militia would replace the militia as the constitutional force. A separate colonial 
army would be created by giving higher bounties to recruits who agreed to serve as 
such, and although recruiting would continue, a ballot would finnish any deficiency in 
the army. This ballot would only be for the infantry, and confined to unmarried men 
between 18 and 25. Significantly, substitution would not be allowed, but there would be 
fines, and each man would serve for five years in the UK unless he volunteered for 
service overseas The author admitted that filling up second battalions with men that 
could only serve in the UK would have its limitations, but felt that the only alternative 
was conscription. ' 12 
Balloting for the line clearly had support from the army, which is not surprising. 
Furthermore, the members of the Addington government, who introduced the Army of 
Reserve in 1803, advocated a return to it from 1807. Lord Melville expressed succinctly 
111 
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the Sidmouthite view- 'It is astonishing to me that, among all the projects for keeping 
up the army, there never has been the good sense to revert back to the system of the 
Army of Reserve. By that system you could receive a supply of 30,000 men by ballot, 
which I am sure, is more than the most sanguine of you can look for from any new 
attempt upon the Militia. "" So why did the government ignore such respected 
opinions? 
The government chose militia volunteering for several reasons. In 1807 and 
1809, Castlereagh was particularly keen to get trained men into the army; balloting for 
the line would take time, and then these men would need training. "' Militia drafts were 
also the only alternative source of manpower that would not affect ordinary recruiting. ", 
The failure of the Army of Reserve, which had lapsed with the demise of the Addington 
ministry, was still a recent memory during the Portland government and so there were 
doubts about the possible success of a similar law. Castlereagh informed the cabinet in 
1807 that 
With respect to success of such a measure, had it even received the sanction of Parliament, 
very considerable doubts must be entertained, when the contempt into which fines have 
fallen, from their enforcement having always been neglected, and latterly wholly abandoned 
by an express enactment, is considered: and it is clear that a recurrence to such a system at 
present would be productive of the utmost resistance and dissatisfaction both in and out of 
Parliament. ' 16 
From a political perspective, a new Army of Reserve bill could not have been passed, 
and implemented at that time. The collapse of both the Portland government, and its 
weak successor, the Perceval ministry, made such an attempt even more unlikely, 
especially when it was preoccupied with the inquiry into Walcheren, and then the 
establishment of the Regency. 
Apart from these political considerations, there were other powerful reasons for 
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the government's reluctance to consider conscription. Much has been made of two 
issues that were thought to stop direct balloting for the line: the administrative limits of 
the British state, and the 'manpower ceiling'. It has been asserted that direct balloting 
for the armed forces would have been difficult, if not impossible in Britain, because its 
administrative machinery could not cope with its rapidly growing and mobile 
population. To some extent this is true, as the militia relied on the counties finding men, 
preferably by ballot, but other means were acceptable. This was particularly true in 
Ireland, where in some places the parish authorities needed to execute ballots hardly 
existed, and in large manufacturing districts, where dense populations simply precluded 
fair and quick ballots. "' It is unlikely that the proponents of balloting for the army ever 
thought direct personal service could be enforced, hence the use of the term balloting, 
rather than conscription, but it was clear that counties could be forced to raise men. 
Therefore, the government chose to raise men via the militia ballots, and later militia 
recruiting, rather than direct intervention. 
The 'manpower ceiling' has been put forward recently as an explanation, "' and 
the argument has supporting evidence. Both Castlereagh and Liverpool believed that the 
army, navy and part-time forces were reaching their limits from 1807. Castlereagh said 
as much in Parliament in 1807, and when Liverpool was drawing up his plans for the 
annual militia transfers in 1811, he wrote that the army was 'as large a force, combined 
with the Regular Militia and Navy as the Population and Finances of the Country could 
well support'. "' But the 'manpower ceiling' was not simply demographic; it was also 
financial. In 1810, Britain's finances were trimmed back in recognition that the war was 
likely to be sustained for some considerable time. Liverpool felt that the commitment to 
Portugal could be maintained indefa-fitely if it cost E3,000,000 a year. In 1810, when 
7 Western, The English Militia, pp. 277-285. 
-125. Cookson, British ArmedNation, particularly Chapter 4, pp. 95 Hansard, 1807, K 864; BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38361, ff. 65-69, Draft Measure for keeping 
up the Regular Army, (late 18 10? ). 
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10,000 men were sent to bolster Wellington during the French invasion, it had cost 
L6,000,000, a massive increase in expense, for a relatively small reinforcement. "0 
Although the financial situation improved from 1812, and Wellington was reinforced, 
the government could still not afford to expand the army by a sufficient level to justify 
the introduction of balloting for the armed forces. 
The overriding concern from 1810 was to preserve Britain's military strength, 
and allow it to continue fighting until events in central Europe raised the prospect of a 
quick victory. In effect, the manpower ceiling was imposed on the government by 
Britain's war aims and strategy. This explains why the government chose to ignore the 
plans emanating from the Horse Guards and Parliament. As Liverpool explained in a 
letter to Wellington on 10 September 18 10, 
The question in short, must come to this. We must make an option between a steady and 
continued exertion upon a moderate scale, and a great and extraordinary effort for a limited 
time, which neither our means, military or financial, will enable us to maintain permanently. 
If it could be hoped that the latter would bring the contest to a speedy and successful 
conclusion, it would certainly be the wisest course; but unfortunately, the experience of the 
last fifteen years is not encouraging in this respect 121 
Rather than a 'manpower ceiling' it was more of a resource ceiling. True to his word, 
Liverpool did enact extraordinary measures in 1813, and in that year, 30,000 men were 
added to the regular army. 
Conclusion 
It is unsurprising in an era of high political drama that the mundane 
parliamentary history of recruitment policy has been overlooked. Making military 
policy a low-key affair also appears to be one of the aims of the post-Talents 
governments. Only Windham's short-service scheme aroused any partisan debates, and 
significantly short-service was not abolished, just sidelined. The governments after 1807 
de-politicised the debate on maintaining the army until the 1811 annual transfer passed 
120 Charles Duke Young, The Life and Administration of Robert Banks, Second Earl Liverpool, (London, 
1868), pp. 364-367, Liverpool to Wellington, 20 February 1811. 121 Young, Life oftiverpool, p. 337, Liverpool to Wellington, 10 September 18 10. 
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without a division. This meant that the arguments became increasingly centred on 
effectiveness, and balloting for the army only had support from the easily ignored army, 
and the small group of Sidmouthites, who were never openly critical of government, 
and joined Liverpool in 1812. It also explains why some government supporters were 
openly against militia transfers, whilst members of the opposition remained quiet. The 
acceptance of militia transfers was such that the Marquis of Buckingham, who, as Earl 
Temple, had spoken out against militia transfer in 1807 and 1809, went on to command 
the militia brigade in France. 
Maintaining Britain's war effort provided governments with some tough choices 
but rather than military efficiency, it was the immediate practicalities, both military and 
politically, which determined government policy. Consequently, those who advocated 
any form of conscription were ignored, and the government chose to use what it had, 
namely the militia. The militia transfers have the appearance of a short-term remedy, 
but the UK's governments did not have the luxury of being able to plan ahead; the 
continued fighting in Iberia meant that nothing could be done to disrupt ordinary 
recruiting for any considerable period of time. Rather than the 'manpower ceiling' or 
administrative limits, it was the immediate situation that resulted in conscription being 
discarded as an option, and the immediate situation was never dire enough to justify 
such drastic action. 
The dismantling of the British military machine after 1815 has hidden the 
debates that took place on military policy, and has obscured Britain's plans for 
conscription. The debates and acts of the governments that managed to sustain a war on 
the continent for seven years, were, in some cases literally, " left on the shelf, and when 
the debate was returned to in the mid-nineteenth century, warfare had entered the 
122 Many of the War Office papers were considered as a library for any future Commander in Chief or 
Secretary at War, to relay the experience of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. (Tbey now form 
W030. ) The need to reform the army in the beginning of the twentieth century prompted a closer look at 
the material in them, and J. W. Fortescue's County Lieutenancies and the Army, 1803-14, (London, 1909) 
was written very much as a historical lesson. 
101 
industrial age. The political story of military policy shows how the govemment steered 
a course between the obvious needs of the army and the obvious needs for their political 
survival. This explains why using the militia eventually triumphed over the other 
options available. In doing so, the government effectively de-politicised the recruitment 
policy, whilst the Opposition's attempts to tum militia transfers into a constitutional 
issue failed. 
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Chapter 4: Ordinga Recruitment 
Introduction 
Between 1807 and 1810 successive Secretaries of War felt that with 
improvements voluntary enlistment would be sufficient to cover casualties. Windham 
based his short service scheme on this assumption, and Castlereagh introduced the 1807 
militia transfer as a temporary remedy. By 1810 it was clear that a more permanent 
solution was needed to cover the shortfall in recruiting, as increased casualties occurred 
in the Peninsular War. Behind the quest for a solution to Britain's manpower demands, 
the Horse Guards consistently strove to improve recruiting, and their efforts were 
successful. Voluntary enlistment, however, always had its limits as the provision of 
more recruiting parties had to be balanced by the adverse effects of removing so many 
officers and NCOs from their regiments. Yet voluntary enlistment of men provided the 
bedrock for the maintenance of the British army: between 1807 and 1815 117,275 men 
enlisted for the army through ordinary recruiting. Furthermore, from 1809 voluntary 
enlistment was used to recruit the militia, which added another 51,373 to Britain's 
military force. Although not as public as the debates on militia transfers, ordinary 
recruitment was an important aspect of Britain's military policy. 
OrdinM Recruiting 
The system of voluntary recruitment in the UK had changed little since the 
establishment of a permanent army in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. 
It was infamous for the recruiting sergeant's dastardly methods, and synonymous with 
drunkenness. Recruiting was conducted by parties -a small detachment from a regiment 
- which had received a Beating Order, allowing the officers and men to recruit and 
request billets. The parties were usually composed of an officer, a few NCOs, 
sometimes some privates, and drummers. Therefore the presence of some of the 
103 
regiment in the UK from which a party could be drawn was crucial to recruiting. 
Besides the depots and second battalions permanently stationed in the UK, recruiting 
during the Napoleonic Wars was aided by the Army Depot on the Isle of Wight, where 
regiments without a presence in the UK could have a few officers and NCOs stationed 
to provide for recruiting. ' As an example, in 1807 all spare officers at the Army Depot 
from the 19'h Light Dragoons, 75th, 77th and 94th were sent out recruiting, before the 
regiments returned from East India. 2 
The demands of recruiting meant that the establishment of a unit could be 
critical to the success of the regiment, as the extra officers and NCOs could be utilised 
on the recruiting service. This conflicted with the government's financial strictures on 
the army, and explains the Horse Guard's rejection of requests to have establishments 
increased when there were vacancies in the regiment's battalion overseas? Recruiting 
success was rewarded in the augmentation of a regiment, which necessarily resulted in 
promotion and new officer vacancies being created. After an earlier request was reftised 
to augment the 1 ". six months later 'to ensure the success of recruiting' the fourth 
battalion was increased to 1,200 rank and file. " Regiments without a recruiting 
establishment suffered severely. The 16'h, 46h, 54th, 55 Ih and 70d' had little success in 
recruiting and the units were wasting away because their recruiting establishment was 
'totally inadequate'. These units were consolidated into six companies, and the 
remaining skeleton companies were ordered home, providing more NCOs and officers 
to form recruiting parties and a regimental depot. ' 
'Me mechanics of obtaining a civilian, and making him a legal soldier were quite 
fixed. A recruit would take the 'King's shilling' from a member of the party, and at least 
1 W03/584, Calvert to Taylor, 17 August, 16 October, 21 November & 15 December 1807, etc. 2 W03/193, Wynyard to Inspector General of Recruiting, 2 February 1807. 3 For instance, W03/46, Calvert to Kent, 17 June 1808, rýjecting an augmentation of the I", and W03/49, 
Calvert to Maj. Gen. Fitzroy, 19 January 1809, for the 25'. 4 W03147, Calvert to Kent, 18 January 1809. 
'5 W03/197, Memorandum to York by Calvert, 9 October 1809; W03/198, Wynyard to Torrens, 13 
December 1809. 
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twenty-four hours later he would then be brought before a magistrate to be attested, 
where the recruit had the right to refuse to join either if he could prove he was an 
apprentice, or if he could repay the party. Once attested, he would receive a medical 
examination, and then if he passed the medical, he became a member of the regiment 
and subject to the Mutiny Act. For each recruit the party was issued levy money 
(usually in advance from the regimental agents), most of which went to the recruit as a 
bounty, but some of which went to party itself. The recruit would probably remain with 
the party for some time, the Horse Guards encouraged this so recruits would spend their 
bounties before they reached their regiment. " The new recruit might even find himself 
recruiting: a militia volunteer recruited a man whilst he was still with a party of the 95h 
and received E2 as the 'bringer', a massive increase in his income from the meagre one 
shilling a week he received as a recruit! 
From 1796 the Duke of York set about increasing supervision of the recruiting 
service. Recruiting districts were established, ' each with a commanding officer 
(Inspecting Field Officer), an adjutant, two staff sergeants and medical officers. They 
set physical examinations for all recruits, and generally supervised recruiting in their 
districts. ' Initially, they only had jurisdiction over parties of regiments that were 
overseas, but later their authority was extended to all parties. In 1798 a district 
paymaster was added to the recruiting district establishment, who dealt with all financial 
transactions, fluther increasing the Inspecting Field Officer's (IFO) power. " By 1807, 
the IFOs were the senior officers in the area and no officer in their jurisdiction could 
leave without their permission, although they could not interfere in internal regimental 
matters. 
The district staff intermediately approved all recruits, giving them a portion of 
6 W03/585, Circular, by Darling, 16 December 1812. 
7 Anthony Brett-James (ed. ), Military Memoirs ofEdward Costello, (London, 1967), p. 2. 8 See Appendix D for recruiting districts in 1809. 90Western, 'Ile Recruitment of the Land Forces', Phl), pp. 130-134. 1 BL, Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37886, ff. 194-199, Fitzpatrick to Windham, 25 March 1807. 
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their bounty and a medical examination before they went to their regiments where, if 
approved by the regiment, they received the rest of their bounty. " In 1812, the IFOs had 
to be permanently at their head-quarters, and needed the Commander in Chief's 
permission to leave their post, so that recruits could be brought to them at any time. " In 
the same year the IFOs were asked to report on defective recruiting officers and NCOs, 
an already established practice. " Lieutenant Andrews of the 53 rd received particular 
attention in 1808; he was recruiting at Richmond whilst absent with leave, but had only 
obtained two recruits who immediately deserted. Calvert judged that he had no claim to 
an extension of his leave, and he was ordered to the Isle of Wight to be transported to 
his regiment in India. 14 
Further reforms came in 1807, when the office of Inspector General of 
Recruiting was abolished. His original role - inspecting recruits for regiments abroad 
(he was also commandant of the infamous Chatham barracks, where recruits were sent 
before going overseas) and making up the muster rolls for them - had been superseded 
by the district IFOs, and the rest of the work was transferred to '2-3 clerks in the 
Quarter-Master-General's department'. " In 1812, IFOs were given command of all 
parties in their district, and the regimental officers were returned to their regiments. This 
meant that recruiting was overseen by men 'well calculated for that service ... instead of 
young officers who accepted the task rather as a leave of absence than a service. ' The 
rewards to the NCOs were also increased (they received more of the levy money) 'upon 
whose exertions the success in recruiting must in a great measure, depend, however 
active and diligent their superior officers might be'. " 
The tightening up of the regulations governing the recruiting service also 
" CJ, 1806-07, IV, 175; WO25/3224, Memorandum on Recruiting, 19 October 1809. 
W03/585, Circular to IFOs, by Calvert, 13 March 1812. 13 W03/585, Circular to IFOs, by Calvert, 3 November 18 12. 14 W03/47, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Abercromby, 24 November 1808. "s Historical Manuscripts Commission, The Manuscripts of J B. Fortescue preserved at Dropmore, 
Q1892-99), 111,185, Grenville to Windham, I January 1807. 
Hansard, 1812-13, XXIV, 1160. Palmerston was speaking during the Army Estimates of 18 13. 
106 
extended to the parties themselves. In 1810 detailed instructions were given to each 
regiment, requiring particular attention to be paid to the selection of the recruiting party. 
The soldiers had to be fit, not only because ill men created a bad impression (seeing a 
wounded soldier was not likely to encourage enlistment), but because recruiting 
required activity and exertion. " In 1813 married men were disqualified from the 
recruiting service, probably because they would not give their full attention to 
recruiting, 's and by 1814 the IFOs had the power to reject any man they thought unfit to 
form part of a party. " 
Generally, the recruiting service came under closer supervision. In 1807, Calvert 
wanted to know why the recruiting parties of the 2/45th employed so many privates. 21 
Calvert also upheld a complaint from a recruit that he was enlisted under undue 
21 pressure, and allowed him his discharge provided he repaid his bounty. Other 
irregularities also caught the Duke of York's attention; NCOs were forbidden to keep 
shops for the sale of necessaries for recruits, another source of income for the recruiting 
party. ' The cavalry was particularly prone to keep shops, as equipping a trooper cost 
much more than an infantryman, and some men of the I't Dragoons were actually in 
debt to the regiment before they joined the regiment, " a situation that encouraged 
desertion. 
Recruiting needed closer supervision because of wartime expansion. This 
inevitably resulted in high concentrations of recruiting parties in particular areas, 
duplication of effort, and competition between regiments. Such rivalries encouraged 
recruiting parties to depart from the physical standards set for recruits, and openly 
exceed the bounties set by government. ' The financial arrangements encouraged the 
17 85, Circular to Regimental Ofriccrs, I December 1810. " W03/585, Circular by Darling, I December 1813. 19 0 Army Museum, 6807/276, Circular, by Darling, 25 February 18 14. 20 3/42, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Pigot, 16 January 1807. 21 W03/584, Calvert to Joseph Gascoigne, 12 September 1807. 22 W03/585, Darling to IFOs, 26 March 1811. 23 W03/42, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Lord Cathcart, 16 January 1807. 24 Western, 'The Recruitment of the Land Forces', Phl), pp. 73-102. 
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party to break regulations, as for every man raised they received, in effect, commission. 
The party could also increase its profitability by making surreptitious deductions from 
the recruit's bounty. Legitimate deductions were made from the bounty for necessaries 
(such as knapsacks), but, as many men were ignorant of what were legitimate 
I 
necessaries, the party could make their own deductions. ' These evils were the source 
for the continual hostility to recruitment, and the army generally, under this system: 
Officers drew money from agents and frequently drew over allowances, creating much 
abuse of false attestations, etc. Most of the time, recruits were left to drunken Recruiting 
Sergeants and of Crimps, with who [sic] they were connected. 26 
The regulations needed to be stricter and enforced more effectively because 
irregularities in recruiting were endemic, and the army's reforms had not changed the 
underlying financial arrangement which created different priorities between the parties 
and the army. For the parties, the more recruits they obtained the more money they 
made, whilst the army wanted recruits fit enough to undergo training immediately and 
be soldiers in as short a time as possible. This inevitably resulted in the parties ignoring, 
or trying to circumvent the recruiting regulations. The I" Foot was a particularly bad 
example: among its various irregularities, it ignored the opinion of the London district 
surgeon in 1807 and approved two men. " More often individuals simply ignored 
recruiting regulations: Corporal Norman enlisted four men in the Taunton district, two 
of whom paid smart money (paying money direct to the party before the recruit was 
attested so that he could leave -a trick prohibited in 1807) while the other two proved 
unfit. The profit motive also encouraged collusion between the party and the recruits, 
and many young men were enlisted as boys because they were not tall enough. One 
sergeant recalled being told by the recruiting sergeant to lie about his age, so he could 
enlist as a 'lad' in the light dragoons. " Accordingly the IFOs were told to examine 
26 
257he Recruiting Regulations for 1806 specifically ban such deductions, CJ, 1806-07, IV, 175 26 BL, Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37886, ff. 194-199, Fitzpatrick to Windham, 25 March 1807. 27 W03/43, Calvert to Kent, 28 April 1807. 28 Joltingfrom my Sabretache, by a Chelsea Pensioner, (London, 1847), p. 12. 
108 
recruits 'Entirely apart from the Bringer and Party enlisting them'. " By 1814 they could 
reject any recruit they suspected of lying about his age. " 
As the IFOs were crucial to recruiting, they were called to account if irregularities 
occurred under their supervision. The IFO at Nottingham had to explain why a thirty-six 
year old man who was only 5' 4" was enlisted in 1807, " and the London IFO received 
particular attention after he approved a wounded ex-marine. " The IFOs, as the agency 
of the Horse Guards' authority, were also scrutinised. Colonel Dacres, the IFO at 
Athlone, was warned that if he did not cease ignoring the recruiting regulations, the 
Commander in Chief would order an investigation 'which will produce embarrassing 
results' for him. " Lieutenant Colonel Clay (Manchester district) passed twenty men for 
the Ir" Foot who were not strictly up to standard, but with the colonel's approval. 14 The 
regimental surgeon who obviously did not know of the deal later rejected them, and 
Clay was called to explain himself to the Duke of York. " Clay later approved a recruit 
that the surgeon refused to pass on medical grounds, but again was fully supported by 
the Duke of Kent. "' Collusion between Clay and the Duke of Kent was commonplace; 
Clay obtained an ensigncy for his Sergeant Major after he recruited one hundred men 
for the I 'q 3' which raises the possibility that such extensions of patronage were 
prevalent throughout the UK. Clay also received particular attention over his claims for 
allowances. "' In the IFO's defence, they were probably under a great deal of pressure to 
ensure that the army secured as many recruits as possible. 
Naturally differences of opinion between the recruiting staff and the regiments 
arose over the defuiition of a fit soldier, and IFOs had discretionary powers to enlist lads 
29 NAM, 6807/276, Circular by Darling, 23 March 1814. 
30 NAM, 6807/276, Circular by Darling, I January 1814. 
31 W03/192, Calvert to Inspector General of Recruiting, 16 January 1807. 32 W03/193, Calvert to Inspector General of Recruiting, 26 February 1807. 33 W035/24, Nicholls to Col. Dacres, IFO Athlone, 31 August 1812. 34 NAM, 7409-8, Kent to Clay, 2 March; Clay to Kent, 13 December 1807. 35 NAK 7409-8, Clay to Kent, 13 December 1807. 36 NAM, 7409-8, Clay to Kent, 13 November & Kent to Clay, 15 November 18 11 37 NAM, 7409-8, Clay to Kent, 5 November, Kent to Clay, 6 November 1813. 38 NAM, 7409-8, Darling to Clay, 6 December 18 10. 
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and boys within half an inch of the height standard. ". and undoubtedly if a recruit was 
slightly under standard, with regular meals and exercise many recruits were later fit 
enough to become soldiers. ' In the Gloucester district three men were accepted by the 
district surgeon but were later rejected by the regimental medical officers, " a difference 
in interpretation that often occurred in the cavalry. Frederick Hildebrand proved to be 
unfit to be a dragoon, but was suitable for the infantry, and as he was determined to join 
the army, he was transferred to the 20'h Foot, at his request. "' Not all such incidents were 
as easily resolved, and so it was decided that if an unfit man was approved, those 
responsible for his enlistment would have to bear the costs. ' If a recruit was found to be 
ill, he was usually assessed at the York Hospital, to ascertain if he was unfit when 
intermediately approved, so blame could be apportioned to the IFO or the regiment. " 
Lieutenant Colonel Belson overrode the opinion of a surgeon and approved a man, but 
later had to repay his bounty, as the recruit was unfit. " 
The final defence against irregularities in recruiting was the biannual regimental 
inspections. Conducted by general officers, and military medical officers of high 
standing, they revealed the extent of the evasion of the recruiting regulations, and the 
gulf between what the army wanted and what it obtained. The Duke of York was 
astonished that men"being evidently incapable of actual service' got into the 2/23"d in 
1807, and then remarkably were transferred into the first battalion. ' Eight men of the 
2/87'h were discharged in 1808, but 
As the services of the men have been so short and their complaints evidently of longer 
standing, it will be necessary, in the first place, to account for their admission into the 87'h 
regiment for the duty of which they do not appear, at the time of their enlistment, to have 
been by any means adequate. 47 
39 W03/585, Circular, by Darling, 4 June 1812. 
40 For instance, W03/594, Calvert to Taylor, 29 August 1808. 41 W03/584, Calvert to Taylor, 16 August 1808; see also, Calvert to Taylor, 16 March and 3 August 
1808. 
42 W03/49, Calvert to Duke of Cambridge, 9 December 1809. 43 W03/584 Calvert to Taylor, 2 September 1808. 44 W03/584' , Calvert to Col. Burnett, York Hospital, 29 March 1808. 45 W03/192, Wynyard to Inspector General of Recruiting, 27 January 1807. 46 W03/42, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Fisher, 12 February 1807. 47 W03/45, Wynyard to Lt Gen. Doyle, 17 May 1808. 
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Tlere was a similar report on the 2/84th that year. 419 
More remarkable were the cases in the 2/50 th of a sixty year old who had only 
served one year and nine months and a soldier who had an ulcer for four years yet had 
only been in the army for three. "' The 2/250' received attention in 1808 because of the 
large number of invalids it had, and the Duke of York ordered an enquiry into their 
enlistments. " These cases were extreme, and recruits could become sick once they had 
arrived in their regiments. An investigation was ordered into the 13th to ascertain if two 
men who were discharged were unfit when they enlisted or if their ailments resulted 
from 'improper Medical treatment since their reception into the 13'h Regiment'. " In 
1811 the Medical Board issued an instruction on the treatment of recruits, prompted by 
high levels of illness at Radipole Cavalry depot (where all cavalry recruits were sent if 
their regiments were overseas): 
Young men are often first weakened by this new fife, ... and extremely susceptible of the 
slightest impression capable of producing derangement in the system, and it is their 
seasoning, as it were, to the habits they must acquire as soldiers, the training to which 
requires the nicest management both by the Military and medical officers. [They are] not to 
be made tender by too much care and confinement, while at the same time the discipline 
should be mild and conciliatory, and the men at first as little exposed to sudden changes and 
crowding together. 52 
A recruit was not usually well treated until he reached the regular and ordered 
life of his regiment. On arrival at the Army Depot, Dr Lamprice, the physician to the 
forces, recommended that recruits should be stripped, washed, receive new clothes, and 
be kept in separate barracks, as 'frequently young soldiers arrive there after long 
marches in a dirty condition'. " 
Recruits Obtained and Factors Affectinp, Recruitment 
The voluntary enlistment system did not produce huge numbers of recruits, but 
49 WO/46, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Vyse, 31 October 1808. 49 W03/47, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Campbell, 17 January 1809. 
50 W03/44, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. F. Dundas, 9 January 1808. 51 W03/45, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. England, 2 February 1808. 52 W07/107, Medical Board to Burrow, Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, 31 December 1811. 53 W07/108, Dr. Lamprice, Physician to the Forces at the Army Depot, 16 July 1813. 
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the number of recruits varied significantly, ' with spectacular results in 1807, a good 
yield in 1812 to 1813, and 1810 standing out as a very poor year. On average 13,031 
recruits per annum were enlisted between 1807 to 1815. From the variation in the 
figures it is clear that generalisations about the recruiting cannot be made based on 
averages. " Firstly, in late 1814 and early 1815 recruiting was massively cut with the 
onset of peace. For the first six months of 1814, an average of 1,023 recruits per month 
was obtained; for the second half of the year the average fell to 295 recruits a month. 
1815 produced similar, but reversed figures. "' The extremes of 1807 and 1810 have 
specific explanations. The high number of recruits raised in 1807 reflected the 
instructions sent out in December 1806 that all officers who were not on active 
regimental duty should recruit. Battalions of less than 600 men were ordered to obtain 
200 men, or the battalion would be reduced, effectively forcing officers to recruit to 
keep their rank (the fifty-four second battalions alone raised 8,035 men). " The dip in 
1810 was caused by the militia recruiting in Britain, which generated competition with 
the regulars, followed by a ballot in the second half of the year. The militia recruiting 
was initially unsupervised, and although the militia recruited from 1811 onwards, it is 
clear from the figures that the army had gained control over it. Balloting always affected 
recruiting, producing a monthly average of recruits during balloting of 942 men per 
month, 12% lower in the absence of ballots. " 
54 See Graph VI. 
35 Cookson, BrifishArmed Nation, p. 100. 56 The figures for the first three months of IS 15 are 533 recruits per month, 1,586 for the second quarter, 
then 1,482 and 1,479. 
. 
51 
e 
57 CJ. 1807, IV, 332, Circular to Regiments below 600 men, 8 December 1806. 1 W4 average whilst not balloting was 1,073 men per month. Both are based on the figures for 1803 to 
1813. 
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Because of these anomalies, a more accurate average can be taken from the 
years 1808,1809 and 1811 to 1813, which produces a figure of 13,184 recruits a year, 
representing a 7% increase above the average yearly recruits for 1803 to 1815. More 
importantly the recruiting reforms of 1812 appear to have contributed to the increased 
recruiting intake. Both years produced close to 15,000, and the first six months of 1814 
produce a similar amount proportionally. Although the worsening economic conditions 
may have contributed to these returns, the consistency of the results (an average of 
1,197 recruits per month) and the poorer results in 1811 -a worse year economically - 
suggest the improvement largely derived from the Horse Guards' efforts. 
As mentioned earlier the number of parties limited recruiting. On average a 
party produced sixteen recruits a year, but increasing the number of parties affected the 
army in different ways. in the second half of 1808,819 parties (an average for six 
months) produced 6,197 recruits, and similar results were produced in the first halfof 
1809. " In 1807 over 1,100 parties produced the 19,114 recruits, but the increased 
59 W025/3224, Return of Average number of Regimental Parties from 25 June 1808 to 24 June 1809, 
AG, 19 October 1809. For the first half of 1809,845 parties recruited 7,026 men. 
Vear 
Sources: W01/946. Return of recruits raised since 1803,21 March 1811. W025/3225, 
Recruiting return for 1812 and 1813, August 1813; CJ. 1814-15, IX, 30 1, Return of recruits 
for 1814; CJ, 1816, XI 1,423, Return of recruits for 1815. 
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number of parties 'Was highly injurious to the Service and Expensive', and obviously 
took NCOs and officers from duty with their units. ' In 1809 the 84th was prohibited 
fi-om sending out more parties, as it already had fourteen out, and its discipline was 
suffering. " 
The army concentrated recruiting parties in the growing urban areas of 
Manchester, Birmingham, and Leeds, and it always got large numbers of recruits from 
London. ' Although these districts had considerable rural areas, they were recognised as 
successful recruiting areas because of the large towns within them. This concentration 
resulted in the urban areas actually producing fewer recruits per party than rural areas, 
but overall yielded more men: Carlisle's parties were particularly successful, obtaining 
112 recruits from its seven parties, and although Leeds' parties were less successful 
individually, the district recruited 545 men, dwarfing Carlisle's contribution. The data 
also shows that Ireland had a high yield per party, but more interestingly Scotland was 
being targeted for recruitment, albeit not very successfully in this year. On average 
Ireland had 217 parties, which roughly equals the proportion of Irish population to the 
UK, producing an average of twenty-two recruits per party a year. Scotland had 181 
parties, over double the number of parties to population ratio, which only produced 
eight men per party. Wales and the bordering counties also did not produce many men 
per party. ' 
60 CJ, 1808, VIT, 163. 
61 W03/47, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Bernard (C. O. 80), 21 September 1809, 
62 See Graph VII. 
63 Ireland's population amounted to 33% of the UK's, and as there were a total of 832 parties in the UK, 
by Ireland's population it would have 217 parties. Scotland's population amounted to 10%, so using this 
ratio it would have 83 parties. Wales (counted as the Hereford and Shrewsbury districts) only had thirty 
parties, which produced nine men per party per year. England had 405 parties, producing seventeen 
recruits per party per year, roughly the average for the UK. WO25/3224, Return of average number of 
regimental parties from 25 June 1808 to 24 June 1809, AG, 19 October 1809. 
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Grgh VII: Comparison of Recruits and Number 
of Parties by District, June 1808 to June 1809 
50 
45 
40 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
loo 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Average 
recruits 
per party 
per year 0.1 
Average 
parties 
Comparing the district recruiting figures with their male population as recorded 
in the 1811 Census raises many more questions than answers, ' and the conclusions 
drawn from this data have be hedged by qualifications. In particular, the population 
figures assume that the demography of the male population in each recruiting district 
was similar. Even considering such inaccuracies, the figures highlight the productivity 
of England's urban areas for the army. Not only were they producing large numbers of 
recruits, but they were also extracting a high proportion of the male population. The 
poor results in the south of England - the Southampton and Maidstone districts - can be 
attributed to several factors. Firstly, the south had a seafaring tradition, and so naval 
recruitment was probably extensive in the area, accounting for the small number of 
recruiting parties deployed per population (this was also probably true in the Durham 
district). Secondly, most of the 3,576 recruits who joined at regimental headquarters 
probably enlisted at the many units stationed in the south-east, or migrated to London 
and then enlisted. Finally, agricultural wages generally increased during the wars 6' and 
64 See Appendix E. 
6' E. L. Jones, 'The Agricultural Labour Market in England 1793-1872', The Economic History Review, 
XVII (1964-65), pp. 323-324. 
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Source: W025/3224, Return of Average number of Regimental Parties from 
25 June 1808 to 24 June 1809, AG, 19 October 1809 
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the south probably experienced the greatest increase because of the demands of London, 
and the large military presence in the region. The last two factors could account for the 
results in the Bedford district. The few recruiting parties in Wales were unproductive, 
resulting in a very small proportion of the male population of the Hereford and 
Shrewsbury districts joining the army. It may be inferred that the army had given up 
recruiting in Wales, because it was not worth deploying large numbers of recruiting 
parties there for such small returns. In Scotland, the highlands stand out in contrast to 
the pattern in England, but as seen above it required considerable resources to recruit 
men in this area as the population was dwindling, although the ratio of recruits to 
population was high the actual number of recruits is small. No conclusions can be 
drawn about recruitment in Ireland, beyond the fact that it was more successful than the 
average for the LJK. " 
It was generally believed that more recruits were obtained in the winter months, 
and this suited the army as it gave the army more men before the campaigrung season 
began in spring. In November 1807 the Horse Guards sent out a circular urging parties 
to increase their efforts as 'The season is now approaching which generally proves most 
favourable to the recruiting service, " but the evidence from monthly recruiting figures 
does not bear this out; on average more recruits were obtained in the summer. " This 
suggests that recruiting was concentrated in urban areas where the annual agrarian cycle 
was less of an influence on employment. It is possible that the rural unemployed, rather 
than join the army immediately, would move to the towns over winter, and then join the 
army in the towns, accounting for the number of recruits obtained in the summer. The 
results in London tend to support this conjecture. 
66 See Appendix E. The UK raised 1.7 recruits per 1000 mates, whilst the ratio in Ireland was 2.1 per 
1000. 
67 WO 1/612, Circular from Horse Guards, November 1807. 
" See Graph VHI. 
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GWh VIII: Monthly Average Recruiting Figures 
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The location of parties could be very important to the success of recruiting. 
Under the recruiting regulations, recruiting officers had the power to take a party to any 
'Fair, Wake or Place of Public resort within 25 miles of their station, ' which 'In general, 
are supposed to hold out the best prospects of success'. Recruiting was thought likely to 
prosper if parties were sent to the county that the regiment was named after (if it had a 
county designation), where the regiment was originally raised, or where it was stationed 
for a length of time. In essence anywhere where the regiment might have established a 
permanent interest with the local inhabitants. Moreover, if any officers had any 
particular influence in certain areas, they could go there. It was recommended that the 
men composing the party should also have similar connections with the area, so as to be 
well acquainted with the country and general character of the inhabitants 'Whom they 
should endeavour to conciliate by their conduct, so as to gain their good opinion and 
confidence'. ' Hence, when the depot companies of regiments were ordered into 
barracks in 1811, they left a party behind 'With a view to preserving the interest which 
69 W03/584, Circular to Recruiting Service, I December 18 10. 
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it is presumed the Corps has established from its long residence in that place'. " Local 
connections could radically bolster recruiting. The 14'h's successful recruiting (with 
Calvert as its Colonel) was a result of its connection with Buckinghamshire, managed 
through the influence of the Marquis of Buckingham (the Lord Lieutenant), and the 
County gentry. 71 
Regimental prestige also helped recruiting, one man walked from Inverness to 
Edinburgh 
With no other intention than to enlist in the 71ft. His father had been a soldier in it, and 
was now living at home, after being discharged. Donald called it 'his' regiment, and would 
not have taken the bounty from any other. 72 
It was for this reason that the Duke of York was reluctant to reduce the establishment of 
corps that were under strength after they had returned from active service. It was 
penalising them for their professionalism, and the extended establishment meant there 
would be more spare officers and NCOs to form recruiting parties. " Accordingly the 3 rd 
and 7th Dragoon Guards and the 4th Dragoons were not reduced in 1811, despite 
pressure from the government to save money, as they were 'Looked to with that degree 
of national pride which has hitherto secured their popularity'. ' It is clear that regimental 
identity aided recruiting. 3,579 men were recruited at all the regimental headquarters in 
the UK between July 1808 and June 1809, testifying to the connections that these 
regiments had established in their local communities. " 
Some regiments were very popular and caused particular problems for the Horse 
Guards. The 27h recruited an average of fifteen men a party per week in 1809, resulting 
in the recruiting company having an unwieldy 543 men. The Earl of Moira (the 
Colonel) wanted a fourth battalion so that recruiting could continue as 'Many of these 
men ... would not enlist in any other Regiment, the Enniskillen being a popular Corps'. 
70 W03/585, Circular OC Depot companies, 3 September 1811. 71 CRA, Calvert Papers, 9/101/1, Calvert to Buckingham, 29 October 1814. 72 Constable (ed. ), Memorials ofthe Late War, 'Journal of a Soldier', (Edinburgh, 1828), p. 29. 73 W025/3224, York to Liverpool, 25 December 1811. 74 W025/3224, Torrens; to Bunbury, 10 January 1811. 75 WO25/3224, Return of men raised at regimental headquarters, 19 October 1809. 
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The I" was in a similar situation, but neither were awarded additional battalions. ' Other 
regiments were increased, probably as a reward to those officers who recruited 
successfully, accounting for many of the formations of second (or third) battalions 
during the period. The 84th was rewarded with a second battalion in 1808 because 
otherwise recruiting would have to stop (its establishment being complete), thus 
'Removing that spirit of exertion in the Country where the men have been generally 
raised, which it would be difficult to revive'. Similar was said of the II th, 56h and I` 
Foot Guards, although in the latter's case the companies were augmented by fifteen men 
rather than the addition of another battalion. " Such augmentations preserved the 
connections that these regiments had in the communities they were recruiting from. 
The army needed to foster close connections with the community to overcome 
the traditional prejudices against the army, and to be able to compete in the labour 
market. As recruiting was always balanced against the loss of men to the economy, 
apprentices could not be enlisted. An apprentice had to be bound for seven years to 
claim this protection, but in Scotland most indentures lasted three years, or four to five 
occasionally. Naturally petitions from the Scottish manufacturing towns were duly sent 
in to the government adverting the harmful effects of the army's stipulation of a seven 
year term for an apprentice. This rendered all apprenticeships in Scotland void, 'Which 
must be highly prejudicial to the manufacturing and trading interest of this part of the 
Empire' and the Mutiny Act had to be changed. " Yet the army could lay claim to a man 
after his apprenticeship had expired: Thomas Charlton was informed that unless his 
friends could find a substitute for him, the army would claim him after his 
apprenticeship. 79 
76 W01/640, York to Castlereagh, 16 January 1809; W06/133, Stewart to Gordon, 28 March 1809. 77 For 84h, W01/637 York to Castlereagh, 6 January 1808; for I Ith, W01/638, York to Castlereagh, 28 Ih ' June 1808; for 56 , W01/656, York to Bathurst, 30 September 1813; for 10 Foot Guards, W01/651, Torrens to Bunbury, 2 June 1812. 78 W01/132, Castlereagh to York, 30 May 1807. W06/160, Castlereagh to John Lanie, Esq., I June 1807; 
Castlereagh to Lord Provost of Glasgow, 3 June; Castlereagh to Peter Anderson (Inverness) 19 June 1807. 79 W03/43, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. Vyse, 18 July 1807. 
119 
Besides competition with the labour market, army recruitment also had to 
contend with recruitment form other quarters. The Duke of York tried to maintain a 
monopoly of recruitment for the military, and between 1807 and 1815 the government 
was bombarded with offers from individuals to raise regiments, but stubbornly refused 
to accept any of them. The offers ranged from a corps of Riflemen to serve in South 
America, "' a company raised in Scotland for service in America, " and a more serious 
offer which Arthur Wellesley (when he was Military Secretary to the Irish Lord 
Lieutenant) forwarded onto the government offering an Irish fencible legion of two 
battalions and four cavalry troops. a Using civilians to raise men had been used 
extensively in the early years of the Revolutionary Wars, and the Duke of York felt it 
seriously undermined the officer corps, and relinquished the army's control of 
recruiting. Private contracts to raise men were not under the jurisdiction of the army, as 
the under Secretary of War replied to the Irish fencible offer: 
it is not the intention of RM government to avail themselves of offers of this description, 
as the raising of such corps would create a competition in the recruiting for the Regular 
Army, and be attended with many other objections which it is unnecessary to detail. 83 
Similar words were used in the rejection of other offers. " 
Tbrough this policy, the army reduced competition in recruiting between 1807 
and 1815, with the important exception of the navy. But there were little signs of 
competition with the senior service as recruits who were seamen were handed over to 
the navy, "' and the army sources do not record any incidents of clashes between the 
military and the navy. The army faced a difficult decision when it fulfilled its manpower 
:0 BL, Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37886, ff. 28-30, Robert Johnson to Wynyard, 6 February 1807. ' BL, Bathurst Papers, Loan 57/5, f. 476, Capt. MacDonald (Glengary Fencibles) to Bathurstý 26 June 
1812. 
"2 WOI/61, Sir A. Wellesley to Castlereagh, IS December 1807 & 110501406, WO to 110,20 August 
1807. Other offers were a regiment from Bristol and Ireland (WOI/1119,1. A. Vesey to Cooke, 19 
August 1809); a general-service corps (WO6/120, Cooke to Maj. Parry, 29 April 1807); fencible regiment 
for Prince Edward Island (W06/120, Cooke to Townsend, 29 January 1808); an offer from Col. Robinson 
(WO6/123, Bunbury to Col. Robinson, 31 August 1811); and an offer from Mr. MacDonald (WO6/133, 
Castlereagh to York, 24 May 1808). 83 W06/120, Stewart to Sir. A. Wellesley, 21 December 1807. " W03/595, Torrens to Bunbury, 22 November 1809. 85 W03/584, Calvert to Howard, 21 November 1808. 
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shortfall by militia transfers. The militia's strength would have to be kept up, but the 
ballot affected recruiting severely. Therefore the army and the government faced a 
choice, either reinforce the militia by balloting, which besides affecting recruiting was 
not very popular, or allow the militia to recruit as the army did. The lesser evil of losing 
the monopoly on recruiting was chosen from 1809, but under strict conditions: the 
militia bounty was regulated, and the militia could only recruit in their own counties. 
Having given up the recruitment monopoly, the supervision of militia recruiting 
was initially inadequate. Some militia regiments recruited in the more lucrative 
industrial areas outside their counties under various pretences. Ile London regiments 
(the Middlesex and Tower Hamlets militias) were particularly bad in this respect, as the 
ballot was never used there, and their men were routinely raised by normal recruiting 
methods in London. In 1808 and 1809 there were reports that the Middlesex Militia was 
recruiting in Manchester, 'To the prejudice of the Recruiting of the Regular Army', and 
also in the Marlborough, Leeds and Birmingham districts. The IFO at Leeds confined 
James Holmes, a private of the West Middlesex Militia, and 'On examining Holmes, 
pass it appeared very irregular one and he manifested much reluctance in shewing [sic] 
it to me: it was a pass to look for deserters. " The army gradually improved supervision 
over militia recruitment, but occasionally the rules were still ignored: complaints came 
from Coventry, Nottingham and Leicester, where it 'In a great measure account[ed] for 
the difficulty we have experienced for some time past to obtain recruits'. " The army 
managed to make an example of the Colonel of the Tower Hamlets Militia, because of 
his repeated disregard for the regulations on militia recruiting, amongst other 
misdemeanours, dismissing him from the service, an extremely unusual and drastic 
act. " 
86 For Manchester, WOI/637, Wynyard to Stewart, 9 March 1808; for Marlborough, W01/637, Wynyard 
to Stewart, 15 March; for Leeds, WOI/638, Calvert to Stewart, 23 April 18081; for Birmingham, 
H050/41 1, Gordon to Beckett, 20 May 1809. 87 For Coventry, H050/422, Gosselin (IFO) to AG, 15 October 18 11; Nottingham, 2 November; for 
Leicester, I November, incl. Hayhide (Capt. 17'b) to Gosselin, 29 October 1811. 88 H050/429, York to Sidmouth, 25 January IS 14. 
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Increasin Recruitment 
The easiest and traditional measure to increase recruiting was to augment the 
bounty. Money was the lubricant of recruiting, and the financial attraction of the bounty 
was a primary consideration for many in joining the army. In 1808 an infantry recruit 
received E16.6s as a bounty for unlimited service or 01.1 Is for short-service, which 
was increased to E16.14s (short-service) or E23 (unlimited) in 1813, " which 
undoubtedly aided the improvement in recruiting during the last years of the Peninsular 
War. " The influence that bounties had on recruiting was demonstrated between 1814 
and 1815. Immediately the war had finished in 1814, bounties were reduced to E4 4s for 
the cavalry and E6 6s for the infantry, and recruiting, which produced 6,081 in the last 
six months of the war, plummeted to 2,537 for the six months after the war. When men 
were needed in early 1815, the Horse Guards increased bounties by half, with a 
commensurate improvement in recruiting. "' The financial rewards of those involved in 
recruiting also received attention. The Horse Guards ordered that the final approval of 
all recruits be forwarded immediately so that the 'bringer' and the party got their 
rewards quickly. ' There were limits to the extent of this policy, as it was recognised 
that increasing bounties further only encouraged desertion. "' 
Alongside improving the levy money, the physical standards for recruits were 
reduced. In 1808 a recruit for the line had to be thirty or under, and at least 5' 5" tall, 94 
but by 1812 the age limit was increased to thirty-five, although men between thirty and 
thirty-five could only enlist for unlimited service, " and the height restrictions were 
reduced to 5' 4". " The physical standards set for recruiting almost certainly deprived 
the army of potential recruits. During nine months in the Nottingham district, 120 men 
89 W03/5 85, Memo by Calvert, 10 February 1813. 
90 See Graph VI. 
91 WOI/660, York to Bathurst, 22 March 1815; W06/134, WO to Torrcns, 26 March 1815; W01/660, 
Bathurst to York, 27 March 1815. 
92 W03/585 Circular, by Darling, 4 April 1812. 
93 See Chapt 9 er 7. 94 W025/3224, Standards of Recruits, 19 October 1809. 95 W03/585, General Order by Calvert, 25 September 1812. 
% W03/585, Memo by Calvert, 10 February 1813. 
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were rejected out of total of 730, although these rejections could have been for many 
reasons, 97 and, in first four months during 1811,242 recruits were rejected from a total 
of 4,975. " A captain of the 51" went further, believing that if men between 4' 11 " and 
5' 2" were taken as riflemen for each battalion, it might furnish 900 men in four months, 
and maybe 10,000 men in total. " But there were sound reasons behind the maintenance 
of physical standards. The drill regulations prescribed a specific sized pace, which short 
men would have had difficulty in attaining during drill, and generally they would have 
been unable to keep up with their taller comrades. The physical burden of being a 
soldier on campaign, carrying large amounts of equipment, long marches, etc., also 
encouraged the army to maintain physical standards. 
This did not preclude recruiting short men for specific duties outside normal 
duties, such as staff or guards. " In some cases, ignoring standards was allowed. In 
1810, an undersized and over aged man was allowed to transfer from the 4h Garrison 
Battalion, and some militia volunteers were below the recruiting standards. "' The 
physical standards were circumvented by the militiamen and limited service men 
transferring their services, as men raised in such a way had a separate, and lower, 
physical standard. Because the Royal African Corps and West Indian Rangers were 
never likely to participate in active campaigns, they were allowed to enlist men as short 
as 5' P, ` and Lt. Col. Halkett was given discretionary powers to enlist 'stout and able 
bodied highlanders' an inch below the standard. " 
Nevertheless, physical standards were under severe pressure. The Horse Guards 
had to remind the recruiting service that physical standards were at a minimum in 1812, 
as they were still being ignored. 'O' Generally, the heavy cavalry and foot guards were 
97 BL, Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37886, ff. 226-227, Grey to Windham, 30 March 1807. 98 WO 1/647 Return of Enlistments for the Cavalry and the Line, I July 18 11. 
WO 1/1116, Capt. Roberts (5 1) to Windham, 21 January 1807. 100 W035/34, Clinton to Calvert, 20 November 1809. '01 W03/49, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Leighton, II January 18 10. See chapter 5 for details of militia volunteers. 102 W03/193, Wynyard to Inspector General of Recruiting, 21 March 1807. 103 W03/192, Wynyard to Inspector General of Recruiting, 24 January 1807. 104 W03/585, Circular by Darling, 4 June 1812 and I September 1812. 
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able to maintain the physical standards, whilst the light cavalry and infantry tended to 
have most of their men at the lower end of the physical standards. "' The army continued 
to have a proportion of men undersized in the army, particularly in the line regiments, 
demonstrating that the physical standards were regularly evaded, despite being as low as 
the army were prepared to allow. " 
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Governments after 1806 inherited the men balloted under the Army of Reserve 
and Permanent Additional Force which had raised 53,700 men (38,000 and 15,700 
respectively) only for service in the UK. 107 Many of these men had volunteered for 
overseas service, but those remaining in the garrison battalions provided a pool of 
potentially trained men for the regulars. In July 1806 a bounty of ten guineas was 
offered to these men if they extended their services, and, by July 1807,15,913 had taken 
the opportunity to join the regulars, leaving only 6,242 still serving on geographically 
limited terms. A year later, only 4,218 were in the garrison battalions. "' The I" and 2 nd 
05 See Graph IX 
06 See Table 1. Boys have been excluded from the calculation. 107 W025/3225, Memorandum, (no date, but probably 1808); Cookson, British Armed Nation, p. 115, 
W, yes the figures as 37,136 and 15,000 respectively. 
CJ, 1806-07, IV, 332, Circular to Gen. commanding districts, 12 July 1806; 1808, V11,183, Return of 
men limited geographically, 10 August 1807; W025/3225, Memorandum, (no date, but probably 1808). 
124 
Table 1: Percentap-e of Soldiers Under Minimum Heip-ht Stand 
Year Heavy 
Cavalry 
Light 
Cavalry 
Foot Guards Infantry 
1807 4.8% 5.3% N/A 21.1% 
1808 5.1% 5.5% N/A 19.1% 
1809 3.8% 2.6% 1.5% 18.1% 
1810 2.0% 6.6% 2.7% 17.9% 
1811 2.9% 5.5% 1.01yo 20.6% 
1812 0.3% IA% 1.7% 17.6% 
1813 6.8% 4.3% 3.5% 13.3% 
1814 0.1% 13.01/o 0.1% 23.01/o 
1815 5.0% 1.8% 19.1% 16.7% 
Average 3A% 5.1% 4.2% 18.6% 
Source: W027. 
Garrison Battalions were particularly prolific in the number of men who extended their 
service, which turned the army's attention to the lacklustre performance of the P 
Garrison Battalion. It was on orders to go to Ireland, and Calvert suggested to the 
district's general that this would be a good opportunity to encourage men to transfer. " 
At the same time as the limited-service men were being offered a chance to 
transfer to the line for a bounty, the garrison battalions were starting to be used as 
hospital corps. This inevitably caused confusion, as some unfit men who were sent to 
the 2d Garrison Battalion from the P Foot then volunteered for the 2/90"Y" Some men 
from the 2/91s'were transferred to the 2 nd Garrison Battalion because they were limited 
service men, who then wanted to transfer specifically back to the 2/91s', but were told 
they could only transfer to the 9l't. '" Detailed explanations then followed from the 
Horse Guards over who was entitled to a bounty for transferring their services, although 
they took some time to implement fully. "' The overall success of the extension of 
service supports the Duke of York's assertion that 'Great difficulty has always been 
1109 W03/42, Calvert to Lt. Gen. England, 10 January 1807. 
10 
W03/42, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Sir George Prevost, Bt., 5 January 1807. 
11 W03/42, Calvert to Prevost, 191anuary 1807. 
112 W03/42, Calvert to Lt. Gen. England, 5 February 1807; W03/45, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. Don, 26 
January 1808, and W03/46, Calvert to Don, II November 1808; W03/49, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Leighton, 
II January 18 10. 
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made to make a man first engage in a military life, after which he is easily induced to 
extend his services unlimitedly', "' but as there were no more soldiers raised under 
limited service terms, it was a unique policy. 
Other units also offered to extend their services, but often as whole units. 
Inspired by the patriotic stand of the Spanish against Napoleon, some militia regiments 
offered to serve in the Iberian Peninsula. "" Such offers were rejected, as many offers 
had conditions attached, and different terms of service inevitably resulted in 
misunderstandings. "' The offer of the Flintshire and Pembroke militias in 1808 stated 
that they would only serve with the 2/43d; the Buckingham Militia's offer in 1811 
stated they would not be separated from their officers or their colours. "I To be 
acceptable, offers to extend services had to fit in with the Horse Guards' policies: when 
Colonel Imhoff offered to extend the service of the 4h Garrison Battalion in 1811, he 
thought that it would be more successful if it formed a new regiment, thus preserving its 
identity. The Horse Guards wanted it as a second battalion, confirming its aversion to 
the raising of any more new regiments throughout the period. Although the soldiers had 
a high opinion of Colonel Imhoff, because of his care and attention to their families, the 
general commanding them was unsure if 'It will have sufficient influence to gain the 
extension of their services'. His uncertainties were proved correct; only twenty-one 
privates, four corporals and seven sergeants offered to extend their services from a total 
of 680 men. "' 
The greatest experiment in recruiting was Windham's short-service scheme. its 
demise was political, "' yet Windham's belief that it was more productive was supported 
113 WO 1/634, Memo by York, 15 February 1807. 
114 The offers were Flintshire and Pembroke (H050/409, Pulteney to Ilawkesbury, 12 July 1808), 
Merioneth (I August 1808), Carnarvon. (3 August 1808), Durham (16 August 1808). Royal Buckingham 
fH050/420, Torrens to Bunbury, II June 1811). 
15 This had particularly been the case with highland regiments, see John Prebble, Mutiny. Highland 
j? fgiments in Revolt, 1743-1804, (London, 1977). 116 H050/409, Pulteney to Hawkesbury, 12 July 1808; H050/420, Torrens to Bunbury, II June 1811. 17 WOI/650, Torrens to Liverpool, I January 1812, incl. Doyle to Torrens, 25 November 1811; Imhoff ýCol. 
4h Garrison Battalion) to Doyle, 18 December 1811. 
18 See Chapter 3. 
126 
by some IFOs. In Nottingham, Windham was informed by Lieutenant Colonel Grey that 
during the nine months in which it had operated there, the area had raised a seventh of 
total recruits of the country, and Grey attributed this to the removal of ' the Dread of a 
neglected, scoffed and starving old age, or mutilation acquired in the service'. "' But, it 
was also realised that Windham's system took time to implement. Initially the new 
terms of service were not well known, crimps were still used, and it suffered from 
competition with militia ballots. "' Consequently, the results of short-scrvice are 
impossible to judge fully, especially in view of the 1806 order forcing spare officers to 
recruit. The reintroduction of unlimited service halfway through 1808 gave soldiers a 
choice of terms to serve under, and from the data available most recruits chose the 
higher bounty and unlimited service. "' Prior to this, from 1806 short-service was 
compulsory and was reinstated as such for thirty to thirty-five years olds in 1812.122The 
figures show some stability between the years 1810 and 1813, " and these men might 
not have normally joined. Although their numbers, around 173 men a month between 
1811 and 1813, may not have been massive, the scheme should not be discounted as a 
total failure. Between April 1808 and September 1812 (when limited service was made 
compulsory for men over 35), 13.992 men deliberately chose short-service, and after 
this until 1815 another 3,600 recruits were enlisted as short-service men. 
"9 BL, Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37886, ff. 226-227, Grey to Windham, 30 March 1807. 120 BL , Windham Papers, Add Mss. 37886, f. 248, Fauvian (half pay officer, 5h Garrison Battalion) to Col. Robinson, 20 April 1807. 
121 See Graph X. Monthly figures are used so that a meaningful comparison between different sets of 
figures can be obtained. lzz W03/585 General Order by Calvert, 25 September 1812. 
123 In 1810 19'. 4% of recruits chose limited service, in 1811 17.10/a, 1812 15.7%, and in 1813 14.8%. 
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Graph X: Terms of Service of Recruits 1807 to 
1815 
E 
I. 
1 000ý/o 
90ý/0 
80 0/ý) 
70% 
60lýI 
50'ý, ý 
40ýo 
30% 
20% 
lo% 
0 Boys Unlimited 
D Men Unlimited 
N Boys Limited 
C3 Men Limited 
Year 
Sources: W025/3224, Recruiting return 1807 to 1810,5 April 1811; 
W025/3225, Recruiting return for 1810-1812,31 December 1812, 
Recruiting return for 1812-1813, August 1813, CJ, 18 14-15, IX, 309; 
As it was recognised that increasing the number of parties was not a particularly 
effective means of increasing recruiting, successive Secretaries of War looked for 'some 
arrangement which will cover the country more generally, which may enable us to draw 
a supply of men from those parts of it which are less frequented by recruiting parties'. ' 24 
The aim was to 'spread the recruiting system over the Kingdom generally'. "' The 
Talents allowed half-pay and volunteer officers to recruit (known as Extra Recruiting 
Officers), and the Portland government permitted volunteer NCOs to do the same"2' but 
these efforts were generally unsuccessful. By June 1807 there were 449 extra recruiting 
officers (EROs), yet by December 1807 they had only raised 1,869 men: the results 
from the 2,081 volunteer NCOs were dire; they merely enlisted 605 men. 12' From the 
outset they also caused problems: some EROs complained that they were not given due 
respect from officers under them, whilst the Horse Guards had to tell another that they 
would not tolerate EROs interfering with regimental recruiting parties. '2' Beating orders 
124 Vane (ed. ), Castlereagh Correspondence, 2 nd Series, 7,49, Memorandum for Cabinet, March 1807. 
25 W040/27 Circular, by Beckett, 23 May 1807. 
: 
26 
27 
W040/27, Circular, by Beckett, 23 May 1807. 
28 
CJ, 1808, VII, 175, Recruits raised, 7 March 1808. 
W03/583, Whitelocke (inspector-General) to Col. Loft, Louth, 20 January 1807: Pritzler to Richard 
Sanders, CoInbrook, 14 April 1807. 
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were misused, and one ERO was jailed after taking E50 from a man and promising to 
provide him with two militia substitutes; neither men nor money were forthcoming. " 
11be Horse Guards had no powers to discipline volunteer NCOs, but it was feared that 
they were 'Introducing the Spirit of Crimping into the Country'. "' 
Although Calvert thought the failure of these efforts was due to 'A want of 
exertion 131 its major flaw was financial. From the outset high bounties were expected, 
and sometimes paid, yet remuneration was not forthcoming, despite a warning that 
'Without which the Recruiting Service cannot be carried on with even a chance of a 
successful result' . 13' As the EROs worked on their own, they were inconvenienced when 
they did recruit someone, as they then had to take him to the district head-quarters that 
could be some distance away. 133 Colonel Robinson, the London IFO, summarised the 
effoq: 'We only increase the number of Recruiters and decrease the benefit expected 
from the Bringing Money; Officers and Gentlemen are entirely dependent on the lower 
classes for every recruit', and although he, and others, suggested some reforms, 134 the 
government began taking back beating orders from those who had not raised any 
recruits and so the effort slowly died. 13' Fortunately they were not paid (they received 
five guineas a recruit), and so the experiment was not too expensive for the government. 
Th e idea of using members of communities who were in local military forces to 
recruit for the army was invigorated by the establishment of the local militia. It was 
believed that the local militia would 'become a permanent source of Recruiting our 
Regular Armies. " The Duke of York shared this opinion, and in 1811 suggested that 
adjutants of the local militia be allowed to recruit, which 'If zealously directed, may 
129 WO 1/63 8, Calvert to Stewart, 9 May 1808. 
130 
WO 1/636, Calvert to StewaM September 1807. 31 WOI/636, Calvert to Stewart, 6 July 1808. 132 W01/637, Calvert to Cooke, 4 January 1808, incl. John Grey (IFO Nottingham) to AG, 31 December 
1812. 
133 WOI/I 115, IL Kelsey to Windham, 2 January 1807. 
134woin74, Powle (Lt. Col. 9h Battalion Norfolk Volunteer Infantry) to Hawkesbury, 26 May 1807; 
WO 1/1116, Robinson to Castlereagh, 19 May 1807. 
135 WO 1 /639, Calvert to Stewart, 4 June &6 July 1808; WO 1/640, Calvert to Castlereagh, II January 
1809; W01/642, Calvert to Liverpool, 7 December 1809; W03/585, Darling to Cathcart (AG of 
Scotland) & AG of Ireland, 20 September 1811. 136 WO 1/1118, William Stewart (Maj. P) to Castlereagh, 15 May 1808. 
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prove extremely advantageous in obtaining recruits for the army'. As they, and their 
sergeants, were part of the permanent staff of the local militia, they were already being 
paid, and had no need for securities. "" 
It was later suggested that the adjutants should recruit for regiments named after 
their respective county, and also for any of the light regiments or rifle corps, which were 
gaining considerable reputations from their exploits in the Peninsula. "' Hence, the 
Lincolnshire local militia regiments recruited for the I 01h (North Lincoln) and 69th 
(South Lincolnshire) regiments; the Nottinghamshire local militias the 45th 
(Nottinghamshire) and 59th (2nd Nottinghamshire). Some counties were also allocated 
non-county titled corps: the Derbyshire local militias were allocated the 2nd (Queen's 
Royal) and 4th (King's Own Lancaster). M' To encourage enlistments by these methods, 
ensigncies in the regulars were offered when fifty local militiamen transferred, the 
colonel of the regiment having the patronage to name an officer to be commissioned. " 
Nevertheless, the attempt faltered because the local militiaman had to pay back the 
bounty he received forjoining the local militia, before he joined the regulars, '41 and only 
a few thousand a year volunteered for the line. 141 It also showed that despite their 
experience as part-time soldiers, local military forces remained remarkably impervious 
to attempts to recruit from them. 
ExtraordinM Sources of Manpqwer 
In wartime the army had always relied on extraordinary sources of manpower: 
the recruitment of boys, recruits for general-service, the enlistment of convicts, and the 
use of foreigners. As part of the reduction of physical standards for admission into the 
army, boys were allowed to enlist. Initially only regiments in the East Indies could 
137 W03/5 85, Darling to IFOs, 30 March 18 11. 139 W03/585, Darling to York, 5 November 1811. 139 W03/585, Circular to IFOs, 2 July 1811. 140 WO 1/165, Bunbury to Goulburn, 3 May 1811. 14, W01/646, Calvert to Bunbury, 25 March 1811. 142 No precise figures are available, but Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, gives a figure of 2,600 to 
4,000 per year between 1809 and 1813. Bartlett, 'The Development of the British Army', PhD, p. 125, 
gives 2,700 to 3,500 per year, or fifteen men per local militia regiment. 
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recruit boys, up to ten per company, on the assumption that by the time they reached the 
India they would be of an age and have sufficient strength to be useful soldiers. "" This 
soon changed, and in 1808 other regiments were added, including regiments that formed 
part of the disposable force, such as the 95th. " EROs were also allowed to recruit one 
boy in every ten recruits for a bounty of two guineas, " and it was suggested that they 
join garrison battalions first, and then later choose which regiment they wanted to 
join. " The number of regiments permitted to recruit boys increased from nineteen in 
1811 to forty-five in 1812, but each regiment could only have fifty boys (i. e. five per 
company). 147 
The recruitment of boys generally benefited the army, as some of them were the 
children of soldiers anyway or from the Royal Military Asylum, '" and they were 
encouraged to attend a regimental school, learning to read and write with the aim of 
making them future NCOs. In 1807 boy recruits had to be at least fifteen, and 5' 2" tall, 
and could only enlist for general-service, but with the expansion of the recruitment of 
minors, the lower age limit was raised to sixteen, but the height restriction was reduced 
to 5'. The recruitment of boys was not always an advantage to the army. Lieutenant 
Colonel Grey at Nottingham, always keen to offer his opinion, thought that 'they very 
frequently disappoint the Expectations of their Growth', and so were discharged. "" 
When the Duke of Kent asked for some boys from the veteran and garrison battalions 
for his regiment, he was told they were to remain in their corps, presumably because 
they were not fit enough for active duty. "O 13,796 boys were recruited into the army 
between 1808 (the first return that differentiates men and boys) and 1815, and up to 
143 03/585, Circular by Calvert, 17 June 1811.1h 
1h 144 W040/29 Calvert to Franis Moore, II November 1808. The other regiments were the 4,34 35 
68dý 73d, 74u' 75d'. 77d'% 78h, 79'h, 84ý 85'h and 94h. 45 W03/192 'Vlemorandum for the Military Secretary, 27 January 1807. 46 W035/24: Clinton to Calvert, 21 October 1809; WO 1/643, Calvert to Liverpool, 22 Jan 1810. 147 Cj 
, 1806-07, IV, 175, Recruiting Standards and Bounties; W03/585, Memo by CalveX7 July 1811; Memo by Darling, 28 May 18 12; Memo by CalveM 10 February 1813. 
148 W03/42, Calvert to Lit. Gen. Doyle, 4 May 1808. 149 BL, Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37886, ff. 138-139, Grey to Windham, 4 March 1807. 150 W03/42, Calvert to Ken4 17 January 1807, Deputy Adjutant General to Kent, 29 January 1807. 
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1813 this source provided roughly 2,000 recruits per year. But the Commander in Chief 
was particularly strict on their numbers, reflecting their useftilness to the army. Only in 
small numbers, and with the aim of becoming NCOs, were boy soldiers permitted. 
General-service recruits were a more recent introduction, and were particularly 
useful to the army, as the army could send them to whatever rcgiment it felt was 
necessary. For instance, in 1807, all general-service recruits at the army depot were sent 
to join the 2 nd Foot, "' and in 1810 forty general-service recruits were selected to be 
NCOs in the 4th Ceylon Regiment. "' The origins of recruiting for general-service lay in 
the 1790s, when the East India Company lost its right to recruit, yet needed some means 
to maintain the strength of its European regiments. Consequently, the physical standards 
were less dernanding. "' The regimental system insured that general-service never really 
achieved any great success, and became synonymous with substandard recruiting. It 
encroached on the colonel's traditional rights, and often confused potential recruits 
when the British army was well known for its regimental identity. When Kelsey, an 
ERO in Berkshire, tried to recruit a man for general-service, the prospective recruit 
wanted to know what sort of regiment it was. "' The recruiting district headquarters 
recruited for general-service, and often men who deserted and were recaptured were 
allocated to general-service, which allowed the army to send them to regiments in 
unhealthy stations, such as the Royal African Corps. Most general-service men, 
however, were given to the East India Company; ` between 1807 and 1811,4,619 men 
were sold to the East India Company at f. 40 a man. " As a measure to increase 
recruitment, it only fulfilled its original function of recruiting for the East India 
Company, albeit with the important advantage of preserving the army's recruiting 
'51 W03.43, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Doyle, 25 June 1807. 
152 W03/198, Calvert to Taylor, 27 April 18 10. 
153 W03/585, Memorandum by Calvert, 10 February 1813. The minimum height was 5' 3" (compared to 
5' 4" for the line), and the recruit had to be under forty (thirty-fivc for the line). 154 WOI/I 115, H. Kelsey (ERO, Whitchurch near Reading) to Windham, 2 January 1807. 5'5 W025/3224, Memorandum showing the manner in which ordinary recruiting works, 19 October 1809. 156 WO 1/654, Return of men transferred to East India Company, 24 December 1812. 
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monopoly. 
General-service recruits did provide a means for the army to process the 
convicts, prisoners and especially the deserters that rapidly filled up the prison hulks. 
General-service allowed the army discretion over where these men were sent, which 
allowed the army to create penal corps. Transferring these men to such regiments 
regularly emptied the Dido prison hulk at the Isle of Wight; ` however, it is difficult to 
determine how many of these men were felons. In drafts to the Royal York Rangers and 
the Royal Africa Corps in 1808, seventy-two were civilian felons from 153 prisoners. "' 
Between 1808 and the end of 1809, only seven convicts in civilian gaols were 
specifically offered pardons to serve in the army. Even then, these men still had to 
undergo a medical examination to see if they were fit enough to serve as soldiers. "' 
There is the possibility of less formal arrangements between magistrates and recruiters, 
and of course some men joined the army because they were in trouble with the law. But 
as the law had the option of transportation to New South Wales, it seems likely that 
convicts formed a minuscule component of recruiting. " 
Inevitably penal corps gained an unenviable reputation. The Royal African 
Corps was particularly bad in this respect: in 1810 there was a 'near mutiny' in the 
regiment, and fifteen men were hanged. The investigation of the regiment found that 
enot one man has ever yet been enlisted for that Corps', Whilst the Royal York Rangers 
and Royal West Indian Rangers had some enlisted general-service men. "' Ibis was the 
consequence of creating specific penal regiments, but it was better than allowing these 
157 W03/192, Wynyard to Inspector General of Recruiting, 9 January 1807, transferring the men in the 
Dido to the Royal West Indian Rangers; W03/195, Calvert to Taylor, 13 July 1808, transferring sixty- 
three men to the Royal York Rangers, and twelve to the Royal African Corps. 158 W01/638, Return of Pardoned Felons, Deserters, etc, 9 May 1808. 159 W03/45, Wynyard to Maj. Gen. Lord Southampton, 5 March 1808; W03.47, Calvert to Lt. Gen. lion. 
Jonathan Hope, 17 March 1809; W03A7, Calvert to Duke of Cambridge, 6 April 1809; W03/48, 
Wynyard to Cathcart, 19 August 1809; W03/49, Calvert to Lt Gen. Pigot, 28 September 1809; W03/49, 
Calvert to Whethant, 28 September 1808; W03/49, Wynyard to Maj. Gen. Whetham, II December 1809. 
'60 One of the reasons convicts were recruited into the army during the American War of Independence 
was the breakdown of the machinery for disposing of felons. S. R. Conway, 'The Recruitment of 
Criminals into the British Army, 1775-81', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 137 (May 
1985), p . 46-58. 161 W03P /598, Torrens to Bunbury, 26 December 18 10. 
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men to serve in the regular regiments of the army, and ensured that their impact was as 
minimal as possible. Convicts were not a particularly welcome addition to the army, and 
even some captured deserters were transported, rather than transferred to penal corps in 
the army. 162 
The other extraordinary source of manpower for the army was the use of 
foreigners, and the years 1807 to 1815 saw a massive increase in their numbers, peaking 
at just over 20% of the army in 1813.163 Before the Napoleonic Wars the army had 
generally hired foreign troops to increase its strength, such as the Hessians in the 
American War of Independence. During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars this 
ceased to be an option as there were no troops to buy. Consequently dedicated foreign 
regiments were established. The army already had one such regiment, and although the 
60d' expanded massively during the wars, with a seventh battalion added from German 
prisoners of war taken during the Walcheren expedition, '" the tendency was to expand 
foreign recruitment into specific unnumbered corps. Originally the 97 th had been a 
foreign corps, but in 1807 it was considered British, " and generally foreigners in the 
line regiments met with disapproval. This did not prevent some line regiments from 
having foreigners in their ranks, and an average 3.4% of the rank and file of line 
regiments were foreigners. Most of these men were 'men of colour' serving in 
regimental bands. '" Typically, the I't Foot came to the Horse Guards' attention because 
of the number of foreigners it had, W and the Duke of Kent was specifically told that 
foreign recruits were not permitted in any line regiment, especially 'a corps so 
distinguished as the Royal Regiment of Foot'. ` The 44 th also received official 
disapproval for enlisting foreigners. 161 
'62 See Chapter 7. 163 See Table 2. 
164 W06/133, WO to Gordon, 23 April 1809; for the formation of the 7/60'h, W06/134, Bathurst to York, 
4 August 1812. 
1 W03/43, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Grosvenor, 23 April 1807. 166 U, 1812, IX, 203, Return of Foreigners in the Army, 10 April 1812. 167 W03/42, Calvert to Bgd. Gen. Dyot4 23 March 1807. 168 W03/42, Calvert to Duke of Kent, 8 January 1807. 169 W03146, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Fraser, 22 October 1808. 
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Table 2: ProDortion of Foreijzn TrooDs in the British Arm 
Year 
Strength of British 
Army (Infkntry, 
Cavalry and 
Artillery) 
Total Foreign Troops 
1804 150,593 17,639 (11.71/6) 
1805 161,956 22,375 (13.81/o) 
1806 185,119 26,643 (14.4%) 
1807 199,457 35,816 (18.0%) 
1808 226,429 37,217 (16A'lo) 
1809 234,176 36,947 (15.8%) 
1810 237,452 38,890 (16AOlo) 
1811 234,594 40,343 (17.2%) 
1812 243,885 45,881 (18.8%) 
1813 255,876 52,737 (20.6%) 
1814 219,662 N/A 
1815 194,251 25,826 (13.3%) 
Composition of Foreign 
Contingent 
KGL I Provinciall Foreign 
273% 
27.3% 
26.8% 
37.1% 
36.9% 
36.0% 
35.7% 
35.8% 
372% 
Sources: U, 1813-14, X1,155; W0255224, Effective strength of Foreign and Provincial 
Corps for 1810 and 1811,29 November 1811; W025/3225, Effective strength of Foreign and 
Provincial Corps, 31 December 1812. 
Foreigners were therefore concentrated in unnumbered units. "' There were 
distinctive types, ranging from those initially raised as imigri corps, such as the Swiss 
regiments and the Chasseurs Britanniques, and the 'armies in exile', such as the famous 
King's German Legion and the Brunswick corps. But with no chance of recruitment on 
the continent after 1808, "" these units increasingly came to rely on deserters and 
prisoners of war to fill their ranks. In 1808 Baron de Roll wanted any Swiss conscript 
prisoners to join his regiment, " and by 1811, Wellington informed Liverpool that the 
Brunswick corps was principally composed of French deserters, and suggested sending 
it to Gibraltar. " 
The use of foreign deserters and prisoners of war was virtually forced on the 
government after 1807, when the KGL left Germany for the last time, and it was 
inevitable that the quality of these units would suffer, and concerns be raised in 
'70 P, C. Yaple, 'Foreign and Miscellaneous regiments in the British Army', J&4IIR, L (1972), pp. 10-28. 171 WOI/668, Moshiem to Lukin, 2 September 1808, on the closure of the foreign recruiting depot at 
Gothenburg. The KGL landed in Germany in 1807, and did not return to Hanover until 1814. For details 
on the KGL's recruitment problem, Daniel Savage Gray, "'Prisoners, Wanderers and Deserters" 
Recruiting for the King's German Legion 1803-15', JSAHR, L111 (1975), pp. 148-58. 172 WOI/I 117, Baron de Roll to Cooke, 25 October 1808. 
173 BI, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38246, Wellington to Liverpool, 4 January 1811. 
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Parliament about their loyalty. But manpower was needed, and every deserter recruited 
from the French represented a loss to Napoleon, and a gain for Britain. Similarly, every 
prisoner of war that joined a foreign regiment represented one less man that the British 
army had to guard and the government feed. The York Light Infantry Volunteers were 
allowed to recruit from prisoners of war (but not French) in 1808; ` three years later an 
officer was sent on a mission to Spain to encourage German troops to desert, offering a 
bounty of $5 for a private, and $20 for an officer-, " and, in 1813, an Italian Legion was 
formed from 1,000 prisoners of war, but 'on no account to take Neapolitans'. "" 
There were limits to foreign recruiting, as the debates in Parliament on the issue 
showed, and some offers, like the proposals to form new British regiments, were 
rejected. "'Ibe army was particularly upset by Sir John Stuart's raising of a Calabrian 
Levy without any reference to London. "' It was even proposed to add Portuguese and 
Spanish companies to regiments in Iberia, "' but the army was quick to dispel such 
rumours in 1811.11* 
Counted amongst the foreign units were troops raised overseas for local defence 
(they were counted as foreign because they did not make any demands on the manpower 
of Britain), and they constituted a substantial amount to the foreign contingent in the 
army. "" The West India regiments, composed of black soldiers, represented the most 
successful application of this policy, releasing thousands of troops from the unhealthy 
garrisons of the West Indies, and the American Fencibles released troops from Canada. 
174 W03/46, Wynyard to Maj. Gen. Hewgill, 15 October 1808. 175 WO 1 /413, Merck to Bunbury, 20 July 1811. He obtained four lieutenants, twenty-one sergeants, and 
337 corporals and privates. 214 later joined the British army. A similar mission was rejected in 1808, 
W06/121, Cooke to Baron Hompesch, 5 August 1808. 176 WOI/916, Alexander Levy (Transport Office) to Goulbum, 21 October 1813, Maj. Baurenis (60'h) to 
Torrens, 26 December 1813, Torrens to Baurenis, 3 December 1813. 
177 WOl/l 117, Baron Eben to War Office, 12 July 1808, offering a foreign rifle corps; W06/120, Stewart 
to Mon. de Kruges, 10 March 1808; W06/122, Bunbury to Bgd. Gen. De Tartaz, 22 February 1811; 
W06/124, Bunbury to G. Jones Esq., 14 March 1813 (offering-a German Rifle battalion). 178 W03/595, Torrens to Bunbury, 8 December 1809. 179 WO 1/647, Memo by York, 13 July 1811; WO 1/65 1, Torrens to Bunbury, 13 June 1812. 
180 
W06/123, Bunbury to Bridges BarTet Esq., 20 December 1811. a' Between 1810 and 1812 the provincial troops contributed 36.7% on average of the total foreign 
contingent WO25/3224, Effective strength of Foreign and Provincial Corps for 1810 and 1811,29 
November 1811; WO25/3225, Effective strength of Foreign and Provincial Corps, 31 December 1812. 
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However, the contribution that troops raised in places that Britain controlled, such as 
Sicily and the Greek Islands, are more difficult to assess, and were generally regarded as 
unreliable. Provincial regiments filled local needs for manpower thus releasing the 
regulars for more active duties, but they were not really considered for anything more. 
Overall, they demonstrated the expans6 of Napoleonic conflict for Britain; in its quest to 
find more men, it took into its service units ranging from the Maltese Fencibles, the 
Greek Light Infantry Regiment, and the Bourbon Corps in Mauritius. 
Although not strictly a source of manpower for the army, raising men for the 
militia constituted an increase in Britain's military force, and was the most successful. 
Between 1807 and 1815 the militia raised 56,873 by ballots and 51,373 by recruiting, 182 
dwarfing the contribution from boys, convicts, and foreigners, and nearly equalling the 
numbers raised by the army. Initially, these men were not openly recruited for the army, 
but with the annual transfers of 1811 onwards, it was clear that the militia became a 
separate recruiting establishment. It developed into what the Horse Guards hoped the 
local militia would become, a means of spreading recruiting across the country without 
increasing the number of recruiting parties. It also had the advantage of being subject to 
some compulsion: if militia regiments were not kept up to establishment, then ballots 
could be ordered to fill their ranks. It proved a very effective means of bolstering 
Britain's recruiting. 
lu See Table 3. 
137 
Table 3: Total Recruits Raised by the Army and the Militia. 
Year Army Recruits 
Militia 
Recruits 
Total raised by 
voluntary enlistment 
Militia Ballots Total 
1807 19,114 19,114 41,305 60,419 
1808 12,963 12,963 12,963 
1809 11,780 9,635 21,415 377 21,792 
1810 9,095 11,214 20,309 10,524 30,833 
1811 11,772 4,796 16,568 3,994 20,562 
1812 14,756 9,564 24,320 417 24,737 
1813 14,647 10,705 25,352 253 25,607 
1814 7,911 5,428 13,339 13,339 
1815 15,237 15,237 15,237 
Total 117,275 51,373 168,648 56,873 225,521 
Sources: See Graph VI for details of the army's recruiting figures and sources. WOI/904, 
Memorandum, AG, 10 May 1808; W0162/326, Return of Men raised by the Militia; Ci, 
18 13-14, XL 154, Militia recruits raised by Beat of Drum, May 1809 to October 1813,1814- 
15, K 323, Militia recruits raised by Beat of Drum, 25 December 1813 to December 1814. 
Conclusion 
Despite all the efforts of the Horse Guards army recruitment was still 
insufficient. But great progress was made in improving recruiting during the period. The 
Horse Guards' reforms essentially 'nationalised' the recruiting service, transferring 
control of it from the regiment to the state, and was 'well calculated, by the effectual 
and immediate checks it affords to the officer's charges, to guard the public in a great 
degree'. " All the usual measures the army adopted in wartime served only to increase 
recruiting fractionally, and the extraordinary sources of manpower, although generally 
more productive, could not provide the answer to Britain's manpower problems. All the 
army's remedies had restrictions and limits, and all had been reached. 
Using the militia to fill the casualty gap proved remarkably effective. Their 
enlistment figures suggest that the army was correct in assuming that more men could 
be obtained through ordinary recruiting. To manage this it had to give up its monopoly 
of raising men. The results fully outweighed the risk, and only in 1810 did the army's 
ordinary recruiting suffer severely. But the army then had to persuade the militiamen to 
183 BI, Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37886, ff. 194-199, Fitzpatrick to Windham, 25 March 1807. 
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volunteer to the I ine 
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Chgpter 5: The Militia Volunteers 
Introduction 
The volunteers from the militia provided the answer to the manpower problems 
of the British army and enabled Britain to prosecute the war. The 1807 transfer (47 Geo. 
III c. 55 and 57) allowed the dispatch of a force to support Spain and Portugal, and that 
of 1809 (49 Geo III c. 4 and 5) repaired the devastated 'disposable force' after the 
Corunna campaign allowing Britain to support its growing army in the Peninsula and 
provide a large force to attack Walcheren. Once again, a militia transfer was used to 
repair a weakened army in 1811 (51 Geo III c. 20), and more importantly established a 
permanent means of supplying the army in the Peninsula. Finally, in 1814, three 
combined militia regiments were formed for service in Europe, confirming the militia's 
new status as an integral part of Britain's military machine. 
The number of soldiers provided by the militia was considerable: ' 94,000 
militiamen transferred to the army under the various acts between 1807 and 1814, 
compared with just over 100,000 men recruited between 1807 and 1814. Without the 
soldiers from the militia, the war could not have been prosecuted against France. The 
militia volunteers also had a wider impact on the army; during these seven years 
militiamen were, at various times, allowed to join the line regiments, Foot Guards, 
Royal Artillery, Royal Staff Corps, Royal Military Artificers and the Royal Wagon 
Train. ' Only the cavalry did not receive any militiamen, although this was suggested? 
Some militiamen even transferred to the Royal Marines, and the government had to 
specifically prohibit transfers to the navy. " 
1 See Table 4. 
2 W01/904, Return of militia transfer, I July 1808; HOSO/406, Calvert to Beckettý 8 September 1809; 
H050/420, Torrens to Goulburn, 24 July 1811; H050/421, Calvert to Beckett, 2 November 1811; 
H050/425, Chapman to Addington, 27 February 1813. 3 WOI/636, Aylett (IFO Ipswich) to AG, 30 December 1807. 
4 H051/28, Sidmouth to Col. Douglas (Forfar Militia), 12 February 1813. 
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Table 4: Militia Transfer Acts and their Yield. 
Years Act British Militia Irish Militia 
Volunteers Volunteers 
Total for 
each Act 
1807 to 47 Geo. IlL c. 55 18,794 
1808 
47 Geo. 111, c. 57 8,353 27,137 
1808 48 Geo. IIL c. 64 3,378 3,378 
1809 to 49 Geo. III, c. 4 15,974 
1810 
49 Geo. 111, c. 5 4,879 20,853 
1810 49 Geo. III, c. 56 2,914 2,914 
1811 to 51 Geo. Ill, c. 20 21,579 30,294 
1814 
51 Geo. 111, c. 30 8,715 
1814 54 Geo. III, c. 1 8,285 1,318 9,603 
Total 11 64,622 29,557 1 94,179 
Sources: Cookson, British Armed Nation, p. It 8 (gives 19,152 from the British Militia in 
1807); WOI/904, Volunteers from the Militia, I July 1808; WOI/946, Return of Militia 
Volunteers, 24 May 1810 (which gives 17,612 from the British Militia in 1807 and 1808); 
WO25/3225, Return of Men volunteered from the Militia, 15 October 1813; U, 1814-15, 
327, Return of Militia volunteers for 1814,14 March 1815. 
This achievement belies the difficulties that the government had in executing 
these acts. To use the militia in this way the govemment had to appease the militia 
interest and entice the militiamen themselves into service in the line. In both cases this 
required a compromise between the interests of the army and the militia. It was not a 
simple matter of asking for militiamen and getting them, the militia volunteers 
highlighted the problems that Britain had with its military establishment, and the limited 
solutions it could offer. 
Quotas and Yield 
Each of the transfer acts stipulated the number of militiamen that were allowed 
to volunteer for the army, and these figures were always considered as a quota that each 
regiment should fulfil. The 1807 transfer was particularly successful, but those 
afterwards increasingly struggled to achieve the targets set by government. Only 1,775 
men were still due from the militia at the end of the 1807 transfer from a quota of 
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29,243.5 but the 1809 transfer provided 20,853 men, or 73.2% of the quota. " On the 
1809 deficiencies, Calvert informed the Home Office that there was 'no probability, at 
present, of the Militia Regiments which have not yet completed their quota of 
volunteers to the Regulars, furnishing the Quota required'. " Quota deficiencies were a 
problem that emerged as soon as militia transfers began. The government expected 
some deficiencies as both the transfer acts of 1807 and 1809 permitted the militia 
colonels to refuse any more discharges if they obtained five sixths of their quota within 
the first thirty-day period nominated for volunteering. If all the volunteers were 
obtained in this period, and the colonels exercised their rights, 83% of the quota would 
be fulfilled, which emphasises the success of the 1807 transfer, and mitigates the lower 
results in 1809. 
From an analysis of individual militia regiments, there are patterns in how they 
responded to the demands for volunteers. " In 1807, the Irish and Scottish Militias had a 
higher deficiency rate than the total English figures (8.0% and 12.3% compared with 
3.1% respectively), and their deficiencies were spread throughout the regiments: over 
half of the Scottish regiments did not fulfil their quota, whereas a third of the Irish corps 
did not, and only eight English regiments failed to meet the government's requirements. 
On closer examination, the Welsh militia regiments also had an average deficiency 
equal to Irish levels, and a quarter of the regiments failed to meet their quota. ' 
This pattern was repeated in the 1809 transfers and the annual transfers from 
1811. In the 1809 transfer, fourteen out of fifteen Scottish Militia regiments did not 
fulfil their quota, nor did a quarter of the Welsh regiments, and seventeen out of sixty- 
5 Ile quotas are calculated from H051/25, Instructions for militia transfer, 17 August 1807 and 
WO 1/612, Arrangement for the Inspection of Volunteers from the Irish Militia, 23 September 1807. 6 See H051/26, Militia Transfer Instructions, 23 March 1809 for the quotas; for the number of volunteers, 
H050/416, Return of Militia Volunteers, Adjutant General's Office, 10 July 1810 & Cookson, British 
ArmedNation, p. 118. 7 H050/416, Calvert to Beckett, 31 July 18 10. 8 See Appendix F. 
9 WOI/904, List of Regiments not furnished quota, 25 April and I June 1808. It is possible that the some 
regiments gave the remaining volunteers before the expiration of the act in August 1808, but the total 
deficiency from the I June return is 1,775 men, not substantially different from the final deficiency of 
1,432. Also, the regiments still with a deficiency at the end of the volunteering have to be from this list. 
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four English regiments were deficient. The cumulative effects of the quota deficiencies 
exaggerated this trend: the British militia had a 32% deficiency in 1812, whilst the Irish 
militia only filled half of its volunteer quota. " In the British Militia, England, Wales and 
Scotland all saw their level of deficiency increase; Wales continued to be worse than 
England and Scotland worse than Wales. " This is particularly significant as Scotland 
and Ireland's military contributions are usually seen as proportionately larger than that 
of England and Wales, yet the proportions are reversed for the militia volunteers. This 
trend of a diminishing yield and the government's inability to rectify it was confirmed 
in 1811. Although the militia managed 70.8% of its quota in 1811, the proportion fell to 
70% in 1812 and to 61.5% by 1813.1' By 1812 Torrens; considered that militia 
volunteering was not 'an available resource for the augmentation of the line', " and in 
1813 the Duke of York informed Earl Bathurst that all the militia volunteers (British 
and hish) had fallen short of their target by 9,355 men, 14 over 4,000 men more than in 
September 1811. Militia volunteering was not producing the men expected, but the 
fortuitously timed improvement in the war allowed the government to introduce a new 
way for the militia to serve the country, neatly avoiding the embarrassment of having to 
continue increasing quotas, despite diminishing returns. 
10 Cookson, British Armed Nation, p. 119, n. 119. 11 See Table 5. 
12 H051/28, Militia Volunteer Instructions, 1811; W03/585, Circular, by Darling, 25 April 1812; 
W03/585, Special Instructions on Militia volunteering, I March 18 13. Unfortunately, no separate returns 
exist for the Irish annual militia transfers from 1811, but they probably provided the same percentage of 
volunteers, if not less. 13 W03/604, Torrens to Addington, 28 December 1812. 14 W025/3225, York to Bathurst, 20 October 1813. 
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Table 5: Militia Ouotas and Deficiencies, 1807 to 1813. 
England Wales Scotland Ireland Total 
Years 
0 ' Cy Im m Cy rz 9 Z Q 
1807- 
1808 15,101 3.1% 1,297 7A% 4,156 123% 8,689 8.01/o 29,243 6.1% 
1809- 16 776 9.7% 1 331 16.1% 3,654 56.2% 6,708 27.3% 28,469 20.1% 1810 , , 
1811 7,199 11.7% 653 18.1% 3,192 44.0% 5,096 46.0% 16,140 29.2% 
1812 6,477 20.01/o 557 32.0% 2,551 63. (r/o 6,543 5 MyYo 16,128 38.5% 
1813 6,668 250% 622 36.0% 2,745 770% 7,546 N/A N/A N/A 
Average 19.7% 29.0% 61.3% 48.5%1 34.8% 
Sources: H051/25, Instructions for militia transfer, 17 August 1807; WOI/612, Arrangement 
for the Inspection of Volunteers from the Irish Militia, 23 September 1807; WO 1/904, List of 
Regiments not furnished quota, 25 April and I June 1808; H051/26, Militia Transfer 
Instructions, 23 March 1809; H050/416, Return of Militia Volunteers, 10 July 1810; 
H051/28, Militia Volunteer Instructions, 27 April 1811; W03/585, Circular, by Darling, 25 
April 1812; W03/585, Special Instructions on Militia volunteering, I March 1813; H051/28, 
Circular, by Sidmouth, 24 March 1814. 
The Quota System 
Part of the problem of deficient volunteers lay in the workings of the militia 
transfer acts. The quota for the 1807 was the excess number of men above three fifths of 
the establishment, meaning that if every regiment were close to its establishment, about 
40% of its strength would be expected to volunteer. In the orders executing the act in 
1807, Hawkesbury explained the quota in the much simpler terms of two fifths of the 
establishment, which would have been correct if every regiment were up to strength, " 
but this was not the case. In 1806 the Talents government suspended the militia ballot 
and so the militia regiments had no means of replacing any casualties suffered. " Just 
before the suspension of the ballot, there was a militia transfer act along with a 
reduction in the establishment of the militia, " so if a regiment did not complete its quota 
in 1805, in 1807 it was likely to be over its establishment. it also worked the other way. 
Lord Fortescue informed the government that little could be expected beyond the eighty 
is H051/25, Hawkesbury to Commanding Officers of Militia Regiments, 17 August 1807. 16 46 Geo. 111, c. 9 1. 17 45 Geo. III c. 3 1. The act allowed the excess above the 1802 militia quota to volunteer. 
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men obtained from the South Devon Militia in 1807, because Fortescue had found a 
considerable number of volunteers in 1805, and consequently the regiment was much 
reduced in strength. " This resulted in the 1807 transfer taking a varied proportion of 
each regiment's strength: the average was 38.2%, but the burden fell heaviest on the 
Scottish Militia which had to provide 44.3% of its men. The highest proportion 
demanded was 54.9% expected from the Forfar and Kincardine Militia, Whilst the 
lowest was the 2d Surrey Militia's 13.9%. " 
Colonels Frankland and Lovedon highlighted such inequalities during the debate 
on the 1809 transfer in the Commons. As the ballot in 1807 had raised men in 
proportion to the 1802 militia quota, without any reference to their actual strength, a 
repetition of the variations of 1807 was possible. The bill would actually penalise 
regiments that were up to strength, whilst it would be easier on a corps that had been 
negligent in completing its establishment . 20 The act did attempt to rectify this by stating 
that if the regiment's strength was below its establishment then the quota was two fifths 
of its establishment; if the regiment had more men am its establishment, then the quota 
was the excess above three fifths of the establishment. This meant that every militia 
regiment's quota should be at least forty per cent of its strength, but, as in 1807, this did 
not prevent some regimental quotas from being a larger proportion of their strength. 
The 1807 ballot to replace the militiamen who volunteered made the quota 
system potentially more inequitable in 1809. The intention of the ballot was to add three 
quarters of the original 1802 militia quota to each regiment (47,642 men), but overall 
the ballot only raised 32,500 men in Britain. " So, as in 1807, regiments varied in their 
strength compared to their establishments. Unfortunately, the instructions for the 1809 
18 H051/26, Lord Fortescue to Hawkesbury, 15 December 1807. In fact his regiment only had to provide 
37.7%, compared to the East Devon's 50.5% and the North Devon's 50.3%. "' H051/25, instructions for militia transfer, 17 August 1807; W01/612, Arrangement for the Inspection 
of Volunteers from the Irish Militia, 23 September 1807; WOI/904, List of Regiments which have not 
fumished quota, 25 April and I June 1808. All the figures are calculated from the I June 1808 figures, the 
last available return before the act expired in August 1808. 20 Hansard, 1809, XH, 651-652, 
21 WOI/904, Memorandum, AG, 10 May 1808. Ireland raised 8,805 out of 9,905 ordered. 
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transfer do not include details of militia regiments' strength, perhaps to avoid militia 
regiments' determining how their quotas were calculated. Using returns from the 8 
March 1809 for the British militia, only a few weeks before the transfer, it appears that 
the excess of their strength above their new establishments determined only fourteen 
regiments' quotas. 22Most were simply allocated two fifths of their establishment fixed 
in 1805, which as all the regiments were augmented in 1807, meant most had to supply 
under 40% of their strength. Only nine militia regiments were under their 1805 
establishments, and because of this had to fumish over two fifths of their numbers. 23 
This resulted in a fairer distribution of volunteering, with a similar average to 1807 
(37.6% of every regiment). The smallest proportion was the Is' Yorkshire West Riding's 
30.1%, which reflected the fact that its large new establishment was incomplete (1,299 
rank and file, and 1,128 effectives) compared with its 1805 establishment of 810. The 
highest proportional quota belonged to the Cardigan Militia, which was due to provide 
47.9% of its strength to the line, but it was not even up to its 1805 establishment, and so 
was effectively being punished for this deficiency. 
Despite such clever mathematics, the interaction of the quota, strength of the 
regiments, and the counties' success in balloting, did not increase the quota of those 
regiments that had fallen short in 1807. In that year, the East Devon Militia's quota was 
324; although it produced only 153 men volunteers for the line, its quota in 1809 was 
actually reduced to 212. The Carmarthen Militia did suffer for its performance in 1807, 
and its quota rose from 134 men in 1807 (of which only 66 men were supplied), to 170 
in 1809. The complex interaction of strength, establishment and volunteer quotas was 
sufficiently bewildering for Lord Stanley and Earl Fitzwilliam to check with the 
22 W0162/326, Return of the Effective Strength of the British Militia 15 March 1810; H051/26, Militia 
Transfer Instructions, 23 March 1809. They were Denbigh, Flint, 2 Wand Yd Lancashire, Leicestershire, 
East Middlesex, Nottingham, Aberdeen, Argyll & Bute, Dumfries, Lanark, Perth, and Renfrew Militias. 
The Buckinghamshire Militia's quota of 289 is above 2/5hs of their 1805 establishment (252), but not 
egual to the excess above 3/5d's of their 1809 establishment (302). 23 WO 162/326, Return of the Effective Strength of the British Militia, 15 March 18 10; H051/26 Militia 
Transfer Instructions, 23 March 1809. They were Cardigan, West Kent, West Middlesex, I'& 2W(f Surrey, 
Sussex, Is'& 2nd Tower Hamlets. 
146 
government that their respective quotas were correct, as both of them were so large. "' 
It was such anomalies that prompted a much clearer statement on what the army 
expected from each militia regiment in 1811. The 1811 act, based the volunteer quota 
on the 1802 establishment, which benefited those regiments that were successftil in 
recruiting fi-om 1810 and in providing their volunteer quotas. Regiments that had 
difficulties in obtaining men found the volunteer quotas an increasing burden. When 
Lieutenant Colonel Mulberry of the Sussex Militia -a regiment that always furnished 
its quotas - complained about this, the Home Office replied that the quota was made, as 
he already knew, with 'no reference to present numbers'. " 
A fixed quota system made the strength of the militia even more critical than 
before. Although the militia proved adept at recruiting overall, there were huge 
variations in individual regiment's success. Between the end of the 1809 act and the end 
of 1813, each militia regiment should have raised just under its 1802 quoW` and most 
regiments raised the men required. Some regiments stand out particularly badly: the 
Forfar and Kincardine Militia only managed to raise 45.2% of the men required, 
followed by Cumberland at 53.8% and Aberdeen at 45.2%. Countering these, other 
regiments were particularly successful at recruiting: the West Kent Militia recruited 
1,121 men between May 1809 and October 1813,150.9% of its recruiting target . 2'As a 
result particular regiments had strict limits placed on the number they could enlist. 21 
Some regiments in 1813 were warned that they were not maintaining their strength, and 
were advised to have one party per company, composed of their best men. If the party 
failed to raise men, Sidmouth suggested recalling it; he also suggested that any 
militiaman on furlough who recruited a man should have his leave extended. " 
24 H051/26, Liverpool to Lord Stanley, I April 1809; an identical letter was sent to Earl Fitzwilliarn the 
same day. 
26 
H051 8, Goulburn to U Col. Mulberry, 4 May 1812. 
cen-fourteenths precisely, one half raised in 1809-10, and a seventh for each year 1811 to 1813 27 016 26, Return of Men raised by the Militia, 13 December 1813. 28 H051 8, Circular, by Ryder, 26 December 1811. 
29 H 51 8, Circular, by Sidmouth, 12 January 1813. The regiments were East Middlesex, East and West 
ent, Isle of ight, East and West London, Oxford, Pembroke, Durnfiies, Forfar, Lanark, Renfi-ew, East 
Suffolk and the Cornish Miners Militias. 
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Pembroke did not even have a recruiting party in 1813. " Recruiting by the militia was 
limited, and was regulated by the regiment's success in volunteering, consequently, 
although the Forfar and Kincardine Militia's recruiting totals were bad, at the end of 
1813 it was well above its establishment because it had not filled its volunteer quotas, 
and similar can be said for the Aberdeen Militia. However, the Cumberland Militia was 
in the dire position of having poor recruiting results and not filling its volunteer quotas, 
and so by the end of 1813 it only had 572 rank and file on an establishment of 645. " 
The militia volunteer quota was considered a 'charge against the regiment, til the 
whole number are completely supplied' since 1807, ' and in 1811 this became an open, 
strictly applied policy: the annual volunteer quota from 1811 was one seventh of the 
regiment's 1802 militia quota, plus any deficiencies from the previous years, including 
any men due from the 1809 act. " By compounding the deficiencies year on year, some 
regiments incurred very large quotas as the annual transfers progressed. For instance, 
out of the Cumberland Militia's establishment of 615 privates, it was expected to supply 
255 men in 1811 (eighty-eight men as one seventh of the 1802 militia quota and 167 
men deficient from 1809), which rose to 262 in 1812,335 in 1813, and a quota of 346 in 
1814, all due to the compound effect of not meeting its targets each year. By then, the 
Forfar and Kincardine Militia was expected to furnish 70% of its 1802 establishment, 
which can be attributed to the regiment's large numbers in 1807, "' and its failure to fulfil 
its rather unequal share of the militia volunteering. The Pembroke Militia was in the 
incredible situation of its volunteer quota exceeding its establishment in 1814 (the quota 
was 127 men, whilst its 1802 quota was 10 1 privates). 
It is difficult to disentangle the combination of the militia's strength, its 
recruiting yield, and volunteering, and it certainly does not explain the results obtained 
30 H051/28 Bathurst to Col. Phillips, 5 August 1813. 31 WOIE7iý6 Return of the Size, Age and Height of the militia, 13 December 1813. 32Vane (ed. ), 'Castlereagh Correspondence, 73, Heads of Plan for Increasing the Military Force, 12 July 1807,. 
33 H051/27, Circular by Ryder, 27 April 1811; H051/28, Circular by Sidmouth, 27 January 1813. 340n the 20 May 1807 it had 864 privates, and an establishment of 647 (WO27/9 1). 
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from the militia volunteering. It does not always follow that if a regiment was under 
strength because of poor recruiting, that it failed to meet its volunteer quotas, nor that 
poor recruiting was due to its establishment being capped as a result of the failure to 
meet its draft for the line. The Perth Militia illustrates this point: it met its quota in 
1807, but only managed 72% in 1809, met this shortfall and its quota in 1811, but after 
that slid to only fulfilling 57% in 1813.1' Overall, the Irish Militia proved the most 
successful in obtaining men, but this did not translate into good volunteering results. ", 
The root causes behind the militia's responses to volunteering lay with the officers, and 
the men. 
Placating the Militia Interest 
Besides parliamentary opposition, any militia transfer required the militia 
officers' acquiescence to work. In most cases the government could rely on the public 
spirit of the officers, to execute any law that had the sanction of Parliament, and the 
government was keen to convey its congratulations to regiments that filled their 
volunteer quotas quickly. " Relying on such motives has been demonstrated to be the 
key to most of the workings of the British state. " The army also encouraged 
volunteering by compensating the militia officers, and accommodating their concerns. 
Despite the army's and the government's efforts, some militia officers did not 
accept the terms of the militia transfers, and this was reflected in their regiment's 
performance. As every volunteer needed the commanding officer's permission to enlist, 
if the latter did not agree with the militia being used in this way he could cripple the 
transfer very effectively. When the idea of transfers was suggested to the militia 
35 See Appendix F. 
36 The Irish militia raised 98.6% of its recruiting quota. WO 162/326, Return of Men raised by the Militia, 
13 December 1813. 
37 H051/25, Hawkesbury to commanding officers of North Lincoln, West Middlesex, Westminster, 2 nd 
Surrey and Hertford Militias, 4 September 1807 (three days after the transfer began); Hawkesbury to East 
Middlesex, I' Surrey, Carnarvon and West Kent Militias, 21 October 1807; H051/27, Goulburn to Maj. 
Boatin (North Hampshire Militia), 6 May IS 11; H051/28, Goulburn to Capt. McKell, 12 May 1812, & 
Goulburn to Lt. Col. White (East Suffolk), 8 May 18 12. 39 Paul Langford, Public Life and the Propertied Englishmay; 1698-1798, (Oxford, 199 1). 
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colonels in 1807, some were against the measure and later demonstrated their objections 
through not fulfilling the quotas set. " The worst English example was the I` Yorkshire 
West Riding Militia, which had nineteen extra regiments added to its list in 1807 in an 
attempt to entice men to join, in spite of Fitzwilliam's objections. In the 1809 transfer, 
the I' West Riding only completed 28% of its quota and there were only four regiments 
worse than this, all of them Scottish. In the volunteering from 1811 it was consistently 
bad, made worse by the rolling over of the deficiencies onto next year's quota. 
The 2 nd lancashire Militia provided examples of the obstacles commanding 
officers could create. During the 1807 volunteering, the officer in charge of supervising 
the parties recruiting from the Lancashire militia was praised for keeping his parties in 
order, 'Which prevented Lord Stanley from taking advantage of any misconduct which 
might otherwise have happened on their part. ' Yet by refusing to discharge militiamen 
until the quota had been filled, forty-two men withdrew their offer. He also refused to 
allow a man to volunteer because he was drunk, improperly dressed, and appeared with 
a sergeant of the 80.40 After the furore with Lord Stanley, Hawkesbury made an 
inquiry to the law office about the colonel's right to refuse to discharge militia 
volunteers. The opinion was that the clause was unclear, but a militiaman was 'entitled 
to his discharge as soon as he has notified his intention to enlist' . 4' Hawkesbury trusted 
that Stanley would discharge the men. In the East Devon Militia, the officers were told 
not to assemble the men and read out the volunteering instruction. ' Other militia 
commanders were not above interpreting the transfer act in their own way. During the 
1812 volunteering it was discovered that the Colonel of the Waterford Militia was only 
allowing men to volunteer into the 8 8h, which would 'Be attended with the most serious 
consequences to the public service', and so an explanation was demanded from the 
39 WO I /1116, Memo, 5 June 1807. 
40 H050/408, extract of Maj. Gen. Thornton to AG, 23 January 1808. 41 H051/26 Hawkesbury to Lord Stanley, 8 July 1808. 
42 H051/26: Hawkesbury to Maj. Hayes, 22 July 1808. 
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Marquis of Waterford. ' 
Conversely, the officers could cajole the men into volunteering, one Irish 
militiaman recollected the day the volunteer instructions were received: 
The militia would be drawn up in line, and the officers of the regiments requiring 
volunteers would give a glowing description of their several corps, describing the victories 
they had gained, and the honours they had acquired, and conclude by offering the bounty. If 
these inducements were not effectual in getting men, coercive methods were adopted. The 
militia colonel would put on heavy and long drills and field exercises that were so tedious 
and oppressive that many men would embrace the alternative and volunteer for the 
regulars. 44 
It was therefore necessary to court the militia officers' influence. In August 1807 
Calvert informed Lieutenant General Wenyss that because the current transfer act drew 
so much from the militia, it was 'necessary that the feelings of the officers in the 
command of the militia regiments should be consulted as far as circumstances will 
admit'. "Not only did the army and government need to be mindful of the attitude of the 
militia officers, they also had to compensate them for loss of their men. It soon became 
established practice for this patronage to be extended during the transfers by allowing 
the militia colonels to nominate a proportion of their officers for commissions in the 
line. This compensated the militia colonels for the loss of investment in the militia that 
occurred when the regiments had their establishment reduced. " Castlereagh considered 
such recommendations as compensation for 'their exertions in promoting this levy', ` 
but Torrens considered it 'an evil by which the great and acknowledged advantages of 
the Volunteering System have been purchased. "" 
The usual ratio for officer recommendations was one ensign in the line for every 
fifty men who volunteered, but the army was not above using officer nominations to 
reward some militia colonels. The North Lincoln Militia received such bonuses in 1807 
43 H050/425, Calvert to Beckett, 21 December 1812. 44 Harris, Recollection of Military Service in 1813,1814 and 1815, (London, 1845), pp. 8-9, quoted in 
McAnally, The Irish Militia, p. 290. 45 W03/43, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Wenyss, 29 August 1807. 46 Cookson, British ArmedNation, p. 117. 47 Vane (ed. ), Castlereagh Correspondence, 62, Measures for Improving the State of the Military Force, 
12 May 1807. 
48 W03/604, Torrens to Addington, 28 December 18 12. 
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and 1809. In 1807, the commanding officer was informed that he could nominate three 
officers, although the regiment's quota was only 138 men. "" In 1809, the Colonel 
obtained an extra officer at the suggestion of Beckett, the Under Secretary at the Home 
Office, as a reward for the speed at which the regiment had completed its quota. " The 
Earl of Berkeley (Lord Lieutenant of Gloucestershire) was given a similar reward for 
the performance of the South Gloucester Militia. " When the government asked for the 
fmal sixth of the volunteer quotas in 1807,1 Beckett reminded Lieutenant Colonel Firth 
of the North Hampshire Militia that completing the full quota would allow him to 
recommend another officer. 53 
To placate the militia interest Rulher the transfers of 1807 and 1809 were 
accompanied by larger augmentations to the militia, allowing the militia colonels to 
appoint more officers, and to keep any officers and NCOs above the establishment as 
supernumeraries, thus preserving the colonel's 'interest. "' In addition, clerks, 
drummers, and members of bands were not allowed to volunteer to the line without the 
explicit consent of the colonel, so maintaining any arrangements they may have made to 
fill these posts. " This inevitably resulted in the army investigating the strength of bands, 
where it was feared the militia colonels were hiding men above the establishment, and 
strict orders were sent out to district general officers to stop this practice. '6 
The government was shrewd enough not to reward regiments that did not fulfil 
their quotas, and used the establishment of regiments to penalise deficient regiments. 
I'lic militia stalwart Earl Fitzwilliarn was informed that the new establishment of the 
West Riding's regiments was approved on the supposition that 244 men would 
49 H051/25, Beckett to Gordon, 10 September 1807. 50 H051/26, Beckett to Gordon, 7 April 1809 & Liverpool to Lord Milsintown, same date. 51 H051/26, Liverpool to Earl Berkeley, 11 April 1809, &II May 1809. 52 The request was sent on 22 March 1808 (H051/26, Circular, 22 March 1808). 53 H051/26, Beckett to Lt. Col. Firth, 3 April 1808. 
'54 BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38191, f. 24, Castlereagh to Beckett, 20 September 1809; H051/27, 
Circular, by Ryder, 17 September 1811. 
"' 47 Geo. 111, sess. 2, c. 57, sec. 11; in 1809 this privilege was extended to armourers and artillerymen, 
49 Geo. III c. 4, sec. 12; as a result of this, the number of men who could claim this exemption was fixed 
ýt twenty in 1811,51 Geo. 111, c. 20, sec. 12. '6 W03/49, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Nicholls, December 1809. Calvert was particularly referring to the Royal 
Buckingham, Warwick and Montgomery Militias. 
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volunteer for the line; as all three regiments did not furnish their quotas, the regiments 
were always over establishment, and so Fitzwilliam's arrangements for them were 
temporary. " Fitzwilliam's request for another regiment was consequently rejected, " but 
he was allowed to appoint a second lieutenant colonel. " In 1809 he was refused the 
appointment of a second adjutant for the 3rd West Yorkshire Militia (a crucial position 
in maintaining the regiment's efficiency), ' and in 1811 the Forfar Militia, whose 
strength considerably exceeded its establishment due to a lack of volunteers, was denied 
an increase in the regiment to ten companieS. 61 These refusals to increase the 
establishment of a regiment to match its strength resulted in particularly large and 
unwieldy companies, without sufficient numbers of officers and NCOs, impairing the 
regiment's efficiency, and a constant reminder of its failure. 
The government also addressed practical concerns raised by militia officers, 
particularly regarding the efficiency of their regiments. Many militia officers took pride 
in the martial spirit of 'their' regiments, and invested considerable time in obtaining the 
best staff, and in developing their units' discipline, training and drill. They were thereby 
maintaining the militia ideal, making the militia as good as the army. Earl Fitzwilliam's 
I" West Yorkshire embodied this attitude, and was a model regiment, its men described 
4as a body the finest I have ever seen, young tall and active'. ' It was also a consistent 
defaulter in fulfilling its volunteer quotas. Interestingly, in the 2"d West Yorkshire 
Militia, which did meet the government's demands for men, there was a 'fatal 
disagreement amongst the officers, and consequent parties form'd which is very 
detrimental to the general system of the regiment. ' When the East Devon Militia was 
inspected, another consistent defaulter whose Colonel (Bastard) had spoken out against 
57 H051/26, Hawkesbury to Fitzwilliam, 14 November 1807. 58 H051/25, Hawkesbury to Fitzwilliam, 22 October 1807. 59 H051/26, Hawkesbury to Fitzwilliam., 18 January 1808. 60 H051/27, Ryder to Fitzwilliam, I July 18 10. Lord Aboyne received a similar blunt reply to his request 
for extra NCOs, H051/27, Ryder to Lord Aboyne, 13 October 18 10. 61 H051/27, Ryder to Col. Douglas, 5 October 1811. 62 WO27/95, Inspection Report of I' West Yorkshire Militia, I May 1809. 63 W027/1 0 1, Inspection report of 2d West Yorkshire Militia, I October 18 10. 
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the transfers, what struck the general was 'in this battalion, the attachment of the men 
appear to feel towards it, which must be certainly spring from the care and attention 
bestowed upon them by those in the government of W. " The privates of the Forfar and 
Kincardine Militia were described as 'the finest set of men possibly to be seen', ' and 
although its commander never objected openly to the transfers, he obviously had hard- 
line militia attitudes. However, the efficiency of the regiment, and the input from the 
officers, were not the only factors affecting quota fulfilment. The I" Lancashire was 
reported to be 'uncommonly steady under arms', and despite the objections of its 
Colonel, Lord Stanley, the regiment fulfilled its quotas. 
Generally, militia officers disliked the disruption caused by transferring men to 
the line, regardless of their political views on the measure, and the government was 
keen to emphasise that 'It has been the anxious endeavour of His Ma esty's Ministers so 
to frame this law in all parts as to protect the Discipline of the Militia, and to consult the 
feelings of that service, as far as appeared to them compatible to rendering the proposed 
measure effectual to its purpose. '" Consequently, between 1807 to 1811 a system 
developed for the enrolment of militia volunteers that minimised disruption to both the 
militia and the regulars. 
In 1799 the militia establislunent was reduced first, resulting in a large number 
of men over establishment, and then recruiting parties were sent to tempt men to join the 
line, resulting in general confusion and disruption. " In that transfer and the 1805 draft, 
the militia was further disrupted by line regiments sending parties wherever they 
thought they might be successful. Inevitably this created competition between line 
regiments, in which all the tricks of recruitment were unleashed on militiamen. 
64 W027/95, Inspection report of East Devon Militia, 27 April 1809. 65 W027/95, Inspection report of Forfar and Kincardine Militia, 31 May 1809. 66 H051/25, Hawkesbury to commanding officers of militia, 17 August 1807. Similar was written in the 
orders for the 1809 Transfer, HOS 1/26, Circular to commanding officers of militia, 23 March 1809. 67 For the West Riding's militia regiments, see Sheffield City Archives, Wentworth Woodhouse 
Muniments, Y16/59, Fawkes to Fitzwilliam, 29 September 1799; /60,2 October, /62,7 October, n3, 
Major Dixon to Fitzwilliam, 13 November 1799. 
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From 1807 transfers became more orderly, and the government addressed the 
particular problem of recruiting parties tampering with the militia. When Castlereagh 
drew up his proposals for a militia draft in 1807, he suggested that each militia regiment 
should be allocated specific regiments to which it could send volunteers. This would 
6put an end to the struggle between different corps of the line for me at the moment of 
volunteering, and the expense of sending numerous recruiting parties to a distance, upon 
the chance of getting men', "' He had experienced such difficulties in the Londonderry 
Militia, when during the first annual Irish militia transfer in 1806, forty-two parties 
competed for 150 men. Castlereagh developed his ideas further before the transfer act in 
1807, after a suggestion from Colonel Anstruther that 'It would render the Measure of 
supplying men for the Line more acceptable to the Colonels of the Irish Militia if they 
were permitted themselves to furnish the required number of men, without the discipline 
of their regiments interrupted at the period of volunteering by the tampering of the 
Recruiting Parties with their men. 69 These ideas were rejected, however, as it was 
thought that allocating particular militia regiments to line regiments would benefit the 
army by targeting weak corps and possibly creating some connections between the two 
branches of the service. " And so the recruiting parties were sent out to their allocated 
regiments to collect the volunteers. " 
As the course of the volunteering went on, it was apparent that restricting the 
choice of regiments that militiamen (and the officers recommended by their colonels) 
could join was detrimental to the speed of the transfer. After two months the quota was 
8,071 deficient; ' accordingly, the army asked the militia regiments to suggest the 
" Vane (ed. ), Castlereagh Correspondence, 57, Measure proposed for improving the State of the Military 
Force, 12 May 1807. 
69 WO I /164, Castlereagh to Hawkesbury, 4 April 1807. 70 Vane (ed. ), Castlereagh Correspondence, 56-57, Measure proposed for improving the State of the 
Military Force, 12 May 1807; W01/634, Draft letter to York, 7 August 1807. 71 H051/25, Hawkesbury to commanding officers of militia, 17 August 1807; W03/155, Calvert to 
Moore, 23 September 1807. 
72 WO 1/636, Memo by Calvert; 20 November 1807. 
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regiments to which their men would like to transfer, " and canvassed the line regiments 
for lists of militia regiments where they might be able to obtain men. The commander of 
the 75h asked to be added to the Berwick Militia's list, as they were quartered together, 
and the commander had a personal interest in the county. " The men of the Renfrew 
Militia wanted to join the 94d'. "-' The 43d thought that it might have some success in the 
West Riding regiments, as they had done well in the 2 nd regiment and had established an 
interest there, and the 81" had similar hopes in the Cardigan militia. ' Typically the 
Duke of Kent was keen to get the I' on the list of as many regiments as possible. 77 
Consequently, by early 1808, an extra 440 regimental recruiting parties had been sent 
out to the militia regimentS, 7' and this logic led to the militiamen from deficient 
regiments being allowed the privilege of volunteering into the Royal Artillery, Royal 
Staff Corps, and the Royal Marines. " 
Yet these enticements were still not enough. The recruiting parties, though 
designated as mere receiving stations, had still not abandoned their old habits. 80 The 48 th 
was offering 'some pecuniary inducements' to militiamen, " and there were problems 
between the I" Lancashire militia and the I 10, which was not on the Lancashire's list. 
An officer of the I Ph was trying to tempt men to join his regiment, offering them drink 
and suggesting that they wait thirty days before volunteering, after which the II th might 
be added to Lancashire's list. On account of this interference, the I Ph was banned from 
73 For instance, W03/43, Calvert to Lt. Gen. England, 31 August 1807; W03/44, Calvert to England, 21 
September 1807, & Calvert to Lt. Gen. Vyse, 29 August 1807. 
74 H050/407, Calvert to Beckett, 20 November 1807. 75 H051/25, Beckett to Calvert, 19 August 1807; W03.43, Calvert to Sussex district commander, 20 
August 1807. 
76 W03/44, Calvert to Gen. Smith (Col. 43 rd ), 21 September 1807; 11050/407, Calvert to Beckett, 25 
November 1807, incl. Procter (Maj. 2/43rd) to AG; Wynyard to Beckett, 18 December 1807, incl. Lt. 
Kingsbury (8 1 st) to Secretary at War, 12 December 1807. 77 W03/43, Calvert to Kent, 15 August 1807 (asking to be on the 3"d Lancashire's list); in 1809, the I' 
was allowed to get volunteers from all deficient militia regiments, before the order allowing them to 
volunteer to any line regiment, W03/48, Calvert to Kent, 4 August 1809. 78 Compiled from H050/406 and /407. 79 For volunteering into the Royal Marines, H051/36, Circular to deficient militia regiments, 22 March 
1808. For the Royal Artillery, W03/194, Calvert to Beckett, 2 April 1808 and 1105 1, Circular to milit, 
regiments, 2 April 1808. The Aberdeen 4 Carmarthen, East Devon, Dumfries, Forfar, Lanark, 2" Lancashire, Renfrew, Warwickshire, and I West Yorkshire Militias were allowed this volunteer to the 
Royal Artillery but with a minimum height requirement of 5' 7" and under thirty years of age. so H051/25, Hawkesbury to Lord Stanley, 21 October 1807. 91 CHA, Calvert Papers, 9/101/2, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Fitzroy, 18 August 1807. 
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enlisting men from the 1" Lancashire Militia, and the Commander in Chief apologised 
to officers of 1' Lancashire Militiaý2 and asked Lieutenant Colonel Plumber what line 
regiments he would like to have on the I" Lancashire's list. " This incident was not 
unique; the I Vh was also removed from the South and East Devon's lists, by which time 
Calvert was becoming exasperated with the commanding officer Foster's 'want of 
information and anxiety to complete his reginient'. " The 11 th was then allocated to 
receive Irish militia volunteers, as their actions had ruined any chance of it being 
completed from English militia regiments. " By November Lord Stanley was again 
complaining of interference, " the 83"d was reprimanded for its conduct towards the Yd 
Lancashire Militia, " and Lord Montagu was assured that measures had been taken to 
insure line parties acted within their orders, "" all of which resulted in Calvert banning 
the receiving parties from taking steps 'With a view to engage any Militia Soldier to 
extend his services in the Line, without the previous concurrence and approbation of his 
Colonel or commanding officer'. " As the increasing number of recruiting parties 
compounded these problems, it was decided in 1808 that militiamen could volunteer for 
any line regiment, except the 6e and 98"' to 101st. ' By April, the deficiency of 
volunteers had been reduced to 1,725 from the British militia regiments. " 
The 1809 act did not specify which line regiments individual militia regiments 
could volunteer to join, but the 1", 27ýý, 30th, 48ý, 53"d, 61Yh, 8P, and 98h to 10P were 
82 H050/406, Calvert to Beckett, 7 September 1807; W03/44, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Sir George Nugent, 17 
September 1807; H050/406, Calvert to Beckett, 17 September 1807; H051/25, Ilawkesbury to Plumber, 
18 September 1807; 11050/407, Gordon to Beckett, 3 October 1807. 
H051/25, Hawkesbury to Plumber, 8 September 1807. 
H051/25, Beckett to Lord Rolle, 22 August 1807; W03/43, Calvert to Lt. Gen. England, 19 August 
1807. 
86 H05 i 
Calvert Papers, 9/101/2, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Asgill, 29 August 1807. 85 CHA 
/26, Hawkesbury to Lord Stanley, 26 November 1807. Foster's conduct resulted from being told 
that the 11"' would not be augmented unless its numbers increased considerably, R. E. R. Robinson, The 
Bloody Eleventh: The History ofthe Devonshire Regiment, vol. 1,1685-1815,0, p. 30 1. 87 W03/44, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Champagne, 19 September 1807. Lord Rolle also raised objections to 
another line officer, BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38320,14awkesbury to Lord Rolle, 7 August 1807. 88 H051/25, Hawkesbury to Lt. Col. Lord Montagu, 12 October 1807. The I' Somerset held a court 
martial for a corporal who drank with some militia volunteers, but no details are given if this was a 
corporal in the line, or militia, W03/44, Wynyard to Maj. Gen. Hugonin, 30 September 1807. 89 H050/407, Circular, by Calvert, 2 October 1907. 
90 H051/26, Hawkesbury to deficient regiments, 4 January 1808; 11050/406, Calvert to Beckett, 15 
February 1808. It was extended to the Irish Militia in August, H050/409, Gordon to Jenkinson, 2 August 
1808. 
9' WO 1/904, List of regiments not yet furnished quota, 25 April 1808. 
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not allowed to receive volunteers, ' and, once line regiments were complete, they were 
not permitted to receive any more militiamen. Popular corps completed their 
establishments quicklyý" resulting in the remaining line parties repeating their actions of 
1807: militia regiments complained of interference. "" Quotas were not being completed, 
and in July 1809, Calvert again advocated opening up the volunteering to any regiment 
regardless of whether their establishment was complete, as 'By this arrangement fresh 
vigour will be given to the volunteering, and it is possible that some additional men may 
be obtained who have formed a predilection for those corps which were originally 
excluded'. " His advice was accepted in October, " but not until after they attempted to 
stimulate volunteering by allowing militiamen to volunteer to the prestigious Foot 
Guards, the Royal Staff Corps and even the 9h GarTison Battalion, "' or letting the 
deficient militias from the north of England enlist into the 7d. " Opening up the choice 
of line regiments to the militia inevitably resulted in popular corps receiving large 
numbers of volunteers, and so ruining the systematic connection between the line and 
the militia and filling up under-strength line regiments that Castlereagh had wanted to 
achieve. 'Me 95h received so many volunteers that it formed an additional battalion. " 
The transfer act of 1811 recognised the importance of giving the men maximum 
choice and the officers least interference from the line. This was achieved by placing the 
enlistment of militia volunteers in the hands of the generals commanding the military 
92 W03/47, Memorandum. 
- 
20 March 1809. 
93 The 2 nd , 
Wh, 7h, 13'h, 14th, 2e, 24"' and 95h were ordered not receive any more volunteers within three 
weeks of the volunteering commencing, W03/47, Calvert to Cathcart, 5 and 12 April 1809; 11051/26, 
Beckett to officers commanding militia corps, 5 April, 1809. 94 The Royal Buckingham Militia complained about the 8h, W03/47, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. Somerset, 10 
April 1809; A general warning was issued in the Sussex district, W03/47, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Hugonin, 
3 April 1809. 
9'5 WO 1/64 1, Calvert to Castlereagh, I July 1809; H050/406, Calvert to Beckett, 9 September 1809. 96 H051/26, Circular to commanding officers of militia, 23 March 1809. 97 11050/412, WO to HO, 21 July 1809 & H051/26, Liverpool to commanding officers of deficient 
militia regiments, 26 July 1809; the men had to be at least 5' 8' and under 28. For the Royal Staff Corps 
H051/26, Liverpool to commanding officers of deficient militia regiments, 5 April 1809. For the 9WI 
Garrison Battalion, H051/26, Jenkinson to commanding officers of deficient militia regiments, 9 August 
1808. 
98 H051/26, Livýýol to Westmoreland, I" &P West Yorkshire, and North Yorkshire Militia, 17 May 
1809. The West Riding's limited service men in 1803 were allocated to the 2nth. See Appendix C. 99 WO 1/64 1, Dundas to Castlereagh, 3 May 1809. The regiment had 1,282 volunteers by that time. 
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districts, mther thari regimental recruiting parties. " Initially deficient regiments were 
also allowed to join the Foot Guards, following the pattem of 1807 and 1809, although 
after some debate between the govemment and the army, the army believed that it 
would interfere with volunteering to the line regiments, and so height and age 
restrictions were set. 'O' In the instruction issued from 1811, no officer was to enlist, or 
persuade a man, without the commanding officer's permission, and 'No parties of the 
line (were) to interfere, if they do they will be held to account as disobeying orders. "' 
To emphasise the disruptive effect that recruiting parties could have on militia 
regiments, they were used as a threat: militia regiments that had not fulfilled their quota 
in 1813 were informed that recruiting parties would have free access to them. " 
The government also curtailed the impact of volunteering on the militia 
regiments by reducing the period that volunteering occurred. The army's needs 
conflicted with the militia's concerns: the army wanted the maximum number of 
volunteers preferably in one draft, whilst the militia wanted to minimise the disruption 
to their units. Initially, the army's view prevailed. In the 1807 act, a thirty-day period 
was allocated for volunteering immediately after the instructions were sent out, during 
which time if the regiment provided five sixths of its quota, then the draft was 
considered complete. After the first period of thirty days, a further period of ten days 
was allocated; thereafter there was no volunteering for at least three months, after which 
three days were nominated for volunteering, and so on, until the quota was complete, or 
the'act expired. '" 
The 1809 act modified this process slightly in the army's favour, by reducing the 
interval between the initial volunteering period and the second volunteering to one 
'('0 H051/27, Circular by Ryder, 27 April 1811. 
101 W06/134, Liverpool to Dundas, 10 April 1811; WO 1/646, Dundas to Liverpool, 12 April 1811; 
W06/134, Bunbury to Torrens, 17 April 1811; WO 1/647, York to LiverpooL 22 July 18 11; W06/134, 
Liverpool to Torrens, 23 July 18 11. 
102 W03/585, General Orders for officers employed for militia volunteering, 20 April 1811. These were 
the standard orders for the next three years. 103 H050/428, Circular to militia regiments, by Darling, September 1813. 104 47 Geo. III sess. 2, c. 57, sec. 5-7 (British Militia) & 47 Geo. III c. 55, sec. 5-7 (Irish Militia). 
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month; after that volunteering could only take place at intervals of three months. "' The 
1811 act reversed this trend, and, as with much of the 1811 transfer act, its provisions 
were drawn from the annual Irish militia transfer. In 1806 two periods of ten days were 
allowed for volunteering, which were reduced in 1808 to six separate periods of three 
days between 24 August and 24 February each year, with the government having to give 
ten days warning before the volunteering period. " By the terms of the 1811 act, two 
days after receiving the order for the beginning of transfer, the regiment was assembled 
and drawn up, and the terms of the act explained. The names of volunteers were taken 
immediately, and if the quota was not met, a book was opened in which militiamen 
wishing to volunteer could enter their names during the next seven days. If further 
periods of volunteering were needed, the government had to give ten days warning, but 
the volunteering only had to be fourteen days after the last period. 'O" 
Finally, the militia was reassured by the measures taken to maintain their 
strength. As seen above, the establishment of the regiment was crucial to the patronage 
of the colonel, and so the 1807 and 1809 transfer were both accompanied by increases 
in the size of the militia. In 1809, this measure was made more attractive by allowing 
the militia regiments to recruit first, before a ballot was held to fill any vacancies. This 
benefited the militia in two ways. Firstly, recruiting allowed militia regiments and the 
counties to dispense with the time-consuming and costly ballot. Secondly, the militia 
received a small amount from government, which could be distributed as the colonels 
wanted, " and the regiment could maintain closer supervision over the standard of 
recruits. The parishes and the regiments were in conflict as the parishes' overriding 
concern was finding men, regardless of their physical standards, whilst the militia's 
emphasis was on finding fit men. Recruiting for the militia, though breaking the army's 
105 49 Geo. III c. 4, sec. 6-8 (British Militia) & 49 Geo. III c. 5, sec. 3-8 (Irish Militia). 106 46 Geo. III c. 124, sec. 3; 48 Geo. III c. 64, sec. 2. 107 51 Geo. III c. 20, sec. 6-8. 108 H051/26, Liverpool to commanding officers of militia, 21 June 1809. Each recruiting party received 
two guineas per recruit. 
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monopoly of recruitment, did have benefits for the army. The army felt that ballots 
generally affected army recruitment, " and the maintenance of the physical standards of 
the militia insured that the militiamen were physically eligible to volunteer for the line. 
The ballot in 1807 resulted in totally unfit men joining the Warwickshire, East 
Middlesex and East Kent Militias, "' and Wynyard lamented that the balloting system 
did not 'effectively insure the Ranks of the Militia being filled with men of a proper 
description for the duty of soldiers'. "' 
Recruiting for the militia had been used extensively in Ireland because in some 
areas the machinery of local government below the county did not exist, so it was easier 
for the regiments to find men. Moreover, when the Irish Militia was raised in 1793, 
widespread rioting had been provoked by fears of balloting. "' The success of 
maintaining the Irish Militia by voluntary enlistment prompted its introduction into 
Britain. In 1807 Castlereagh advocated militia recruiting, "' although he admitted it was 
6an innovation upon the strict militia principle, ' but by May 1807 he, and the cabinet, 
had changed their minds and wanted an immediate ballot. Castlereagh relied on the 
shortness of the ballot not affecting recruiting too severely, "" and thus avoiding any 
confrontation in Parliament over the issue. It was clear that balloting as a 'militia 
principle' was firmly held by some Lord Lieutenants and militia colonels. In Ireland, 
despite the fact that the ballot was optional, some counties, such as County Down, 
preferred balloting to recruitment. "' However, generally balloting was a 
discouragement, and the government used the threat of a ballot if the militia did not 
recruit enough men. During 1807, although Wellesley was not entirely sure how 
109 CHA, Calvert Papers, 9/101/2, Memorandum, 21 November 1807. 
110 CIHIA, Calvert Papers, 9/101/2, Calvert to Beckett, 16 March 1808. Calvert also mentions that 'others' 
were in a similar situation. 111 W03/45, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. Fitzroy, 30 March 1808. 
112 Thomas Bartlett, 'An End to the Moral Economy: The Irish Militia Disturbances of 1793', Past and 
Present, 99 (May 1983), pp. 41-64. 113 Vane (a), Castlereagh Correspondence, 59, Measures proposed for Improving the State of the 
Military Force, 12 May 1807. 
114 Vane (ed. ), Castlereagh Correspondence, 65-66, Memorandum respecting the State of the Military 
Force, 26 May 1807. 
115 McAnnally, Irish Militia, p. 
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successftil the recruitment of the militia had been, he agreed that if two thirds of the 
men ordered to be raised were not complete by 1808, he would order a ballot, despite 
the fact that it would be unenforceable in Kcrry, Tipperary, Limerick, and Waterford. "', 
The use of recruitment and the threat of a ballot were applied to all of the LIK in 
1809, "' and became part of the annual transfer in 1811. The militia was also allowed to 
recruit up to its 1802 establishment plus one seventh of that establishment, "" and some 
regiments were allowed to recruit boys in keeping with the practice in the regulars. "" 
Recruiting became part of the package of annual transfers: when annual transfer acts 
were passed for the Cornish Miners and the Tower Hamlets Militias, they were also 
allowed to recruit openly. In 1813, the militia was allowed to recruit an extra half of its 
1802 quota, and every regiment was allowed to have five boys per company. 120 
The attitude of the militia officers, and their acceptance of the terms offered by 
the government and the army, influenced the results obtained by their regiments. But the 
political attitude of the colonel was not the determining factor in the success of the 
militia transfers. The Colonel of the Yorkshire North Riding Militia was against the plan 
in 1807, but in 1809 the regiment completed 'Its full quota, admittedly after a slow 
start. "' More interesting were the regiments that supported the 1807 plan, yet failed to 
fulfil their quotas, and to a lesser extent those that offered no opinion on transfers, yet 
struggled to meet their quotas. These outcomes demonstrate that the attitudes of the men 
were also important, accounting for the disparate grouping of regiments that were 
116 BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38242, ff. 131-134, Wellesley to Castlereagh, 9 December 1807. 
Wellesley also added that Clare, Longford, Roscommon, Sligo and Donegal would probably not be able 
to have a ballot either. 117 H051/26, Liverpool to commanding officers of militia, I June 1809. 118 H051/27, Circular, 15 July 18 11. 
1 19 H05 V27, Circular, 15 July 1811. The boys had to be fourteen, and only a quarter of the number raised 
could be boys. The regiments were Anglesey, Berkshire, Cambridgeshire, Cheshire, Dorset, Durham, 
Glamorgan, Hereford, Hertford, Huntingdon, Merioneth, Monmouth, Montgomery, Northampton, 
Northumberland, Oxford, Radnor, Shropshire, Sussex, Warwickshire, Wiltshire, Worcester, North 
Yorkshire, East Yorkshire, Fife and Ross. 120 H051/28, Sidmouth, Circular, 8 July 1813. Only the London, Rutland and Isle of Wight Militias were 
exempt from this. 121 By the 20 May only 42% had volunteered, two months later no more had volunteered. By August 1809 
the regiment had fulfilled 77% of its quota. WOI/904, Return of militia volunteers, 20 May and 21 July 
1809 & H050/416, Return of militia volunteers, 10 July 18 10. 
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always dcficient. 
Encourap, ing the men 
Whatever the opinions of the officers, the government still had to encourage the 
militiamen to volunteer. As with recruiting, men were offered a bounty to transfer, but 
like ordinary recruiting there were physical standards that potential volunteers had to 
pass. This meant that despite some militiamen's desire to volunteer, they were ineligible 
because they were too small, or too old. This derived from the fact that there were 
differing standards for the militia and the regulars: to join the militia a man had to be at 
least 5' 2" tall, and between eighteen and forty-five; for the regulars the height standard 
was 5' 4". and under thirty-five. From a sample of the inspection returns of militia in 
1807, this did have a variable impact across the militia regiments. On average 15% of 
militiamen could not volunteer because of their age, whilst another 9% were ineligible 
because of their height. However, there were considerable variations across the country; 
the age data had a range of 12% above and below the average, ranging from East 
Norfolk and the West Middlesex Militias which both had 27% of their regiments 
ineligible because of their age, down to the Forfar and Ayr Militias 4% each (the 
Scottish Militia had better figures for ages because only men between eighteen and 
thirty could join). The height data shows as much variation (a range of 13%), with the 
East Middlesex Militia the worst at 25%, whilst the Berkshire, Durham and Yd West 
Yorkshire Militias had all of their militiamen above the regulars' standard. 112 
There were no inspections of the militia in 1808, and most of the regiments 
inspected in 1809 occurred after the militia transfer began, so often exaggerating the 
proportion of the regiment unfit for the regulars. From 1811, the interaction of militia 
recruiting, and constant transfers being made to the regulars, make any conclusions on 
the information in these years unreliable. Only the second half of 1810 was a quiet 
122See Appendix G, for details of militia regiments that have been sampled. Henceforth, this source will be referred to as W027 Sample, Militia Regiments. 
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period for the militia, and the small sample from that year shows that the percentage of 
militiamen ineligible to volunteer because of their height had risen to 15% (the range 
had also widened to 15%), whilst the proportion excluded because of their age had 
fallen to 12% (the range also falling, down to 5%). " A complete survey of the militia 
was made in October 1813, and by then 18.2% of militiamen were too short to volunteer 
for the line, and 30% were either too old or young. "" It is unlikely that these two groups 
of data were mutually exclusive; there is very little chance that none of the 19% of the 
East Suffolk Militia who could not volunteer because of their height were not also some 
of the men who could not volunteer because of their age. " This, however, makes 
quantifying physical standards as an influence on militia volunteering difficult to assess, 
and there is no way to extrapolate from the data, as it is only given in separate tables. 
All that can be said is that the quality of the men joining the militia may have had an 
impact on that regiment's ability to fulfil its quotas to the line, and perhaps in some 
regiments as many as a quarter of the men could not volunteer. Also it is clear that the 
situation got worse between 1807 and 1813, and so contributed to for the worsening 
results in the period. 
Admittedly the army waived the regulations in particular cases. Two volunteers 
from the Hereford Militia were allowed to volunteer despite one being 5' 3" and the 
other over thirty-five, because they were good soldiers, "" and some lads (i. e. under 
eighteen) were allowed to transfer from the West Middlesex to the 73rd , if the general 
inspecting them thought they would become good soldiers. 127The army also allowed a 
reduction in the standards for volunteers for particular units. In 1807, volunteers for the 
Royal Marines were allowed to be as short as 5' 27. ` and, in 1811, regiments that had 
not completed their quotas were allowed to volunteer men between 5' 2" and 5' 4" for 
123 W027 Sample, Militia Regiments. 124 W0162/326 Return of the size and age of the militia, 13 December 1813. 175 W027/91,1ýspection return of East Suffolk Militia, 9 May 1807.. 126 W03/44, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Fit2roy, 2 September 1807. 
127 W03/47, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Whediam, 17 April 1809. 
128 H051/26, Beckett to Col. Cooke, 6 January 1808. 
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the Royal Wagon Train, addressing the height discrepancy between the militia and the 
regulars. '" 
Some men'used the discrepancy between the militia laws and the recruiting 
standards. During the 1807 transfer the inspecting officers in Ireland were specifically 
told if they were not sure of a volunteer's age or height, they were to refer to the 
regimental books. "' In 1809 men under thirty-five and over 5' 4" could transfer, but, by 
the recruiting regulations, a man had to be less than thirty and over 5' 5". In Scotland, 
men were actually using this to their advantage, John Hope the IFO at Glasgow, rejected 
a man as a recruit because he was not up to the standards, only to see him later enlisted 
into the militia, and transferring to line. For this he also obtained two bounties, and the 
practice seemed widespread in Scotland. "' The use of the recruiting districts during 
volunteering helped to police this practice by ensuring that officers and surgeons, who 
knew the recruiting standards, inspected recruits. " 
The major problem for encouraging the men was the militiaman's family 
allowance. A militiaman's family received an allowance of 2s 6d for his wife, and Is for 
each child, when he was stationed outside the regiment's county, but as soon as the man 
enlisted into the regulars he lost the entitlement, and it was repeatedly highlighted how 
injurious this was to militia volunteering. "' The Duke of Kent believed that it would 
'Prevent the volunteering more than anything else, ' though, in a telling line about the 
militia officers, he believed that the militia colonels would not confirm this point. '14 The 
Duke of Kent's concerns were echoed by Castlereagh in his 1807 memorandum on 
129 H051/28, Circular, by Ryder, 9 December 1811; Sidmouth to commanding officers of regiments not 
furnished quota, 24 September 1812. 130 WOI/612, Particular Instructions for the General and Field Officers Appointed to Inspect Volunteers, 
23 September 1807. 
131 WO 1/64 1, Calvert to Castlereagh, 15 September 1809, incl. John Hope to Calvert, 4 September 1809; 
Wynyard to Bunbury, 18 December 1809. 
13Z' W03/47, Memorandum, by Calvert, 20 March 1809. Assistant Adjutant Generals were also sent out to 
inspect volunteers, at Exeter (for militia regiments in Devon and Cornwall) and Beverley (for units in 
Yorkshire). W03/47, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Hugonin, 30 March 1809; Hugonin was allowed to use line 
sRrgeons, because he did not have enough staff surgeons. 133 WOI/1116, memo, 5 June 1807; WO25/3224, Bgd. Gen. Clinton to Horse Guards, 2 April 1810; 
Memo on York's letter of 7 December 1811; WO25/3225, York to Bathurst, 31 January & 20 October 
1813. 
134 WOI/634, Gordon to Stewart, 8 August 1807. 
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militia volunteering. Without a general family allowance, he argued 'The militia 
regiments will consist of married men who will be deterred from entering the Line. "" 
Extending the family allowance would not only have increased militia 
volunteering but it was also humane. Mention has already been made of the Duke of 
York's ideas on how to improve recruiting. Clinton echoed his views in a 
comprehensive memorandum. He believed that it would stop wives accompanying men 
on campaign thus reducing the tonnage required to transport the troops abroad. Families 
on active service made the situation worse when provisions were short on campaign, 
which promoted plundering, and left them 'exposed to the miseries of active service'. If 
wives and children remained at home, they were faced with similar miseries: they had to 
rely on other family members or the poor rates to support them, while in Scotland and 
Ireland (where there were no poor rates) many were reduced to begging. "' The Duke of 
York was convinced a family allowance was 'Absolutely necessary to give popularity 
among the men of the Militia to the service of the Line; ' and the improvement for 
soldier's wives and children would increase the popularity of the army generally by 
removing the sight of wives begging because their husband had enlisted. 137 
Calvert actually derived a plan for its administration, establishing regimental 
depots where wives could receive assistance and the boys learn military habits at a 
regimental school. It would also provide a 'Real and intimate connection to the 
Regiments with the county of which they bear the name'. "' Clinton went as far as to 
work out the cost after analysing the number of wives and children from a sample of 
different battalions. From this he estimated that for an army of 50,000 it would cost 
f. 85,371. Later estimates for just extending the family allowance to these militiamen 
who enlisted would cost E8,580 per 1,000 men per annurn and E216,112 per annum for 
135 W01/1116 Memo, 5 June 1807. 
136 W025/322 , Clinton to Horse Guards, 
2 April 18 10. 2 
137 WO25/3225, York to Bathurst, 31 January & 20 October 1813. 138 W025/3224, Calvert to Clinton (extract), 8 December 18 10. 
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a general provision for wives and families. "" 
Despite widespread support at the Horse Guards, the proposal was never 
adopted. A limited extension of the provision to just militiamen who had volunteered 
would have been unfair, and it would have encouraged men to join the militia first, then 
volunteer for the army, so reducing ordinary recruiting. A general extension of the 
family allowance may have been too costly, and, in 1813, the government's suggestion 
to send militia regiments to Europe neatly avoided the issue. But the influence of the 
family allowance may explain the reluctance of Irish and Scottish militiamen to 
volunteer. The family allowance to these men was crucial to their families, whilst the 
English militiamen could take some comfort from the fact that if his family returned to 
his parish they would not be destitute. 
The men were compensated for the loss of the family allowance by the bounty. 
Like recruiting, the bounty was intended to be the principal attraction to volunteering. In 
1807 the bounties were fourteen guineas for unlimited service, and ten guineas for 
short-service, for men who were in the militia before the passing of the act. If a man 
joined the militia after the act, and then volunteered, he would receive ten guineas 
(unlimited) and six guineas (short-service). " These terms were repeated in 1809 and 
181 L"' This was an attempt to encourage experienced militiamen to volunteer and stop 
men joining the militia and immediately volunteering, thus getting two bounties. "' 
However, this policy had to be abandoned in the face of mounting shortfalls. In 1812 it 
was raised to fifteen guineas (unlimited service) and ten guineas (short-service), and the 
different bounty rates for those who joined the militia after transfer act were scrapped, 
because men were holding back from volunteering until they could get the full 
bounty. 143 Militiamen volunteering were in the curious situation of being treated as 
139 WO 1/946 Memo, (no date, but probably 18 10). 
140 
H051/25 'Hawkesbury to commanding officers of militia, 17 August 1807. 41 H05 I t26', Circular to commanding officers of militia, 23 March 1809; 11051/27, Circular by Ryder, 27 April 18 11. 142 H050/416, Torrens to Goulburn, 13 August 18 10. 143 H050/427, Darling to Addington, 14 October 1813. 
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normal recruits, as their service in the militia counted for nothing, and it was suggested 
that their service in the militia be recognised so they would be entitled to higher rates of 
pay, limiting it to men under thirty and a maximum of seven year's service. The officer 
who suggested the idea knew of men who had served in the militia for ten or twelve 
years but probably would not volunteer otherwise. '" 
The army also offered distinct inducements for militiamen to volunteer. In 1807, 
militiamen were allowed to volunteer into the Foot Guards, where they would receive 
higher rates of pay than in the line, an obvious advantage to any potential volunteer. 
When some militia regiments were allowed to volunteer into the Royal Staff Corps in 
the same year, Calvert was keen to highlight the benefits ofjoining the corps: a sergeant 
received 2s. 7d a day, whilst the privates were divided into three classes, a first class 
private received 2s. 1d, second class Is. 7d and third class IsAd. It also gave men with 
skills a chance to practise them, as only properly qualified carpenters, bricklayers, 
smiths, stone masons and wheelwrights could join. "" 
The culmination of this policy occurred in 1813. Despcrate to increase the 
number of volunteers from the Scottish Militia, the Duke of York proposed that they 
should be allowed to volunteer for units in Canada because of 'The known inclination of 
the Scotch Population to emigrate to America will probably overcome the repugnance 
which has hitherto been manifested by the militia of that country to volunteer their 
services to the Line'. ` Although the Home Office objected to these special terms, the 
needs of the army were more important, ""' and so when the annual volunteering for 
1813 began in May, all the Scottish militias, except the Ayr Militia, were allowed to 
volunteer to the 49h. The volunteers were only to serve in north America, and six 
months after peace, they would be discharged and receive a grant of land - fifty acres 
144 WO 1 /946, An officcr to Beckett, n. d., probably 1811. 145 W03/43, Calvert to commanding officer Kent district, 19 August 1807. 146 H050/427, York to Sidmouth, 2 May 1813. A second battalion for the 49dwould be established. 147 H051/28, Addington to Goulburn, 22 March 1813. 
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for a private, sixty for a corporal, and seventy-five for a sergeant. As a further incentive 
their wives and children were shipped to Quebec, and they received subsistence for a 
year after they had been discharged, but when they volunteered they only received half 
the normal bounty. "' 
The army and the government also faced problems between the men and the 
militia itself. The counties sometimes hampered militia volunteering. In 1807 some 
volunteers' accounts from the Durham Militia could not be settled as they had had 
stoppages for knapsacks from their pay, but had not actually received them. "' To 
expedite the 1809 transfers, the district recruiting staffs, who were well versed in the 
intricacies of military finance, dealt with the accounts of the militiamen volunteering. "' 
In 1811, some men in the Cardigan Militia could not volunteer because they had not 
received all their enlistment money, and their accounts had to be settled before they 
could get a discharge. It happened again the following year. "' Such problems, coupled 
with administrative faults, such as not indicating where the militia volunteer got his 
bounty from, "' militia regiments being on the march during the volunteering periods, "' 
or being unable to release their volunteers because they were guarding prisoners of 
war, 154 can ftirther account for the failure of some regiments to provide the requisite 
volunteers. 
To facilitate volunteering, the government mixed incentive with punishment. It 
was felt that the stationing of a militia regiment near to its home county lessened the 
chance of men volunteering, a fact apparently exemplified by the Irish and Scottish 
Militias. The Devon Militias, along with all the other factors that influenced its 
performance, were stationed in Devon during 1807 and 1809. "' The army also found 
148 H051/28, Circular, by Sidmouth, 14 May 1813; Sidmouth to Scottish militia regiments, 15 June 1813. 149 W03/44, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Earl Chatham, 10 December 1807. 150 W03.47, Memorandum, 20 March 1809. 
151 H050/419 Lt Gen. Nicholls to Torrens, 2 May 18 11; H050/424, Calvert to Beckett, I July 18 12. 152 
woin74, ' Earl Temple to Hawkesbury, 19 August 1807; H0501419, Merry to Goulbum, 2 May 1811. 153 H050/425, Darling to Addington, 19 March & 14 May 1813. 
154 H050/406, York to Hawkesbury, 20 August 1807. 
155 W027/91, Inspection returns of East, North and South Devon Militias, 12 March, 15 & 16 April 1807, 
& /95,27 April, 4& 24 May 1809.. 
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that the Irish Militia regiments provided more volunteers if they were stationed away 
from their counties, but when they were close to home, they recruited better. "" Another 
benefit of the militia interchange act, was that it was hoped that moving Irish Militia 
regiments to Britain would improve their volunteering, and that more would come from 
the Scottish regiments if they were stationed outside Scotland. "' Ties to home may also 
explain the results from the Tower Hamlets Militia, as they could only serve in 
London. " An anonymous letter to the War Office suggested that the deficient 
regiments should be stationed as far away as possible from their counties, and put on 
prison duty, whilst 'Those who readily furnish their quota go to their county for a 
time'. "" 
There were a multitude of other events and influences that could affect 
volunteering. In 1807 the volunteering period in Scotland was extended because of the 
late harvest. " In the same year a ship was wrecked off Dublin, which was carrying 300 
Irish militia volunteers and their families from the South Mayo and South Cork Militias 
to their new units; their bodies were washed up on the beaches around Dublin, a grim 
reminder of the risks of joining the line. "' Some regiments in the south west of England 
during 1809 had the misfortune to catch typhus from the army returning from Corunna, 
an occurrence that was hardly likely to encourage militiamen to join these regiments. "" 
Conclusion 
The significance of the militia's contribution to Britain's military effort is 
apparent, but the contribution of different parts of the United Kingdom appears to 
contradict the trends in ordinary recruiting. England and Wales proved most compliant, 
'56 BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38242, ff. 131-134, Wellesley to Castlereagh, 9 December 1807. 157 W025/3224, Memo on York's letter of 7 December 1811. 5" H051/28, Sidmouth to Earl Moira, 12 March 1813. The Tower Hamlets Militia was 'in a very 
inefficient state because of its limited service'. 139 H050/420, Merry to Goulburn, II June 1811, incl. extract of anonymous letter, 20 May 1811. 160 Bl, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38191, f. 21, Castlereagh to Beckett, 20 September 1807. The thirty 
4qys volunteering period were counted from the 15 September not the I' as in England. 161 McAnnally, Irish Militia, pp. 27-28.1 162 W027/95, Inspection return of I' West Yorkshire Militia, I May 1809; North Devon Militia, 4 May 
1809; North Hampshire Militia, 6 April 1809; 1' Lancashire, 3 May 1809. 
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whilst Scotland and Ireland provided a smaller share of volunteers. In exploring the 
deficiencies in the militia volunteer quota, and the possible reasons for them, it is 
apparent that there is not one single explanation for them. There were a multitude of 
reasons which coalesced in particular units at particular times, but, in essence, they 
reflected the loose contractual nature of the relationship between the army, government 
and the militia, which epitomised the eighteenth century state. The militia was 
essentially in the strongest position as they had what the army wanted - trained men. 
Despite widespread support (as it is easy to overemphasise the problems, rather than the 
successes), or at least compliance to the government's terms, the transfer system did not 
address the requirements of the men. The growing deficiencies by 1813 may simply 
derive from to the fact that the militia was increasingly filled with men who had already 
decided that they did not want to volunteer, and certainly some of them would have had 
plenty of opportunity to do so before then. This appears to be particularly the case in the 
Scottish Militia. It did not have a high turnover in manpower because men reftised to 
volunteer, and so no new men could be recruited in to the regiment. Testifying to the 
strong collective identity that many regiments had are the offers to serve in Spain in 
1808, and to serve in Europe in 1814. It may also be significant that the Scottish and 
Irish regiments were more 'clannish' than English regiments, binding officers and men 
together in a pact the government was unable to penetrate. This shows that although 
many militiamen may have objected to the means of enlistment, they were soldiers, and 
they did not object to the ends of military service. 
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ChUter 6: Rank and File - the Social Compgsition 
of the Army 
Introduction 
Only a few historical works have touched upon the subject of the common 
soldier during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Western's PhD thesis 
on army recruitment between 1793 and 1799, makes a passing mention of the types of 
men recruited, ' but this was written before modem computing made powerful databases 
and analysis with the reach of the historian. Sylvia Frey's The British Soldier in 
America. ý A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period, devotes a 
chapter to the social composition of the rank and file in the American War of 
Independence, ' and Cookson's British Armed Nation, has made use of the large amount 
of statistical data on nationality, age, and service in the army, contained in the 
regimental inspection reports conducted during the Napoleonic Wars? However, these 
only provide grouped data (for instance they give the number of men between 18 and 
20), and as each table is distinct, making no reference to each other, they do not provide 
detailed information about soldiers. For further information on the 'average' soldier, 
this chapter has sampled some regimental books, which give a soldier's place of birth, 
age, place of enlistment, and any other details the regiment thought worthy to keep 
(usually his physical appearance). The chapter also uses some of the biographies of 
soldiers written after the Peninsular War, some of which are famous and easily 
obtained, but others are rare, and a few are still manuscripts. Finally, regimental 
histories have been utilised, where they contain any details relating to the men that filled 
their ranks during the Napoleonic Wars. 
I Western, 'The Recruitment of the Land Forces', Phl), pp. 220-222. 2 Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier inAmerica, Ch. 1. 
3 Cookson, British ArmedNation, p. 126. 
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Sources and Sampling 
The different sources utilised in this chapter have peculiar restrictions that 
require preliminary explanation. The inspection returns provide a broad picture of the 
state of a corps, each return giving the nationality of the men, their ages, their time in 
the army, their heights, and their terms of service left. A procedure was inaugurated in 
1798 that created a regular system for inspecting troops: printed forms were used so that 
all data was standardised, and comments on the regiment were made under specific 
headings. This meant that inspection reports were transformed from personal letters 
between the inspecting general officer and the Horse Guards into a useful tool for the 
army, and the historian. " Inspections were supposed to take place every six months, in 
the spring and autumn, thus allowing the Adjutant General to ascertain the state of a 
regiment before the campaign season, and after any service. But these orders were not 
strictly adhered to, especially by the units involved in the protracted campaign in the 
Peninsula. 
As every unit was not inspected each year, entering all the data from the 
inspection returns would be unrepresentative, and so a sample has been used. Ideally, a 
sample would miffor the different types and locations of units, making the sample 
representative. However, given the unevenness of inspections, this is difficult to 
achieve, and so it is necessary to note where and how the sample differs significantly 
from the army as a whole. Firstly, the unnumbered and foreign corps have been ignored, 
as this sample seeks to examine the units which recruited in the UK and those that could 
receive militia volunteers. 5 The exceptions to this are the 60'h and the Royal West Indian 
Rangers, as they formed a large part of the West Indies garrison and have been selected 
to provide a view of troops in the colonies. The first selection in the numbered 
regiments that can be easily be made is by the type of units. Basically there were six 
4B 
-56. 5 S: 
Iett, 'The Development of the British Army', PhD, pp. 54 
Appendix G for details of the W027 Sample. For referencing purposes, these sources will be cited 
as the W027 Sample 
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distinct forces in the British army: the household cavalry, foot guards regiments, the 
heavy cavalry units, the light cavalry, infantry and light infantry. The cavalry 
(household, heavy and light) formed 13% of the army (not including artillery and 
militia), but they were inspected more often and so are over represented in most years. 
Only in 1812 and 1815 do the proportions in the sample match those in the army. 6 
Table 6: PercentagLeof Cavally and Infanixy in th6 W027 Sample 
1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 
Cavalry 21% 20% 2(r/o 2(r/o 17% 14% 20% 191/0 13% 
Infantry 79*/o 800/0 800/0 80% 83% 86% 80% 81% 87% 
Total Sample 24,415 27,008 26,168 20,042 22,182 22,334 17,386 13,402 16,787 
Source: W027 Sample. 
The number of mounted regiments stabilised after 1801 at three household 
regiments, twelve heavy cavalry regiments and nineteen light cavalry regiments. The 
Royal Horse Guards had an undefined status during this period, being somewhere 
between household troops and the army, but for the purpose of the sample they have 
been counted as household cavalry, as their recruitment policy was outside the 
jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief If the size of a cavalry regiment was roughly 
equal regardless of type, then approximately one in ten of the regiments should be 
household cavalry, four out of ten heavy cavalry, and the remaining half light cavalry. 7 
Although the individual establishments and strength of the units varied, on average the 
proportion between cavalry types remained consistent. In April 1810,1,779 troopers 
were in household cavalry regiments, 6,937 in heavy cavalry regiments, and the light 
cavalry regiments totalled 12,579 men; although by November 1811, the totals had 
changed to 1,716,8,620, and 13,361 respectively, overall the proportion between the 
types had not changed significantly. ' 
6 See Table 6. 
7 The exact proportions are 3/34ths (9%) for the household, 12/34ths (35%) for the heavy and 19/34ths 
156%) for the light cavalry regiments. 
W025/3224, Return of the British Army, 25 April 1810, Return of the British Army, 29 November 
1811. The two regiments of Life Guards were not included in these returns, and a figure of 600 men each 
has been used. The proportions in 1810 are 8.4% Household Cavalry, 32.6% heavy cavalry and 59.1% 
light cavalry; in 18 11 the figures are 7.2%, 36.4% and 56.4% respectively. 
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To be a representative swnple of the cavalry, the proportion between the different 
regiments should not vary significantly from the average. However, in common with all 
the King's personal troops, the household cavalry was inspected very infrequently (the 
two regiments of Life Guards never sent inspections reports according to the 
regulations), and so they have been sampled when returns are available, regardless of 
proportion. Generally, the sample is limited by the inspections that were made, and the 
returns that survived or are complete. Consequently, the cavalry sample is not 
representative of the British army's cavalry arm in each year, but is spread over the 
period between 1807 and 181V 
Table 7: The Proportions of CavalKy in the W027 Sample, 
1 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 Average 
Household 12% 01/a 11% 0% 09/o 0% 12% 0% 0% 4.6% Cavalry 
Heavy Cavalry 39% 43% 48% 37% 41% 25% 24% 34% 42% 38.2% 
Light Cavalry 490/9 57% 41% 63% 59% 75% 64% 66% 58% 57.2% 
Total Cavalry 5,206 5,508 5,275 4,036 3,852 3,131 3,554 2,490 2,151 Sampled 
I 
Source: W027 Sample. 
Similar problems are encountered in the selection of the infantry. There were 
minor changes in the proportions between foot guards, infantry and light infantry in 
1808 and 1809 caused by the conversion of the 5lt, 68h, 70,85 1h regiments to light 
infantry, and the establishment of a third battalion for the 95h. These augmentations 
increased the light infantry corps by six battalions (the 71"t had two battalions), but 
nonetheless seven line regiments had additional battalions raised, 'O and overall the line 
regiments still formed the overwhelming majority of the infantry. Including the 
converted regiments as light infantry, which they were throughout most of the period in 
question, there were seven battalions of foot guards (4%), 169 line battalions (89%), and 
thirteen light battalions (7%) out of 189 battalions. The variations in strength were 
considerably more diverse than in the cavalry, with battalions ranging from 400 to 1,200 
9 See Table 7. 
10 See Appendix C. 
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rank and file, but because the strength of the line regiments predominated, the 
proportions of the different infantry types did not vary much. Two detailed returns, one 
in April 18 10 and another dated November 1811, show that the strength of the line 
regiments remained at 87.8% of the infantry, the foot guards increased from 4.7% to 
5.2%, whilst the light infantry dropped from 7.5% to 7%. " As with the household 
cavalry, the foot guards were not inspected frequently or even according to the 
regulations, and so they have been sampled when details are available, skewing figures 
for individual years. The light infantry are slightly over represented but as these units 
often provided a large part of the disposable force, they have been deliberately over 
sampled. " 
Table 8: Proportions of Infan 
1807 1808 
! ly in the W027 Samp-I& 
1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 Average 
Foot 
Guards 0% 00/0 6% 4% 6% 4% 8% 9% 7% 5.0% 
Infantry 86% 87% 85% 91% 84% 87% 79% 84% 93% 86.2% 
Light 
Infantry 14% 13% 9% 5% 9% 90/0 14% 7% 0% 8.9% 
Total 
Infantry 19,209 21,500 20,893 16,006 18,330 19,203 13,832 10,912 14,636 
Sampled 
Source: W027 Sample. 
Furthermore, the different stations of the regiments can affect the reliability of the 
sample. For instance, if there are a large number of troops sampled from the home 
garrison, it is likely that these units would have large numbers of men unfit for service; 
they would either be young recruits or older men, which would affect both the ages and 
length of service data. Conversely, the troops active abroad would consist of the fittest 
men in the army, and would not be representative of the army as a whole. Accordingly 
the location of the regiments sampled needs to be known, and, for simplicity, these 
locations have been organised into the strategic roles already used earlier (home, active 
11 W025/3224, Return of the Force on Foreign Stations, 25 April 1810, Return of the British Army, 29 
November 1811. The detailed figures are 6,212 foot guards in April 1810,116,545 line infantry, and 
91955 light infhntry; in November IS II the amounts were 6,904,116,677, and 9,237 respectively. I See Table 8. 
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abroad, Mediterranean, West Indies, North America, Africa and East Indies). Invariably 
it was the troops at home that were reviewed regularly, and so these units form the bulk 
of the survey. In 1812 and 1813 units in the Peninsula were inspected, and so they have 
been deliberately targeted as they were not inspected in other years. The large 
percentage of the sample serving in North America in 1815 reflects the transfer of many 
of the Peninsular units to that theatre during the war with the USA, unfortunately no 
survey was made of the Waterloo regiments. 
The strength of the army at overseas stations varied, making average figures for 
troops abroad difficult to calculate. For instance, in 1807 there were hardly any active 
service abroad locations; apart from the small number of troops in South America, the 
only other active force was the corps sent to Stralsund and Copenhagen in late 1807, 
whilst the inspections were made in the spring. In effect, the active part of the army was 
at home that year. 1811 was a fairly typical year, and 26% of the army was deployed at 
home, 26% active overseas in the Peninsula, 16% in the Mediterranean, 3% in Africa, 
11% in the West Indies, 4% in North America, and 14% in the East Indies. " Comparing 
these actual figures to the sample, overall the colonial army is underrepresented. 14 
'able 9: Location of Rep-iments in W027 Sample 
LA)cation 1807 1808 1809 1810 
Home 55% 68% 71% 48% 
Active Abroad 00/0 0% 00/0 13% 
Mediterranean 190/0 01/0 7% 7% 
Africa 12% 6% 3% 4% 
West Indies 8% 12% O,. YO 13% 
North 6% 7% 4% 5% America 
East Indies 0% 7% 14% 11% 
Source: W027 Sample. 
47% 34% 26% 30% 
4% 39% 561/o 20'Yo 
120/o 13% 00/0 13% 
5% 4% 0% 15% 
61/o 8% 5% 8% 
1815 
13% 
6% 
70/o 
r/0 
3% 00/0 3% 00/0 39% 
I Average 
47% 
13% 
90/0 
5% 
7% 
7'Yo 
24% 4% 10% 14% 28% 1 12% 
Comment is also necessary on the accuracy of the data in the inspection returns. 
It is not clear whether soldiers were asked details and counted on the day of the 
1811 1812 1813 1814 
13 W025/3224, Return of the British Amy, 29 November 1811. 14 See Table 9. 
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inspection, or if the tables were compiled from regimental books. Either way, there are 
likely to be inaccuracies in these returns: for instance, soldiers may have lied about their 
age when they enlisted, and so had to continue this pretence, and clerical errors were 
likely in an era when everything was hand written and calculations were based on 
mental arithmetic. Moreover, the definitions of the categories used are not specified 
anywhere, and so it is difficult to know, for example, how Henry Kinkman, a Sergeant 
Major of the I" Dragoons, would have been categorised, when he had German parents, 
but was born in England, and spent the Revolutionary Wars in the Austrian army as an 
aide-de-camp to General Melas in Italy. " 
The regimental books and surviving attestations provide far more detail than the 
inspection returns, and allow a closer examination of the place of birth of soldiers, and 
their occupations before enlisting. As with the inspection returns, the details in them are 
not always clear, in particular, it is not apparent if the ages given in these books refer to 
when the book was begun, or the soldier's age at his enlistment. The sample from these 
books includes the P Foot Guards, 21Yh Light Dragoons, 2/6th, third and fourth 
battalions of the P", and 2/32 nd . In addition there are some entries in the books of the 8 
1h 
and 2/34th Foot which relate to the period, but they are untypical as the men entered are 
boys who enlisted in the Napoleonic Wars and survived until the books were created in 
1830s. Alongside these, some attestations (giving the same information as the 
regimental books) from the 7fl' Light Dragoons have been utilised. " 
Finally there are the printed and manuscript biographies of soldiers and the 
regimental histories that need to be considered. Although these were written for an 
audience, and so may have embellishments to make the works less factual, their 
omissions are even more significant. Soldiers rarely describe their background, or what 
13 H050/405, Henry Kinkman to AG Scotland, 4 April 1807. 
16 Scots Guards: W067/1; 200'Light Dragoons: W025/285 & /287; 3/1": W025/314; 4/1": W025/316; 
2/6"': WO25/329; 8h: W067/7; 2/32d: W025/368; 2/34fl: W067/14; 7h Light Dragoons: NAM, 6806-43- 
32. The sample comprises 1176 men. 
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led them to enlist, and instead quickly pass over their initial experiences in the army, 
and launch into battle descriptions. " A few were written for religious instruction - after 
all, what better tale of a sinner saved is there than a soldier who returns to Christianity - 
which colours the details of particular soldiers. " The regimental histories are similar in 
this respect, briefly alluding to the mundane aspects of where the regiment recruited, 
and what type of men were enlisted, whilst giving precedence to the glories of 
successful campaigns and battles. 
Nationalities and Regional Distribution 
The national composition of the army has been thought not to miffor the 
composition of the UK. Contemporary opinion asserted that the army had an overlarge 
proportion of Scots and Irish during the Napoleonic Wars, and one of distinctions of the 
post-Waterloo army was the size of the Celtic component, particularly the number of 
Scots in the army compared with Scotland's inhabitants. This was a change from the 
pre-1793 army, which was principally Anglo-Scottish, and reflected the massive 
recruitment in Ireland and Scotland, especially during the Revolutionary Wars. 19 
Unfortimately, the printed inspection returns do not make a separate entry for 
Wales - it is treated as England - and so only a comparison between England, Scotland 
and Ireland can be made. There was always a small proportion of foreigners in the army 
as a whole, from the total sample of 160,524 men, only 4,631 were foreigners (3%). The 
2/60'h has been sampled in 1810,1812 and 1814, and subtracting these men, only 1,459 
soldiers were foreigners in the other line regiments. From the units sampled in the 
period from 1807 to 1815, the outcome differs from the traditional perception of the 
17 For example Vicissitudes in the Life of a Scottish Soldier, written by himsetr, (London, 1828), Narrative 
of a Private Soldier in one of His Majesty's Regiments of Foot, written by himsey, (Glasgow, 1819), and 
D. Robertson, Journal of Sergeant D. Robertson. late ýýd Highlanders, during the campaigns between 
1797 and 1818, (Perth, 1842). " For instance, The Veteran Soldier: An Interesting Narrative of the Life and Religious Erperience of the 
Late Sergeant Greenleigh, (London, 1822) & Memoirs of a Sergeant late in the Forty-Third Light 
Infantry Regiment, Previously to and During the Peninsular War, including an Account of his conversion 
49 om Popery to the Protestant Religion, (London, 1835). 
Cookson, British ArmedNation, pp. 126-128, & 153-155. 
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national composition of the army. " The striking point is the similarity between the UK 
population and the national composition of the army; Scotland is slightly over 
represented, on average it made up 13% of the army, but 10% of the UK, whilst the 
Irish contingent is less than its proportion of the population (25% of the an-ny compared 
with 33% of the UK). It is difficult to explain this contradiction of contemporary 
opinion, but one consideration is that the inspections made in Ireland, and sent to the 
Irish Adjutant General, no longer exist. However, Ireland's garrison was not exclusively 
composed of Irish troops; in fact, it was government policy to reduce the proportion of 
21 Irish soldiers in Ireland. 
Graph XI: Nationalities in the British Arm 
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Another explanation is provided by the regiments sampled. The four specific 
1h Irish regiments, the 18", 27th, 87th and 88 , spent most of their time outside the home 
garrison, and so they were not inspected often. For instance, the 27 th had two battalions 
in Sicily, where inspections were almost non-existent, and its third battalion was in 
Ireland. Only when the 3/27 th moved to Canada in 1815 does an inspection return exist 
20 See Graph XI. 
21 Cookson, British Armed Nation, pp. 153-155. 
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for the regiment, and similarly, the 18"' and 88h have only been sampled twice. But just 
because a regiment had an Irish title did not necessarily imply that it was Irish. 
It may be possible that the nationalities in the army came to mirror the UK 
through government policy. The militia transfers took a large number of men from 
English and Scottish Militia regiments, and in the years when there were no transfers 
from the British Militia (1810,1814 and 1815), there was a higher proportion of Irish 
troops in the army. In these years the army's strength was maintained by ordinary 
recruiting, which traditionally focused on Ireland, and moreover, in 1810, Irish 
militiamen were allowed to volunteer under the terms of the 1806 Act. Significantly, the 
militia transfers were not as successful from the Irish and Scottish Militias, and so the 
drafts they provided to the line were not equal to their populations. In 1809,69% of the 
militiamen who volunteered were English, whilst only 8% were Scottish and 23% were 
Irish. Although the Scottish Militia rallied in 1811 and provided 15% of the volunteers, 
Ireland still under performed, providing only 24% of the intake that year. In effect, the 
militia transfers were counterbalancing the army's traditionally heavy recruitment in 
Ireland and Scotland. The balancing effect of the militia volunteers may also explain the 
nationality patterns in the post-Waterloo period. A large number of militia volunteers, 
especially Englishmen, chose limited service, and when these men were discharged first 
in 1814 and 1815, the army was left with ordinary recruits and militiamen who had 
chosen unlimited service, and in both categories the Irish and Scottish predominated. 
Turning to individual units in the army, nationalities were not evenly distributed. 
It is generally assumed that under the pressure to fill the ranks, regiments would send 
out recruiting parties to wherever they thought they could get men, so rendering their 
regimental titles as virtually meaningless. In some cases this is valid; " the 4/1",, hungry 
for men to fill the ranks of its three sister battalions overseas, went from 
overwhelmingly Scottish in 1807, to predominately Irish in 1812, although the battalion 
22 See Appendix H. 
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was always a mixture of all three nationalities. " The only possible justifications for the 
its title change to the Royal Scots in 1812 were that its third and fourth battalions were 
raised in 1804 from limited service men raised in Scotland, and the stationing of the 
fourth battalion in Scotland during 1807,1808, and 1811 to 1813. " The 2/31" almost 
replicates the populations of the UK, in 1807,60% of its men were from England, 7% 
from Scotland and 32% from Ireland. However, from the regiments sampled only the 
1/25th in 1808 has a similar composition. 
These regiments do seem to be untypical, and most regiments were more stable 
in their national composition, generally composed of two nationalities. Anglo-Irish 
regiments included the 130' Light Dragoons, the 8h Foot, the 2/47h and the 1/61't. 23 
There were other combinations, the 1/26h in 1811 and 1814 was Scotch-Irish, whilst the 
2/8 I't was Anglo-Scottish. " It is clear that there were also national regiments especially 
in the cavalry corps. Out of the fifteen regiments of heavy cavalry (including the 
household cavalry), only two - the 6h and 7th Dragoon Guards - have a mixture of men 
in their ranks, with no single nationality above 70% of their men. 'Me 4 th and 5 th 
Dragoon Guards were Irish, and although the 2 nd Dragoons have not been sampled, it is 
safe to assume that their troopers reflected its unofficial title of the Scots Greys. The rest 
of the heavy cavalry were overwhelmingly English. 
The light cavalry regiments also show delineated nationalism. As mentioned 
above the 13th Light Dragoons was Anglo-Irish, and the 8 th Light Dragoons can be 
categorised as Irish-English, but overall there is the same pattern as the heavy cavalry, 
with English regiments dominating, if anything, even more. Such exclusiveness may 
have bordered on discrimination. Mr. Bennett questioned Colonel Palmer in the 
23 In 1807 the percentages by nationality in the battalion were 17% English, 72% Scottish, 7% Irish and 
4% Foreign; in 1809 22% were English, 41% Scottish, 36% Irish and 2% Foreign; in 1810 34% English, 
27% Scottish, 38% Irish; by 1812 the figures were 34% English, 19% Scottish, 45% Irish and 1% 
Foreign. 24 W0380/1. 
25 See A endix H. 26 Up 1/26 was 56% Scottish and 36% Irish in 1811, and had only changed to 60% and 32% respectively by 
1814; the 2/8 V had 62% English in 1811, and 37% Scottish. 
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Commons as to why Irishmen were not allowed to enlist in the IOh Hussars, whilst 
foreigners were, to which Colonel Palmer replied simply 'because Irishmen desert'. " 
From the data on the cavalry regiments, the cavalry could maintain its ranks without 
having to send recruiting parties throughout the LJK. 
Examining the infantry, if a threshold of seventy per cent is used (i. e. any 
regiment with over seventy per cent of one nationality), the foot guards are English, 
including the Scots Guards in 1807 as are some line regiments, namely the 6'h (which in 
1807 was British), the 206', the 23 rd , 2/34d' and 360', which was in keeping with their 
titles. More importantly some Scottish- and Irish-titled regiments were composed of 
these nationalities, namely the 42d, 78h, 79h ,91".. and 92 
nd for Scotland, 180". 27h, 87th, 
88'h and 101" for Ireland. As with the light cavalry, such exclusiveness could be 
discriminatory: it was with some satisfaction that Lieutenant Colonel Burrard of the Vt 
Foot Guards informed the Duke of York that out of 480 recruits for the regiment, only 
seventeen were Irish. ' 
In some cases the national identity of regiments was actually promoted, usually 
by the militia transfers. The 2/0' ranks' had a slight preponderance of Irishmen in 1807 
and 1808 (50% in 1807 and 42% in 1808), but afterwards was predominately filled with 
Englishmen, a result of the 1807 militia transfer, when the 0' was initially allocated 
volunteers from four English and Welsh Militia regiments (the Derbyshire, Monmouth 
and Brecon, and I" and 2 nd West Riding regiments). During the 1809 transfer it received 
734 men from the British Militiaý" Furthermore, the 97h was transformed from a 
foreign regiment into a British unit by the militia transfers. " 
It appears unusual for the militia to promote the nationality of a regiment in this 
way. Initially the 1807 Act had set up national connections, with all Scottish militiamen 
27 Hansard, 1812-1813, XXI, 1812,1249. 
211 WO 1/65 1, Lt Col. Burrard to York, I June 1812. 
29 W01/904, Return of Militia Volunteers, 20 May 1809 30 Hansart4 1810-1811, XIX, 1811,188. 
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going to Scottish regiments (which were the 1". 21"9 42 nd , 71't to 75 
th 78 th 79 th , and 
90'h to 90)? ' Of the Irish line regiments, the 18'h was to receive militiamen from the 
South Mayo and Waterford Militias, the 27h from Fermanagh, Kildare and Longford 
Militias, the 87h Galway's and Tipperary's men, and the 88 th Galway, Leitrim, both 
Mayo regiments, Roscommon, Sligo and Waterford Militias. A detailed return of the 
destination of Irish Militia recruits during the 1807 act shows that the army had to 
balance preserving, or creating national regiments, against the needs of regiments about 
to embark on foreign service. The four Irish line regiments received 1,009 men, but by 
November 1807, when restrictions were still in force on the choice of regiments for 
militia volunteers, the 13th was allocated six Irish militia regiments, and received 396 
men from these units, the most given to any regiment by the Irish Militia. The 13 th 
embarked for the West Indies in 1808, and it is clear that the Horse Guards wanted as 
many men as possible in its ranks before it departed. Overall, this return shows that 
even in 1807, most militiamen were not preserving national regiments, 83% of the Irish 
volunteers obtained by the winter of 1807 went to non-hish line regiments, 5% even 
went to highland corps. " 
Allowing militia volunteers complete freedom of choice as to which line 
regiment they would volunteer for, made preserving national identities harder, and less 
under the control of the Horse Guards. Eighty-seven regiments received volunteers from 
the British Militia in 1809 with an average draft of 161 men. The Irish volunteers were 
more concentrated, although fifty-eight line regiments received volunteers from Ireland 
and the average draft was only thirty-three men, 80% of Irish militia volunteers went to 
eighteen regiments. Although predictably the 88th received a draft of 240 Irish 
militiamen, vastly outnumbering the seventeen volunteers from British Militia 
regiments, the 59th obtained 202 British militiamen and 159 Irishmen, the second 
31 H051/25, Militia volunteering orders, 17 August 1807. 32 WOI/612, Return of Irish Militia Volunteers, 17 November 1807. 
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highest draft from the Irish militia, and the 74h only got seven men from the British 
Militia (so they might not even have been Scottish, let alone highlanders) but seventy- 
three Irish volunteers. " A return from the first volunteering period in 1811 shows 
similar, if not worse results: 2,813 British volunteers chose eighty-two different 
regiments, and ignoring the large draft to the three Foot Guards regiments (357 men), 34 
each of the seventy-nine line regiments received on average thirty-one British 
militiamen. The Irish Militia regiments were spread even thinner across thirty-nine 
regiments, with an average of only eight men per regiment. ' 
Detailed analysis of where soldiers came from is more difficult. Simply labelling 
a soldier English, Scottish or Irish does not do justice to the diversity within the three 
Kingdoms, nor provide any real indication of where a soldier came from. In some cases 
regiments were able to have a territorial basis. The Duke of Richmond managed to fill 
his regiment (the 35h) with men from Sussex, and change its title accordingly in 1805. "' 
Some militia regiments had a relationship with their county line regiments: the Perth 
Militia sent seventy-two out of its 171 volunteers to the 90th, 17 and Earl Temple used his 
influence as Colonel of the Royal Buckingham Militia to ensure that the 14"' received 
volunteers from his regiment, after Calvert had solicited his interference,, 3" and in 1811 
sixty-five men out of eighty-five chose the 14 th . 
39 
Such territorial connections were rare; and made less likely by the militia 
transfers. In an inspection return of 1/23"d in 1808 only 200 out of 1,077 men were 
Welsh, and the most prominent nationality is English (634 men). ' When the 77h 
returned from India in 1807 it was given the title East Middlesex, but it was not until 
33 WO 1/904, Return of Militia Volunteers, 20 May 1809 34 225 to the I' Foot Guards, 76 to the 2"d, and 56 to the Yd. 35 WOI/946, Volunteers from Militia Regiments. The return only covers British and Irish Militia 
regiments in Britain. 36 G. D. Martineau, A History of the Royal Sussex Regiment, (Chichester, 1955). The Duke became 
Colonel of the 35'h in 1803. 37 W027/96,16 May 1809. 
39 Claydon House Archives, Calvert Papers, 9/101/1, Calvert to Maj. Wood, 28 July 1807. 
39 W027/105, Inspection return of BuckinpýTshire Militia, 2 May 1811. 40 W027/94, Inspection return of the 1/23' 9 11 August 1808. 
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1809 that it actually received some militia volunteers from the Middlesex militia 
regiments, and even then they were few in number. "' In the example of the Perth Militia, 
apart from the volunteers for the 90'h, the remaining ninety-nine volunteers went to 
fifteen different regiments, and there were undoubtedly many similar cases to the 
solitary militiaman in the 2 nd West Yorkshire who chose the 77h. ' 
Studying the regimental books provide ftu-ther details of where the soldiers came 
from. For convenience the recruiting districts have been used to divide the United 
Kingdom into more manageable areas than counties. In the cases where a county was 
divided and included in more than one recruiting district, the recruiting district with the 
largest area in the county has been used. "-' 
41 C. L Kingsford, The Story of the Duke of Cambridge's Own (Midd(esex Regiment), (London, 1916), 
pp. 62-63. 
W027/95, Inspection Retum of 2d West Yorkshire Militia, 15 May 1809. 43 See Table 10. 
186 
Table 10: District of Birth of Soldiers 
District 3 FG 7 LD 20 LD 3/& 2/6th 8th 2/32nd 2/34th 
4/1 st 
Durham 3% 0% 1% I% 0% 00/0 2% 0% 
Carlisle 01yo 00/0 1% 00/0 0% 01yo 00/0 4% 
Leeds 6% 0% 11% 4% 3% 2% 2% 12% 
Manchester 12% 0% 6% 5% 50% 4% 7% 4% 
Nottingham 11% 5% 5% 1% 00/0 00/0 1% 4% 
Birmingham 12% 5% 5% 2% 5% 90/0 13% 0% 
Shrewsbury 2% 90/0 0% 0% 1% 2% 0% 4% 
Bury St. 4% 5% 2% 1% 7% 00/0 1% 32% 
Edmunds 
Bedford 4% 23% 7% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Gloucester 11% 00/0 2% 4% 00/0 0% 8% 00/0 
Hereford UVO 9, YO 0% 2% &YO 2% 1% 8% 
Maidstone 2% 0% 61/o 9% 00/0 2% 1% 00/0 
London 2% 91yo 90/0 2% 1% 2% 1% 4% 
Southampton 7% 5% 7% 6% 00/0 4% 9% 00/0 
Wells 4% 5% 5% 12% 0% 0% 24% 4% 
Edinburgh 8% 00/0 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Glasgow 40/6 5% 1% 6% 0% 2% 1% 00/0 
Aberdeen 2% 00/0 1% 2% 0% 00/0 01yo 00/0 
Inverness 1% 00/0 00/0 1% 0% 00/0 0% 0% 
Belfast 00/0 5% UYO 4% 1% 2% 3% 00/0 
Enniskillen (YY0 00/0 2% 8% 4% 6% 3% 4% 
Newry wo 5% 3% 10% 5% 28% 2% 0% 
Dublin 1% 5% 21/o 6% 1% 21% 6% 4% 
Athlone 01yo 5% 2% 2% 7% 4% 5% 0% 
Waterford 1% 0% 4% 5% 3% 4% 2% 8% 
Limerick 00/0 00/0 00/0 3% 2% 00/0 1% (r10 
Cork 0% 5% 0% 2% 3% 2% 6% 8% 
Overseas 1% 0% 16% 0% 2% 2% 2% 0% 
Sample 161 22 123 308 209 47 232 25 
Sources: W025/285, /287, /314, /316, /329, /368; W067/1, n, /14, NAM, 6806-43-32. 
The clearest conclusions that can be drawn from the English soldiers in these 
regiments are the predominant presence of men from the Manchester district 
(Lancashire and Cheshire) especially in the 2/6h, from Wells (Somerset, Devon and 
Cornwall), and Birmingham (Warwickshire, Leicestershire and Staffordshire). This 
made the 2/32 nd title slightly relevant, but rendered the 2/6h rather meaningless. The 
high percentage of recruits from the 2/340' bom in the Bury St. Edmunds district is not 
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significant, as it only equals eight men. By means of a comparison, the 5% of the 2/6h 
born in Warwickshire outnumber these eight men, as it equates to ten soldiers. 
Similarly the Scotsmen tended to come fi-om the more urban districts (Edinburgh 
and Glasgow), with the highland areas particularly underrepresented. This reflects the 
regiments sampled, as the 42 nd and 91" were able to maintain their highland status, and 
the recruits that were coming from the highlands were going to these regiments. In the 
case of the 42 nd the highlanders were 'much attached' to the Colonel, the Marquis of 
Huntley, and so the inspecting general expected the regiment to keep up its strength. 44 
The Irish-born soldiers show more variation from across the country, ignoring the 
results from the 8th Foot, whose sample is small, but with a slightly higher concentration 
of recruits fi-om Enniskillen, Newry and Dublin. 
Just as revealing as where these soldiers were bom, is where they were enlisted, 
as this provides a glimpse of the recruit's life before he enlisted. Comparing the details 
from regimental books with the information gathered by the Adjutant General in 1809 
on the number of recruits raised per district, they provide a similar picture overall. Large 
proportions of the army were enlisted in London, Birmingham, and Manchester, but it is 
also clear that some regiments did have a regional recruitment base. The 32 nd obtained 
many of its men in the Wells district, but none of the regiments sampled obtained any 
men from Carlisle, or the highlands, which suggests, particularly in the latter case, that 
specific regiments were recruiting in these areas. " 
44 W027/92, Inspeuion return of the 2/4Vd, 27 May 1807. 45 See Table 11. 
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Table 11: District of Enlistment of Soldiers compared to 1809 Recruiting D 
1809 
District 25Va 2/6* 3 FG 3/11" 4/1" 7 LD 8h Total Recruiting District 
data 
Durham 3 0 9 0 0 0 0 12 2% 1% 
Carlisle 0 1%, 
Leeds 0 1 4 0 1 0 1 7 1% 4% 
Manchester 22 52 15 0 4 0 3 96 12% 14% 
Nottingham 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 12 2% 3% 
Birmingham 31 5 13 1 3 1 3 57 7% 5% 
Shrewsbury 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 (r/O 1% 
Bury 1 10 5 0 0 1 0 17 2% 3% 
Bedford 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 00/0 2% 
Gloucester 11 2 12 0 13 2 2 42 5% 3% 
Maidstone 0 60 3 1 2 0 1 67 8% 1% 
London 2 2 33 0 10 4 3 54 7% 8% 
Southampto 5 0 13 0 5 3 4 30 4% 2% 
n 
Wells 69 17 15 0 67 3 0 171 22% 3% 
Edinburgh 0 2 10 0 0 0 0 12 2% 3% 
Glasgow 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 1% 2% 
Aberdeen 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0% 2% 
Inverness 0 3% 
Ireland 69 41 8 8 48 4 27 205 26% 39% 
Total 213 195 159 10 153 18 44 792 
Sources: WO25/3224, Return of Recruits, 19 October 1809; WO25/285, /287, /314, /316, 
/329, /368; W067/l, n, /14, NAK 6806-43-32. 
More can be gleaned from comparing the district of birth of a soldier with his 
place of enlistment. UnfortimatelY this data was not collected in a consistent manner in 
the original returns. Not all of the 1,176 soldiers in the database even have a place of 
enlistment, and twenty-three entries give obscure places of enlistment. For instance 
Patrick Brads from Mayo, enlisted into the 3/1" at Westport in 1813, but there are three 
Westports, one in Argyll, one in Mayo - the most likely - and one in Somerset. There 
are six soldiers with no place of birth given but are listed at the place where they were 
recruited. In such cases these soldiers cannot form part of any comparison between 
birthplace and enlistment. Moreover, any soldier that was a militiaman or a volunteer 
from the Army of Reserve has been specifically removed from the data, as he would 
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have had no choice over where he enlisted, simply joining from the depot where the 
militia regiment was stationed. It is possible that militiamen were not always recorded 
as such in regimental books. Nowhere in the sample from the 2/32 nd is any man listed as 
a militia volunteer, yet the enlistments of Robert Bray, Samuel Bread, John Bonney and 
Phillip Beswick, all from Cornwall in 1813 at Castlebar, Mayo, by the 2/32 nd look 
suspiciously like transfers from the militia. " However, to be consistent, the regimental 
books have been taken literally, and only entries that mention the soldier being a 
volunteer from the militia have been removed. This deducts eighty men from the list, 
and leaves 721 soldiers with places of birth and enlistment. 
There are significant variations between the soldier's district of birth and the 
district where they enlistecL"' The low percentage of soldiers born in London contrasts 
with the high number of London enlistments and this can be explained by examining the 
birth district of the men enlisted in London. Of the thirty-six soldiers enlisted in 
London, only six (or 17%) were born in London, and the rest were born in sixteen 
different districts. This demonstrates that recruits obtained in London were migrants 
from other regions, and the same can be said of the Maidstone district, where only 2% 
of the sixty-five men recruited in the district were born there. Some of these soldiers 
were born in adjacent districts, such as the thirteen soldiers enlisted in London from the 
Bedford, Maidstone, Southampton, and Gloucester districts. Even including these, the 
army was recruiting from the substantial number of migrants to London. It is difficult to 
imagine the journey that took Charles Archibald from Roxburgh, and Alexander Adam 
from Lanarkshire to enlist in the Yd Foot Guards in London, or Thomas Savage, born in 
Kerry, to join the 4/1" in London, potentially the longest journey possible in the UK. An 
anonymous soldier who went on to record his army career moved from 'never-mind- 
where' in Shropshire to London before enlisting. " The 2/6h's recruiting party stationed 
46 W025/368. 
47 See Appendix 1. 
48 Jouingsftom my Sabrelache, p. 5. 
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at Great Baddow, just outside Chelmsford took full advantage of the migrant population 
in London, and the regiment obtained sixty men in the Maidstone district, the largest 
total obtained by its recruiting parties in any district. 
Recruiting from migrants was limited to certain districts. In the rural Bury St. 
Edmunds district, eleven out of the twelve recruits were born in Norfolk, Suffolk or 
Cambridge. Similarly, in the Nottingham district, only one of its eleven recruits was not 
from the district, and he was a framework knitter from nearby Leicestershire. When the 
number of men enlisted in a particular district is small, it is difficult to make firm 
conclusions, and so the results from Bury might be an anomaly. However, the 
Manchester district had ninety-one enlistments, of which 74% were born in Lancashire 
or Cheshire. From the twenty4our from outside the Manchester district, thirteen were 
born in adjacent recruiting districts, indicating some migration to the industrial towns in 
Lancashire from which the army obtained its men, but overall a relatively stable 
population. The Gloucester district provides similar data to that of Manchester, 95% of 
recruits were born in the district or adjacent districts. The results from Newry and 
Dublin show a similar pattern, but counting adjacent districts engulfs vast areas of 
Ireland, for example, only the Cork, Newry and Belfast districts were not adjacent to 
Athlone. 
The largest number of recruits obtained in this sample was in the Wells district. 
The results from there show the limitations of the data provided by the regimental 
books, as superficially the area's enlistments indicate a situation closer to London than 
the results obtained from the rest of England. Only 39% of the recruits were born in the 
West Country, and the remainder came from eighteen different districts. As noted 
above, the 2/32"d's regimental book, does not indicate if a soldier was a militia 
volunteer, and some of the sixty-nine men recruited by that regiment in the south-west 
may have been militiamen. The south-west had a number of important naval ports that 
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were often garrisoned by militiamen making such a possibility more likely: out of the 
171 men who gave a place of enlistment in the Wells district, twelve were recruited at 
Pendermis, probably meaning the castle, another twelve in Falmouth, fourteen at 
Berryhead barracks, and forty-eight at Plymouth. Potentially half the recruits enlisted in 
this sample from the Wells district were militiamen. The degree of migration of men 
before they joined the army was probably less extensive than the enlistment data 
superficially indicates. In Wells' case 73% of men born in the district joined the army in 
their district of birth, and only twenty-two out of the eighty-two future soldiers born in 
the south-west moved before they joined the army, some of whom were probably 
militiamen. 
This small level of migration meant that the 2/32 nd was able to have a West 
Country presence in the ranks, but even a low level of regional migration made 
maintaining any kind of territorial link difficult. The army's recruiting instructions did 
suggest sending parties to their counties, but it was likely that the men recruited would 
not necessarily be from that county: on average, just over half the men recruited in a 
district would be from elsewhere. The regional composition of a regiment also 
depended on its history. The 6th, despite being the I" Warwickshire, had its second 
battalion formed from limited-service men raised in Lancashire, and although not in 
keeping with its title, it preserved this identity throughout the period. A quarter of its 
recruits enlisted in the Manchester district, and of the sixty men the party at Chelmsford 
recruited, thirty-eight were bom in Lancashire. 
Most regiments in the British army had no real territorial origins, and were given 
titles later, "' but the notable exceptions to this rule were the highland corps. Clan chiefs 
raised these regiments from their tenants, creating true territorial units. " This source of 
manpower had proved very productive, and massive use was made of highland 
49 G. H. Cleare, 'County names for regiments in 1782', MHR, 1962(38), pp. 34-38. " Stanley Dean MacDonald Carpenter, 'Patterns of Recruitment of the Highland Regiments of the British 
Army, 1756-1815', M. Litt., (University of St. Andrews, 1977), pp. 77-78 
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recruiting in the early years of the Revolutionary Wars. Between 1793 and 1800,30,000 
men were raised for regulars and Fencible units, " but this put an enormous strain on the 
remaining highland population. The last highland unit to be raised, the 9P, had great 
difficulty finding men, despite the Countess of Sutherland's promises of land leases. " It 
was clear that the manpower reserves of the highlands were exhausted, caused as much 
by the army's heavy recruitment as the introduction of sheep farming which was far 
more profitable than tenant farmers. In a few years, commercialism destroyed the clan 
system that underpinned the highland regiments. " 
This caused problems for the existing highland corps, particularly those that did 
not have a second battalion in Scotland. The in2 nd was stationed at the Cape of Good 
Hope, and although Scotsmen outnumbered Englishmen and Irishmen, it cannot be 
considered a highland regiment. ' In 1809 this regiment and five others (the Vd, 70, 
75'h, 91" and 90) were removed from the highland establishment, and henceforth did 
not wear kilts. " This order left only five highland regiments, the 42 nd 78 th 79 th 92 nd 
and 9P., and was a frank admission that under the pressures of war, even the territorial 
highland corps could lose their regional identity. 
The 71" had a more chequered. history, it was originally raised in 1777 by Lord 
MacLeod from his land on the Isle of Lewis and the north west of Scotland, but its 
second battalion was formed from Dumbarton's Army of Reserve men, and in 1808 it 
was designated the Glasgow Highland regiment. By 1810 it had lost its Glaswegian 
title, and become the Highland Light Infantry. Even the remaining highland regiments 
51 Carpenter, 'Recruitment of the Highland Regiments', M. Litt., p. 73. 52 jbid, P. 80. 531bid, pp. I 10_123. m In 1807 60% were Scottish, 24% Irish and 15% English, in 1808 the figures are 63%, 21% and 15%, in 
1809 64%, 19% and 16%. 55 Carpenter, 'Recruitment of the Highland Regiments', M. Litt., p. 108. There is some discrepancy over 
what regiments were de-kilted. All agree that the 71" to 74h were removed from the highland 
establishment, the 94'h is listed in some copies of the general order, but it is not clear if it was a highland 
corps in the first place. Cookson, British Armed Nation, p. 130 gives 71 "1 72"d, 74tht 75h 9 I't & 94 1h ; Lt. 
Col. Angus Fairrie, "Cuidich 'n Righ": A History of the Queen's Own Highlanders (Seaforth and 
Camerons) (Inverness, 1983), p. 7, the 71"' to 75h, & 91"; Wood, The Scottish Soldier, p. 49, the 72 nd to 
75d', &91 ý- R. P. Dunn-Pattison, The History of the 91" Argyllshire Highlanders, (Edinburgh, 19 10), p. 
4 1, states the 72d to 75ýý, 91" and 0" were de-kilted. 
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had difficulty preserving their highland credentials. Although the majority of the 42 nd 
came from the highlands, there was a large infusion of lowlanders into its ranks. "' The 
92 nd was fortunate enough to have its second battalion raised from limited-service men 
from the highland counties of Nairn, Inverness, Moray, Banff and Aberdeen, which 
went on to supply recruits consistently to its sister battalion overseas with men 
principally from north of Inverness. " 
The de-kilting order was unpopular, and some of the de-kilted regiments sought 
to preserve their highland heritage, usually unofficially. In 1813, the 73d still had a 
piper who defiantly wore the Black Watch kilt (the regiment was originally raised as a 
second battalion of the 42d), which proved of great use in motivating the corps during 
its forced march across Germany. ' The in2 nd continued to use Scottish drumbeats, 
preserved many of its Scottish traditions, and like the 73d retained a piper. The 72 nd 
became a highland regiment again in 1823, and, along with the 73"d , 75 
th and 91 st, 
regained the kilt in 1881. -" Tbroughout this period, these regiments preserved their 
Scottish status, and this reflected the growing national identity of Scotland, which was 
increasingly centred on the image of the highlander. 
The example of the highland regiment demonstrates that territorial identity in the 
regulars was impossible to maintain during the period whilst the army still relied on 
voluntary enlistment. With a mobile population, recruiting in a particular district was no 
guarantee of obtaining locally bom men. The 2/32 nd recruited heavily in the Wells 
district (3 1% of its men enlisted there), but only 24% of its men were bom there. ' Even 
when men were raised by compulsion in 1803, the army had to balance the ideal of 
territorial regiments against the manpower demands of individual regiments, hence the 
56 Eric and Andro Linklater, The Black Watch: The History of the Royal Highland Regiment, (London, 
1977), p. 54. 57 LL Col. C. Greenhill Gardyne, The Life of a Regiment: The History of the Gordon Highlandersfrom its 
Formation in 1794 to 1816, vol. 1, (London, 190 1), pp. 113,345. 53 Linklater, The Black Watch P. 79. 
'59 Fairrie, A History of the Queen's Own Highlanders, p. 7. 60 W025/368. 
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6'h receiving limited-service men from Lancashire. Having received this draft from 
Lancashire, it continued to draw on its connections to Lancashire in order to preserve its 
strength. In the end the army was largely able to preserve national regiments, but could 
not maintain any more specific identities. Regimental titles were something that the 
army would aspire to, but could never fully achieve. Moreover, in particular cases 
regimental commanders did not want a strong territorial basis to their units: the 
commanding officer of the 2/28th requested some Scottish militia volunteers as they had 
many Irish recruits and he felt 'a mixture of Scotch would be advantageous to us. "" 
Me and Service 
The age of soldiers remained remarkably constant throughout the period in 
question. ' The average age of privates between 1807 and 1815 was twenty-eight, that 
of NCOs just over thirty-one; and the range for NCOs is only ten months (i. e. the 
difference between the highest and lowest amount halved), whilst that of the privates 
shows more variation with a range of twenty months. The figures for musicians have 
not been given as they varied considerably and were a small proportion of the army. 
Often they were boy recruits, and the unit had a small fixed establishment of them, so 
there would be an influx of boys into this category, who would then get older, until they 
were replaced with a new intake of boys. ' 
61 H050/407, Calvert to Beckett, incl. Belson to Adjutant General, 10 November 1807. 
62 See Table 12. 
6' For instance, between 1807 29% of musicians were under 18, in 1808 26% were under 18, in 1809 
20%, yet in 1810 only 9% were under 18. 
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Table 12: Averap-e aae of NCOs and Soldiers 
Year Average Age for Average Age for Difference I NCOs Privates 
I 
1807 30.9 27A 3.5 
1808 30.9 27.1 3.9 
1809 31.2 27.4 3.8 
1810 30.9 28.2 2.7 
1811 31.1 28.5 2.7 
1812 31.6 28.2 3A 
1813 31.6 28.6 3.0 
1814 31.5 28.3 3.2 
1815 32.5 29.6 2.9 
Average 31.3 28.0 3.3 
Source: W027 Sample. 
A comparison of the age groups of the privates and NCOs in Table 13 shows the 
remarkable demographic stability of the army between 1807 and 1815. Just over half of 
the army's privates were between twenty and twenty-nine years old, whilst over 60% of 
the NCOs were concentrated in the age band of twenty-five to thirty-four years old. 
There are small changes in the percentage of private soldiers in various age groups, the 
large number of eighteen and nineteen year olds in 1807 reflects the influence of 
Windham's drive to complete the second battalions in that year. However, the high peak 
of eighteen and nineteen year olds in 1814 is probably due to the sample, which has 
many second battalions and so is unrepresentative of the army in that year. The only 
detectable trend is the slight shift in the balance between eighteen to twenty-four year 
olds and the twenty-five to thirty-four age group. In 1807,42% of the army was aged 
eighteen to twenty-four, but by 1815 this proportion had shrunk to 26%, with the 
biggest shift occurring between 1809 and 1810 (38% to 33% respectively). Conversely, 
37% of the army was between twenty-five and thirty-four in 1807, which had risen to 
50% by 1815, the most dramatic change (excluding 1814 and 1815) occurred between 
1807 and 1808 when the proportion of soldiers aged twenty-five to thirty-four leapt to 
44%. 
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Table 13: The Percentage Privates of the Sample in each Ame Group by Ye 
Age 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 
1 
Average Group 
I 
Undcr 
is 
18-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55+ 
5.9% 5.2% 5.7% 4.61/o 3.6% 4A% 1-90/o 5A% 1.7% 4.3% 
9.6% 9.61/o 7.9% 7.61/o 7.9% 8.7% 6.5% 10.6% 4.0% 8.0% 
28.3% 28.8% 29.0% 25.1% 25.7% 23.9% 26.3% 23.1% 22.4% 25.8% 
25.5% 28.5% 26.4% 26.71/9 26. UYo 2620/a 28.70/a 23.0% 31.90/o 27. (r/o 
15.0% 15.0% 15.5% 18.6% 18.7% 19.61/o 18.90/0 18.0% 18.3% 17.5% 
8A% 7.7% 9.4% IO. Wo 10.1% 10.90/0 11.3% 11.7% 12.6% 10.3% 
4A% 3.1% 3.8% 4. (r/o 4.8% 4.1% 4A% 5.5% 5.9% 4A% 
2.0% 1.7% 1.7% 1.9% 2.3% 1.7% 1.6% 2.0'Yo 2.5% 1.9% 
0.7% OA% 0.5% 0.5% 0.7% OA% 0.4% 0.6% 0.7% 0.5% 
0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 
Sowre: W027 Sample. 
This shows that the recruiting standards were being upheld, and more 
importantly the balance between the army growing old (as it did in peacetime), or 
declining rapidly in age (when it recruited heavily) was being maintained, despite the 
demands made on the army recruitment. From the regimental books, the average age at 
enlistment was twenty-four, excluding boy recruits under sixteen. " 
The demographic stability of the army was achieved by a number of factors. 
Soldiers spent a few years in second battalions before being sent overseas, and so the 
average age of a first battalion was twenty-nine years and two months, whilst the age in 
second battalions averaged twenty-six and seven months, a difference of approximately 
two and a half years. Obviously, with an active army in the Peninsula, many of the 
twenty to twenty-nine year old soldiers (the age group considered best for active 
campaigning) would be killed or injured, but it also demonstrates that soldiers were 
going elsewhere. Some would have received discharges, most for ill health, especially 
during the disaster year of 1809, and some privates would of course become NCOs, but 
that might only extend their time in the army by a few more years. Others deserted, 
which is dealt with in Chapter 7, and some would have transferred back to second 
battalions when they became unfit, and eventually to the Royal Veteran and Garrison 
64 The standard deviation is six years. 
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battalions, which provided a few more years in the army before a soldier had to risk the 
vagaries of an army pension board. 
Given this turnover in manpower, the consistency in the demography of the 
army is more remarkable, and points to the importance of the militia volunteers. The 
average age of a small sample of militia regiments was twenty-eight in 1807 and 1809, 
dropping to twenty-seven in 1810. "1 These older men maintained the army in an almost 
perfect state with regards to age, and the volunteers from the militia account for the 
shifts in the percentage of the army's age groups between 1807 to 1808, and 1809 to 
1810, both periods of large militia transfers. 
The length of service of a soldier had a bearing upon the likely efficiency of the 
army. The longer soldiers served, the more likely the army would be able to perform the 
tasks set for it, and the more likely it would be that the soldier would break all ties with 
civilian society, and embrace his new home - the regiment. As with ages, the service of 
soldiers between 1807 and 1815 remained remarkably constant, 66 with privates 
averaging six years and four months service, and the average NCOs spending nine and a 
half years in the army. It does appear that the average service of a soldier was 
lengthening in the period, and although this is likely during a period when the army 
grew, it is difficult to reconcile with the casualty rates that the army was sustaining. 
This may simply reflect vagaries in the sample: although the data from the second half 
of the period includes some of the regiments in the Peninsula, the 1815 sample excludes 
the Waterloo regiments whilst including many of the old Peninsula corps still in north 
America. 
65 W027 SamPle, Militia Regiments. 
66 See Table 14. 
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Table 14: Averaze Years Servic"f--NC0s-4-ndPrhv-ates 
Year Average Length Average Length 
of Service of of Service of 
NCOS Privates 
Difference 
1807 9.4 5.6 3.8 
1808 8.4 4.8 3.6 
1809 9.1 5.8 3.3 
1810 8.9 6.0 2.9 
1811 9.5 6.8 2.6 
1812 9.2 6.5 2.7 
1813 10.3 7.3 3.0 
1814 9.9 7.0 2.9 
1815 11.4 8.6 2.8 
Average 9.6 6.5 3.1 
Source: W027 Sample. 
As with the ages, the information provided by the inspection returns is hampered 
because it is already grouped, making the average less accurate. An examination of the 
length of service for privates (as with ages, musicians have been ignored, and the NCOs 
followed a similar pattern, but with a few years more service) predictably shows a high 
concentration of privates, on average half, with up to four years service. "' The growing 
proportion of soldiers with five to nine year service during the latter half of the period is 
probably due to the militia volunteers. As they enrolled at specific times, and did so in 
large numbers of men, they affected the figures. Many of the militiamen the army 
received in 1807 and 1809 were still in the army by 1813 (i. e. they had served five 
years), and this also explains the relatively high proportion of soldiers who had served 
five to nine years in 1807, as these men were probably militia volunteers from 1799 and 
1800. 
The militia volunteers also affected the army without it being recorded. The 
militiamen's service before they volunteered was not counted in the inspection returns, 
which raises the possibility that these men had spent a longer time in the military than 
these figures suggest. Given the numbers of militiamen that volunteered into the line, 
67 See Table 15. 
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Table 15: Privates' Service by Year. 
Year Up to 4 years 5 to 9 10 to 19 20 to 29 30+ 
1807 55.7% 28.1% 14.5% IA% 0.3% 
1808 66.8% 20.9% 11.6% 0.7% 0.1% 
1809 58.1% 20.9% 20.0% 0.9% 0.1% 
1810 53.5% 24.2% 21.0% 1.2% 0.1% 
1811 50.3% 23A% 24.6% 1.5% 0.1% 
1812 49.5% 29.7% 19.8% 0.90/0 0.0% 
1813 39.6% 36.6% 21.9% 1.9% 0.1% 
1814 42.5% 32.9% 22.4% 2.0% 0.3% 
1815 27.1% 43.5% 25.2% 3.9% 0.3% 
Average 1 49.2% 28.9% 20.1% 1.6% 0.1% 
Source: W027 Sample. 
their influence on an overall estimate of the service of soldiers cannot be discounted. In 
1807, it is very unlikely that any militiaman had served less than four years, as after the 
militia was raised in 1803, there were no ballots until after the volunteering period. 
During the annual militia transfers, evidence suggests that militiamen usually had some 
service before they volunteered for the line. From the Sussex Militia recruits between 
1811 and 1814, only 6% had served less than a year in 1811, whilst 81% of those who 
volunteered had served over a year. By 1813 this trend had been reversed, with 51% of 
the volunteers having served less than a year (36% of all volunteers had served less than 
six months), whilst only 10% of those who transferred had served for at least two years. 
Between 1811 and 1813 the volunteers from the recruits had on average one year and 
two months service in the Sussex Militia, whilst those listed a parish men (presumably 
balloted) had three and a half years service. " These figures may be untypical, but they 
suggest that many militiamen who transferred from 1811 had some military training, 
This would mean that the privates' service in military forces would be higher than the 
six years and four months given above, maybe as much as another two years. 
The question of service is linked to the soldiers' ages. Subtracting the soldiers' 
service from the average age produces a rough guide to the age at enlistment. For both 
68 East Sussex County Record Office, LCW3/EW I, Casualty Returns, 1811-1814. 
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NCOs and privates the enlistment age is twenty-one. This does not correlate well with 
the average age of twenty-three from the regimental book examined (including boys, as 
the inspection returns do), but, as mentioned above, it is difficult to tell if the ages in 
these books refer to the age when enlisted, or the age when the book started. Men 
recruited in their early twenties were young enough to complete several years of active 
service, but not so young as to detract from the fighting capabilities of the army. This 
contrasts with France, where by 1814 the army was increasingly composed of teenage 
conscripts, the notorious 'Marie-Louises'. " This must have had an influence on the 
fighting capability of the army, because men of twenty or more with six years' service 
were undoubtedly better soldiers than boys of fifteen or sixteen who had only had a few 
months drill, especially given the physical demands of campaigning. Young soldiers 
were not physically equipped to withstand the strains of warfare, and if they became ill, 
would require replacement, so increasing the manpower demands. The age and service 
of the rank and file shows that the army was very finely balanced: any higher casualties, 
or the absence of the militia volunteers, may have resulted in catastrophic results for the 
British army. In the event the British army managed to maintain high standards in its 
recruitment, and this, alongside other factors, undoubtedly contributed to the spectacular 
performance of these men in the Peninsula. 
Occupations and Motives 
The occupations that the soldiers claimed or were reported as having before they 
joined the army are perhaps the most interesting, yet daunting, question in any study of 
the composition of any army. This is particularly so for the British army: its soldiers 
have often be labelled as criminals, or drawn from the lowest classes of society, but this 
judgement may not withstand detailed scrutiny. There were undoubtedly desperate 
characters in the army, such as a soldier of the 58th who was 
69 Forrest, Conscripts andDeserters, p. 36. 
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A notorious rebel and a man of so much influence that several of the soldiers of the 
battalion to which he belongs are understood to have been seduced from their allegiance by 
the effect of his persuasion or by his example. 70 
More revealing was a letter sent to a deserter of the 22 nd from his father, relating the 
latest exploits of 'Ned Ludd' in his home county of Nottinghamshire. "' 
In order to compare regiments, and make general observations on the class of 
men that joined the army, occupations have been classified. Unfortunately, there was no 
official contemporary classification of occupations, and the status of the occupations has 
only been crudely divided. The first breakdown of occupations is into wage earners 
(hereafter referred to as labourers), artisans, and retailers. This reflects the basic division 
between those who were employed and paid directly by others, those who had some 
degree of economic independence, and those who owned their own businesses. 
However, *during this period the status of artisans was becoming more diverse. Some, 
such as weavers were becoming part of a putting out system that was threatening their 
independence, yet those who were in other trades less threatened by technological or 
structural innovation, upheld their status. To reflect this diversity the artisan grouping 
has been ftirther divided in three categories of status, simply known as low, medium and 
high. These categories are not intended to reflect their wealth, but their position in 
society and in their respective trade, and in most cases their skill. ' A cabinetmaker 
would not consider himself an equal of a sawyer. By using a classification based on 
status, it makes comparisons easier than listing every occupation that has been found, 
and reduces the influence of economic geography, and local differences in titles. For 
instance, in the West Country woollen industry, the men who finished the cloth were 
71 known as shearmen, whilst in the West Riding of Yorkshire they were called croppers. 
The rank. and file of the army shows a high proportion of labourers, but equally 
70 W035/24, Irish Adjutant General to Calvert, 5 August 18 10. 71 HOSO/460, Taylor to Torrens, incl. Letter to 11ornas, Fox, II February 1812. 72 Wages were largely graded by skill anyway; Eric J. Evans, The Forging of the Modern State: Early 
Industrial Britah; 1783-1870, (London, 1996), p. 132. 73 See Appendix J for full list of occupations. 
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large is the presence of artisans, ' and in some cases they predominate. Such artisans 
cannot be called the 'scum of the earth'; they were men who once had some degree of 
economic independence, but had enlisted into the army due to particular circumstances. 
This is evident in the cases of the 3 rd Foot Guards and 2/6th , and reflects the areas from 
which the army recruited. The P Foot Guards recruited in the Nottingham district, and 
so their ranks were filled with men who were in the stocking weaving trade, including 
framework knitters (thus accounting for the large numbers of artisans in the regimental 
breakdown). Their status is well known, and it was changes in their working practice 
that led to the Luddite disturbances. The 2/6th, as seen earlier, received most of its 
recruits from the Manchester district, and so most of these men were weavers. During 
1807 and 1808 there was a strike in Lancashire by the weavers, and large numbers of 
weavers joined the army as the strike continued without any result: thirty-three weavers 
enlisted into the 2/6d' between I January 1807 and the end of 1808, out of a total of 
sixty-four recruits. The I` and 2/32nd recruited extensively in the West Country, 
explaining the large numbers of labourers in these units. The area's predominantly 
agricultural economy was stagnating, leaving large numbers of agricultural labourers 
without employment. For these men the army, and navy no doubt, were obvious choices 
to escape poverty. 
74 See Graph XII. 
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Gr4ph XII: Classification of Soldiers' 
Occupation 
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The economic motive is often ascribed as the sole reason why a man enlisted, 
and although the evidence about motive is rarely found anywhere, it can be inferred 
from other facts. The bounty was an attraction to the labourers and poor artisans who 
made up the army, but they neither automatically choose the closest recruiting party, nor 
the highest bounty. Very few soldiers' biographies mention the bounty. A Dorset 
Soldier was offered a bounty of sixteen guineas, which he thought a great deal of 
money, and took it believing that he 'would not want for money for a long time"', and 
Edward Costello asked how much bounty he would get, but he was more attracted to the 
uniform initially, " and most soldiers had other reasons for joining the army. 
The 50,000 men who chose to enlist in the militia were making an informed 
choice between an easy (but unexciting) service but low bounty, and a larger bounty and 
a more extensive (if glamorous) service. It is possible that these men were using the 
system of militia volunteering to gain two bounties, but the bounty was not the main 
concern of militiamen transferring to the line. They show more awareness of the 
75 Eileen Hathaway (ed. ), A Dorset Soldier: The Autobiography of Sergeant William Lawrence, 4e 
Regiment, (Staplehurst, 1995), p. 18. 76 Brett-James (ed. ), Military Memoirs of Edward Costello, p. 2. 
20 LD 3 FG 3& 4/1st 2/6th 2/32nd 
Regiment 
Sources: W025/285, /287, /314, /316, /329, /368; W067/1, /7, /14. 
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military system, and were more likely to enlist for limited terms of service than ordinary 
recruits, and the British regiments' volunteers were more likely to be on limited service 
than the Irish regiments, but Irish militiamen were less likely to choose limited service 
than even ordinary recruits for the line. " It may be that some married men were 
transferring from the militia, and so were unwilling to sign up for life, or perhaps, 
having spent more time in the armed forces, recognised the benefits of limited service. 
The mechanism for militia volunteering may have given potential recruits time for 
reflection, without the pressure of a recruiting sergeant, and the allure' of a larger 
bounty. Thomas Morris enlisted for limited service, despite pressure from the recruiting 
sergeant to enlist for life, because he thought seven years 'quite long enough for a 
trial", a sentiment echoed by George Calladine when he volunteered into the 19'h from 
the Derbyshire Militia. ' 
Table 16: Comparison of Percentage of Militiamen and Line Recruits who Chose Limited 
Service 
Year 1807 1809 1811 
British Militia 86% 78% 65% 
hish Militia 701/o 8% 4% 
Line Recruits 1000/0 27% 17% 
Sources: W01/904, Volunteers from the Militia, I July 1808; W01/904, Return of Volunteers 
from the Militia, 5 August 1809; W01/946, Abstract of Militia Volunteers, 21 September 
1811; W025/3224, Recruiting return 1807 to 1810,5 April 1811; W025/3225, Recnflting 
return for 18 10 to 1812,31 December 1812.1 
Recent research has suggested that a soldier's life was more attractive than 
civilian employment. The length of the Napoleonic Wars increased inflation and raised 
prices, but pay generally failed to match these increases. In such circumstances, the life 
of a soldier, with accommodation, food, regular pay (at least when stationed at home), 
basic medical care, chances of promotion, and possibly a pension, were incentives to 
enlist. ' Besides these benefits, there was 'a glitter in the life of a soldier unknown to 
77See Table 16. 78 John Selby (ed. ), Thomas Morris: The Napoleonic Wars, (London, 1967), p. 7. 79Maj. M. L. Ferrar (ed. ), The Diary of Colour-Sergeant George Calladine, 191h Foot, 1793-1837, 
(London, 1922), p. 11. 30 Bartlett, 'Ile Development of the British Army', Phl), pp. 131-138. One estimate cited by Bartlett 
gives a 65% increase in the cost of living. 
205 
every other profession', " and 'the roll of the spirit-stirring drum, the glittering file of 
bayonets, with the pomp and circumstance of military parade' inspired men, particularly 
young men, to enlist. Many envied the 'apparent freedom, the frankness and gaiety of 
an open-hearted soldier's holiday life. "' 
Personal circumstances often influenced soldiers to enlist. A manuscript 
biography of a soldier of the 38h details his journey to taking the bounty. After being 
apprenticed, and a pious youth (he could read by the age of six), his world fell apart 
when the Independent Chapel he attended split after the minister died. He was in an 
'agitated state' until sixteen when he moved to Leicester and, after a year there, he 
enlisted. " One soldier obtained a position in a theatre when his father became ill, 
horrifying his parents. To compound his humiliation he froze on his first night and the 
next day joined a recruiting party at Leith on its way to the Isle of Wight. " Stephen 
Morley transferred from the Army of Reserve after his pay-sergeant's wife made him do 
chores for her. " 
More often it was a desire for a more exciting life. Edward Costello lived with an 
old soldier who had fought in Egypt in 1801, and 'became red hot for a soldier's life, 
and although rejected as to [sic] young for the Regulars I "listed", ... , in the Dublin 
Militia. ' He later volunteered into the 951h . "" James Anton always wanted to be a soldier, 
but was rejected for the line, and eventually got into the 42 nd via the militia. " The 
Chelsea Pensioner who joined the cavalry was perhaps more typical, after taking the 
"profession of the quill', and then a watchmaker in London, 
It was in the month of January 1806, that happening to be on a stroll through Westminster, 
I forget with what ob ect in view, I was attracted by a huge placard on which was i 
emblazoned the figure of a light dragoon, mounted on a dashing steed and brandishing a 
a' The Veteran Soldier. An interesting Narrative of the Life and Religious Experience of the Late 
&rgeant Greenleigh, p. 26. 82 Memoirs of a Sergeant Late in the Forty-Third Light 83 .W 
Regiment, p. 12. 
84 
NAM, 7912-21, Memoirs of an Unknown Soldier of the 38 . 
85 
Constable (ed. ), Memorials ofthe Late Wars, (Edinburgh, 1828), p. 23-25. 
86 
Stephen Morley, Memoirs ofa Sergeant ofthe Yh Regiment ofFoot, (C=bridge, 1999), p. 6. 
87 
Brett-James (ed. ), Military Memoirs ofEdward Costello, p. 1. 
James Anton, Retrospective of a Military life, during the most Eveniful period of the late War, 
(Edinburgh 194 1), pp. 3,39. 
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sabre. I Nt a tap on the shoulder and looking round I was accosted, with a wink meant to be 
particularly knowing, by a swaggering blade of a light horseman in full fi of the very 
costume which I had been admiring. 
After the recruiter found out that he could write, he was soon 'under his fascination' and 
was enlisted. " 
Wanderlust appears particularly conspicuous in the accounts of some soldier's 
biographies, coupled with a desire to escape parental control, which eventually led them 
into the army. George Calladine was apprenticed as a framework knitter, and had a 
happy life, but he 'had an inclination for roving, so it came to my mind to enlist for a 
soldier. "" Joseph Donaldson often played truant at school and even tried to run away to 
Surinam when he was only thirteen. After the shock of a short time at sea, he returned to 
Glasgow, but one night walking home from school he met a soldier and asked to join 
the army. " Charles O'Neil was apprenticed to a carpenter, 'but the quiet habits, constant 
labour, - destitute of an exciting or romantic incident - of a mechanics life, ill suited the 
tastes I had already formed. "' 
Boredom was not limited to civilian life, and militiamen could find the 
excitement, and potential promotions, of the line alluring. James Hale volunteered from 
the North Gloucester Militia as 
There was no hopes of peace, I was rather inclined to extend my service, so that I might 
have opportunity of seeing some other country, for I was then quite 2 
tired of rambling about 
England, although the militia service is nothing but a mere pleasure. 9 
Similar feeling could influence members of part-time forces. Thomas Morris decided to 
leave the Loyal Volunteer of St. George's Middlesex after reading of 'the heart-stirring 
accounts of sieges and battles; and the glorious achievements of the British troops in 
Spain, following each other in rapid succession' which left him feeling ashamed of 
as Jottings from my Sabretache, p. 7. 89 Ferrar, The Diary of Colour-Sergeant George Calladine, p. 3. 90 Joseph Donaldson, Recollections of the Eventful Life of a Soldier, including the War in the Peninsula 
andScenes andSketchesftom Ireland, (Staplehurst, 2000), p. 3-34. 91 Charles O'Neil, The MilitaryAdventures of Charles ONeil, (Worcester, 185 1), p. 12. 92 James Hale, Jountal ofJames MIA late sergeant 9* Foot, (Cirencester, 1826), p. 5. 
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being only a part-time soldier. " 
Militiamen had to make a ftuther choice once they had decided to volunteer for 
the line of which regiment they wanted to join. Personal reasons were undoubtedly 
influential: some volunteers from the Derbyshire Militia volunteered for the 19 th 
because its depot was at Hull, and they 'wished to have a long march through the 
country. '" The militia volunteers preferred the light regiments, probably indicating that 
their martial reputation, or their progressive attitudes towards soldiers, was more 
important than joining particular county regiments. In 1809, the 2 nd West Yorkshire 
witnessed sixty-one men volunteer to the 43'd. thirty-nine to the 52 nd, fifty-eight to the 
68th, five to the 85th and thirty-four to the 95th; a total of 197 out of 313 who 
volunteered. Only two other regiments, the 2 nd and 50% received militiamen in large 
numbers from the 2 nd West Yorkshire. The Royal Camarvon Militia was trained as light 
infantry and consequently twenty-nine of its forty-six volunteers chose the 52nd , and 128 
men from the South Lincoln Militia joined the 95th, probably because they were 
stationed at Hythe barracks with them. The 95th was particularly popular in 1809 and by 
May, had attracted 1,286 volunteers. " 
Army recruits and militia volunteers took the decision to join the line for 
numerous reasons, of which their economic situation was only one. The Lancashire men 
recruited by the 2/6h in the Maidstone district ignored the numerous recruiting parties 
and regimental depots in London and the surrounding area, and were attracted by a 
recruiting party that championed their Lancashire roots. A Scottish soldier of the 71" 
specifically chose that corps because of its name, and because it already included so 
many of his fellow townsmen. ' In some respects, Windham's idea of making a bargain 
with a potential recruit materialised, but not in the way he envisaged. To some men, 
93 John Selby (ed. ), Thomas Morris: The Napoleonic Wars, pp. 2&5. 94 Ferrar, The Diary of Colour-Sergeant George Calladine, p. 10. 95 W01/904, Return of Militia Volunteers, 20 May 1809 % Vicissitudes in the Life of a Scottish Soldier, written by HimsetC, p. 2. 
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status was as important as money, a factor that the short-service scheme failed to 
address. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to describe the average soldier of the period 1807- 
1815, and despite the shortcomings of the samples, some conclusions can be drawn. The 
soldiers who fought under Wellington were in their mid-twenties, and already had six 
years' service behind them. The NCOs who were immediately in charge of them would 
be a few years older. Before a soldier joined the army he would possibly have been an 
urban artisan, or a rural labourer, and, in both cases, it was likely that he had moved 
from his home parish before enlisting. The regiment in which he served was probably a 
mixture of men from other parts of the United Kingdom but it usually had one 
nationality dominant although, on account of the recruiting party system, men could 
come from different areas. In essence, the army would fairly accurately represent the 
lower end of the British society, with a mix of young men from different locations and 
trades. 
The men that took the King's shilling often had several reasons for doing so, and 
were not always forced to join the army out of economic misfortune. A soldier's life 
was attractive to young men, particularly as the Peninsular War began to supply a stock 
of victories that glorified the humble rank and file (and the casualties from which 
opened up chances for promotion). During the Napoleonic Wars a cult of heroic 
endeavour developed which was not limited to patricians, nor even part-time 
volunteers; "' Charles O'Neil, amongst other reasons for enlisting, felt soldiering was the 
only choice for a young man because 'the fair young damsels of our dear island - were 
scarcely willing to regard any young man as honourable or brave, who did not enlist. ", 
It is unquestionable that there were desperate characters in the army, but it is incorrect 
97 Colley, Britons, pp. 320-321 98 Charles O'Neil, The Military Adventures of Charles 0 'Neil, p. 9. 
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to describe the entire army as such during the latter half of the Napoleonic Wars. In this 
context it is harsh to judge soldiers as those who did not fit easily into society. 99 
Migration was prevalent in the UK and not just a symptom of those who rejected 
society's strictures, and it is clear that the army (or militia) was a viable alternative to 
civilian life. As with many judgements on the British Army, the character of the post- 
Waterloo army has been projected back onto the 'Napoleonic army, which has 
prejudiced observations on the rank and file during this period. 
99 Cookson, British ArmedNation, p. 100. 
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Ch"ter 7: Deserters 
Introduction 
Desertion was a problem throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and 
was almost an accepted facet of European military life. ' Britain was no exception, and 
every year between 1807 and 1815 the Horse Guards witnessed 2.9% of the rank and file 
abscond from their units. But the problem was more serious than just the loss of soldiers 
from the ranks. For the military, it could cripple units at particular moments, drastically 
affecting the morale of a regiment, and generally damaged the reputation of the army. it 
also had wider implications on society, forcing deserters into crime, and implicating 
civilians in their illegal behaviour. Some civilians did this reluctantly, others were keen to 
help a 'runaway hero', Whilst there were those who saw the opportunity for profit. As 
desertion was a phenomenon of eighteenth-century armies, the problem in the UK had 
many similarities to desertion on the continent, but there were also peculiarities unique to 
Britain, which resulted in a very different approach from the policies of continental 
governments. This chapter will review the scale of the problem, the official policy on 
desertion and its implementation, the motivation of deserters, and the fates that befell 
them. 
ne Scale of the Problem 
Between 1807 and 1815 Britain lost an average of 5,574 soldiers a year from the 
regulars through desertion, added to which were desertions from the militia, totalling 
5,650 for 1811 and 1812, ' spiralling to 3,934 for 1813. ' To put the scale of desertion in 
context, 50,166 men deserted between 1807 and 1815,19.3% of all casualties; if the 
figures for 1807 to 1813 are examined (thus excluding the large number of discharges in 
1 For-rest, Conscripts and Deserters, p. 7; Andre Corvisier, Armies and Society in Europe, 1494-1789, 
(Bloomington, 1976), p. 179; Best, War and Society in Revolutionwy Europe, p. 33; J. C. R. Childs, 
Armies and Wwfare in Europe, 1648-1789, (Manchester, 1982), pp. 71-73. 2 Cj 1813-14, XL 312-33 1, Retum of death, discharges and desertions, CalveM 26 July 1814. 3 WO 162/326, Retum of Casualties from 25 December 18 12,17 February 1814. 
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1814 and 1815 that were counted as casualties), 33,906 men deserted, 21.3% of all 
casualties in the regulars. Out of every five British soldiers who were casualties in the 
Napoleonic Wars, one was a deserter. 
Desertion was a primarily a problem of the home army. In 1807 the army at home 
lost 5.1% of its strength through desertion, an amount that increased to 5.5% in 1808 and 
dropped to 4.0% in 1809,4 whilst the averages for the entire army were 1.9%, 2.2% and 
1.6% respectively. The home army suffered more desertions than the army lost through 
deaths in 1807 and 1808, and only in 1809, with the combination of the Corunna retreat 
and Walcheren fever, did deaths outstrip the rate of desertion fiom troops at home. 5 
These figures were nothing unusual. Of the total desertions from British troops in 
1810,73.6% occurred in the United Kingdom, figures that are repeated in 1811.6 
Although the percentage of desertions that occurred at home decreased in 1812 and 1813 
(to 61.4% and 55.5% respectively), the actual proportion of the home army that deserted 
increased. In 1810 one in twenty of the soldiers stationed in the UK deserted, roughly 
equal to the average for 1807 to 1813, but, by 1812, this had risen to 7.2%, and despite 
being reduced in 1813 to 6.3%, it was still above the average for the period! Worse was 
to follow: in 1814 total desertions increased by over half to 8,857 men, and a similarly 
high rate was sustained in 1815. ' Unfortunately no detailed returns exist of where these 
desertions occurred, but the UK must have suffered endemic desertion from troops 
stationed at home in these years. 
4 CJ, 1807, IV, 315, Return of deserters, AG, 10 August 1807; 1808, VII, 121, Return of Desertions and Effective Strength, 15 February 1808; 18 10, XIII, 435, Return of deserters, Calvert, 16 February 18 10. 3 The figures are 4.0% army died in 1807,4.1% in 1808, and 7.0% in 1809. 6 WO25/3224, Casualty return for 1810,15 November 1811; 3,459 desertions occurred in Britain, Ireland 
and the Channel Islands out of a total of 4,698; WO25/3225, Casualty Return for 1811 to 1813,24 
September 1813, WO162/326, Return of Casualties from 25 December 1812, AG's Office, 17 February 
1814; WO162/326, Number of Desertions from the Regular Army, 5 April 1814.3,631 desertions 
occurred in the U. K. from 5,026 in 1811 (72.2%), 3,632 from 5,918 (61.4%) in 1812, and 3,233 from 
5,822 (55.5%) in 1813. 7 Cj 
, 1807, IV, 315, Return of Dcsertionsý AG, 10 August 1807; 1808, VII, 12 1, Return of Desertions and Effective Strength, AG, 15 February 1808; 18 10, XIII, 435, Return of Desertions, AG, 16 February 18 10; 
18 13-14, X1,26 1, Return of Casualties 1803 to 18 12,13 November 1812; WO25/3224, Casualty Return 
for 1807 to 1810,5 April 18 11; Casualty Return for 18 10, AG, 15 November 1811; W025/3225, 
Casualty Return, for 1811 to 1813,24 September 1813. 8 WO162/326, Return of Casualties, 14 March 1815 &6 March 1816. 
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Within the UK there were variations. Ireland, both troops stationed there, and 
troops from there, had an unenviable reputation for desertion. " Detailed figures giving 
desertions in Britain and Ireland only exist for 1807, during which 6.2% of troops in 
Ireland deserted, compared to 4.6% in Britain. The Horse Guards believed there was a 
problem in Ireland, and so recruits for regiments with a battalion in Britain and Ireland 
were automatically sent to the battalion in Britain to reduce desertion. " Evidence justified 
this view. Some units suffered terrible rates of desertion in Ireland. Out of the worst ten 
corps in 1811, seven were stationed in Ireland (1/37d', 2/90th, 2/84thg 2/59tý 2/21", 2/32d, 
and 2/40ý). The 1/37cý lost 173 men that year, in 1812, by contrast, when it was sent to 
England and later Gibraltar, it lost only 36 men. The pattern was not consistent, however. 
In same year that the 1/37"h lost 173 men, there were 908 desertions from units stationed 
in Ireland for the entire year, from a total of 3,13 9 desertions from units with a presence in 
the UK given in the return, equating to 28.9%. The 1/5th had only twenty-six desertions 
during its stay in Ireland in 1811, slightly less than in 1813 when the unit travelled to 
England and then Spain. " 
An example of the variation in desertion is provided by the 60' Foot one of the 
Horse Guards' 'ideal' regiments as its first battalion served as part of the disposable force, 
whilst the second battalion remained at home recruiting and sending drafts to its sister 
battalion. When the first battalion was at home, it averaged losses of 3.2% of its strength 
per year due to desertion (with a range of 2.9%); while abroad, the battalion only lost 
0.8% a year on average through desertion. Ile second battalion averaged a loss of 4% of 
its strength a year by desertions. 12 This only abated when the battalion was sent to Jersey, 
which, though still part of the United Kingdom, was a military environment and difficult 
to escape from. 
9 One sixth of the Irish establishment deserted in 1780, Best, War and Society In Revolutionary Europe, p. 
33. 
10 W03/195, Calvert to Adjutant General of Ireland, 31 May 1808. 
11 
CJ, 18 13-14, X1,312-33 1, Return of Deaths and Desertions, 26 July 1814. 2 W017/104,259 and 274, Monthly Returns of 6dFoot. 
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The second major basis of desertion in the army was the foreign and colonial 
troops, particularly the former. The foreign corps' desertion rates were the reverse of 
those of the British units: foreign units stationed in the UK only lost 3.1% on average 
every year between 18 10 and 1812, much lower than the rates of British units in the UK. 
Whilst overseas foreign corps lost 2.5% per year, four times the average loss from British 
troops overseas. A detailed examination makes the contrast even more apparent. Between 
18 10 and 1813,61.2% of all desertions overseas were from foreign and colonial corps. In 
addition, desertions from all foreign and colonial units increased from 1.9% of their 
strength in 1809 to 3.3% in 1813.13 Every year desertions from these units increased by a 
third, comparing with an average yearly increase of 6.6% from British troops. 
Desertion from these units was unsurprising. As the war proved more protracted 
prisoners of war and deserters were increasingly used to fill their ranks, rather than the 
natives of particular areas as they had done when first formed. This policy was even 
encouraged by government, as it sought to increase the size of the army, 14 particularly in 
the Iberian Peninsula. But to the men who joined Wellington's army in this way, Spain 
was their 'home', from a point of view of desertion, they could easily leave units, and had 
the language and knowledge to be able to depart quickly from the area. " With army 
stragglers, brigandage, and an endemic lack of civil authority in some areas, a Spanish, 
French, German or Polish deserter in Spain could easily never be heard of again. it is 
indicative of the problem that Wellington refused to put foreign regiments on outpost 
duty, and even suggested that some of them be sent to the security of Gibraltar. Elsewhere 
in the Mediterranean the situation was even worse: from the Sicily command of the 401 
13 U, 1807, IV, 315, Return of Desertions, AG, 10 August 1807; 1808, VII, 121, Return of Desertions 
and Effective Strength, AG, 15 February 1808; 1810, X11,435, Return of Desertions, AG, 16 February 
1810; 1813-14, XI, 261, Return of Casualties 1803 to 1812,13 November 1812; W025/3224, Casualty 
return for 1807 to 1810,5 April 1811; Casualty Return for 18 10, AG, 15 November 1811; W025/3225, 
18 1 to 1813,24 September 1813. ýýer, 1who 
spoke Spanish, was able to desert from Wellington's army. See Andrew 
Pearson, The Autohiography ofAnthony Pearson: A Peninsular Veteran, (Edinburgh, 1865), pp. 88-92. 
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men who deserted in 1813, only four were British. ". ' 
Desertion in North America during 1814 and 1815 was the final major component 
of the levels of desertion from the British army. Desertion in 1814 and 1815 increased 
massively both from foreign and British troops, a phenomenon which may have been 
connected to the campaign in North America. The 1/0 lost thirty-three men by desertion 
in 1815, a very high level of desertion by its standards (unfortunately no comparison can 
be made with its strerigth). Whilst campaigning in Spain during 1812, only three men had 
deserted. The number of geneml courts martial held for desertion provides another index 
of the scale of the problem. During 1815, twenty-one were held in North America, three 
times the number in 1814, and prior to that from 1807- to 1813 only fifty-one courts 
martial were held for desertion in Canada, an aver-age ofjust over eleven a year. In 1815, 
only in Europe (i. e. France) were more courts martial held for desertion. " 
A deserter was not always a permanent loss to the army. Ibere was a chance that 
he would be recaptured, although no official statistics on this survive. But, the regimental 
monthly returns do give an entry for deserters returned. In the 15th Light Dragoons, 
between 1807 and 1815 102 men deserted, Whilst during the same period thirty-three men 
were returned to the regiment from desertion. In the 1/36cý thirty-seven out of eight-eight 
were recaptured, and the regiment's second battalion saw 105 out of 236 deserters 
brought back to their unit. "' Although these units' statistics might not be representative, 
they suggest that between a third and a half of all deserters were recaptured or gave 
themselves up, and returned to their corps. The last caveat is important, because not all 
recaptured deserters were returned to their regiments, some were to face the full force of 
military law, and others were sent to the army's specific penal corps. Moreover, some 
deserters may have re-enlisted and were never caught. Considering these factors, perhaps 
16 W0162/326, Number of deserters from the Regular Army at home and abroad during 1813,5 April 
1814. 
17 W092/1. 
18 15'h LD: W017/41,257,272,288; 36'h: W017/146,262,277,292. 
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as many as half all deserters escaped the army permanently. 
Official Policy on Desertion, and its Implementation. 
The obvious starting point to tackle desertion was to try to stop soldiers leaving 
units. To this end, the Horse Guards used the UK's small islands to hold troops, 
particularly the Isle of Wight, and to a lesser extent the Channel Islands. Any deserter, 
unless he was extremely resourceftd (and sometimes they were), would be automatically 
confined to a small area, and so the chances of recapture were much higher. Even the 
psychological effect of being surrounded by water could resign a soldier to accept his lot. 
But the Horse Guards made no attempts at understanding the problem, and so because of 
the potential drain on Britain's army and the damaging effects on morale, the official 
attitude to desertion was harsh. Any deserter faced the prospect of a general court martial 
that could impose the death penalty, and had a whole range of options from transportation 
to a penal colony to service abroad, whilst a soldier who deserted twice faced the prospect 
of being marked forever by a 'D' two inches below his left armpit. " Nor were these 
punishments theoretical. A deserter from the 374' was sentenced to 500 lashes and to be 
marked with the letter ID', and although the Prince Regent commuted the flogging, he 
was still branded. " General courts martial used the array of sentences at their disposal. 
Out of the 395 general courts martial held in this period, most culprits were sentenced to 
general-service (132, or 33.40/o), which usually meant unlimited service in one of the 
penal corps. But the second highest category of sentence was transportation for life (117 
men) to New South Wales. If the other sentences of transportation are included (for a 
limited period, usually seven years, after which they would be attached to the corps at that 
place), then the, total rises to 178 men, roughly half of all sentences. Other sentences 
included corporal punishment, prison, and ten deserters were sentenced to death. None of 
these death sentences, however, were carried out in the period; the monarch commuted 
19 47 Geo. 111, c32, sec. vi; Mutiny Act, 23 March 1807. 20 W03/159, Calvert to Deputy Secretary at War, 29 May IS 13. 
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these sentences to lesser punishments. 21 
This draconian level ofjustice was matched by increasing levels of supervision by 
the army. W-ith monthly returns and the bi-annual inspections, regiments with high levels 
of desertion could expect a demand for an explanation from the Horse Guards. In March 
1807, after carefid scrutiny of the monthly returns by the Adjutant-General's department, 
the 18th Light Dragoons, I/P. 1/8619,2/21'% 2/28d% 2/4& and 2/474h were all singled out 
because of their high rates of desertion in February. All the units were predictably in 
Ireland, and the 18'h Light Dragoons and 2/28th received more demands for explanations 
for their March returns. The Adjutant General also had the ignominy of asking the 
commander of the first battalion of his own regiment (the 14th) to explain the desertion 
rates in that corps. 21 The Horse Guards continued this practice throughout the period. 21 By 
1812 a return of every deserter had to be sent into the Horse Guards giving ftd1 details of 
the deserter, which was then compiled into detailed books, enabling the Horse Guards to 
keep a closer eye on desertion in particular corpS. 24 
The organisation of the UK into military districts gave the Horse Guards a 
permanent military presence that could be used to form parties to recapture deserters. 
James Berry, a deserter from the 25th probably thought he was safe whilst he was at sea, 
but when his ship berthed at Liverpool, a party was despatched to claim him. ' James 
Guttridge, a deserter from the Royal Wagon Train, also received a visit on board the 
Zealand, after orders were sent to the local general officer. 2" But it is easy to overestimate 
the state's power and the army did not use all the powers it had, nor did it have the 
manpower available to tackle desertion systematically. 
Military justice was never fidly applied to most deserters. As noted above, there 
21 W092/1. 
22 W03/193, Calvert to Adjutant-General in Ireland, 13 March 1807; Wynyard to Adjutant General in 
Treland4 17 March 1807. 
23 W03/45, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Cartwright, 31 March 1808 (on desertions from 3d and 4h Dragoons). 2A 52 Geo. 111, c 22, Mutiny Act, 20 March 1812. 25 W03/42, Calvert to Fisher, 23 March 1807. 26 W03.43, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Lord Forbes, 27 August 1807. 
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were just under 400 general courts martial between 1807 and 1815, including trials of 
militiamen, a tiny fraction of total desertions in the period. General courts martial took 
time to assemble, and could not process the sheer numbers of deserters. It is clear that 
military justice was being used selectively, -for exemplary purposes. In 1807 James 
Tbompson was considered 'a fit subject to be made an example of' after he deserted from 
the 55th, and confessed to desertion from the Ayrshire Militia. ' John McAnalty was also 
chosen as an example after he deserted 'from three services in a very short space of time. ' 
Remarkably, the trial eventually benefited him: he was sentenced to transportation as a 
felon, but pardoned by the King, because of his defence that he fell in with bad company 
who encouraged him to deserý and informed his officers that he was onboard a ship and 
wanted to be clairne1n Samuel Hulston was singled out for a trial as he had deserted from 
the Ayrshire Militia, twice from the line, and after commuting his sentence to service 
abroad, he then deserted from the Royal West Indian Rangers. Rather shrewdly, he gave 
himself up to the Ayrshire Militia, hoping his career in desertion would not be 
discovered. 21 
Underneath general courts martial there were finther layers of military courts that 
could try desertion. Garrison courts martial were instituted, but most deserters were 
probably dealt with at a regimental level. The Articles of War permitted regiments 
particular latitude in this respect, as the final section allowed regimental courts martial to 
try 'all disorders and neglects, which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the 
prejudice of good order and military discipline. "O This also gave the regiment alternative 
charges for deserters - usually absent without leave, thus, perhaps, hiding the true level of 
desertion in the army. There were limits to regimental authority, and when the 
27 W03/44 Wynyard to Lt. Col. Sir James Blair (OC Ayrshire Militia), 30 November 1807. 28 W03/45, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. Pigot, 7 April 1808. His trial was on the 24 April 1808 (W092/1), and 
the proceedings are in W071/213. 29 W03/46, Wynyard to Lt Gen. Somerset, 28 October 1808. The sentence of his general court martial 
was 500 lashes, W092/1. 30 G. A. Steppler, 'British Military Law, Discipline and the conduct of Regimental Courts Martial in the 
later Eighteenth Century', EHA 102 (1987), p. 863. 
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commanding officer of the Westmeath Nfilitia offered terms to a deserter, the Horse 
Guards informed the local general that the soldier was also a deserter from the West 
Indian Rangers. Calvert informed all involved that the sole power for offering terms 
resided with the King? ' 
Even at regimental level trials were probably infrequent for similar reasons that 
general courts martial were not held. In 1812 the Horse Guards suggested that deserters 
should either go to a battalion of their corps if it was at home, or to the army depot; 
regimental depots were neither secure nor offered much chance of sufficient officers 
being available to form a court-martial. " Consequently, many commanding officers gave 
captured deserters the chance to either accept service overseas, or take the chance of a 
trial that would probably inflict a higher penalty. James Flint was sent overseas, despite 
the Horse Guards' wish to try him, because of the inconvenience of assembling the 
necessary officers. " Such proceedings still needed the sanction of the Horse Guards, but 
they never refused an offer. 34 This option was regulated, and only permitted if the man 
was fit, had certified his willingness to commute, and was backed by the authority of a 
general officer, 31 thus ensuring that regimental officers did not abuse the system. The 
option was usually only offered if there were 'no circumstances of aggravation' that 
attended the desertion. 36 
Within these confines, the army used the threat of a trial, but often offered pardons 
to ensure that soldiers continued serving. The Horse Guards began recommending the 
practice to commanding officers. Lieutenant General Ludlow at Canterbury was informed 
that the deserter Henry Gaunt of the 2/90' would be pardoned if he transferred to a 
31 W03/196, Calvert to Bgd. Gen. Taylor, 4 January 1809. 32 W03/158, Calvert to Merry, 24 April 18 12. 33 W03/42, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. Pigot, 30 January 1807. 34 For instance W03/45, Wynyard to Lt. Pen. Mackenzie, 27 May 1808, informing him that IIRII Duke 
of York approved of Edward Doran (2n Dragoon Guards) serving abroad rather than having a trial; 
W03/195, Calvert to OC Army Depot, 26 August 1808. 35 W03/47, Calvert to Lt Gen. Tarleton, 17 November 1808. If he was a deserter from the militia, it also 
required the consent of his Lord Lieutenant. 36 W03/49,28 September 1809. 
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regiment overseas? " When in 1809 George Pardy of the 7h Light Dragoons was informed 
that he could either serve abroad with the infantry, or take the chance of a court martial 
for the crime of repeated desertion, it was clear that the court martial's sentence would be 
much harsher. 18 From 1812 it became official policy to try to persuade deserters 'to 
volunteer for Service Abroad, instead of taking their trial, and that when their consent can 
be obtained, they are generally sent out of the country', " and from then on a system 
developed for the treatment of deserters. Initially all deserters were sent to the army 
depW' but later their fitriess was tested at the nearest military station, so it could be 
quickly decided if they were to go to their regiments, or sent to the army depot for service 
abroad or be discharged. " By 1812, any deserter travelling across the country had to have 
papers which explained whether his punishment was commuted to general-service, if he 
confessed, or if he was sentenced to service abroad, so that on arTival at the army depot 
the commandant there could dispose of him accordingly and quickly. " 
Reducing the use of trials, and sending most deserters on foreign service suited the 
Horse Guards. The army had no wish to lose men through punishments that would 
certainly discourage deserters from returning, and probably exacerbate the problem. 
During the trial of W`illiam Jones witnesses repeatedly reported that Jones said that if he 
was punished he would desert again. " Calvert was reluctant to sanction the branding of 
soldiers, despite the fact that it was permitted by the Mutiny Act. " Furthermore, the 
government was reluctant to punish men who had deserted for a long time, particularly if 
they were old or of no use to the army. A deserter from the P was caught in Lincoln in 
1807, after fourteen years, but was 'very ruptured' and so was discharged. 43 In the same 
37 W03/46, Calvert to U Gen. Ludlow, 10 August 1808; see also W03/46, Calvert to Maj. Gen. 
Whetimm, 19 September 1808. 
38 W03/49, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. Burrard, 27 September 1809. 39 W03/158, Calvert to Deputy Secretary at War, 13 April 1812. 40 W03/158, Darling to Deputy Secretary at War, 12 September 1812. 41 W03/158, Calvert to Deputy Secretary at War, 10 December 1812;, W03/159, Calvert to Deputy 
§pcretary at War, 4 February 1814. 42 W03/158, Darling to Deputy Secretary at War, 10 September 1812. 43 W07 I t216, Trial of William Jones, 15th Foot, 9 January 1809. 44 W03/48, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Cockburn, 22 July 1809. 45 W03/155, Deputy Adjutant General to Moore, 24 August 1807. 
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year another man who deserted in 1793 was caught, and also given a discharge, and, in 
1814, a deserter from the Army of Reserve who was 47, and had rheumatic pain in his 
head and breast, was also discharged. ' Hugh Martin, a deserter ftom the 47th, was only 
41 considered fit for garrison duty, and so was discharged. In 1810, during a deserter 
amnesty, all unfit deserters were given a discharge because it was 'unnecessary and 
inexpedient to burden the Garrison Battalions with men of that description. " So Patrick 
and Hugh Graham, both of the 94th, escaped any kind ofjustice because of the ulcers that 
both of them had. "" 
As with much of military justice, each judgement took account of the 
circumstances and the character of the deserter, which resulted in an apparent lack of 
consistency. Whereas the army wanted a deserter from the Army of Reserve who was 
caught in 1811 to serve, if it was legal, " it required that a man who was feigning 
rheurnatism in Colchester jail should be sent to the army depot and thereafter embarked 
for the first battalion of his regiment overseas. " It decided that a deserter from the 
Coldstream Guards should be ordered on overseas service if he was fit enough, " and 
required that Anthony Pearson, a deserter fi-om the 2/24"', who was only fit for garrison 
duty, should also be embarked for overseas service in the 3 rd Garrison Battalion at 
Malta. '2 
The army's manpower demands meant that the Horse Guards were keen to keep 
men in uniform. If the deserter's case was simple, or he surrendered himself, he was often 
returned to the regiment A deserter from the 68th was sent back to his regiment and 
ordered to be treated with leniency as he had 'no circumstances aggravating his case', and 
46 W03/155, Wynyard to Moore, 29 October 1807; W03/159, Darling to Deputy Secretary at War, 12 
August 1814. 
47 W03/158, Calvert to Merry, 21 September 1812. 48 W03/198, Calvert to Bgd. Gen. Taylor, 30 January 1810; W03/49, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Vyse, 6 January 
1810. 
49 W03/157, Wynyard to Merry, I May 1811. 50 W03/157, Calvert to Deputy Secretary at War, 25 March 1811. " W03/158, Wynyard to Deputy Secretary at War, 28 November 1812. 52 W03/159, Calvert to Deputy Secretary at War, 22 May 1813. 
221 
a deserter from the I Vh Light Dragoons received similar treatment. " Most deserters were 
allowed to commute their punishment to service abroad. A deserter from the 84h was 
sentenced to join the regiment's battalion overseas,, ' as was Jason Mills, a deserter from 
the 4h Dragoon Guards, --' and a recruit deserter was embarked for the 211 " in India. ' This 
created some interesting dilemmas for the army. Deserters from the V Foot were initially 
sent to the first battalion in the West Indies as punishment" but the Horse Guards soon 
changed this policy. A suggestion to send culprits from the Foot Guards to the 1/1' was 
refused, ` and after some consideration it was decided that 'it never ought to be considered 
a mark of disgrace to be removed to another battalion of the regiment. '" When six 
deserters were attached to a detachment of the 2/89h going to the first battalion in India, 
this almost certainly affected the morale of those who had chosen to serve in the first 
battalion. ' When a deserter from the 1/4th agreed to serve abroad, as the battalion was 
under orders, Calvert suggested either a different punishment, or offered to send him to 
another regiment. " To avoid these situations, it became increasingly prevalent to send 
culprits to colonial corps, specific penal units, and the East India Company's army. 62 
The numbers of deserters and other criminals led to the creation of specific penal 
corps of selected (i. e. young) men from the prison ships (the Royal African Corps, Royal 
West Indian Rangers, the York Light Infantry Volunteers, and later the York Chasseurs). " 
They provided a usefid addition to an over-stretched army. After an order to tum over all 
'disposable deserters' in the prison ships at the army depot in 1807, " 551 men were taken 
33 W03/157, Calvert to Merry, 30 April 18 10; W03/157, Calvert to Merry, 21 May 1811. "4 W03/157, Calvert to Merry, 7 January 1811. 
55 W03/157, Calvert to Merry, 4 January 1811. 
56 W03/159, Calvert to Deputy Secretary at War, 24 July 1813. " W03/43, Calvert to Kent, 5 May 1807; W03/197, Calvert to Lt. Col. Barlow (Army Depot), 5 May 
1807. 
53 W03/193 Calvert to Lt. Col. Barlow, 2 May 1807. 59 9 W03/44, Wynyard to Kent, 20 October 1807. 
60 W03/45, Wynyard to Maj. Gen. Whetham, 13 April 1808. 
61 W03/45, Calvert to Bgd. Gen. Clinton, 2 May 1808. 
62 W03/195, Wynyard to Taylor, 26 November 1808; W03/198, Wynyard to OC Amy Depotý 19 April 
1810. 
6'woin74, Williams to Sir George Shee, 17 February 1807; WOI/638, Gordon to Stewart 28 June 
1808; W03/158, Calvert to Merry, 13 February 1812 (for 103 rd 
64 W03/193, Calvert to OC Army Depot, 9 July 1807. 
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from the hulks to join the Royal West Indian Rangers. " Later, in 1808,138 prisoners 
were selected from Woolwich and Portsmouth for the Royal York Rangers. " In 1809 
more deserters were chosen for the newly formed Royal African Corps; until its 
establishment of 800 rank and file was complete, all deserters arriving at the army depot 
were attached to the corps. ' They were then usually sent to the most inhospitable 
garrisons, where there was little chance of escape again. Before they even got to their new 
stations, they were treated with suspicion; they were sent to the army depot (and still 
classed as deserters until they reached there), " and then to the Channel Islands or the 
Scilly Islands, all bases that were difficult to escape from. "' 
However, disposing of large numbers of deserters in this way caused its own 
problems. The prison hulks in the Medina on the Isle of Wight were constantly 
overflowing, and new ships were bought to increase the capacity there. " Some of the 140 
recruits from the prison hulks that joined regiments in the West Indies and Africa had 
been in prison for three or four years. " In 1812 deserters could no longer be sent to the 
Isle of Wight as the hulks could not accommodate them, whilst repeated applications were 
made for them to be shipped overseas by the Transport Board. ' In 1813 it was suggested 
that a new corps for the Cape of Good Hope be formed from commuted deserters, as there 
were 4-500 at the army depot. " By 1815 there were 746 convicts and deserters which the 
Horse Guards desperately wanted to send to the Mediterranean and the West Indies, 'The 
prison ships in the Isle of Wight being in such a crowded state as to render it most 
desirable to be relieved from these men. " By May 1815,1,024 deserters and culprits 
65 WOI/635, Gordon to Cooke, 25 July 1807; W06/133, Stewart to Gordon, 20 January 1808; Gordon to 
Stewart, 9 April 1808. 
66 W03/45, Wynyard to Bgd. Gen. Fraser, IS March 1808. 67 W03/197, Calvert to OC Army Depot, 2 August 1809; Wynyard to Taylor, 26 August 1809. 68 W03/155, Wynyard to Moore, 17 March &5 April 1808. 69 WO 1/634, Gordon to Cockburn, 2 March 1807, suggesting depot on the Sicily Isles. 70 WOI/639, Jwnes Taylor to Gordon, 18 July 1808, asking for the Buffalo, an ex-transport, Gordon to 
Stewart; WOI/638,28 June 1808, the Dido was over capacity. 71 W06/133, Stewart to Gordon, 20 January 1808. 72 W03/158, Darling to Deputy Secretary at War, 23 October 1812, & 27 October 18 12. 73 WO 1/657, York to Bathurst, 18 October 1813. 74 WOI/660, Torrens to Bunbury, 20 May 1815. 
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were sent to regiments overseas, " and, by December, they were joined by 500 more sent 
to the East Indies. ' 
There was one fmal factor that contributed to the army's apparent lack of fu=ess 
towards desertion: the difficulty in capturing, identifying and prosecuting deserters. One 
obvious method was to send a NCO who knew the deserter to find him, but even this 
could prove difficult. The author of Jouings from my Sabretache was sent on such a 
mission. Attired in civilian clothes made by the regimental tailor, his only clue 'was two 
dashing London fernale acquaintances'. He waited at their house until the deserters 
visited, and then stowed away in their carriage. When they alighted at Whitechapel, he 
attempted to follow them, but soon had no sight of them. " 
Guildford, a military town on the main route from London to Portsmouth, 
provides a snapshot of the desertion problem. John White claimed he had been discharged 
from the 7th Royal Veteran Battalion, and had left his discharge papers with a friend, but, 
after being confronted by a private of his old corps (the 9d' Light Dragoons), he 
confessed. ' John MacGuire, a deserter from the 1/19'h, had the misfortune to come across 
the soldier who enlisted him two years before, albeit when he used the alias of John 
Collins. " Inevitably many cases in the town were not this simple, and one deserter had the 
nerve to let the authorities prove his guilt, which meant a series of voluminous 
correspondence between the local magistrate, the War Office, the regiment's agent, and 
the prisoner's commanding officer. John Edmunds of the 21" Light Dragoons told the 
local magistrates, under oath, that he had a furlough from his commanding officer to 
attend to some business. He could not complete his affhirs before the furlough expired, 
but applied to his Colonel to prolong it, and went to see some friends at Stratford. On his 
way back he had lost the furlough somewhere between Petersfield and Guildford. The 
75 W03/160, Darling to Deputy Secretary at War, 26 May IS 15. 76 W03/16 1, Calvert to Deputy Secretary at War, 15 December 1815. " Jottingsfrom my Sahretache, pp. 114-115. 78 SHC, BR/QS/5/25, Oaths of John White and George Nethercotty, 5 February 1808. 79 SHC, BR/QS/5/25, Information of Nathaniel Lening, 21 December 1808. 
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man who arrested him believed him to be a deserter, and so the War Office had to check 
with the commanding officer to corroborate his story. " James Walker, who was in the 
Royal Military Artificers for nineteen years, had returned to the UK from Gibraltar with 
three other men who were to be discharged because they were unfit. Whilst in a public 
house the other three men left him, taking the furlough for all of them. He was later 
arrested as a deserter in Guildford because he had no furlough. " Thomas Crabtree of the 
2nd West Yorkshire Militia was apprehended in the town by a corporal of the P Foot 
Guards, but after reference to the lieutenant colonel, Toffe, it transpired that he was 
provisionally enlisted and on his way to his regiment. ' 
' This pattern was repeated throughout the LJK. Thomas Fitzgibbon, a deserter from 
the 1/62'd. was sent to the army depot, where, if he was recognised by anyone there, he 
was to be tried, otherwise he would go out to the battalion in the Mediterranean! ' Patrick 
Skinner was confmed at Winchester gaol as a deserter, but as well as ordering an 
investigation into the prisoner, Calvert also wanted inquiries to be made into the person 
whose evidence had led to his arrest. " At the court martial of James Higgins, alias Clarke, 
it was decided that he had never enlisted, and the Commander in Chief felt duty bound to 
remunerate the accused for his fourteen-month stay in prison. "' 
These problems stemmed from the lack of comprehensive details about individual 
soldiers. James, alias William, MacDonald was released, although he was suspected of 
being a deserter, as all the Horse Guards could ascertain was that he had enlisted while 
unfit in the 75'h, not in itself a crime. " Tbree men in 1815 had not joined their regiments 
at home, but Calvert could not be sure that they were deserters as they could have joined 
other battalions of their regiments. "' False accusations and mistakes were inevitable with 
so SHC, BR/QS/5/24, Oaths of John Edmunds and Jonathan Benson, 28 November 1807. - 81 SHC, BR/QS/5/26, Confession of James Walker, and oath of John Tucker, 21 June 1809. 82 SHC, BR/QS/5/29-31, Oath of Cpl. John Garron; Merry to Town Clerk Guildfbrdý 9 September 1813. 83 W03/157, Wynyard to Moore, 14 September 1809. 84 W03/43, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Sir James Craig, 2 July 1807. 83 W03/159, Calvert to Deputy Secretary at War, 2 August 1813. " W03/158, Darling to Merry, 28 September 1812. 87 W03/160, Calvert to Deputy Secretary at War, 7 March 1815. 
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a decentralised army bureaucracy. Two men who were thought to be deserters had to be 
sent back to their homes, as they were falsely apprehended, "' and, after five months in 
prison, Patrick Roch was sent back to Ireland with five guineas, as there was no evidence 
of him being a deserter from the 2d. "" In such circumstances, it is unsurprising that the 
army relied heavily on confessions. Out of the nineteen deserters arrested in Guildford, 
twelve confessed, thus drastically reducing the workload of the local authorities and the 
War Office. " 
The desire to deal with deserters quickly led to the army encouraging deserters to 
surrender. Although Calvert explicitly stated that 'no terms can possibly be entered into 
with a deserter, ' he afterwards added to the local general who had received a message 
from a deserter that if he surrendered himself, 'HRH will be disposed to take his case into 
favourable consideration'. " Morgan Morgan also received a similar assurance that he 
would get a discharge, under terms not specified, if he surrendered. 9' Sir David Dundas 
during his tenure as commander in chief did not alter this policy, but at the same time 
assured one deserter that if he surrendered he would be treated leniently. " Typically, the 
troublesome Royal Dukes who were colonels exceeded their authority. Wynyard had to 
reprimand the Duke of York's brother Cumberland after he had tried to discharge a 
deserter before he had even given himself up. 9' 
The government was also unwilling to use authoritarian methods to capture 
deserters. The commander of the depot of the 19'h suggested that the mail of a deserter's 
parents should be intercepted to locate him, as it was thought that he was making his way 
to the USA. However, the Home Office replied that it was 'by no means a case in which it 
would be proper to have recourse to the measure suggested. "' There was also the problem 
88 3/157 Wynyard to Merry, 16 July 18 10. 89 t 
3/158, Calvert to Merry, 28 November 1811. 90 SHC, BR/QS/5/24-3 1, papers on deserters, 1808 to 1815. 91 W03/44, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Pigot, 5 September 1807. 92 W03/45, Wynyard to Gen. Norton, I February 1808. 93 W03/49, Calvert to Lord Somerset, 25 Augsut 1809. 94 W03/45, Wynyard to Cumberland, 7 March 1808. 95 HO50/422, Lawrence (OC 196's Depot) to Secretary at War, 31 October 1811; 11051/172, Beckett to 
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of escorting deserters across the country, and inevitably some men escaped again. " 
To alleviate the problem of deserters periodically general pardons were issued, 
allowing them to rejoin their regiments without reprisals, demonstrating the government's 
overriding need for men above its desire to uphold the law, and the difficulty of a 
cighteenth-century state in catching deserters. During the crisis of 1815, all men who 
returned to their regiments before the 20 July were pardoned, and sent to their regiments 
at the earliest opportunity. 97 in autumn 1807 it was suggested that a pardon be offered 'to 
a number of deserters who have concealed themselves ... in the western part of Ireland"" 
and, in 1813, a pardon was again offered to deserters in Ireland because it was 'almost 
impossible to apprehend them in the usual mode. '" But the 1808 proclamation warned 
that after the expiration of the pardon 'the most vigorous measures will be adopted to 
apprehend and punish those who do not accept RM's pardon'; in future the Ilue and Cry 
was to be sent to parish officials, and descriptions of deserters were stuck up in 
conspicuous places in parishes, thus preventing 'deserters from returning to their homes 
and imposing on their friends and family. "' These pardons were not fully understood, 
and some men of the Royal York Rangers tried to claim them. "' It is symptomatic of the 
failure of the army to address the problem that pardons were offered in 1809 and 1815. 
However, given the restraints on Britain's manpower, the army judged it better to 
encourage deserters to surrender, than to hunt them down with any degree of vigour. 
The Deserters 
The reasons why desertions were not treated in a uniform manner across the army 
derived from the differing motives and the variable opportunities of the potential deserter. 
A soldier obviously needed strong reasons to leave the army and risk the punishment if 
96 W03/155, Wynyard to Moore, IS December 1807. 
97 H050/43 1, Palmerstone to Sidmouth, 22 May 1815; W03/160, Memo, Assistant Adjutant General, 29 
July 1815. 
98 H051/171, Beckett to Gordon, 25 September 1807. 99 H051/172, HO to Torrens, 15 February 1813; Beckett to Torrens, 2 April 1813. '00 H050/409, Calvert to Beckett, 17 June 1808. 10' W03/46, Wynyard to Bgd. Gen. Whetham, 27 June 1808. 
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caught, but these motivations had to contend with the differing circumstances of each 
individual. 
Contemporaries believed that desertion was principally caused by the bounty. 
Windham's reforms were meant to address this problem and reduce desertion because the 
bounty was smaller, desertion, he believed, 'did not proceed so much from the desire to 
get fi-ee from the restraints of a soldier's life, as from the temptation of a fresh bounty in 
another corps. "" But the desire to leave the army did exist and three categories of 
desertion can be discerned: those who enlisted as recruits and then deserted -a response to 
the initial shock of a regimented life style; those who absconded aficr some service, 
disgruntled with officers, conditions of service, or for a host of personal reasons; and 
those who were tempted into desertion by the offer of bounties elsewhere. All three could 
lead to repeated desertion. 
Recruit deserters were the major problem for the army. It was estimated that one 
in ten recruits deserted; " if this were true, approximately 1,250 deserters per year were 
recruits, accounting for one fifth of desertions. Of the deserter returns sampled from 1812 
onwards, 14% of deserters left within a month, and within a year 54% of desertions 
occurred. "' Desertion from recruiting parties was considerable, but as they did not get the 
full bounty money until they arrived at the regimental headquarters, the financial impact 
was lessened. It was for this reason that recruiting at headquarters was criticised, as the 
recruit got all his levy money, and could then leave. "' This was the problem with recruits, 
they had just received what to them was a large sum. of money, yet oflen had a 
considerablejourney before they reached their regiment. 
The desertion of recruits is easy to understand. Many innocent men, who took the 
King's shilling, had their expectations raised by the recruiting sergeant, yet found the 
102 W01/637, York to Castlereagh, 22 January 1808. 103 WO 1/637, York to Castlereagh, 22 January 1808. 104 W027/2906-2907. The regirqents sampled are I'& 2nd Dragoon Guards, 7h- I O'h Light Dragoons, I/I 
Foot Guards, 2nd e, 2/36tý 42ný 2/88'h. 105 9 WOI/I 115, E. B. Littlehales to Sir George Shee, 14 March 1807. 
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reality of life in the army vastly different fi-orn their hopes. In the remarkable story of 
Charles O'Neil (who deserted twice and enlisted in three different regiments yet was 
never caught), he recounts his burning desire for the life of a soldier, fuelled by stories of 
adventure, but after he joined the 8d' at Belfast, the 'rigid life of discipline baulked, 1 
especially as he had enlisted to escape the constraints of home. It was now the excitement 
of desertions that enthralled him: 'The very romance connected with the undertaking, and 
the thrilling interest that existed in listening to these adventures, strengthened in my mind 
my desire to share in their experience. ' However, it was a punishment for a breach of 
discipline, when he felt he was innocent, which determined him to leave. " 
More common was homesickness, exacerbated in some cases by disobeying their 
parent's wishes. Sergeant Greenleigh recollected 'the dagger that pierced me to my heart' 
because he had rebelled against his parents wishes and enlisted. " A sergeant of the 43d 
described his first night in barracks shortly after he enlisted: 
[my] memory began to be busy. I could not help thinking of the peaceful fire-side I had 
left; and in despite of my most vigorous effort to shake off the intrusion, conscience would 
not be denied, and the image of my mother, descried at her utmost need, and pinched perhaps 
by want, was a source of great uneasiness. But having passed the Rubicon, retreat I knew 
was out of the question. 108 
Thomas Morris also had a similar experience in his first few nights, and like the 
sergeant of the 43"d, felt he could not go back. " For many, the temptation was too 
much, and like Charles O'Neil, they returned home. 
To tackle the problem of recruits deserting, the army reduced the opportunities 
they had to abscond. Recruits were closely supervised, and the time they spent travelling 
overland was reduced. The overall aim was to remove a recruit from familiar 
surroundings as quickly as possible. For instance, recruits for the 20", 32 nd , 38th , 61 
", 
72 nd p 70h, and 90'h from the north west of England were sent to their regiments in Ireland 
106 Charles O'Neil, The Mililwy Adventures of Charles ONeil, pp. 19-20. 107 The Veteran Soldier. An Interesting Narrative of the Life and Religious Experience of the Late 
&rgeant Greenleigh, p. 28. '08 Memoirs of a Sergeant Late in the Forty- Third Light Infantry Regiment, p. 14. 109 John Selby (ecl. ), Thomas Morris: The Napoleonic Wars, pp. 7-8. 
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via Liverpool, not the army depot. "' There were also specific'problem areas that needed 
separate treatment, particularly Ireland and London. Irish militia volunteers for the line 
were not allowed to join corps in Ireland because they could easily desert from thern, ' " 
and so the single battalion regime nts in Ireland were shipped over to Britain allowing 
Irish militiamen to join them there, "' and recruits for other regiments were sent to the 
army depot and shipped to their battalions overseas at the earliest opportunity. 111 It was 
suggested that the recruiting districts in Ireland had to be changed as the Limerick district, 
though the smallest, had the highest desertion rates. Limerick was in a disturbed state after 
the rebellion, and a recruit from there had to march up to sixty miles to the nearest port, 
giving him ample opportunity to reconsider his situation and leave the army. "' The 
answer for London, and later the whole south east, "' was to establish a depot at Tilbury 
fort; from which recruits were shipped to the army depot. The fort was used in this way 
temporarily in 1807, and proved so effective in reducing desertion that it was given a 
permanent staff. 1 16 The need to address desertion in London was heightened by the 
re-introduction of unlimited service, and higher bounties, which would increase 
desertion. ' 17 Shipping recruits became standard practice; in Ireland a depot was 
established at Cork, and in Scotland at Leith for the transport of recruits by sea. "' As 
ships could move men over large distances with little chance of desertion, many of the 
soldiers were sent on to the army depot on the Isle of Wight, another difficult place to 
escape from. 
Deserters who absconded after some service left few records, and most 
disgruntled long serving soldiers were more likely to express their emotions through 
110 W03/585, Darling to receiving officer at Manchester, 6 May 1812. 1 11 H051/172, Beckett to Torrens, 5 July 18 11 - 12 W03/585, Darling to York, II April 1811. The regiments were the 20'h, 37'h, and 76h. 113 W03/585, Circular, by Calvert, 18 November 1811; Darling to Taylor, 13 April 1812. 
114 WOI/643, Calvert to Bunbury, 26 March 18 10, incl. Clinton to Adjutant General. 115 W03/584, Wynyard to IFOs of London, Maidstone, Ipswich and Bedford districts, 5 December 1808; 
Calvert to Taylor, 20 August 1808. 
"6 W03/154,30 April 1807, Calvert to Moore; W03/584, Calvert to Carew, 16 May 1808; Calvert to 
Midgely, I July 1808. 
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1808. 
1 "' W031584, Calvert to Taylor, 27 August & 26 September 1808. 
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drunkenness or unruly behaviour. "' Institutionalised soldiers were more likely to accept 
their lot, and looked forward to their pension. Some soldiers, however, were desperate to 
leave the army. James Anderson, a deserter from the 71". cut his Achilles tendon so he 
could get a discharge, "O and Paget Bailey, despite recovering from a shot wound inflicted 
while he was trying to escape his escorting party, escaped again from his hospital bed at 
Haslemere. "I Two men deserted from Guernsey, and arrived in a boat at Winchelsea, 
where they pretended to have been prisoners of war escaped from France. Whilst the War 
Office was investigating, they promptly deserted again. " The trial of Thomas Housley of 
the 36h is a little morr, difficult to interpret. He claimed that whilst drunk and visiting his 
wife shortly after enlisting, his wife cut two fmgers from his right hand, an act for which 
she freely claimed responsibility. She announced to the sergeant who arrested Housley 
that 'she would cut his throat before he should serve as a soldier', and Housley appeared 
'Well contented' to him. But in his defence Housley hoped the court would allow him to 
serve, indicating that his wife was not saving him from the accusation of maiming 
himself The court decided to give Housley his wish, probably intending to be rid of the 
gruesome case as quickly as possible. " 
Dissatisfaction with the service inevitably led to some men to desert. George 
Callaghan of 2/67"' deserted from hospital, and persuaded a comrade to join him because 
where they were stationed at a 'dear place' and there was 'a great difference from the 
regiment we had both left together'. As Callaghan knew how to handle a boat, he 
proposed that they go to France where they could live well. The only reason the pair gave 
for deserting was cheap living. 114At the court martial of a deserter from the 2/60'h in his 
defence he stated that 'not understanding English he found no pleasure in the English 
Service, and wished to return to his own country. ' But for his comrade in the attempt, his 
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desertion was a protest. He had enlisted into the Hanoverian Legion (presumably the 
KGL), but was transferred to the 2/60'h, and he still had not received his bounty. "' The 
protest motive explains why some deserters made no attempt to disguise their crime, 
simply taking to the roads still in their uniforms, and not making any attempt to hide 
themselves. Hugh Machiver was confronted by a corporal of the 2 nd Surrey Militia in the 
King's Head public house in Guildford, at which Machiver immediately confessed to 
deserting from the 5d' Dragoon Guards the day before. "' John Dunning hardly had any 
criminal intent when he deserted. After four days he was detected in a public house, and 
the sergeant who recaptured him testified that 'I put my hand on his shoulders and said 
you are the man I want, and the prisoner said I am glad you are come". He had his 
regimental jacket and breeches on and was in no ways disguised. ' 127 The protest element 
of desertion was revealed in the trial of John Smith and William Langford. They deserted 
because of low pay and their treatment by two NCOs, but whilst on the run, they wrote a 
letter to their unit (one of many), asking if the Colonel would forgive them and send a 
pass so they could return safely to their regiment. 1211 
The Horse Guards recognised such grievances, and took measures to improve pay 
and conditions, thus insulating soldiers from wartime inflation. "" In some cases deserters 
were given discharges, and although no reasons were given, it is probable that this was a 
recognition that some soldiers had legitimate reasons for their actions, an admission that it 
was sometimes better to allow a soldier to leave, than force him to stay. "' The York 
Chaseurs were specifically raised in 1813 from the 'better class of deserters', "' after a 
suggestion that young lads 'whose only crime is perhaps that of inadvertently having left 
the recruiting party' should be removed from hardened criminals stationed in the hulks at 
125 W071/21 1, Court Martial of Washill Wadeof and John Walker, 8&9 December 1807. 126 SHC BR/QS/5/29-3 1, oath of William Derrick, Cpl. 2 nd Surrey Militia, 6 July 1813. 127 wo i 1/220, Trial of John Dunning, 14 March IS 10. 
1 
211 W071/226, Trial of William Langford, 17 April 1812. 29 Bartlettý 'The Development of the British Army', PhD (Durham), pp. 136-139. 130 W03/198, Calvert to Taylor, 2 January 18 10. A man had surrendered as a deserter, but it was deemed 
expedient to give him a discharge for one substitute. 131 W0380/5, entry for York Chasseurs. 
232 
the Isle of Wight. "' 
The end of the war in Europe did see an increase in desertions from soldiers with 
some service. In June 1814 it was feared that some desertions in the York Chassuers 
would be speedily emulated, because the war had finished. "' This particular sense of 
grievance may have been exaggerated by the war with the USA, thus accounting for the 
high rates of desertion in 1814 and 1815. An anonymous soldier recorded his feelings 
when his discharge was refused in 1814 (which he was entitled to as a limited service 
man): 'I was almost tempted to desert. I lamented my becoming a soldier, ... to be so near 
home, and almost fi-ee, and yet to be sent across the Atlantic was very galling! 134 John 
Spencer Cooper also expected his discharge in 1814 as he only had three weeks service 
lefý but he needed to get the Colonel's signature and before he could get it, the regiment 
was sent to America. He did not get the chance to desert in Britain, and sailed to the USA 
'In the very worst hurnour. 13' Many men in France took the chance and deserted on the 
continent. The 71" lost twenty men the night before they sailed for America, 'chiefly, it 
was supposed from the attractions or enticements of French wornen. ' 131 Certainly, with the 
prospect of yet another campaign, and one even further from home, such enticements 
could be powerfully seductive. 
In amongst all the motives for deserting, some deserters would be aware of their 
prospects once they had deserted. In many cases this explains why soldiers deserted with 
their equipment, as they could sell the latter. Desertion was also more likely to occur in 
the summer months in the UK, '-"' reflecting the fact that there were opportunities for work 
during the harvest for a man who wished to earn a little, but maintain his anonymity. 
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Ultimately, deserters depended upon the sympathy of those outside the army if they were 
to avoid recapture, and there is evidence that it existed. Charles O'Neil was fortunate and 
found someone to help when he decided to desert for the first time: 
Into this shop I saw an old clothes man enter, and immediately followed him. Having 
ordered a pint of porter for him, I asked him if he would be willing to exchange his old and 
ragged clothes for my new suit. He said he would, and informed me that I might meet him 
under a bridge near, where we might exchange. Observing that no one was near, I went under 
the bridge, and soon reappeared, dressed in his old clothes, and bearing his pack. Thus 
disguised, I walked bravely onwards, even passing some of my old comrades, who did not 
recognise me. "' 
Later during his journey, after some trepidation, he confessed to a fanner who asked 
him directly if he had been a soldier. The farmer then provided him with another set of 
clothes, and took O'Neil in his market wagon to the door of O'Neil's parental home. 139 
Ile high desertion rates sustained in Ireland may be linked to its predominate 
agricultural subsistence economy, as soldiers could return to their communities knowing 
that they would find work, and more importantly be protected by the community. " 
More disturbing for the authorities were the alarming incidents ranging from 
igno . rance to collusion with deserters by those whom the government expected to uphold 
the law. The constables at Barnet and Finchley quartered some deserters and their escort 
in such a bad manner that the deserters escaped, and the constable of Newton Bushel 
also lost deserters when he failed to billet the whole of the escort with the deserters. "' A 
garrison court martial tried the men who formed the escort party that allowed James 
Wright to escape. "" The duplicity of gaolers was more serious: four deserters escaped 
from Woburn gaol, which meant they must have had help from the gaolers themselves, 
and the same occurred in Tiverton (where it was 'very frequent'), and in Warrington 
and Colchester. In all four cases investigations were ordered. "' The case of the Usk 
139 Charles 0, NeiL The Military Adventures of Charles ONeil, p. 20. 139 Jbid, p. 21. 140w 
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volunteer who helped a deserter demonstrates that placing a man in a uniform did not 
divorce him from his civilian mentality. " 
The fmal category of deserters were those who simply left to gain another bounty, 
taking advantage of the army's need for men. The bounty system, in one officer's 
opinion, had 'reduced the practice of desertion to a system', "' and the desertions of this 
type seem extensive. It some circumstances this is unsurprising. A man who enlisted 
purely for financial reasons, may have had no reason to remain in the army, particularly if 
he could again alleviate his distress by enlisting elsewhere. Soldiers could also find 
themselves in debt, and one option to solve this problem was to desert. Debt could often 
turn first-time offenders into repeat deserters, if they sold their equipment whilst on the 
nuL When they were returned to their regiment, they had to buy new equipment, and so 
received no pay for considerable lengths of time. In such circumstances, a soldier's mind 
would inevitably turn to a new start in another regiment. Francis Morpeth of the 31" was a 
typical case: he deserted three times in one year, each time returning without any part of 
his regimental clothes or necessaries, by which means he was over E5 in debt. '" 
There were those who used bounty jumping as a system. A Chelsea pensioner, 
Mr. Smith, was 'in the habit of engaging himself as a recruit with different parties, and 
afterwards obtaining his discharge on the pretence of lameness. "" John Cullen, a 
pensioner of the 87'h, also tried the same, enlisting under the name Tiffen in the Royal 
African Corps. "" In 1814 some militiamen deserted, joining line parties and then giving 
themselves up as militia deserters, and so had to be sent back to their militia regiments. 119 
There were also men known to the army as repeated offenders: the I lorse Guards were so 
exasperated with John Wilson and 11ornas Bouler, that they wanted to know if there was 
144 W03/46, Calvert to General Norton, 24 September 1808. 143 BL Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37889, ff. 128-13 1, proposal of Capt. Drinkwater. 146 W671/217, Trial of Francis Morpeth, 5 March 1808. 147 W03/584, Calvert to Chelsea Hospital Commissioners, 8 August 1808. 
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any means of stopping them fiom deserting again. ` In 1813, the Duke of York warned 
recruiting parties about these 'trampers, who 'gave no satisfactory account of themselves 
but proceed through the country, fiom one district to another, enlisting with whatever 
Party will receive them, with the sole view of getting the bounty on intermediate 
approval, and afterwards deserting. ' He ordered that recruiting parties should question all 
recruits about their past. "' 
The most insidious aspect of this type of desertion was that organisations 
developed to take advantage of the fact that desertion was poorly monitored. Soldiers 
were always accused of mixing with the fringes of the criminal world, and the Horse 
Guards believed there was an organisation behind 'bounty jumping'. Wynyard informed 
Beckett at the Home Office that journeymen shoemakers (the worst description of 
subjects in all countries') were holding meetings across the county 'for the purpose of 
aiding and assisting Deserters, and facilitating the frauds practised by those fellows on the 
government. ' 152 As the men who brought in recruits were also paid, a soldier could desert 
with the active knowledge of an accomplice who would bring him to another party and 
vouch for him. The Horse Guards contain revealing details of these men and their 
accomplices. James Smith persuaded John Ross of the 78th to desert, 15' and there were 
more partnerships like these, including the involvement of ex-soldiers or army personnel. 
Lieutenant Sharpe induced a man of the 7h Light Dragoons to desert, and so the Secretary 
at War stopped his half pay hoping to get him to come to the I lorse Guards so he could be 
arrested. " There were also large numbers of Chelsea pensioners who were involved in 
such affhirs, a striking fact as they were supposed to be good soldiers. "' Even worse was 
the involvement of Mess. Tudor, Cannon and Sons, army agents, in getting William Lee 
150 W03/160, Darling to Deputy Secretary at War, 7 October 1814; W03/160, Calvert to Deputy 
Secretary at War, 4 February 1815. Thomas Bouler had been discharged in 1813. 151 W03/585, Circular, 15 January 1813. 
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of the I O'h Light Dragoons to desert. " 
Inevitably opportunities to exploit the bounty attracted organised criminals, 
probably crimps who already had knowledge of the workings of the army, yet had seen 
their 'services' bypassed by better organisation in army recruitment. Most of their activity 
centred around ports where they could tempt a man to desert and join the navy, in which 
case there was less chance of him being discovered. A deserter in the navy could be 
shipped off immediately and not be back in Britain for many years, and so there was little 
chance of the army authorities ever finding him, while ship's officers were unlikely to 
receive up to date details on army deserters. Liverpool had a particularly active group of 
criminals. John McAnalty revealed the systematic way they had encouraged him to 
desert: 
When I was quartered at Liverpool I promiscuously fell into bad company and after some 
drinking with them for some time they advised me to desert and quit the regiment entirely, at 
the same time recommending and praising the Sea Service, being young and ignorant of what 
I was doing, I quitted the regiment, and willing to try my fortune at Sea in the Service of the 
King I entered on board of the Princess vessel lying at Liverpool for the purpose of receiving 
Seamen for His Majesty's Service. 157 
More evidence of desertion to the navy came to light after a private of the 89h deserted 
in Liverpool, again after being encouraged to leave so he could join the navy, turned 
King's evidence to get a pardon, "' and a private of the 74, h discovered a deserter 
concealed in a safe house near his quarters. "' The crimps involved at Liverpool felt 
sufficiently threatened that they attempted to murder him, firing on him one night. 
Although he was not killed, he had to have his leg amputated. Consequently, a reward 
of one hundred pounds was offered for information that led to the discovery of the 
offenders. " The crimps also made an attempt on the life of another private in Liverpool 
who gave evidence against them. "" 
'm W03/157, Calvert to Merry, 2 January & 16 January 18 10. 157 W071/213, Trial of John McAnalty, 2 May 1808. '58 W03/157 Calvert to Palmerstone, 13 September 18 10. 159 H050/4 I i, Merry to Beckett, 25 September 18 10. 160 H050/417, Merry to Beckett, 25 September 18 10; H05 1/17 1, Goulburn to Merry, 29 September 18 10. 161 H050/417, Merry to Beckett, 2 October 18 10. 
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In investigating these crimes, it was found that many of the culprits were Chelsea 
pensioners, supposedly good soldiers, and, needless to say, they were struck off the 
pension lists. " Similar cases emerged at Hull involving a publican, " and in Brighton, 
where some inhabitants encouraged men to desert. " One of the problems when the extent 
of this emerged was that it was difficult to secure successfid prosecutions. " Consequently 
aggravated desertion was introduced as a crime in the 1813 Mutiny Act, making it a 
fmable offence even to advertise a service that could provide men for the navy, army or 
East India Company. '" 
It is difficult to assess the extent of desertion to other regiments through these 
means, but it seems a problem, particularly in respect of those who deserted from the 
army to the navy. Of the details of men who surrendered under pardons for desertion, 
90% of those in other units were either in the navy or Royal Marines, ""' suggesting that 
desertion encouraged for the naval forces was very prevalent, and contributed to the high 
rates of desertion in the United Kingdom. The men who did desert to the navy were 
generally lost to the army, as 'Men claimed from the Navy seldom become useful and 
steady soldiers"" and from the Horse Guards' perspective, the men claimed were likely 
to desert again. It was suggested that all deserters be sent to the navy, an idea that 
predictably never went any further. " Nevertheless, the reclamation of soldiers was useful 
in exposing those who had helped them to desert to the navy, and the few sailors who 
made the reverse journey to the army were often sent back to the navy, because they made 
bad soldiers. 110 
The whole problem of desertion was exacerbated by the provision of substitutes. 
Much has been made of this practice in the militia, and in the Sussex and Surrey Militia 
162 051/17 1, Goulburn to Merry, 5 October 18 10. 63 W03/158, Calvert to Deputy Secretary at War, 28 August 1812. 164 H051/172 Goulburn to Torrens, 16 October 1811. 165 WO31157,9 Calvert to Palmerstone, 23 March 18 10. 166 53 Geo 111, c. 17, sect. XCI, 23 March 1813. 167 W03/155, /157 & /158. Ile sample has 106 names in it. 169 W03/155, Calvert to Moore, 17 November 1808. 169 BI, Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37889, fE 128-13 1, Proposals of Capt. Drinkwater. 170 W03/158, AG to Secretary at War, 31 December 1812. 
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regiments a direct link was made between substitutes and desertion. It was felt that the use 
of crimps, who provided 'the worst description of substitutes' for the regiment, and the 
'Inattention on the part of the Deputy Lieutenants to the description of persons they enrol' 
caused the high level of desertions in those regiments. "' What is less commonly known is 
that substitution was also allowed in the army, although officially on a limited scale. The 
commander in chief invariably 'declined to authorise the discharge of soldiers, unless 
under circumstances of a very peculiar nature, "' and all required his authorisation. 
Occasionally, the Horse Guards were presented with a discharge for substitutes that they 
had not authorised, which they allowed. " 130 such discharges for substitutes have been 
found, 174with a different number of substitutes required depending on the service of the 
men who wanted to get their discharge, and the terms the substitutes enlisted under. 
Normally three substitutes were needed for a soldier enlisted for life, and two for a limited 
service man. "' The army also tried to limit it in other ways. When James Walker applied 
to have his furlough extended, as he had not found any substitutes, he was informed he 
must rejoin his regiment when his ftirlough expired. " 
As the soldier, or his family, had to find the substitutes, it increased the chance 
that crimps would be used. One crimp was caught attempting to encourage a recruit of 
the 17fl' Light Dragoons to desert so that he could enlist as a substitute in the 8P, 
predictably in London. " After this any substitute enlisted in London had to be 
inspected by an IFO, so he could be checked against details of known deserters. William 
Macauly enlisted as a substitute for Duncan McGregor whilst he was a deserter from the 
21'% and, for his part in the affhir, McGregor was prosecuted as 'it appearing of 
importance that an imposition of this nature should not pass with impunity, and that for 
171 H050/417, Wynyard to Goulburn, 25 October 18 10. 
W03/158, Calvert to R. Laldn, Esq., 28 August 1812. 173 W03/49 Wynyard to Lt Gen. Wenrys, II December 1809. 174 They are I scattered throughout WO3, particularly W03/4249. 175 W03/193, Wynyard to Col. Hay (Maidstone), 15 June 1807. 176 W03/49, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Marquis Huntley, 5 October &I November 1809. 177 W03/584, Calvert to Taylor, 5 September 1808. 
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the sake of example the delinquent should be proceeded against'. " One messenger at 
the adjutant general's office was even involved in trying to recruit a substitute for a 
desperate relative. "' 
The practice of substitution in the army could have been more widespread than 
was officially known, especially as it benefited the army if the party gained two recruits 
instead of one. There was a NCO at the army depot that was offering substitutes to the 
new recruits there. " In the 2/24h the Quarter-Master offered discharges for money, whilst 
in the 2/80 it was the Paymaster who offered a similar service. In both cases money was 
deposited with them, and they would then use these sums to purchase substitutes and get 
discharges for the soldiers. "" 
Once a soldier had deserted, for whatever reason, life could be very diflicult and 
lead to other incidents of crime. If he returned to the army, he was likely to desert again. 
It was the fear of being recognised as a deserter in his home in Dundalk that led Charles 
O'Neil to leave home and try his luck in the army once more. He found life in the 64 th 
worse; the commanding officer was even stricter, and, as he put it, 'I had deserted once, 
without discovery. Why should I not do so again? ' As before, it took another factor to 
convince him: the imminent arrival of his old regiment, the 8 th ." Having made this 
decision, he soon found himself in the same predicament; 'my condition was now 
irksome in the extreme. There was so much danger of being recognised that I could not 
feel myself safe anywhere. ' He decided to enlist in another part of Ireland, thus hoping 
to avoid detection. He later enlisted in the Louth Militia, and then volunteered for the 
28'h, about to embark for foreign service. In the end his crimes went undetected. 183 
Not all deserters were this fortunate, or sought sanctuary in rejoining the army. At 
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the trial of John Smith and William Langford, a letter was produced which was sent by 
Smith to his mother. They had marched to Newcastle from Newark in the hope of finding 
a place on a ship, (in the first day marching for fifty-six miles) but the town was full of 
soldiers and they did not dare step outside. They returned to Smith's mother at Newark, 
where the sergeant sent after them was waiting. '" In the case of Thomas Purton, a deserter 
from the 62 nd , desertion could lead to 
desperate actions. He volunteered into the 62 nd in 
1807, 
From where he deserted about six weeks after, and went to Dorchester in Oxfordshire, 
where he was employed as a Iabourer in the service of Mr. Parsons, and in whose employ he 
met a young woman named Betty Powell, who knew him to be a deserter, and having 
threatened to inform a sergeant of the Guards then recruiting at Dorchester that he was so, he 
determined to murder her, for which purpose he waylaid her one evening between the hours 
of 7 and 8 o'clock at night and killed her by stabbing her with a knife, and then buried her in 
a ditch by the roadside between Dorchester and Whiteham. 
He then fled to Norwood near Croydon, where after working on a cut in the 
neighbourhood, he was recognised as a deserter by a bailiff, who made the mistake of 
threatening to inform a local Dragoon officer. Purton duly murdered him. Fleeing to 
London, he worked in a stable yard, and stole a horse which he sold at Newbury, and 
then stole another from Launceston (in Somerset) which he sold at Devizics. With his 
money all spent, he enlisted in the 77th and was sent back to the 62 nd as a deserter. He 
volunteered for the first battalion in Sicily, but was found wandering in the local fields 
'much troubled in mind' after which he resolved to make a confession. "' 
Conclusion 
Desertion remained a problem throughout the course of the war, and probably 
indicated some of the tensions from the growing presence of the army in British society. 
As the large numbers of troops in Britain became permanent, so the sight of soldiers 
became commonplace, making capture harder. Equally, parts of civilian society were 
sympathetic to deserters, and becoming more knowledgeable of the army system, and 
184 W071/226, Trial of William Langford, 17 April 1812. 185 HO50/459, Wynyard to Beckett, 10 October 18 10, incl. Confession of Thomas Purton. 
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used this for personal gain. The reasons for desertion were varied, and so in some 
instances were difficult to address, but generally the causes of the problem were similar 
to France's experience. Desertion was frequently remarkably casual, and often due to 
homesickness or a protest against poor conditions of service, ""' and its low incidence in 
areas of active service confirms the view of sociologists that desertion was rarely the 
product of fearing battle. "' One of the significant differences for Britain was the 
influence of the navy's enormous demand for manpower, which introduced the practice 
of desertion specifically to enlist elsewhere. 
Perhaps most revealing of all, was the Horse Guards' incredibly liberal attitude 
towards desertion, both compared with France, "" and even with the army under 
Wellington, where executions for desertion were carried out. In France during one year 
349 men were executed for desertion, "' and discipline in the army under Wellington 
was fierce. Because national statistics on desertion do not exist for the pre-war period, it 
is difficult to compare levels of desertion with peacetime, but evidence for a study of 
two regiments suggests that desertion decreased in the period. " This was not the result 
of a deliberate attempt to tackle desertion. The army chose to deal with the problem 
rather than solve it, and so only severe cases were punished. There was no discussion by 
the government or Horse Guards on desertion, nor any investigation into its causes, but 
this was only following the army's previous attitude towards desertion. "" The army also 
refused to involve civilians in the problem, and a suggestion that a reward for capturing 
deserters was quietly ignored for fear that it would only lead to collusion between 
civilians and soldiers. "' The decline in desertion was probably due to the increased 
1" Forrest, Conscipts and Deserters, pp. 64-65, & 94-96. 197 Arthur N. Gilbert, 'A Tale of Two Regiments: Manpower and Effectiveness in British Military Units 
during the Napoleonic Wars', ArmedForces andSociety, 9 (1982-83), p. 290. 188 Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters, p. 229. 189 Ibid, p. 187. 190 Gilbert, 'A Tale of Two Regiments', ArmedForces andSociety, 9 (1982-83), p. 290. '91 Pimlott, 'The Administration of the British Army', 1783-1793', PhD (Leicester), pp. 223-236. 192 WO 1/1117, 'An Old Soldier' to York, Jan 1808. Recruiting parties were not rewarded for capturing deserters for fear of collusion between the parties and recruits, W03/584, Calvert to Taylor, 13 October 1807. 
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supervision of soldiers, regiments becoming more stable institutions, and improvements 
in the soldiers' conditions of service. Unfortunately, the regimental deserter returns do 
not distinguish the terms of service that a soldier enlisted under, and so no judgement can 
be made on the effectiveness of short-service in reducing desertion. 
The acceptance of desertion also indicates something about the character of the 
army. Desertion was not considered the result of recruiting from the scum of the earth, 
nor was it considered that army life engendered delinquency. '" The Horse Guards 
appeared to maintain a more pragmatic approach to desertion, indicating that 
assumptions about the rank and file of the army could not be drawn. The formation of 
the York Chassuers testified to this spirit, as it was Calvert's foremost aim to ensure that 
first-time deserters went on to be good soldiers. Although such views may have 
stemmed from the pressing concerns of keeping men in uniform, in whatever units, it 
was perhaps a fairer treatment of the problem of desertion. 
193 Peter Boroughs, 'Crime and Punishment in the British Army, 1815-1870', EHR, 100 (1985), pp. 545- 
571. 
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Conclusion: Recruiting the British Army and the 
Nature of the British State 
What emerges from the study of the recruitment of the army between 1807 and 
1815 is the liberal nature of the British army in that period, particularly the part of it that 
was under the direct control of the Duke of York and Adjutant General Calvert. This 
was particularly shown in their treatment of deserters but is also evident elsewhere: the 
army advocated the introduction of a family allowance for soldiers; and it improved the 
soldiers' conditions of service. Although outside the remit of this thesis, other work has 
shown that the army developed a career structure for soldiers, culminating in the 
positions of sergeant major, colour sergeant, etc. posts that carried prestige and benefits, 
and positive rewards for good soldiers. ' Alongside these, the Horse Guards was not 
afraid to push its humanitarian ideals, even if it meant interfering in regimental matters. 
The commanding officer of the 2/474h was officially admonished for allowing a 
punishment of 800 lashes on a boy, ' and the local general at Exeter was requested to 
make a private representation to an officer, who punished a man for marrying without 
the commanding officer's consent? 
Moreover, the religious issue in the army highlighted the Horse Guards' forward 
thinking attitude. Catholic recruitment had been open from 1793, but there was no 
provision for their religious needs. Under Calvert, an evangelical, religion was re- 
introduced into the army, " but not on sectarian lines. Catholic worship was permitted, ' 
and the future of Christian soldiering was being laid. The Horse Guards also made 
active efforts to suppress sectarianism. When it emerged that there was an Orange Order 
I Bartlett, 'The Development of the British Army', PhD (Durham), p. 137. 2 W03/45, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. Lord Fitzroy (Ipswich), 15 March 1808. 
3 W03/49, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Theter, 18 December 1809. 
4 Calvert had an ally in Perceval, CHA, Calvert Papers, 9/101/2, Calvert to Perceval, 25 February 1808. 
See W03/49, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Whetharn, 30 December 1809, for holding divine service at all 
military stations; W03/49, Calvert to Duke of Cambridge, 15 January 1810, for arrangements for the 
Guards in London. 
5 Charles O'Neil claimed to be responsible for this, after he complained to the Duke of York for being 
confined and receiving 300 lashes for refusing to attend a Church of England service. Charles O'Neil, The 
MilitaryAdWntures of Charles ONeil, pp. 4448. 
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Lodge in the Vý West Yorkshire Nfilitia, after membership papers were discovered on a 
travelling razor grinder, the army ordered its activities to cease. ' Such lodges were 
declared illegal on the grounds that they administered oaths, but banning them, despite 
their protestations of loyalty, shows that the army was particularly sensitive to the effect 
sectarianism could have on a regiment. 
The other aspect of the army's liberal behaviour was its ability to suggest and 
implement reforms. The small improvements made in recruitment, particularly the 
creation of recruiting districts and the nationalising of recruiting, appear superficially to 
be rather insignificant. In the context of the political climate in the 1790 and 1800s, any 
reform was treated as revolutionary, especially if it changed any part of the 
constitutional balance. Removing recruiting from the regiment and placing it under 
army control represented a massive increase in the power of the Horse Guards, and 
questions were raised in the Commons about the expense of the staff establishment that 
this caused, and the division of the UK into military districts. ' Any such regional control 
was comparable to the Major-Generals of the Commonwealth. 
Elsewhere, the army and the government departments relevant to it, have been 
shown to have developed significantly in these years, introducing modem bureaucratic 
methods, salaried officials, and improved working arrangements! All of these actions 
had their roots in the reforms of the 1780s, but whereas other aspects of this reforming 
drive stopped on the onset of war (particularly political reform), ' reform in the military 
gathered pace. The abolition of the Inspector General of Recruiting in 1807 is an 
important point in the development of the army. Firstly, it removed one of the many 
sinecures existing in the army establishment, but it also had important repercussions for 
the administration of the army, and development of policy. The work of the Inspector 
6 H050/413, Gordon to Jenkinson, 9 September 1809, incl. Deardon (Lt. Col. I' West Yorkshire Militia) 
to Gordon, 6 September 1809; Gordon to Jenkinson, 19 September 1809; Torrens to Beckett, 5 October 
1809, H051/17 1, Jenkinson to Gordon, 18 September 1809. 
7 Hansard, 18 10, XV, 657-672. 
Bartlett, 'The Development of the British Army', Phl), pp. 259-260. 
Sir Norman Chester, The English Administrafive System 1780-1870, (Oxford, 198 1), pp. 123-141. 
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General was transferred to the Horse Guards, and under Calvert detailed statistics were 
collected on recruitment, statistics that were not easily available beforehand, which has 
enabled a deeper understanding of the productivity of recruiting during the last years of 
the Napoleonic Wars. Such information was not intended for posterity, and the clear 
message behind the assiduous collection of data by the department of the adjutant 
general was that 'ordinary recruitment' was insufficient to meet the demands of the 
army. In this respect, the Horse Guards presaged the development of the professional 
civil service and a modem bureaucracy, which provided information for relevant 
ministers to determine suitable policies. " Nowhere is this clearer than in the annual 
reports sent from the Commander in Chief to the Secretary for War; without such 
intelligence, it is difficult to see how the government could have successfully 
maintained the commitment in the Peninsula. 
Perhaps the single most important issue for reform in the army was how to fill 
its ranks. The army, more specifically the adjutant general's department, consistently 
pushed for some form of compulsion to supply the army, usually under restricted terms 
of service, but at the same time allowing men to volunteer for overseas service. 
Although never stated in the various memoranda and letters sent on the issue, the 
implementation of these proposals this would have entailed a massive increase in state 
bureaucracy, and necessarily a considerable enhancement in the state's power. Of 
course, compulsion was a soldier's answer to a military problem, but constitutional 
ideology, exemplified by Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
pervaded every gentleman in this period, regardless of his position in the government. 
To even suggest conscription was a decisive turning point in the development of the 
British army - some officers in the Horse Guards had accepted the 'French principle' 
and so unwittingly admitted that the British constitution would have to be changed to 
10 See D. Eastwood, "'Amplifying the Province of the Legislature': the Flow of Information and the 
English State in the Early Nineteenth Century', Historical Research, 62 (1989), pp. 276-294. 
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meet the demands of the modem world. This implied that the 1688 constitution was not 
perfect, and echoes the development of new politics outside the framework of the Whig 
1688 settlement In common with the radicals of the post-Waterloo period, " the army 
was suggesting rational and modem solutions to its problems. 
It is easy to overstate the army's progressive tendencies, and they had their 
limits. The Duke of York was consistently hostile to Windham's short-service scheme, 
and the Duke was the champion of the regimental system, showing that his reforming 
attitude only extended within the fi-amework of a long-serving army based on esprit de 
corps, rather than nationalism. Any form of compulsion would be territorial, so 
preserving the regimental structure of the army; a British army with regiments that were 
only administrative units was never conceived. In all the memoranda on balloting, 
Ireland was not specifically mentioned, but it was understood from the experience of the 
militia and the Army of Reserve that such a system was unworkable in Ireland given its 
state of parochial and county government. 
Moreover, it was easy for soldiers to suggest such improvements in the army 
when they did not have to consider the political situation in Parliament, nor face the 
reality of implementing them. Even if the governments from 1807 to 1815 had been 
more stable, it seems unlikely that the army would have got all that it wanted as, after 
the Talents, all the governments were Tory. They were particularly sensitive to any 
changes in the constitution, and the implications of substantial reforms in the way the 
army was recruited would have undermined their stance on political reform. Only under 
extreme circumstances, such as 18034 when the very existence of the UK was under 
threat, could the raising of the army by compulsion be countenanced. The weakness of 
the UK's governments in this period also played its part: after the failures of 1809, the 
Perceval government felt that the 'public might take alarm at any ftirther operations. I 
11 W. D. Rubenstein, 'The End of "Old Corruption" in Britain', Past and Present, 10 1 (November 1983), 
p. 81. Rubenstein also argues that "Old Corruption! ' ended because the aristocracy reformed British 
government itsel& i. e. like the army, reform leadership emanated from the top. 
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am aftaid there is not power and authority enough in the existing government to 
counteract such a dangerous apathy. "' Rather than entering into a debate on army 
recruitment, from 1807, the Tory governments preferred to de-politicise military policy, 
indicating that they even had reservations over the changes that they were making in the 
role of the militia. They were successful in this, so much so that after 1809 there was 
only token opposition to their military policy. The Perceval government even used the 
army's liberal attitude to religion to deflect criticism of its own intransigence on the 
issue. Liverpool declared that there was no need for a general measure for religious 
toleration, because the army permitted Catholics in England to attend Catholic 
worship. " Ryder as Home Secretary actually gave way on Catholic rights during the 
debates on the Militia Interchange Bill in 1811, but the clause. allowing Catholic 
militiamen the same rights as they had in Ireland was predictably rejected by the 
Lords. "' 
Financial considerations also featured in the government's choice of military 
policy. Although the 1801 census, and the calculations afterwards, demonstrated that the 
UK's economy was buoyant and expanding, and therefore capable of sustaining high 
levels of taxation, there were still limits on the British government's capability to wage 
war. " The consequences of defeat were so dire that expansion of the military forces had 
to be circumspect in case it upset the economy too much, thus undermining Britain's 
ability to wage war. Liverpool and Wellington both understood that for Britain at least, 
logistics played their part in the determining the size of the force in Iberia, and both 
were aware that even slight increases in the number of troops deployed there caused a 
disproportionate increase in the expenditure, and resources required. "' In essence, it was 
possible for Britain to lose the war by over exertion, and the situation was not severe 
12 Bl, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38360, ff. 283-286. 13 Hansard, 18 10-1811, XM 350-355 (for Commons debates), & pp. 368-371 for the Lords. 14HanSard, 1810-1811, XX, 332, & 643-645. 15 J. E. Cookson, 'Political Arithmetic and War in Britain, 1793-1815', War and Society, 1 (1983), p. 42. 16 AL D. Harvey, Collision of Empires: Britain in Three World Wars, 1793-1945, (London, 1992), pp. 160-162. 
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enough to justify radical acts. 
The strategic situation also mitigated government policy. Once the war in the 
Peninsula became permanent, no major reforms in army recruitment were likely, as they 
would jeopardise the commitment to fight in Iberia in the short-term. The recruiting 
results in 1810 were sufficient to scare the government and army into returning to 
militia transfers, and the demands for compulsion to fill the ranks of the army in 1811 
were based on the assumption that an invasion was increasingly likely. After this report, 
the Duke of York produced a paper showing monthly recruiting from 1803, indicating 
when ballots were in operation, the clear message being that both could not co-exist. 17 It 
was therefore only necessary to cover the gap between casualties and recruiting, and to 
do this with the least possible disruption. 
It is not surprising that Britain's brief flirtation with balloting for the army 
occurred in 1803, when it needed to raise an army quickly, and had no serious overseas 
commitments. However, the period 1807 to 1815 is interesting as it shows the intricate 
relations between government and the localities in the British state. The militia transfers 
were an ideal solution for a number of reasons, but their particular attraction was that 
the government had a ready made body of opinion to listen to, and a group with whom it 
could make an agreement in order to obtain what it wanted - men. This was a 
particularly subtle way of improving Britain's military stature, but meant that the 
government had to accommodate viewpoints that did not always coincide with its own. 
Operating in such a manner is one of the hallmarks of an anden regime state, and 
although it is clear that in other areas of the military the government was prepared to 
increase state power, over solving the manpower shortage, it resorted to tried and tested 
methods of functioning - using the counties to implement policy, and allowing them 
particular latitude in doing so. The importance of Parliament should also be stressed in 
allowing the government to proceed as it did, since it permitted militia stalwarts to 
17 WO 1/946, Return of Recruits raised from 1803,21 March 1811. 
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express their views, but in the end amplified the consensus that developed over using 
the militia to supply the army. On account of these factors, there was no provincial 
revolt against the state caused by recruitment, and the only opposition to the 
government's military policy came from the militiamen who ignored the bounty being 
offered to them and remained in their regiments. 
The numbers raised by the army and the militia suggest that the militia was a 
valuable extra recruiting service for the army. The case of Wales is a good example. 
The yield from the Hereford and Shrewsbury districts which covered Wales and the 
border with England was the worst in the UK, " but the militia regiments from these 
districts provided 775 men per year between 1809 and 1813, just under three times more 
than the army obtained. " Inevitably, there were problems when the militia in Britain 
was allowed to recruit openly, but overall militia recruitment, the use of ballots, and 
recruiting for the line proved sufficient. Just under 30,000 men a year between 1807 and 
1813 joined Britain's military forces through these means, with the militia providing 
approximately half of them. In view of this achievement, it would necessitate a severe 
crisis to permit the introduction of compulsion for the line, as even the Army of Reserve 
had only envisaged raising 30,000 men. 
Such successes were showing their limits by late 1813. Although the militia was 
successfully recruiting, that did not necessarily mean that these men were available to 
the army. The government's solution was to allow militiamen to serve overseas. 
Clearly, this was sanctioned on the understanding that it would speed the end of the war, 
but it also reveals that the government had been more skilful in changing Britain's 
military system than is often realised. In his 1807 memorandum on the militia transfer, 
Castlereagh also outlined a plan for a local militia, which after considerable revision, 
was enacted in 1808. Mentioning the two within the same paper to the militia colonels 
18 See Appendix E. 
19 See Appendix F. 
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shows that Castlereagh was attempting to mould Britain's different forces into a more 
coherent structure. Following the collapse of the Portland ministry, this process 
continued, with the Militia Interchange Act. In this context, militia transfers were the 
natural corollary of further integration of Britain's military, and, in 1814, the full extent 
of this quiet evolution was shown. During the diplomatic wrangling of 1813 and 
especially 1814, Castlereagh was able to highlight Britain's military power to the 
astonishment of most of its continental allies: from the paltry few thousand men it had 
offered the first coalition in 1793, Britain was now a major military power. 
The major concern over the militia transfers was the effect that they had on the 
status of the militia. The removal of the ballot, and full-time embodiment made the 
militia similar to the regulars, and so it was feared that the militia was liable to compete 
with the line, effectively raising the bounty for men. This was particularly true from 
1809 when the militia began recruiting by voluntary enlistment. Despite the army's 
attempts to get men who had served in the militia for some time, or were about to be 
discharged from the militie the need for men overrode such niceties. When the 
balloted men were assembled in 1807, replacing those who had already joined, 
arrangements were made for them to volunteer at their assembly points, even before 
they reached their militia regiments. " 
The use of the militia, and local forces, in a co-ordinated military policy was an 
important point in the development of Britain's military force, which was hidden by the 
government's de-politicising of military policy and the lack of any radical changes. 
Although the question of the relationship between the army, militia, and local part-time 
forces was largely shelved until the Crimean War, when the latter war occurred the 
government quickly resorted to the expedients used in the Napoleonic Wars. By the end 
20 H051/25, Circular, by Hawkesbury to deficient regiments, 16 October 1807. 21 H050/407, Calvert to Beckett, 27 October 1807; Wynyard to Beckett, 2 November 1807, incl. O'Coute 
(MAj. Cmd. 73d) to AG, 29 October 1807; Calvert to Beckett, 3 December 1807, incl. Farley (Lt. Col 
68'h) to AG, 27 November 1807. 
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of the Crimean conflict, 33,000 militiamen had volunteered for the line, and ten Militia 
battalions were sent to the Mediterranean. Just as significant was the fact that the 
government allowed the militia to be raised by voluntary enlistment, holding the ballot 
in reserve for counties that did not raise their quotas. ' The apparently ad hoc nature of 
Britain's Napoleonic system, and its reform into truly linked territorial units as part of 
the Cardwell reforms, hides the progress that was made between 1807 and 1815 which 
allowed these future developments. Without the militia transfers of 1807,1809 and 
1811, the Militia Interchange Act of 1811, and the New Military System of 1813, the 
governments of the post-Crimea would have had a much tougher parliamentary battle 
over re-casting the army. After all, in the preamble to the 1811 Militia Transfer Act it 
stated that militia voltinteering was to be a permanent means of supplying the army. 
The question, therefore, arises about what happened to the forward thinking 
army, and the emergence of Britain as a major military force? Britain's army and its 
administration traditionally existed in two forms - one peacetime and one wartime, and 
this was particularly so after 1815. Although the Duke of York and Calvert were able to 
preserve the army from the kind of savage pruning it had received in 1783, most of 
Britain's military machine was dismantled. Despite the initial efforts of the Horse 
Guards, their military estimates of the force Britain required were ignored, and within 
ten years of its peak strength in 1813, the army was reduced by 147,080 men. " This was 
largely down to fiscal restraints imposed by the government, which the army was 
powerless to stop as civilian control of the army, under the oninipotent Treasury, 2" was 
firmly established during the wars. 2' As Torrens informed the Duke of York 'while you 
continue that paternal support of the great interests of the Army, you should anticipate 
at the same time the financial difficulties and objections which will come from 
22 Hew Strachan, Wellington's Legacy. The Reform of the British Army, 1830-54, (Manchester, 1994), p. 
220. 
23 Strachan, Wellington's Legacy, p. 18 1. 24 Chester, The English Administrative System, pp. 197-208. 25 Bartlett, 'T'he Development of the British Army', PhD (Durham), pp. 255-258. 
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Government"' Initial estimates for the numbers needed in early 1815 were as high as 
230,000,1" but the army estimates of 1815 provided for a force of 150,000 (this was still 
three times that of 1784-1792). 
Post-Waterloo British military policy was affected, above all, by the fact that 
another European war looked unlikely: Britain had cffectively satisfied its strategic 
aims, and so the army again reverted to the role of an imperial force. Every year 
between 1815 and the Crimean War, casualties were matched by ordinary recruiting, 
and there seemed no reason for any kind of reserve to meet emergencies, as none were 
envisaged. 21' The primacy of the imperial mission was emphasised fin-ther as the growth 
of police forces in the UK removed many, if not all, of the an-ny's duties at home. This 
meant that there was neither impetus for codifying the military system that had 
developed during the wars, nor for undertaking any reforms in the recruitment of the 
army. 
What was left of the army was soon dominated by the influence of Wellington. 
His ultraconservative attitude, both politically and towards the army, was to dominate 
the history of the army. Any major reform was actively discouraged, and minor reforms 
(such as the institution of regimental libraries and savings accounts)" had to be quietly 
engineered by regimental officers; the kind of policies that were seen during the 
Napoleonic Wars were not repeated. Only after the burden of Wellington was lifted by 
his death in 1852 did a progressive army begin, slowly, to emerge, but it was soon cut 
short by the Crimean War, and The Times burgeoning campaign for root and branch 
changes in the administration of the army. Although the army was released from 
Wellington's shadow, as this work has shown, there is much to understand about the 
workings of the British army during the Napoleonic Wars. 
26 W03/6 10. Torrens to York, 30 December 1815. 
27 W06/135, Bunbury to Torrens, 7 February 18 15. W025/3225, York to Bathursý 3 November 1815. 211 Strachan, Wellington's Legacy, p. 56. 29 Linklater, The Black Watch, pp. 89-90. 
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The long peace and the success of the Peninsular Army has often inhibited 
ftirther investigation of Britain's military system. By examining the UK's military 
recruitment policy, it is clear that in many respects the roles of the army and 
government were reversed, with the army advocating more radical changes, and the 
government refusing such suggestions. In implementing the government's chosen policy 
of militia transfers, it is clear that Britain was operating as an ancien regime state, 
although with its own peculiarities. The agencies of the state were limited, and as those 
calling for an expansion of state apparatus were ignored, the government chose to use 
its traditional means of executing policy. It was successful, but it was operating under 
increasing strain, and so it could be generously said that the government had chosen the 
optimum policy, obtaining what it needed for the least disruption. The administration of 
the army was stretched to its limits, and further changes would have also involved a 
more comprehensive reform of the system of government. Britain's 'fiscal-military 
juggernaut' was operating at maximum output, and to do this some alternations were 
necessary. The government's quest for manpower meant that the eighteenth century 
methods of mobilisation had to be supplemented. The Army of Reserve showed that 
balloting for the army was just possible; whether such a policy could ever have been 
sustained for the seven years of Wellington's campaign in Iberia is a different matter. 
Militia transfers were not a new idea, 10 but this was the first time that they were used. In 
this respect the era was a turning point, and future European wars were going to be 
larger, and more demanding, and so the ideas emanating from the Horse Guards in 1809 
would prove harder to ignore when warfare entered the industrial age. 
30 It had been suggested during the American War of independence, see Considerations upon the Different Modes of Finding Rer-ruitsfor the, 4rmy (London, 1775), p. 19. 
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Appendix A: Ministers and Chief MilijM Pos 
Holders, 1807 to 1815 
Horse Guards 
Commander in Chief 
Duke of York until 1809 
Sir David Dundas 1809 to 1811 
Duke of York 1811 onwards 
Military Secretary 
Lieutenant Colonel Sir James Willoughby Gordon 2 October 1809 
Lieutenant Colonel Henry Torrens onwards 
Adjutant General 
Major General Harry Calvert 
Deputy Adjutant Generals 
Brigadier General William Wynyard. 
Lieutenant Colonel Henry Torrens I October 1809 
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Darling onwards 
Assistant Deputy Adjutant General 
Lieutenant Colonel Ibeophilus Pritzler 
Government Minister and Secretaries 
Printe Minister 
Lord Grenville 21 March 1807 
Duke of Portland 4 October 1809 
Spencer Perceval 18 June 1812 
Earl of Liverpool 10 April 1827 
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies 
William Windham 25 March 1807 
Viscount Castlereagh 31 October 1809 
Earl of Liverpool II June 1812 
Earl Bathurst onwards 
Permanent Under Secretary for War 
Sir George Shee 25 March 1807 
Edward Cooke 31 October 1809 
Hon. C. C. C. Jenkinson 1810 
Robert Peel 1812 
Henry Goulbum onwards 
Under Secretary for War and Colonies (War) 
Sir J. Cockburn 1807 
Hon. C. W. Stewart I May 1809 
Hon. E. F. Robinson 2 November 1809 
H. E. Bunbury onwards 
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Secretary of State for the Home Department 
Earl Spencer 25 March 1807 
Lord Hawkesbury I November 1809 
Richard Ryder II June 1812 
Viscount Sidmouth onwards 
Permanent Under Secretary for the Home Department 
J. Beckett 
Non Permanent Under Secretary 
C. W. Williams Wynn 1807 
Hon. C. C. C. Jenkinson 1810 
H. Goulburn 1812 
J. H. Addington onwards 
Secretary at War 
Richard Fitzpatrick 30 March 1807 
J. M. Pulteney 27 June 1809 
I ord Gower 27 October 1809 
Viscount Palmerston onwards 
Deputy Secretary at War 
Francis Moore January 1810 
William Merry onwards 
257 
A12Wndix B: Regimental Titles 
Drazoon Guards 
I st (King's) 5d(Princess Charlotte of Wales') 
2ý1 (Queen's) e (Carabiniers) 
Yd (Prince of Wales') 7h (Princess Royal's) 
4'h (Royal Irish) 
Dmp, oons 
I'(Royal) Wh (Queen's) 
2"a (Royal North British) (Royal Scots Grey) Oh (Imiskilling) 
3 Fd (King's Own) 
Light DraMns 
7'h (Queen's Own Hussars) 17'h 
8ý4 (Royal hish) 18'h (King's Hussars) 
9th I 91h 
I O'h (Prince of Wales' Own Hussars) 20'h 
I jib 21' (or Yorkshire) 
12d'(Prince of Wales') 22nd 
1P 23d 
10 (Duchess of York's Own) 20 
151b (King's Hussars) 25'h 
1e (Queen's) 
Foot Guards 
V0 815 Grenadier Guards) 2d(Coldstream) 
P (Scots) 
Line ReQiments 
I" (Royal; 1812 Royal Scots) 53d (Shropshire) 
2"d (Queen's Royal) 54h (West Norfolk) 
P (East Kent) (Buffs) 55h (Westmoreland) 
4'h (King's Own Lancaster) 56h (West Essex) 
5* (Northumberland) 57h (West Middlesex) 
e (1' Warwickshire) 58h (Rutiandshire) 
7'h (Royal Fusiliers) 59th (2 nd Nottinghamshire) 
gth (King's) 60'h (Royal American) 
9'h (East Norfolk) 61" (South Gloucestershire) 
I& (North Lincoln) 62d (Wiltshire) 
I 11b (North Devon) 6P (West Suffolk) 
12'h (East Suffolk) 64d(2m Staffordshire) 
13d'(I" Somersetshire) 656'(2nd Yorkshire North Riding) 
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14'h (Bedfordshire; 1809 Buckinghamshire) 66h (Berkshire) 
15d'(Yorkshire East Riding) 67h (South Hampshire) 
16d'(Buckingbamshire; 1809 Bedfordshire) 68* (Durham, 1808 Durham Light Infantry) 
17& (Leicestershire) 69h (South Lincolnshire) 
18'h (Royal Irish) 70d(Surrey-, 1812 Glasgow Lowland) 
7V (Highland-, 1808 Glasgow Highland, 1809 
19d'(1 " Yorkshire North Riding) Glasgow Highland Light Infantry; 18 10 Highland 
Light Infantry) 
20'b (East Devonshire) 7Vd (Highland pre 1809) (Seaforth Highlanders) 
21* (Royal North British Fusiliers) 73d (Highland pre 1809) (Perthshire Highlanders) 
22'd (Cheshire) 74h (Highland pre 1809) 
23'd (Royal Welsh Fusiliers) 75d(Highland. pre 1809) (Stirlingshire Highlanders) 
246'(2! 'd Warwickshire) 76h (Hindoostan, 1807-12) 
25'h (King's Own Borderers) 77d(East Middlesex) 
26! h (Cameronians) 78h (Highland) (Ross-shire Buffs) 
27ýý (Enniskillen) 79h (Cameron Highlanders) 
28dk (North Gloucester) 8e (Staffordshire Volunteers) 
29'h (Worcestershire) 813, 
30d'(Carnbridgeshire) 82d (Prince of Wales' Volunteers) 
3 1' (Huntingdonshire) 83d 
32nd (Cornwall) 84 th (18099 York and Lancaster) 
33'd (0 Yorkshire West Riding) 85h (Buckinghamshire Volunteers; 1808, Buckinghamshire Volunteer Light Infantry) 
30 (Cumberland) 86d(1 809, Lcinster, 1812 Royal County Down) 
35'h (Sussex) 87'h 
(Prince of Wales' Irish; 1811. Prince of 
' Wales Own Irish) 
36d'(Herefordshire) 88'h (Connaught Rangers) 
37d'(North Hampshire) 89& 
38d'(1* Staffordshire) 90'h (Perthshire Volunteers) 
39'h (Dorsetshire) 91" (Argyllshire Highlanders pre 1809) 
40* (Vd Somersetshire) 9Vd (Highland) (Gordon Highlanders) 
41' 93d (Highland) (Sutherland Highlanders) 
42nd (Royal Highland) (Black Watch) 94d(Scotch Brigade) 
43'd (Morunouthshire Light Infimtry) 95h (Rifles) 
44* (East Essex) 96d' 
45'h (Nottinghamshire) 97d(Queen's Own Germans; 1808 Queen's Own) 
466ý (South Devonshire) 98th 
47d'(Lancashire) 99h (1811, Prince of Wales' Tipperary) 
48fl'(Northamptonshire) 100'h (1812, Prince Regent's County of Dublin) 
49th (Hertfordshire) 10 0 (Duke of York's Irish) 
50th (West Kent) 10TO 
51" (2nd Yorkshire West Riding; 1809 2d 103 rd Yorkshire West Riding Light Infantry) 
52'd (Oxfordshire Light Infantry) 100 
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Appendix C: Details of the establishment of 
additional battalions to Line regiments. 
Unit Date Details 
3/1' 1804 Scottish Additional Force Men 
4/1$' 1804 Scottish Additional Force Men 
2j3td 1803-04 Middlesex Army of Reserve and Additional Force (hereafter limited 
service men) 
2/4'h 25/12/1804 Letter of service to Earl Chatham 
2/5'h 1803-04 Sussex limited service men 
2/6 di 1803-04 Lancashire limited service men 
2/7th 1803-04 West Riding limited service men 
2/8d' 1803-04 West Riding limited service men 
2i9th 1803-04 Dorset and Somerset limited service men 
2/1 & 1803-04 Essex limited service men 
2/1 Ith 3/10/1808 From Irish militia volunteers, by 1807 Act 
2/12! h 25/12/1811 Established from recruiting company of Ille (in East Indies) 
2/10 1803-04 Buckinghamshire, Bedfordshire and Northamptonshire limited service 
men 
3/14d' 25/12/1813 From militia volunteers by 1811 Act 
2/15di 1803-04 East Riding limited service men 
2/18(h 1803-04 Irish limited service men 
V2 I" 1803-04 Ayr and Renfi-ew limited service men 
2=m lOt2/1814 From militia volunteers by 1811 Act 
2/23'd 1803-04 Welsh limited service men 
2/24'h 1803-04 Warwickshire limited service men 
2/251h 1803-04 Cumberland and Westmoreland limited service men 
2/26'h 1803-04 'Certain Scottish counties' limited service men 
2/27'h 1803-04 Irish limited service men 
3/27'h 1803-04 Irish limited service men 
2/28'b 1803-04 Irish limited service men 
2/3e 1803-04 'Certain English counties' limited service men 
2/3 I't 1803-04 Cheshire limited service men 
2/32nd 1803-04 Cornish limited service men 
2/34'h 25/4/1805 From militia volunteers by 1805 Act 
2/35'h 25/4/1805 From militia volunteers by 1805 Act 
2/361h 1803-04 Durham limited service men 
2/37'h 25/5/1813 From militia volunteers by 1811 Act. 
2/381h 1803-04 Stafford limited service men 
2/39'h 1803-04 Cheshire, Shropshire, Warwickshire and Worcestershire limited service 
men 
2/400' 25/12/1804 Dorset and Somerset limited service men 
2/42'd 9n/1803 Scottish limited service men 
2/43'd 25/12/1804 Worcester limited service men 
2/44'h 9t7/1803 Irish limited service men 
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unit Date Details 
2/450' 25/12/1804 Nottinghamshire and Rutland limited service men 
2/47ýý 9/7/1803 Essex, Norfolk and Suffolk limited service men 
2/48th 9/7/1803 Cumberland, Westmoreland and Lancashire limited service men 
2150ýý 1803-04 Gloucestershire limited service men 
2/5Td 1803-04 Hertfordshire, Oxfordshire, and Berkshire limited service men 
2/53'd 1803-04 Yorkshire limited service men 
215e 1803-04 Surrey limited service men 
2/57d' 1803-04 Kent, Surrey, and Sussex Army of Reserve, Kent and Cinque Ports 
Additional Force 
2/58'h 1803-04 Irish Amy of reserve, Cork and Kerry Additional Force 
2/50ý 1803-b4 Derbyshire limited service men 
2/61* 1803-04 Durham, Northumberland Army of Reserve; Northumberland Additional 
Force 
2/62ýd 1803-04 Wiltshire Army of Reserve 
2/63'd 1803 Suffolk Army of Reserve 
2/66'h 1803-04 'Certain English counties' Army of Reserve; Hampshire Additional Force 
2/67* 1803-04 Irish limited service men 
2/69th 1803-04 'Certain English counties' Army of Reserve; Lincolnshire Additional 
Force 
2/71* 1803 Scottish Army of Reserve 
VWd 1804 Aberdeen Additional Force 
2/73'd 24/12/1808 Established from recruiting companyofinYd (in East Indies) 
2178"' 6/12/1804 Letter of Service to Maj. Gen. Fraser to raise a battalion in Scotland. 
2179th 23/3/1805 Letter of Service to Col. Cameron to raise a battalion in Scotland. 
2/81" 1803-04 Welsh limited service men 
2/82nd 1804 Tower Hamlets Additional Force 
2/831d 1804 Middlesex Additional Force 
2j841h 2514/1808 Established from recruiting company of 1/80 (in East Indies) 
21870h 1804 Irish Additional Force 
2/8e 1804 Irish Additional Force 
2/89th 1804 Irish Additional Force 
2/90th 1804 Monmouth, Brecon and Glamorgan Additional Force 
2/91' 1804 Argyll, Bute, and Perth Additional Force 
2/9Td 1803-04 Scottish limited service men 
3/95t" 1/4/1809 Militia volunteers under 1809 Act 
2/96di 1804 Cardigan, Carmarthen and Pembroke Additional Force 
Sources: W0380/14 
261 
ApWndix D: Recruiting Districts in the UK, 1809 
Notes 
District headquarters are underlined. 
Until May 1808 there was a recruiting district centred on Marlborough, comprising of 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, Oxfordshire and Berkshire, which was later adjusted to the 
Gloucester recruiting district as depicted above. (W03/594, Calvert to Taylor, 18 May 1808). 
In 1812 the Carlisle and Durham districts were consildated (W03/585, Circular by Darting, 3 
January 1812). 
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Appendix E: Recruiting Yield in 1809 Compared to 
1811 Male Population 
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District Recruits ERO recruits Total Recruits Male Population Recruits per 
- 
1000 males 
F Manchester 1 1,80 150 1,956 504,945 3.87 
Inverness 371 12 383 139,525 - 2.75 
Birmingham 740 42 782 330,978 2.36 
Ireland 4,871 780 5,651 2,745,656 2.06 
I Aberdeen 224 224 120,890 1.85 
London 1,197 5 1,202 662,922 1.81 
Edinburgh 491 5 496 314,929 1.57 
Bury 450 3 453 306,833 IA8 
Carlisle 112 15 127 87,271 1.46 
Nottingham 380 4 384 295,504 1.30 
Glasgow 311 4 315 253,367 1.24 
Leeds 545 7 552 477,728 1.16 
Wells 461 24 485 434,257 1.12 
Gloucester 376 4 380 359,011 1.06 
Bedford 221 1 272 224,886 0.99 
Durham 87 13 100 114,056 0.88 
Southampton 230 42 272 323,051 0.84 
Maidstone 99 56 155 240,058 6 0, 
Hereford 134 15 149 233,679 0.64 
Shrewsbury 117 117 230,187 0.5 1 
Notes: 
3,576 recruits were enlisted at regimental headquarters. 
The population of Ireland was 5,937,856 in 1811, and the percentage of males to total 
population in the rest of the UK was 46.2398618%, so, assuming Ireland had the same ratio 
gives a male population of 2,745,656; K. H. Connel, The Population oflrelancZ 1750-1845, 
(Oxford, 1950), p. 5. 
The London district includes the population of the following areas: Blackheath, Bromney and 
Beckenham, Little and Lessness, and Ruxley hundreds, the boroughs of Greenwich, Deptford 
and Woolwich in Kent; in Essex, the hundreds of Becontree, Ilavering Liberty, Chafford, 
Waltham and Ongar, Watford in Hertfordshire. 
Ile Wells district includes Bradford hundred in Wiltshire. 
'Me Gloucester district includes Malmesbury, Highworth Cricklead and Staple, Kingsbridge, 
Ramsbury, Selkley, Calne, Chippenhwn hundreds, the borough of Marlborough, and the 
parishes of Wroughton and Little Hinton in Elstub and Everly hundred, all from Wiltshire. 
Sources: 1811 Census; WO25/3224, Return of Average number of Regimental Parties from 
25 June 1808 to 24 June 1809, AG, 19 October 1809; Thomas Dix, A Complete Atlas of 
English Counties, (London, 1822). 
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Appendix F: Percentage of Militia Volunteer Ouotas 
Completed, 1807 to 1813 
Regiment Attitude to 1807 Plan 
Percentage of Volunteer Quotas 
Completed 
1807 1809 1811 1812 1813 ý- !2 
54 
ý2 -M 
0 
w 5 
0 U MW 
.5E 
w "a 
V 
1 
0. 
0 
in. 0 
Anglesey Against I 00. (YYO 100.0% 100.01/0 100. 1000/6 49 1 25 62.3% 7.5% 33.01/o 
Bedford For 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 201 02 113.1% 18.4% 26.8% 
Berkshire 
For, a 
wann 
supporter 
100.01YO 100.0% I 1 00.01YO 100.0% 100.00/0 350 171 100.0% 35.8% 27.2% 
Buckinghamshire Against 100.0% 100.00/0 100.0% 1100.0% 
100.0% 238 179 
1 
75.0% 
120.7% 
25.9%1 
Cambridgeshire For 100.0% 100.00/0 100.00/0 100.0% 100.01/0 396 101 1 111.3% 131.1% 38.0% 
Cardigan 1) ý. S "o 40.21ý',, 7N. 35.7"/,. 35.7%., 36 167 93.5% 10.1% 28.5% 
Carmarthen Against 5(). '71! /,, 35.3% '78.6'Vo 20.2%o 36.7% 97 138 62.5% 3.5% 19.1% 
Carnarvon 100.0% 100.00/0 1100.01/0 100.01/0 100.0% 53 34 73.2% 18.6% 27.1% 
Cheshire 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 291 352 78.2% 12.9% 26.5% 
Cornwall 100.0% 1000/0 100.00/0 100.01YO 100.01/0 181 235 69.2% 13.3% 22.8% 
Cornish Miners 100.0% 100.0% 7.0% 33.8% 
Cumberland 1 35.3111;. 31.8(1/,, 5.711/ý, 25.4",,. 151 156 53.8% 1 8.2% 27.0% 
Denbigh 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 237 104 106.8% 12.1% 24.2% 
Derby 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 551 196 83.2% 11.6% 19.1% 
East Devon 36.71ýý, 133.0% 56.31'., 2 1.1 11 . 33.0",, 
295 37 
1 
70.9% 22.1% 25.3%, 
North Devon 100.0% 67.91% 80.71ý/,. 1 27.6%,, 35.7'ý/,, 196 231 91.2% 17.9% 17.2%1 
South Devon 100.0% 65.1% 100.0% 98.0", 98 (, ",, 
. 
419 51 100.4% 1 19.6% 24.3%1 
Dorset 100.0% S-1.1111, 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%1 368 56 111.1% 18.8% 26.1% 
Durham For 100.0% 100.00/0 100.0% 100.0% 179 165 75.3% 16.7% 28.0% 
East Essex 
1 
100.00/0 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 264 186 77.9% 27.9% 37.4%1 
West Essex 100.00/0 100.00/0 100.00/0 100.00/0 100.00/0 409 169 100.1% 24. (YYo 24.2% 
Flint 100.00/0 100.00/0 100.0% 100.0% 90.6% 65 110 93.8% 15.2% 30.5% 
Glamorgan 100.0%, 98,111.1 100.0%1 100.0% 100.01/0 273 161 116.0% 23.6% 23.1% 
North Gloucester 100.00/01 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 455 116 
_ 
127.5% 
- 
14.5% 26.1 % 
South Gloucester Against 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 458 108 1 89.5% 1 18.1% 31.91/6 
North Hampshire 100-09/0 100.0% 100-01/0 100.01% 1000/0 355 45 1 101.6% 25.4%1 41.6'Yo 
South Hampshire I 00.01YO 100.09/0 1 00. (Yyol 100.00/0 100.00/0 282 91 1 110.1% 13.61/a 3 1.01/6 
Hampshire Isle 
of Wight 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
I 
100.0% 100.0% 108 11 210.1% 6.0% 16.0% 
Hertfordshire For 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%1 100.0% 7(). 4", 426 0 95.6% 33.5% 28.8% 
Herefordshire For 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 322 174 102.7% 27.9% 33.3% 
Huntingdonshire 100.0% 100.00 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%1 153 F29 1 123.3%1 39.2%1 22.9ý/o 
East Kent 
- 
100 . (r/O 
I 
100 - 0*/0 1000/0 100.00% 100.00/61 427 
1 20 1 97.1% 1 18.41/ý 25.6%1 
265 
"a 
Percentage of Volunteer Quotas 4 S2 
"a 
R 
V 
('. 0 
0= 
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9 
C' 
0 (U U 
(U 
U 
1807 1809 1811 1812 180 ý I 0 
West Kent Generally 100 0% 100 0% 100 0% 100 0% IWQII'ý 1121 0 150 9% 31 9% 30 1% for . . . . . . . 
I' Lancashire 100.00/0 100.01/0 100. (YYO 100.01/0 100.0'Yol 336 297 83.8% 12.5% 12.5% 
2"d Lancashire Against 100.0% -5.6"o 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 363 307 88.8% 25.1% 25.0% 
3rd Lancashire 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1 100.0% 100.0% 236 342 1 76.6% 17.2%1 27.7%1 
Leicestershire For 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 297 227 87.8% 22.8% 23.5% 
North 
Lincolnshire For 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 90.1)11(ý 255 166 66.3% 22.2% 30.8% I 
South 
Lincolnshire 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 98.0% 453 114 89.3% 33.7% 30.6% 
I 
East London 3.4% 29.6%1 
West London 13.0% 34.4%1 
Merioneth 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1 29 53 73.0% 13.5% 30.6% 
East Middlesex For 100. (YYO 100.00/0 100.00/0 100.01/0 100.00/0 1402 17 150.90/0 26.2% 33.7% 
West Middlesex 100.00/0 100.00/0 100.00/0 1 00. (YYO 100.00/0 550 271 87.3% 36.3% 45.6% 
Middlese x 
Westminster Against 100.0%1 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.00/0 261 367 66.8% 34.3% 52.01 
Monmouth & 
Brecon 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 382 
I 
124 109.7% 28.4% 27.1% 
Montgomery 100.0% 100.0%1 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 159 79 91.9% 36.8%1 40.0% 
East Norfolk 100.0% 31.2"/o 44.1%, 28. `Vo 30.0%, 203 150 62.9% 1 24.8% 33.0% 
West Norfolk Against 100.0% 63.0('ý, 91.70o 1)4.111(ý 100.0% 623 74 1124.1% 18.4% 27.7%1 
Northampton- 
shire 
100.0%1 100.0% 100.0%1 1) ", 1 100.0% 1454 8 68.7% 23.6% 31.0% 
Northumberland 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 143 260 66.9% 17.3% 33.0% 
Nottinghamshire For 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 296 218 98.1% 14.2% 23.5% 
Oxford 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 290 275 100.99/0 29.5% 27.3% 
Pembroke For 11.61ýý, 
1 
22.211, /ý. 2 2. S'V,, 
1 
19 115 98.1% 20.5%1 19.2%, 
Radnor 100.00/01 1 00. (YYO 100.0%1 100.00/0 100.0% 43 45 67.7% 23.9% 27.4% 
Rutland 100.0% 40.0"/o 100.0% 38.21ý,, 48.0%, 71 01 92.1% 15.5% 52.4% 
Salop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 260 262 _ 56.7% 27.3% 30.9% 
1' Somerset 100.0% 98 "', 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%1 336 402 98.1% 22.1%1 31.9% 
2nd Somerset 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%1 629 137 110.6% 26.4% 28.8% 
Staffordshire 100.0% 1000yo 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%1 674 378 100.0% 15.7% 31.1% 
East Suffolk For 100-01/0 100.0% 100-00/0 100.0% 100.00/ol 514 0 106.2% 29.7% 35.3%, 
For, a 
West Suffolk warm 84.4"/,. 100.0% 100.0% 15.00/4 
I 
251 197 92.6% 14.3% 33.6% 
supporter 
I 
1 `4 Surrey For 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 388 177 91.1% 44.4% 35.4% 
2'd Surrey For 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 414, 175, 95.0% 1 27.4%1 38.0% 
Sussex 1 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.00/6 100.0% 481 1 222 1 94.3% 1 17.71/61 35.09%1 
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0 0 
U 
2 
Q 
(U 
1807 1809 1811 1812 1813 00 ý 1 
U 0. U 0. ý, a, 
-. ' -0 
I" Tower 100 0% 
I 
43.0"',. 33.21114 33.511% 2(). S"/.. 431 139 109.6% 28.9% 34.8% Hamlets . 1 
, 
2"d Tower 100 0% 100 0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 589 79 128.5% 16.4% 40.6% Hamlets . . 1 
Warwick For 100.0% 55.9"/o 91 S" ý, 100.0% 100.0% 520 319 105.9% 14.6% 31.1% 
Westmoreland For ()0 7"', 30.3"1., 49.4"ý- ; -. 4-,, 163 75 105.5% 17.0% 30.6% 
Wiltshire 100.00/0 100.0% 100.01/0 100.0% 100.00/0 337 291 73.8% 1 23.6% 32.0%1 
Worcester 100.0% 100.00/0 100.0% 100.01/0 100.0%1 169 290 80.2% 1 19.8% 34.5% 
Yorkshire East 100 0% 0% 100 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 206 182 74.1% 22.9% 48.7% Riding . . 
1 
I' Yorkshire Against 42.9"/,, 2.6 56.911/4, 
I 
24.0'ý/o 35.3"o 325 164 
I 
65.0% 
I 
1.7% 18.7% 
West Riding 
I I 
2"d Yorkshire 100 0% 0% 100 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 463 285 99.5% 14.1% 23.3% West Riding . . 
1 
3'd Yorkshire Against 100.0% 64.4%o c),. 6')(, 82.4"% 62.5-4 282 233 68.5% 13.7% 26.2% West Riding 
Yorkshire North Against 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 728 132 101.7% 10.6%1 30.7%1 Riding I 
Antrim 100.0%1 411 257 110.1% 
1 
10.3% 30.5% 
Armagh 1 495 24 85.6% 6.9% 21.5% 
Carlow 100.0% 333 63 100.8% 11.9% 28.0% 
Cavan )ý 416 0. 91.3% 14.1%1 45.8%1 
Clare 100.0% 
1 
481 
.0 
105.5% 20.8% 25.3% 
Cork City 100.0% 507 0 100.0% 14.4% 35.1% 
North Cork 100.00/0 1 567 0 111.8% 3 L(YV6 45.0%1 
South Cork 1000/10 683 14 114.9% 12.3% 38.1% 
Donegal 100.0% 1 672 0 106.2% 12.7% 31.2% 
North Down 100.00/0 
1 
245 245 107.91/6 4.3% 27.2% 
South Down 100.0% 246 1 78 71.4% 113.9% 33.2%, 
Dublin City 100.0% 412 6 68.9% 18.1% 38.8% 
Dublin County 100.0% 596 0 130.8% 10.1% 39.41/0 
Fermanagh 0'. 1 "o 459 0 120.4% 15.7% 36.3% 
Galway 100.0% 776 56 109.9% 22.5% 
131.3%, 
Kerry 35,. O-o 445 57 90.6% 9.3% 48.1% 
Kildare 100.0% 
1 
349 6 111.6% 11.2% 30.1% 
Kilkenny (), ) 011 11 543 0 89.5% 25.6% 34.01/,, 
King's 100.0% 
1 
631 0 104.0% 28.3% 
126.4% 
Leitrim 385 4 94.8% 18.7% 28.1% 
Limerick City 100.0% 
1 
13 102.9% 25.1% 31.9% 
Limerick County QO. Pl. 601 19 102.2% 
-19.1% 
29.1% 
Londonderry 100.0% 727 51 102.7% 111.5% 132.3% 
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Longford 26.7/1. 364 15 99.4% 19.1%1 27.9% 
Louth 73.4'ý, o 472 216 100.4% 8.1% 19.7% 
North Mayo 87.9%, 396 0 79.4% 11.7% 26.7% 
South Mayo 10O. W01 600 3 113.5% 20.7% 29.2%, 
Meath 100.00/0 1 534 0 88.0% 5.6% 19.6%1 
Monaghan 100.00/0 365 0 63.1% 15.2% 37.9% 
Queen's 100.0% 374 26 87.8% 18.0% 28.3% 
Roscommon 100.0% 747 0 123.2% 28.9% 33.0% 
Sligo ( -. ; 1! ,, 297 20 74.1% 25.4%1 30.5%1 
Tipperary 100.0% 842 9 112.4% 7.3% 25.0% 
Tyrone 100.0%1 569 0 80.8% 10.6% 39.0% 
Waterford 100. (r/O 435 0 85.8% 15.3% 31.9% 
Westmeath 100.0% 447 94 
1 118.7% 14.7%1 32.7% 
Wexford 100.0% 246 3091 73.3% 11.3% 23.4% 
Wicklow 100.0%1 516 01 113.2% 13.6% 33.3% 
Aberdeen so. w-o 1 32.9", /,. ILY! 14 20.4`ý, 111 211 54.2% 18.0% 37.2% 
Argyll & Bute 100.0%1 65. Pý/, ý 47.2", /,, 50.0"/'o 35.71ý,, 88 155 62.4% 20.3%1 31.7% 
Ayr Against 100-0, /01 100.00/0 100.0, /01 100.0% 100.0% 232, 1701 99.3% 14.6% 24.3% 
Berwick, 
Haddington, 100.0% ()1.7"/4 89.7'Vii 90,5"o 79.0'! /o 291 118 98.3% 18.4% 27.2% Linlithgow & 
Peebles 
DumfHes, 
Roxburgh & 57.811% 37.71ý., 53.3",, 'o 42. Pý'o 313 76 86.0% 12.1% 39.9% 
Selkirk 
1 1 
Edinburgh 84.21', 1o 49.311, /o 41.3'V,, 285 137 
1 95.5% 15.5% 29.1% 
Fife 100.0%1 80.3'ýý, 100,0% 1 72.51ýý, 67.0%, 148 221 
1 82.1% 19.7% 20.5% 
Forfar & 20.3'ýý. 110 234 46.5% 10.0% 24.2% 
Kincardine 
Inverness, BantT, 79 411% 9 3" o 35 7",,, ý. 30.1",, 24.5'!, ý 131 
I 
256 56.0% 10.5% 38.6% 
Elgin & Nairn . . . 
1 
Kirkcudbright & 100 0% 51.,, 65 100 0% 100 0% 100 0% 176 102 110.9% 18.4% 
128.6% 
Wigton . . . 
1 
. . 
Lanark Against 10.1--, 40.61! /, o 26.3%. 24.5'! /,, 187 229 59.7% 8.0% 
118.8%, 
Perth Against 100.0% 72.0'1, /ý, 100.0% 89.211% 1; 7.1"//.. 167 324 1 81.0% 14.6% 26.6%1 
Renfrew 100.0% 74.41ýý, 78.41/'o 22.81'/ý, 34.71ýo 177 56 1 62.1% 11.7% 16.4% 
Ross, Caithness, 
Sutherland & 85.5"/'o 54.9"/o 32.1"/o 30.1"Iý, 29.1)'! /o 187 156 69.2% 27.0% 24.3% 
Cromarty 
Stirling, 
Dumbarton, 0", /o 88 41 2 100 0% 5 8"//., 78 6'! ý. 240 139 88.5% 18.5% Clackmannon & . . . . . 
Kinross I I 
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Appgndix G: Regiments Sampled from W027. 
Regular Regiments Sampled 
1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 
Corps (WO27/ (WO271 (WO27/ (WO27/ (WO27/ (WO27/ (WO27/ (WO27/ (WO27/ 
91) 92) 94,96- 98-101) 102- 106- 116- 126- 134) 
97) 105) 113) 123) 128) 
10 Life Guards 
2"d Life Guards I 
Royal Horse 1/3/07 19/5/09 Guards 
Depot, Royal 22/10/13 Horse Guards 
I" Dragoon 1/3/07 31 t7/09 Guards 
2 ad Dragoon 12/5/09 26/5/13 2/6/15 Guards 
3rd Dragoon 
Guards 16/4/07 12/5/08 18t7/15 
Depot, P 
Dragoon Guards 
Wh Dragoon 
Guards 15111110 
5d'Dragoon 13/6/10 Guards 
Depot, 5d' 
Dragoon Guards 
6di Dragoon 
Guards 16M12 
7d'Dragoon 16110/ 11 Guards 
10 Dragoons 
Depot, Ist 
Dragoons 
2"d Dragoons 
P Dragoons 1/4/07 6/5/08 5/5/09 7/5/11 
Depot, 3 fd 
Dragoons 
4'h Dragoons 1/4/07 7/5/08 
Depot, 4d' 
Dragoons 
6d' Dragoons 15/6/14 
7th Light 
Dragoons 1/4/07 16/5/08 27/4/13 
S'h Light 
Dragoons 9/5/15 
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1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 
COTPS (WO27/ (WO27/ (WO271 (WO27/ (WO27/ (W027/ (WO27/ (WO27/ (WO27/ 
91) 92) 94,96- 98-101) 102- 106- 116- 126- 134) 
97) 105) 113) 123) 128) 
9'h Light 
DTagoons, 
Depot 9'h Light 
DTagoons 
10d'Light 
Drdgoons 26/5/09 V7111 15/5/12 
Depot, 101 
Light Dragoons 
II dLight 10/5/14 Dragoons 
Depot, 11* 
Light Dragoons 
12ý Light 
Dragoons 
Depot, 12"' 
Light Dragoons 
13'h Light 
DTagoons 28/4/07 1 IM08 30/5/09 
Depot, 13'h 
Light Dragoons 
10 Light 
Dragoons 
Depo4 14'h 
Light Dragoons 
15d'Light 21/5110 Dragoons 
Depotý 15'h 
Light Dmgoons 
I Oh Light 
Dragoons 
Depolý l6d' 
Light Dragoons 
17d'Light 
Dragoons 
I 8'h Light 12/5/10 Dragoons 
Depot, 18'h 
Light Dragoons 
19'h Light 
Dragoons 1/4/08 19/6/15 
Depo4 19'h 
Light Dragoons 
20h Light 
Dragoons 4/5/08 
21" Light 
Dragoons 1/3/07 6/5/08 8/5/10 21/5/12 23/5/14 
22'd Light 
Dragoons 25/3/13 
23'd Light 
Dmgoons 1415111 11/5/12 
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Corps 
1807 
(WO27/ 
91) 
1808 
(WO27/ 
92) 
1809 
(WO27/ 
94,96- 
97) 
1810 
(WO27/ 
98-101) 
1811 
(WO27/ 
102- 
105) 
1812 
(WO27/ 
106- 
113) 
1813' 
(WO27/ 
116- 
123) 
1814 
(W027/ 
126- 
128) 
1815 
(WO27/ 
134) 
24'h Light 
Dragoons 15/12/09 1 4/11/11 16/10/13 
25d'Light 
Dragoons 
1/1"Foot 
Guards 19/5/11 
2/1 " Foot 
Guards 1/6/10 21/8/15 
3/1' Foot 
Guards 
1/? d Foot 
Guards 6/5/14 
2Y2ý Foot 
Guards 
1/3 rd Foot 
Guards 15/8/13 
2/3 fd Foot 
Guards 1/5/09 27/4/12 
1/1" Foot 14/5/08 
2/1" Foot 
3/1'0 Foot 1/5/09 
4/1 " Foot 19/5/071 17/5/09 
1 
14/6/10 15/6/121 
2"" Foot 1 1/5/08 11/5/121 22/4/151 
1/3 rd Foot 13/5/12 
2/3'd Foot 19/4/08 1/5/09 21/5/14 
1/0 Foot 17/5/10 
2/4'h Foot 11/3/07 1/5/08 27/5/09 1415111 5/7/13 
1/5d'Foot 1/5/13 
2/5 dFoot 
1/6'h Foot 1/4/07 14/5/09 24/4/151 
2/6 dFoot 1/4/07 2315/08 1/5/09 2/5/14 
ind, Foot 1 30/6/9 1 7/6/10 1 12/4/13 
2f1d'Foot 
1/8d'Foot 27/6/08 4n1lO 
2ad'Foot 115110 1616111 
1/9* Foot 
2/9d'Foot 11/5/12 
1/10th Foot 28/3/071 
2/1 Od'Foot I lonno 
1/1 IdFoot 14/4/071 
2/1 It" Foot 
. 
11/5/14 
12d'Foot 14/10/11 
13'h Foot 18/4/07 25/5/12 2515115 
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Corps 
1807 
(WO27/ 
91) 
1808 
(WO27/ 
92) 
1809 
(WO27/ 
94,96- 
97) 
1810 
(WO27/ 
98-101) 
1811 
(WO27/ 
102- 
105) 
1812 
(WO27/ 
106- 
113) 
1813 
(WO27/ 
116- 
123) 
1814 
(WO27/ 
126- 
128) 
1815 
(WO27/ 
134) 
1/14'h Foot 7/4/09 
2/10 Foot 
3/14'h Foot 
11151h Foot 1/5/08 515110 
2/15th Foot 
16'h Foot 24/5/08 
17d'Foot 
A 
1 30/11/11 
1/18'h Foot 29/5/07 
2/18'h Foot 6/5/11 
1 91h Foot 
20'h Foot 25/5/09 1 19/5/10 12/4/13 
lf2ls'Foot 10/3/15 
V2 I" Foot 2/7/12 
22ý4 Foot 6/5/09 
MP Foot 1 11/8/08 25/5/12 12/4/13 
MP Foot 1 
1/24 th Foot 29/4/071 
2/24'h Foot 1/4/07 8/10/13 
1/251h Foot 16/5/08 12/5/10 19/5113 
2/25 th Foot 10/5107 1/5/09 27/4/14 
lf26'h Foot 19/5/10 3/5/11 18/8/12 28/4/14 
2/26'h Foot 
V27'h Foot 
2/27'h Foot 
3/27'h Foot 18/5/15 
M28'h Foot 21/6/10 21/5/11 
=8'h Foot 
29'h Foot 15/12/11 
1/30 Foot 30/6/15 
2/301h Foot 
1/3 1" Foot 
2/3 0 Foot 5/4/07 
1/32 nd Foot 11/5/09 11/5/12 
2/32nd Foot 5/5/08 
33'd Foot 15/6/08 
1/34'h Foot 
2/34'h Foot 315108 1/5/09 12/5/12 
1/35d'Foot 
2/35 lh Foot 23/5/08 
1/36b Foot 
1 
24/5/09 11/5/12 
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Corps 
1807 
(WO27/ 
91) 
1808 
(WO27/ 
92) 
1809 
(WO27/ 
94,96- 
97) 
1810 
(WO27/ 
98-101) 
1811 
(WO27/ 
102- 
105) 
1812 
(WO27/ 
106- 
113) 
1813 
(WO27/ 
116- 
123) 
1814 
(WO27/ 
126- 
128) 
1815 
(W027/ 
134) 
2/36'b Foot 8/6/08 26/4/11 7/5/13 3/5/14 
1/376'Foot 18/5/08 
2/37'h Foot 
1/38d'Foot 
2/38'h Foot 1 
23/5/14 
1/39d'Foot 5/6/07 6/5/13 
2/39'h Foot 21/4/08 
1/401h Foot 
2/40d'Foot I 
41'Foot 22/5/15 
1/42 nd Foot 168/07 1/5/09 
2/42ýd Foot 27/5/07 
1/43'd Foot 25/4/07 1 
10/5/08 
2/43'd Foot 23/4/07 5/5/08 25/5/09 3015111 1 
1/44d'Foot 2/3/07 
2/44 dFoot 515108 
1/45 th Foot 
2/45d'Foot 5/6/08 115111 
46d'Foot 
1/47d'Foot 
2/47"' Foot 11/6107 11/6/08 9/5/09 26/5/11 
1/481h Foot 17/3/07, 8/5/09 
2148 th Foot I 1 
1 
49'h Foot 17/31071 
1/50th Foot 7/5/12 
2/50* Foot 20/3/07 23/5/08 1415111 1 19/5/14 
51" Foot 23/4108 1 
22/5/12 
1/52'd Foot I 
2/52"d Foot 1815110 26/4/14 
1/53'd Foot 29/2/08 
2/53'd Foot 1 18/4/15 
50 Foot 17/5/07 25/4/14 
55d'Foot 9/3/07 
1/56d'Foot 
215e Foot 28/5/101 1 31/5/13 
3/56'h Foot 17/5/14 
1/57d'Foot 14/5/12 
2/57d'Foot 8/5/08 1 
1/58 th Foot 
2/58dFoot I 
-I -I I I 
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Corps 
1807 
(WO27/ 
91) 
1808 
(WO27/ 
92) 
1809 
(WO27/ 
94,96- 
97) 
1810 
(WO27/ 
98-101) 
1811 
(WO27/ 
102- 
105) 
1812 
(WO27/ 
106- 
113) 
1813 
(WO27/ 
116- 
123) 
1814 
(WO27/ 
126- 
128) 
1815 
(WO27/ 
134) 
1150 Foot 
2/59'b Foot 
1/600'Foot 
2/60d'Foot 12/5/10 22/5/12 2/5/14 
3/60* Foot 
4/60'h Foot 
5160'h Foot 5/5/07 
6/0d'Foot 
7/60th Foot 
1/6 1" Foot 10/5/09 19/5/12 
2/61"Foot 6/5/08 
1/62 nd Foot 12/6/15 
2/62nd Foot 21/4/08 
1/63 fd Foot 22/10/11 
2/63'd Foot 
64'h Foot 22/9/13 
65'h Foot 14/3/10 
1/66'h Foot 
2/66'h Foot 10/5/13 
1/67"' Foot 9/5/14 
2/67'h Foot 
68'h Foot 3115111 
1/69d'Foot 4/8/15 
2/69t" Foot 
70fl'Foot 23/11/11 
im Foot 22/4/13 
2/7 1 Foot 
1/72 nd Foot 1/3/07 13/5/08 19/5/09 16n1l 1 10/5/12 2/5/14 
2/72 nd Foot 
InYd Foot 
. 
28/9/11 1/6/15 
2/73'd Foot 
70 Foot 12/7/08 
75d'Foot 
76'h Foot 1/5/08 
77'h Foot 
in8'h Foot 10/5/09 
2/78 th Foot 
inglh Foot 12/6/101 
2/79'h Foot 
80'h Foot 17/5/101 
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Corps 
1807 
(WO27/ 
91) 
1808 
(WO27/ 
92) 
1809 
(WO27/ 
94,96- 
97) 
1810 
(WO27/ 
98-101) 
1811 
(W027/ 
102- 
105) 
1812 
(WO27/ 
106- 
113) 
1813 
(WO27/ 
116- 
123) 
1814 
(WO27/ 
126- 
128) 
1815 
(WO27/ 
134) 
1/8 1" Foot 1 
17/5/15 
2/81"Foot 1515111 27/4/14 
1/82"d Foot 23/5/11 15/5/12 
2/82'd Foot 
1/83'd Foot 15/07 1415111 26/5/14 
2/83'd Foot 
1/84" Foot 28/6/15 
2/80 Foot 
85'h Foot 7/4/07 9/5/09 31/5/13 
86'h Foot 11/5/09 24/10/11 
1/876ý Foot 
2/87d'Foot 11/4/07 
1/88th Foot 
2/88'h Foot 14/61101 9/5/12 
1/89d'Foot 
2/89'h Foot 16/5/15, 
1/god'Foot 615/08 
2/901h Foot 1/4/07 
1/9 1 Foot 19/5/09 24/4/11 2/5/12 26/11/13 
2/9 1 Foot 1115115 
1/92'd Foot 23/4/13 
Z192 nd Foot 
93 rd Foot 
94'h Foot 
1/951h Foot 
14/6/14 
(depot) 
2/95'h Foot 5/5/08 1/5/12 
116115 
(depot) 
3/95'h Foot 
ll%'h Foot 12/5/11 
2/96'h Foot 
97'h Foot 1/5/08 
ggd'Foot 614/07 
gqffi Foot 
100th Foot 
101"Foot 22/1/11 
102nd Foot 
103'd Foot 
I (M'b Foot 
Royal West 
Indian Rangers 1315115 
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Militia Regiments Sampled 
Regiment 1807 
(WO27/91) 
1809 
(WO27/95) 
1810 
(WO27/101) 
1811 
(WO27/103) 
Anglesey 
Bedford 
Berkshire 15/4/07 
Buckinghamshire 30/5/07 15/5/09 25/9/10 2/5/11 
Cambridgeshire 3/3107 
Cardigan 
Carmarthen 1 15/5/09 1 4/10/10 17/5/11 
Camarvon. 31/3/07 22/5/09 7/10/10 29/4/11 
Cheshire 14/5/09 
Cornwall 19/5/09 
Cornish Miners 
Cumberland 29/4/07 
Denbigh 
Derby 
East Devon 12/3/07 27/4/09 14/10/10 1415111 
North Devon 1514/07 4/5/09 8/10/10 20/4/11 
South Devon 16/4/07 24/5/09 29/10/10 24/6/11 
Dorset 2/5/09 
Durham 2/6/07 
East Essex 
West Essex 28/3/09 
Flint 
Glamorgan 
North Gloucester 
South Gloucester 
North Hampshire 6/4/09 
South Hampshire 
Hampshire Isle of 
Wight 
Hertfordshire 
Herefordshire 
Iluntingdonshire 
East Kent 
West Kent 1/6/07 
la Lancashire 4/4/07 3/5/09 
2"d Lancashire 21/5/07 
Td Lancashire 2/4/07 
Leicestershire 18/4/07 
North Lincolnshire 2/3107 
South Lincolnshire L- 1 13/5/09 
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Regiment 1807 
(WO27/91) 
1809 
(WO27/95) 
1810 
(WO27/101) 
1811 
(WO27/103) 
East London 
West London 
Merioneth 
East Middlesex 7/4/07 
West Middlesex 6/4/07 28/3/09 
Middlesex 
Westminster 
20/4/07 
Monmouth & Brecon 
Montgomery 
East Norfolk 7/4/07 
West Norfolk 24/4/07 
Northampton-shire 
Northumberland 
Nottinghamshire 
Oxford 
Pembroke 4/3/07 
Radnor 
Rutland 11/5/09 
Salop 
Ig Somerset 
2nd Somerset 
Staffordshire 
East Suffolk 9/5/07 
West Suffolk 8/4/07 23/5/09 
I' Surrey 12/3/09 
2 nd Surrey 
Sussex 26/5/09 
V Tower Hamlets 15/3/09 
2 nd Tower Hamlets 23/3/09 
Warwick 19/5/09 
Westmoreland 27/5/09 
Wiltshire 
Worcester 
Yorkshire East Riding 
I' Yorkshire West 
Riding 
1/5/09 5110110 
2ý Yorkshire West 
Riding 
8/5/07 15/5/09 1/10/10 
3'd Yorkshire West 
Riding 
30/4/07 10/5/09 20/10/10 
Yorkshire North 
Riding 
Aberdeen 26/5/07 
Argyll & Bute 
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Regiment 1807 
(WO27/91) 
1809 
(WO27/95) 
1810 
(WO27/101) 
1811 
(W027/103) 
Ayr 12/3/07 29/5/09 23/10/10 
Berwick, Haddington, 
Linlithgow & Peebles 
Dumfries, Roxburgh & 
Selkirk 
1/5/07 
Edinburgh 19/5/07 
Fife 
Forfar & Kincardine 20/5/07 31/5/09 17/10/10 14/5111 
Inverness, Banfý Elgin 
& Nairn 
30/5107 8/6/09 11/10/10 28/3/11 
Yjrkcudbright & 
Wigton 
Lanark 3/6/07 22/6/09 
Perth 24/4/07 16/5/09 
Renfrew 
Ross, Caithness, 
Sutherland & Cromarty 
Stirling, Dumbarton, 
Clackmannon & 
Kinross 
13/5/07 
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Appendix H: Nationality of Regiments 
1807 Ism IW9 1810 1811 1812 
1813 1814 1815 
7ý 
corps 
I'Life 
Guards 
2' Life 
Guards 
Royal Horse 
Guards 96 
2 0 0 0 
Depot, Royal 0 
H om 
d, 
1 2 
Guards 
2' Dragoon 
Guards 
8(1 0 13 
9 2 7 
3" Dragoon 
Gutirds 
2 8 
2 11 
I- Drgoori I 12 3 3 
Guards 
0 Dragoon 12 1 
Guards 
6' Dragoon 
C. -is - 
7' Drgoott 3S 2 
iCivards 
I' Dragoons 
2- DIralgoorts 
3' Dragoort,; 6 16 8 13 8 Is X, 7 10 - 
4' Dragoorts I(, I 1 3 1 
r 
e Dragoom 
- - - - - - - 
18 3 -1 
7' Light 1 l 2 2 
Dragoorts 
8' Light 39 3 
Light 
10' Light 2 2 
Dragoorts 
I I' Light 
Dragoorts 
12" Light 
D-00- 
13' Light 4 38 37 5 37 
Dragoo. 
14' 1 ýighf 
Dragoorts 
15' Light 3 1 
DragocIrIs 
fglit 
17' Light 7' Light 
)mg, x- Dragoorsi 
18' Light 1 8.1 'gN 38 4 
. u. ourts 
19" Light 1 9- Light 21 17 
Dragoons Umuoons 
2(r Light '(fh I . 8ht 
U 
Drag- D L -s 
. 
7 
21' Light 1 22 
I I 
21 
I I I I 
2 lu t 21 
Dragooris 
. 
22' Light K1 10 7 
Dragooris 
2 1' Light m" 2 11 2 14 
Dragoo,, s 
24' Light 10 11 
DragLIorts 
25* 1 ight 
Draw x- 
1/1' F .4 4 1 
Guitr& 
2/1' KxX 
T 1 
S 4 29 26 44 
Cmards 
3/1' FmI 
C; 
1/2' Foot 
Guards I - 
4 S 
- - 
I- 
170 
- 912 181 1814 
1815 
1307 I BM 1 " 1910 
1 811 1 
'5 
2/2' R. A 
Gý& - - - - - - 
i/3ý Fýt 
[ 1 
ý 1 4 
Gýd s 
- - - - - - - - 
- - - - 
g 
2/3' F-t 
t 
X3 15 2 
-- 1 21 21 3 3 
.. "is Gc uards - - - - - - - 
1/1' F. Ot 23 18 45 - - 
7JI. F: 
- 
- - - - - - - - - 
3/1' Fot 
- 
5 36 
- 34 19 5 
W I' Foot 17 7 7 22 41 
36 34 27 38 
- - -1 19 
= 8 14 
2' F 10 24 wt 
' 
7 
- 
27 
- - - - 1/3 Foot 
T 
- - - - - - - -9 1 20 
2/3' I'M 4 12 - - - - - - - 
- - 
1/4' F-t 
98 1 11 
- - - s 
- - - - 2 1-0 20 
2/4' Fwt 48 8 4 2 2 
_f2 
-1 1 27 2 
13 
1 /-S' F. t - - - - - - - 
1 
2/5ý Foot 
- 
- - - - - - - 91 1 18 
1/6ý Ft 2 27 
- - 
- - - - S, 12 5 
- 
21e Foot 1 6 20 
- 
" s 1 10 st 2 14 - - - - - - - - - 3 23 
- 
TFFO. t - - 
3 33 2 
-Lg 
-T-F-F --. 
t - - - - - - - - - 
- - 
7TF Foot 6 39 
5 41 
- - - - - - - - - 
- 
2te Foot _JL -L -L9 --L - - - 
- - - - - - - - 
1 
1/96 FM 
h - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 - - - - - - - 
- - - 
2/q Fýt 
I/Iyh Fýt 6 12 
2/ 1& Foot 
5 
- - - - - - - 
1/11' Fwt 1 4 23 
2/11' F-t r 
12' PM 
4 21 
36 
t 131h Fw t 20 1 - - - - - - 
' .w N' 4 8 
R 
11/14 Foot /14 
2114. F: 21 10F: t 
13/14. Fýj /1 I'M 
1 1 I ýwt 19 25 
8 18 
M 5' F-t 
e 42 Fwl l 
- , 
2 14 
Fm I P 
ý Foot IM 8 7 2 
' Fwt 2/18 
, Fm I) 
' 
1 3 
Fwt 20? 8 461 45 1 
' Foo( 1/21 
0 24 
' I'M 2112 1 
12 27 22nd Foot 
- Kil 2 17 2 2 1 -7/- - 2TTF ,1 1 2 4 wI 
' 
r r 
I 
Fool 2/23 I 
' . 1 6 - - Fm V24 1" 
- - - - - - 1 124 
' 3 Foot 2. t14 ", . 
2 
40 27 12 
/25" F 1 1 9 31 
42 19 38 
- 1 4s 41 14 
2/25' I'M 
ol 
6 37 46 37 17 
6 18 9 Fm Ic 
0' F-1 V2 
7ý F wt IJ2 
" F-1 1 2121 
7' F oot 312 
/28' F t 
2 41 1 2 44 
- - 1 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
- - 
' Fox 2/28 
ýlh 
12 34 
Fca 2 3 22 
I lie Fw - 
213(y' F t oo 
113 1* Fom 
2/3 1' Fmx 7 32 
R 
1/32' F(x-A 29 
2 22 
2/32ý I'm 
33' FM 8 L4 
1134" FM 
__ - - - 
2/34' I'M 2 17 81) 3 7 I I 
1/3 0 FM 
= 
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1907 1808 1 1810 
1811 181 1813 1814 
1815 
,2 ýG - w 
Corps 
2/3 5' F t ý11 0 6 oo 
77; 7 - 
. 94 2 
13 3 20 
1/ ý t 
t 2/3e F 
- 
1 
- 
4 
- 
20 
- - - - - - 
- -L 
2-1 3 19 
- oo 
1137* F t 7 32 - - - oo 
ý 
- - - 
- 237 Foot - - - - - - - - - 
6 - - - - - - - - 1138 Foot - - - - - - - - -S 1 20 
' 2/38 Foot 
- - - - - - - - - - 
- 3 18 
I I/Wh Foot , , 6 - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - I 
ý 
1 10 
- - - 
- - - - - - - - - 
- 
' - - - - - - 1/40 Foot 
- - - - - - 
' - - - - - - 2/40 Foot - - - - - - - - 3 11 
' 41 Foot 
1/42' Foot 2 Xý 9 7 
7 7 - - - - 
- I I 
2/42ý Foot 1 4 - - - - - - - - - 
'F 3 42 3 40 - - - - - - oot 1/43 
ý 44 2 7 27 
6 28 
- - - - - - - Foot 2/43 2 - - - - 
ý - - - - - 1/44 Foot 3 
2/44"' F ot 8 8 1 
- - 
o 
1/4ý5 
TFool 
2/45' F 
[ 
, 2 
- 
Ll 
- - - - - - 
- 
- 
" 3 
- 4 
_L - - - - - - - - oot 
' 
-- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
- 46 Foot 
- - - - - - - - - 
' ' - - - - - - - - - 1/4 1 F-I 
' 38 4 1 1 1 
- 
41 
- - 1 
- 
40 
- - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - 12/47 Foot 
1 1/49ý Foot .1 2 7 A3 
1 16 - - - - - - - 
2/48' Foot - - - - - - - - - - - 
- 
49' Foot 
' 
37 3 
T 
- - - - - - 3 
--L 
33 
1/50 Foot 
2/Sdh Foot 
W Foot 
xx I to '3 
' 
1 
'2 
26 
18 
27 
2 36 
,1 4 24 
1/52' Foot 
2ý52' Foot 
- - - - - 
I 
- , 
- 34 
h It, 
1/53' Foot Sl 6 1 is 
2151' Foot 
- - - - - - 
41 
SO Foot 18 1 
d i 
I to 8 L8 
ý' -L - _ 
- - - - - - 
E 
1/56 Foot 
' 
1 2S 
19 
2/S6 Foot S ', 6 1 1) 
' 1/50 Fool 
' - 
3 
- 
29 
- 1/57 Foot 
- - - - - - - 
/57'F 3 27 - - - - - 2 oot - - - - 
' - - - - 1158 Fo, m - - - - - - 
" 2/58 Fo, q 
T 
10' - - 115 Fom 
- - - - - - - - 
75ý; Fooi 
& 
1 
116 Foot 
2/60'Foot 
- - - - 2 
- 
0 
- 
1 
- - - 0 1 
e - - - - - - 1 1/6 FocA 
1 &F - 4M oot 
- - - - - - - - 
- - - - 
I 5/6(P Fo. 1 0 
o' w6 Fo, '4 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
- 
&F 7/6 oot 
1/61' Foot - - - - - - - 
4 
- - 
tt 
' ,, 6 S - - - Foot 2/61 . - - - - - - - - - .1 1 24 
'F I - oot 1/62 - - - - - - 
T' R 1 1 0 - - - .1 2 6 
1- P l 
- - - - - - - 1 
- 
41 
1/6 oo I II 
2J63' Foot - - - - . 
- 
1 
- - - - - - - - - - 
t)O Foot 
30 13 
1 
2/Wh FM)t - - - - - - - 
4S 41 
7' F 
I 
1/6 oot - 
2/67' Foot 
' 47 ýIL 42 - Foot 68 - 77 
/69' F t oo 1 - 
2/69' Foot - 
70`h Foot 
34 
1771. Foot 
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1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 
1811 1814 191S 
LO 
2171'I'm 
I r7T' Foot 151 24 IS 21 16 
151 22 1ý 21 20 
2172' FM 
I 
- - 
I I I I I 
1/73' Fmt 43 
1 30 24 1 46 2s 27 
1 
2M' FM 
I I 
- - 
I 
70 Foot to 16 
75* Fwt 
. 
76' Foot 4 
77' Foot 
I 
in8* FoL4 I II - 5 
1 1 1 1 1 
- - - - 
I I 
I - 
I'V' F-I 
in')' Fwl 
I 
-H 
6 
2rll? 'h FocA - - - - - - - - 
go' Fm 49 13 29 - - - - - - - - 
1/8 1' F(" 
- - - - I 10 
218 1' Fo(X 
37 2 
1/82' F. Clt 
- - - - - - - 1 17 3 18 
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1/91 -. 4 Fm 4 -': 16 
1 W, 16 6 6 13 - - - - 
Y) 1 -a I'm 
I I I 
I I 12 
1/'P- Fm 
- - I I I M9 17 
2/92" F. )( 
93' I'm 
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12 1 2h t, is 
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1/%' F-I I I 
I I 
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2196' Fm I I 
I I - 
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I I I 
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I I 
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I oo* F. X I I I I I I I I I- -- 
I 
- 
I 
101' Foot I I 
i I I 1 - 14 10 1 
- -- 
I I 
103" I'm 
t 
104' FoM 
I 
- - - 
" Wed 
lndý 
Rmg- 
r 
- 
H 
46 4 31 
Source: W027 Sample. 
All figures are the percentage of strength. Regiments with those with over 50% 
have the 
relevant figures coloured; those with over 70% of one nationality 
have the figure in 
bold. 
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Appgndix 1: Comparison of Soldiers Place of Birth 
and Place of Enlistment 
0 
P 
Total Enlistments 
overseas 
Cork 
Limerick 
Waterford 
Athlone 
Dublin 
Newry 
Enniskillen 
Belf" 
Invemess 
Aberdeen 
Glasgow 
Edinburgh 
Wells 
Southampt- 2 
London 
Maidstone 
Hercfbix 
Gloucesto 
Bedfor( 
Bury 
Shrewsbury 
Birmingham Jý ci* 
Nottiingham 
Manchester 
Izeds 
Cadisle 
Durharr 
-0 9 
41 0 :n th 
K A Z 
A M 
E 14 -0 U I 
m I 
. 0 
Z 
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Appgndix J: Classification of Occupations a , 
iven i 
Soldiers' enlistment details 
Labourers Low Artisans Medium artisans High artisans Retailers 
Boatman Apprentice Anchor smith Breeches maker Baker 
Bottler Blanket maker Basket maker Brewer Book binder 
Carrier Bricklayer Blacksmith Brogue maker Butcher 
Carter Brick maker Block maker Cabinet maker Clerk 
Coachman Button Burnisher Brassfounder Carver Gin stocker 
Coal Miner Button Maker Brazier Clockmaker Grocer 
Coger Carder Knife maker Cloth dresser Musician 
Collier Card maker Bridle cutter Clothier Plan maker 
Cook Comb maker Calico printer Cloth maker Scribe 
Firer Cordwainer Carpenter Coach painter Upholder 
Forgeman Cotton spinner Cassimere printer Cutler 
Furnaceman Felter Cloth glosser Dresser 
Gardener File smith Cloth maker Engraver 
Groom Firingman Coating glosser Farmer 
Husbandman Joiner Cooper Flaxdresser 
Jobber Leather Cutter Draper Framework knitter 
Labourer Leather grinder Dyer Fustian cutter 
Miner Nail maker Farrier Gilder 
Nailer Potter Founder Glass grinder 
Oilman Rope maker Plasterer Hatter 
Puddler Sawyer Glazier Hoiser 
Sailor Skinner Iron founder Husbandman 
Servant Slater Ironmonger Ivory turner 
Slate Getter Spinner Linen manufacturer Keysmith 
Tinner Stay maker Mason Lambskin dresser 
Stone cutter Miller Locksmith 
Tanner Moulder Lace maker 
Turner Painter Machine maker 
Weaver Painter & plumber Manufacturer 
Wire drawer Pipe maker Millwright 
Wool skinner Painter & glazier Papermaker 
Wool spinner Plasterer Patent snuff maker 
Plumber Pocketbook maker 
Plumber & glazier Reed maker 
Printer Shearman 
Saddler Silk weaver 
Shoemaker Steel toy maker 
Smith Stocking weaver 
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Labourers Low Artisans Medium artisans High artisans Retailers 
Stirrup maker U)ck maker 
Stone mason Tailor 
Stuff maker Watchmaker 
Tinplate worker Whitesmith 
Wheelwright Wool comber 
Wright Wool sorter 
Wool stapler 
Yeoman 
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